BearWorks
MSU Graduate Theses
Spring 1999

In Harm's Way: The Continued Relevance of the U.S. Navy's
Forward Presence Mission in the Post-Cold War World
Christopher B. Earls
Missouri State University

As with any intellectual project, the content and views expressed in this thesis may be
considered objectionable by some readers. However, this student-scholar’s work has been
judged to have academic value by the student’s thesis committee members trained in the
discipline. The content and views expressed in this thesis are those of the student-scholar and
are not endorsed by Missouri State University, its Graduate College, or its employees.

Follow this and additional works at: https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Earls, Christopher B., "In Harm's Way: The Continued Relevance of the U.S. Navy's Forward Presence
Mission in the Post-Cold War World" (1999). MSU Graduate Theses. 542.
https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/542

This article or document was made available through BearWorks, the institutional repository of Missouri State
University. The work contained in it may be protected by copyright and require permission of the copyright holder
for reuse or redistribution.
For more information, please contact BearWorks@library.missouristate.edu.

IN HARM'S WAY: THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE
U.S. NAVY'S FORWARD PRESENCE MISSION
IN THE POST-cOLD WAR WORLD

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate College of
Southwest Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in Defense and Strategic Studies

by

Christopher B. Earls
May 1999

1

UANE G. MEYER LIBRARY

IN HARM' S WAY : THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THt!.JT~EST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSIT'
i:;PPll\.fGl=IELD, MO 65804
U.S. NAVY'S FORWARD PRESENCE MISSION
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

LB

Department of Defense and Strategic Studies

{qou
0

51{,~

I C,/.

C1

I

lJ
I

Southwest Missouri State University, 14 May 1999
Master of Science
Christopher B. Earls
A B S T R A C T
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States Navy
has seen the fleet shrink from nearly 600 ships in 1988 to
320 ships in 1999, with a planned reduction to 305 ships by
2004. While the fleet has been reduced by nearly 50 percent
over the last decade, the deployment of U.S. naval forces
has continued at near-Cold War levels.
The result is a
mismatch between the national security requirements that
naval forces are called on to support, and the forces
available to meet those requirements.
Some have suggested
that the traditional forward presence mission of the NavyMarine Corps team is no longer relevant in the post-Cold War
environment. Others suggest that "virtual presence" through
space surveillance and global air power can replace the
physical presence of naval forces.
Still others have
advocated a return to an isolationist policy, forgoing
military presence altogether. Although U.S. naval forces
are no longer required to counter the threat of Soviet
aggression, possible peer or near-peer competitors, such as
Russia and China, combined with emerging regional powers,
require that the United States maintain forces in areas near
U.S. interests.
This thesis will examine the continued
importance of maintaining a strong naval presence in the
three principal areas of U.S. interest--the Mediterranean
Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia--and the inability
to meet U.S. national security requirements with proposed
alternatives to forward presence. Also covered will be new
systems and operational concepts of the Navy-Marine Corps
team, and their importance to the forward presence mission.
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Their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and by
that and that alone they gained their empire.
--Alcibiades

Without a respectable Navy--alas America!
--John Paul Jones

Navies are not all for war.
--Matthew Fontaine Maury

Navies do not dispense with fortifications or armies, but
when wisely handled they may save a country the strain
which comes when these have to be called into play.
--Alfred Thayer Mahan

The whole principle of naval fighting is to be free to
go anywhere with every damned thing the Navy owns.
--Admiral Sir John Fisher

Thank God for the U.S. Navy!
--Major General "Gee" Gerow, Commander, U.S. V Corps,
message to General Bradley,
evening of 06 June 1944

Any man who may be asked what he did to make his life
worthwhile can answer with a good deal of pride and
satisfaction: I served in the United States Navy.
--John F. Kennedy

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The United States Navy has long been the principal
guardian of American security beyond the nation's borders.
While the United States Army and Air Force play vital roles
in America's defense, the Navy has been protecting American
interests abroad since the earliest days of the Republic,
and is uniquely capable of fulfilling this vital role today.
From sending a squadron to the Mediterranean in 1801 to
deter the Barbary states from preying on U.S. commerce, to
escorting the tools of war across the Atlantic in World War
Two, to escorting Kuwaiti tankers in 1987, the Navy has
always been a global force, capable of projecting American
power into any area of the world accessible by sea.
For most of the post-World War Two era, the Navy was
focused, as were all branches of the U.S. military, on the
threat posed by the Soviet Union.

From 1947 until 1991, the

Soviet Union drove virtually every aspect of U.S. defense
planning.

The Red Banner Fleet formed the overriding

concern of the Navy, which would be tasked primarily with
keeping the sea lanes to Europe open in the event of a
Warsaw Pact-NATO war.

With the disintegration of the Soviet

Union, the United States has (happily) found itself without
1

a plausible challenger.

However, the importance of the

Navy's traditional forward presence mission has not declined
in the post-Cold War environment.

If anything, the

importance of naval forward presence has grown.
U.S. interests are global in scope.

Interests range

from vital, including such interests as access to energy and
the associated freedom of the seas, to very important, such
as protecting U.S. allies from significant external
aggression, to just important, including preventing or
terminating conflicts that do not threaten the United States
directly. 1

Almost all of America's interests have one

common feature, however: they are not to be found, nor can
they be protected, within the borders of the United States.
It follows naturally that threats to U.S. interests also are
global, as threats occur in proximity to interests.
Instead of a readily identifiable threat, such as was
posed by the Soviet Union, the nation and the Navy in the
post-Cold War world face uncertainty as to the origin of
threats to U.S. interests.

Accordingly, the United States

has adopted a security strategy focused on specific regions
in which U.S. interests are to be found.

The National

Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on regional security, most
1 The interests of the United States differ from author
to author or from committee to committee. The examples
listed here come from Robert Ellsworth et al., eds.,
America's National Interests, a report by the Commission on
America's National Interests, July 1996.
2

notably in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia.

The

strategy--Shape, Respond, Prepare Now--attempts to shape
events in order to maintain regional security, while

responding to crises when they occur. 2

It is in meeting

these two aims of the NMS--shaping and responding--that
forward-deployed U.S. naval forces, consisting of the Navy
and Marine Corps, are uniquely capable.
In order to protect global national interests, the
military forces of the United States must be global as well.
That is, they must be capable of deploying to and operating
from any location on Earth where American interests are
threatened.

It is in these criteria--global mobility, along

with global sustainability--that forward-deployed naval
forces render the greatest utility to defense planners.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the importance of the
forward presence mission of U.S. naval forces has not
diminished since the breakup of the Soviet Union--nor will
it.

As long as U.S. interests are located overseas, the

forward presence mission of the Navy-Marine Corps team will
remain an inherent feature of U.S. defense planning.3

2National Military strategy of the United states of
America 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1997) .
3 colin Gray, The Navy In the Post-Cold War World
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1994), 163. "Relative decline or not, it is the case that
the U.S. role as the essential leader for the undertaking of
international peace and security duties is as plain as it
3

The forward presence of U.S. naval forces serves to
protect global U.S. interests in both the near-term and the
long-term.

In the near-term, the presence of U.S. naval

forces serves to deter aggression, promote lawful behavior
on the seas, and provide a signal of U.S. preparedness to
protect interests.

Many nations around the world view U.S.

naval forces as a valuable and appreciated instrument of
regional security, embodying the concept of "benevolent
hegemony." In the long-term, the presence of U.S. naval
forces serves to strengthen ties with allies, at both the
military and diplomatic levels.

Annual exercises such as

COBRA GOLD (U.S.-Thailand) and RIMPAC (U.S.-Japan, South
Korea), as well as port visits by U.S. ships, serve both to
maintain military interoperability and to strengthen the
political ties between the United States and allies around
the world.
Why is naval forward presence superior to that of landbased forces, whether Army or Air Force? The attractiveness
of naval forward presence derives from the salient features
of naval forces in general, and of forward-deployed naval
forces in particular.

Naval forces are less obtrusive to

other nations that may desire U.S. presence, but have

ever was . . . . The detail of naval power, deployment, and
action varies dramatically from era to era; but the
structure of the strategic demand for effectiveness at and
from the sea does not alter from decade to decade, or even
from century to century."
4

political or religious reasons for avoiding large numbers of
U.S. servicemen on their territory.

The physical occupation

of Kuwait by Iraq was required to overcome Muslim-Christian
friction in Saudi Arabia's security thinking, for example. 4
Also, because naval forces operate in international
waters, they are free to come and go without the host nation
permission needed for land-based forces.

With the ability

to sustain themselves at sea for extended periods, naval
forces can be moved to a crisis area and maintained there,
free from basing or transit constraints, allowing U.S.
policy-makers time to attempt peaceful resolution.

Naval

forces are inherently quick to respond to crises, due to
proximity to problem areas and the speed with which normal
peacetime operations can transition to combat operations.
Because naval forces have a lower profile among the
populations of regional actors, the political impact of
their arrival or departure may be less than that of groundbased forces.

American troops or aircraft often are magnets

for local attention.

The Khobar Towers bombing is a tragic

example of the animosity sometimes caused by the presence of
U.S. troops on another nation's territory.

By virtue of

their location offshore, naval forces can avoid many of the
political problems of land forces, and can adjust their

4 The Future of U.S. Sea Power. U.S. Army War College
Report of the Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy, May
1993: 27.
5

level of visibility as dictated by the situation.

Naval

forces can take position close to the twelve-mile limit of
international waters, or remain over the horizon, "out of
sight but not out of mind." For this same reason, their
departure may be less traumatic to local nations than the
departure of land-based forces.
Additionally, two emerging features of the
international environment dictate the need for forces that
can be on-scene anywhere, and respond quickly to protect
U.S. interests.

The first feature is the increasing

incidence of emergency evacuations of U.S. or allied
civilians from areas of impending or occurring violence.
Known as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), this
mission demands the attributes possessed by the Marine
Corps: ability to deploy in close proximity to crisis areas,
mobility overland from the sea, forcible entry capability,
and organic firepower support if needed.
The second emerging feature is the growing emphasis on
ballistic missiles in world militaries, particularly the
militaries of potential adversaries.

Iran, Iraq, and North

Korea, the three nations mentioned in the National Security
Strategy (NSS) as potential sources of regional conflict,
have advanced ballistic missile capability. 5

If used to

5 william Clinton, A National Security strategy of
Enqaqement and Enlarqement 1995-1996 (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey's, 1995); The Proliferation Primer. Report by the
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and
6

attack regional port or airfield facilities, especially with
chemical or biological weapons, ballistic missiles could
prevent U.S. forces from deploying into a region in the
event of a major, short-warning crisis, such as the 1990
invasion of Kuwait.
By providing theater missile defense (TMD) capability,
forward-deployed naval forces would be positioned to defend
regional facilities, U.S. and allied forces, and regional
populations at the outset of a crisis, rather than having to
be flown into the region.

This TMD capability would be

independent of host nation access, since it would be based
at sea.

The two naval TMD programs currently underway,

Upper Tier and Lower Tier, are designed around the Aegis
radar system on existing Ticonderoga-class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

These Aegis ships are

constantly deployed around the world, as part of carrier
battle groups (CVBG), amphibious ready groups (ARG), or
surface action groups (SAG).

As such, they would allow

constant TMD coverage of critical regional facilities, with
the ability to increase the number of Aegis ships quickly in
times of crisis.
Finally, the inherent mobility of naval forces, which
are able to come and go as they please in international

Federal Services, January 1998.
7

waters, means that the deployment and re-deployment of naval
forces requires nothing more than the orders of the National
Command Authority (NCA).

No agreements are needed with host

nations prior to the deployment of naval forces, nor are
political or military negotiations required for their
removal.
When naval forces arrive on station, their organic
logistics and ability to replenish at sea provide long
endurance.

This mobility and sustainability allowed

Amphibious Squadron 4 (PhibRon Four) to maintain station off
the coast of Liberia from 2 June 1990 to 6 August 1990, at
which time the embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
conducted an emergency evacuation of over sixteen hundred
American, Spanish, Swiss, and German civilians from the U.S.
Embassy in Monrovia.6
For all of the reasons provided here, naval forward
presence is the preferred method of using military
capability to protect American global interests.

The

qualities of mobility, flexibility, sustainability,
independence from host permission to come and go, ability to
increase or decrease visibility as required, ability to
transition from peacetime operations to combat operations on
short notice, and ability to respond rapidly to crises make

6 Lt. Colonel T.W. Parker, "Operation Sharp Edge,"
Proceedinqs (May 1991): 102.
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forward-deployed naval forces one of the most important
features of U.S. defense planning.
As important as the naval forward presence mission is,
it is important to be clear about what it is not intended
for.

Naval forward presence is neither capable of

protecting every U.S. interest, nor resolving every crisis.
Preventing genocide in the former Yugoslavia, for example,
or preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction within a region are interests that naval forces
have little ability to influence.

Also, naval presence

forces are not meant to fight regional wars by themselves,
as they lack the sustained land power of the Army or the
sustained high sortie rates of Air Force land-based
aircraft. 7
Instead, forward presence forces serve a function
similar to the policeman walking a beat.

Keeping a watchful

eye on conditions in a region, maintaining law and order on
the seas, deterring aggression through physical presence,
re-assuring regional allies of U.S. interest in their

7 Land-based forces, whether Army or Air Force, are
required in Korea and Europe as much for political reasons
as military reasons. In Korea, the Eighth Army provides an
unambiguous signal of U.S. commitment to an important ally,
while U.S. Army forces in Europe serve to maintain the
United States' leadership position in NATO. See Bradford
Dismukes, National security strateqy and Forward Presence:
Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces (Alexandria,
VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), 4.
9

safety, responding quickly when U.S. or allied civilians are
in danger, maintaining the capability to head off many
crises before they erupt into war--these are the primary
functions of forward-deployed naval forces. 8
A second, and equally important, function of naval
forward presence is to enable the introduction of land and
air power into a region if deterrence fails, and the United
States must employ military force.

The Navy has the ability

to conduct strikes ashore, but cannot seize or hold
territory.

The Marines can seize discrete pieces of

territory, but lack the heavy equipment necessary to engage
in sustained heavy fighting.

Thus the Army must be

transported into the region if significant ground combat is
anticipated.

Likewise, Navy carrier air wings are limited

in their ability to generate sortie rates, resulting in
fewer missions per plane over time than land-based aircraft.
For a sustained air campaign, the Air Force is the service
of choice, and must be transported into the region.

8 Jan Breemer describes these short-of-major-war
activities as "The U.S. Navy and Marines' specialty." See
"Naval Strategy Is Dead," Proceedings (February 1994): 49;
Bradford Dismukes provides a similar commentary:" Presence-deploying and operating forces forward to influence, short
of war, what foreign governments think and do--plays a
crucial role in a national security strategy of 'engagement
and enlargement'." See Bradford Dismukes "The U.S. Military
Strategy Abroad," Strategic Review (Spring 1995): 49.
10

This comprises the second function of forward presence:
"holding the door open" for the deployment of land-based
combat power from the continental United States (CONUS) to a
region of crisis.

Although soldiers can be flown in from

CONUS, their heavy equipment and supplies must be delivered
by ship. 9

Before this can happen, the sea lines of

communication (SLOCs) must be rendered safe for the passage
of sea lift ships.

Air Force aircraft can fly in to

regional airfields, but must have air cover until they have
built up sufficient assets and logistics to protect
themselves.

Finally, in the future it will be necessary to

protect regional facilities from ballistic missile attack,
requiring TMD capability at the outset of a crisis.

Naval

forward presence satisfies the conditions needed for the
deployment of CONUS-based land and air power, and can do so
without the need for foreign permission or access.
If naval forces are to continue to meet the national
security requirements of the forward presence mission, the
force structure of the Navy and Marine Corps will require
careful assessment and adjustment.

While the size of the

Navy's fleet has nearly been halved since 1988, the tempo of
normal peacetime operations has hardly decreased at all,
9 During the build-up for Desert Storm, for example,
approximately 95 percent of all equipment and supplies were
delivered to the Gulf region by sea. See Greg Weaver and
David Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass

Destruction Undermine u.s. strategy for Projecting Military
Power (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1997.
11

while crisis interventions have increased over the last
decade.

The result is easy to predict: a heavy strain on

Navy and Marine Corps personnel and equipment, as
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO)
continue to produce wear and tear on servicemen and their
equipment.

Correcting this imbalance between mission

requirements and force structure represents one of the
greatest challenges facing the sea services.
Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps are at a
transition period in terms of modernizing their equipment.
The Marine Corps in particular suffers from rapidly
approaching obsolescence of many of its systems, such as the
CH-46E helicopters used for vertical insertion of MEU forces
and the AAV7 amphibious landing vehicle.

The Navy has begun

work on the next-generation surface combatant, as well as a
new class of amphibious ship, the LPD-17.

As mentioned

previously, two TMD programs are underway, with a projected
deployment of the more crucial Upper-Tier system slated for
2006.

Lower-Tier, which is a point defense system, will

begin a User Operational Evaluation System in 1999. 10
Finally, the Navy is in the beginning stages of
developing Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), an informationbased warfighting concept similar to the Army's Task Force
10 vision.

Presence. Power: A Proqram Guide to the

u.s.

Navy 1998 Edition (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy,
1998), 74.
12
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When combined with the current austere defense

budget, continuing uncertainty about the international
setting, and the need to replace aging systems, both the
Navy and Marine Corps clearly face challenges in maintaining
an appropriate force structure.
It should not be surprising that alternatives to
forward presence have been proposed as strategies for U.S.
national security.

For reasons of financial constraint,

inter-service rivalry, differing philosophies of
international relations, and other reasons, many different
proposals have been advanced in the past.

Three

alternatives will be addressed in this thesis.

The first is

a withdrawal of most U.S. forces to CONUS, with the ability
to deploy those forces overseas in a crisis.

The second

alternative is the use of long-range air power, embodied in
the B-2 bomber, combined with space-based surveillance to
monitor threats.

The third alternative is a return to a

1940-style isolationist policy, in which American forces
would be responsible for little more than the physical
integrity of the United States.12

llMark Hanna, "Task Force XXI: The Army's Digital
Experiment," Strategic Forum 119 (July 1997): 1-4; Vice
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Gartska. "Network-Centric
Warfare: Its Origin and Future," Proceedinqs (January 1998):
28.
12william Odom, "Transforming the Military," Foreign
Affairs (July/August 1997): 55; James Canan, "Airpower From
Home Base," Air Force Magazine (June 1994): 20; Patrick
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Each of the alternatives has champions that advocate
reducing or eliminating naval forward presence as a means of
protecting American interests.

Especially among Air Force

proponents, the alternative of global air power combined
with space surveillance has great currency.

However, it is

the position of this thesis that none of the alternatives
satisfy the requirements of protecting global interests,
while simultaneously shaping the security environment in the
manner that naval forward presence does.
This thesis will examine the continued relevance of the
Navy-Marine Corps team's forward presence mission in the
post-Cold War world.

Chapter II will examine and classify

the interests of the United States as the twenty-first
century approaches.

It is not the purpose of Chapter II to

debate and develop a comprehensive list of U.S. interests,
but rather to provide a broad description of U.S. interests,
from which will be drawn the specific interests supported by
naval forward presence.

Special emphasis will be given to

the three "hubs" of major significance to the United States:
the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and
Northeast Asia.13

Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," .T.h.e.
National Interest (Spring 1990): 77.
13 Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward

Presence: Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces,
26. "The presence of U.S. forces forward in East Asia,
Europe, and the Gulf--and not elsewhere--is a reflection of
14

After presenting the national interests supported by
naval forward presence, this chapter will examine existing
and possible future threats to the security of those
interests.

Again, the primary focus will be on the

Mediterranean, the Gulf, and Northeast Asia.
Chapter III will examine the nature of the forward
presence mission.

Specific force postures and/or

operational plans are not intended.

Rather, the advantages

provided by constant naval presence in areas of interest
will be described.

The enabling function of naval power,

which makes possible all military strategies outside CONUS,
will be examined, as will the visual signal provided to
friends and foes alike of U.S. interest in the region.

The

concept of conventional deterrence, and the age-old practice
of naval ("gunboat") diplomacy will be covered, with
emphasis on the flexibility and scalability of naval forces.
Crisis response is one of the most important tasks of
forward-deployed forces, and accordingly will receive indepth treatment.

Finally, the ability to re-assure allies

the primacy of these regions in the national strategy
today." Jerome Kahan and Jeffrey Sands, Alternative Naval

Deployment concepts: Demand for Deployed Naval Forces 1992(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1991), 1-2.
"In the mid-1990s, despite the fact that the Soviet threat
has largely receded, the traditional crucial deployment
areas or "hubs" where U.S. interests will lie remain
essentially where they have been for decades--the
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and the
Northern Pacific."
~
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of our intention to support them, the opportunities provided
for training with allies, and the familiarization of U.S.
forces with the theater will conclude Chapter III.
Chapter IV will examine the various issues of force
structure and systems, from which capabilities derive.
Included will be the new littoral focus in Navy-Marine Corps
thinking, concepts for new surface combatants, the possible
future (or lack of a future) of aircraft carriers, the new
LHD-1 and LPD-17 amphibious ships, emerging mine
countermeasures ships and capabilities (MCM), and emerging
naval surface fire support (NSFS) programs, which are
increasingly important in the new littoral focus.

Theater

missile defenses are perhaps the most important conventional
system in the Navy's immediate future.

Lower Tier, a

relatively short-range endo-atmospheric point defense
system, and Upper Tier, a long-range exo-atmospheric system,
will be addressed.

Completing Chapter IV will be coverage

of Network-Centric Warfare.
Chapter V will examine in turn the alternatives to
naval forward presence.

A CONUS-based military, with

deployments only in times of crisis, is the first such
alternative.

Global air power combined with space

surveillance--Billy Mitchell rides again--is the second
alternative, and will receive somewhat more emphasis due to
the wealth of literature extolling its virtues.

16

The option

of withdrawing from the events of the world, and adopting a
policy of isolationism, will conclude Chapter V.
Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the information
presented in the body of the thesis, with observations on
the Navy-Marine Corps team and the forward presence mission
in the twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER II
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THREATS

This chapter will address U.S. national interests, and
threats to those interests.

After examining the broad range

of U.S. interests, the individual interests that can be
protected with naval forward presence will be described,
including interests specific to the Mediterranean, the
Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and Northeast Asia.
Finally, existing and projected threats to American
interests will be presented.
U.S. National Interests
U.S. defense policy derives from national interests,
and the need to protect U.S. interests.

After interests are

identified and ranked, the kinds of protection required can
be determined.

Finally, from a determination that military

capabilities are required to protect an interest, the
specific military capabilities and missions needed can be
established.

The forward presence mission is no different

in this regard than any other mission of the armed forces.
The national security requirement for forward presence
arises from the need to maintain military force in proximity
to far-flung U.S. interests.
18

The process of identifying and ranking U.S. interests
is subject to different perspectives on the U.S. role in the
world, differing theories of international relations,
personal preference, political preference, and a variety of
other factors.

In reading several different works on U.S.

national interests, the nature and order of interests likely
will differ from one work to the next, as different authors
place different value on interests.

Accordingly, the

national interests set forth in the following pages
represent a combination of several different works, as well
as this author's judgment.14
When considering national interests, it is natural that
interests should occupy differing positions of importance.
In this thesis, U.S. interests will be categorized as Vital,

Very Important, and Just Important.

Vital interests

represent interests that are fundamental to the safety and
prosperity of the nation, and for which the United States
should be willing to go to war if threatened.

Very

Important interests are not fundamental to the safety and
prosperity of the nation, but do have a significant impact

1 4 The specific sources used to produce the national
interests set forth in this thesis are: Ellsworth et al.,
America's National Interests; Kim Holmes and Thomas Moore,
eds., Restoring American Leadership: A
Foreign and
Defense Policy Blueprint (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, 1996); William S. Cohen, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense, 1997).
19

u.s.

on American safety and prosperity.

While military force may

not be the preferred method of dealing with threats to Very
Important interests, nonetheless the nation may decide that
these interests are worth fighting for.

Finally, Just

Important interests are interests that have a noticeable
impact on American safety or prosperity, but often are not
worth resorting to military force to protect.

The result of

threats to Just Important interests may be inconvenient for
American prosperity, or may impinge on American moral
sensibilities, but likely will not affect U.S. safety or
prosperity in any lasting way.

The decision on how to

resolve threats to Just Important interests will depend on
the specific circumstances of the situation, but often will
not involve the use of military force.
The Vital Interests of the United States include:
•

Maintaining the physical safety of American territory.

•

Protecting the lives and safety of U.S. citizens.

•

Maintaining freedom of the seas.

•

Preventing the emergence of a hostile peer or near-peer
competitor in Europe or Asia.

•

Maintaining access to resources.

•

Preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in the
Persian Gulf or in Asia.

•

Preserving the safety and security of strategically
important allies.
20

These Vital interests are presented only in a general
order of priority, except for the first two interests, which
must take priority over all others.

Freedom of the seas

likewise must come third, but the remaining Vital interests
are sufficiently interrelated that ordering them is not
necessary.
The Very Important Interests of the United States
include:
•

Deterring regional conflict in the Persian Gulf.

•

Deterring regional conflict in Northeast Asia.

•

Deterring regional conflict in Europe.

•

Maintaining the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

•

Maintaining the U.S.-South Korea security relationship.

•

Maintaining U.S. access to and use of space. 15

•

Promoting international adherence to law and order.

15 rt is worth noting, although beyond the scope of this
thesis, that access to space may soon be elevated to a Vital
interest. Indeed, among military planners of all services,
the level of dependence on space assets for surveillance,
communications, early warning, and positional information is
so high that many likely would place access to space in the
list of Vital interests today, let alone in the future. See
George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power.
Technoloqy. and American Dominance in the 21st Century (New
York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996); Gray, The Navy in the
Post-Cold War World; Daniel Goure and Christopher Szara,
eds., Air and Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997);
Cohen, Report of the ouadrennial Defense Review, section 3;
Commander Randy Bowdish and Commander Bruce Woodyard, "Space
Is An Ocean," unpublished U.S. Navy briefing produced by
OPNAV N513, Strategy and Concepts Branch, 1998.
21

•

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and
chemical {NBC) weapons.

•

Stopping or reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the
United States.

The Very Important interests also are presented without
regard to relative order, as no one interest can easily be
judged more important than another.

However, deterring

regional conflict strongly suggests itself as an interest

primus inter pares.
Finally, the Just Important Interests of the United
States include:
•

Promoting democracy abroad, especially among U.S. allies.

•

Preventing or stopping conflict in regions of lesser
importance.

•

Undertaking humanitarian relief operations.

•

Promoting and following sound environmental policies.

Just Important interests are more likely than Vital or
Very Important interests to be removed from considerations
of employing military force.

Sound environmental policy,

for example, is very unlikely as a cause of U.S. military
involvement. 16

Nonetheless, the interests listed are valid

security concerns, albeit only Just Important.
16 But not to be ruled out completely. For example,
22

As mentioned in Chapter I, naval forward presence
forces are not intended to protect every U.S. national
interest.

For example, maintaining the physical safety of

American territory is the mission of all of the armed
forces, and cannot be apportioned to naval forces alone.
While naval forward presence supports maintaining the
physical safety of the United States, this interest is too
broad to be assigned to a single military mission.
Similarly, stopping or reducing the flow of illegal drugs
into the United States, while primarily a naval mission, is
not a naval forward presence mission.
Which of the national interests advanced in this
chapter are protected by naval forward presence?

While

other interests may gain some form of protection or indirect
benefit from naval forward presence, the interests that
naval forward presence is tailored for are: freedom of the
seas, maintaining access to resources, preserving the safety

wholesale destruction of the Amazon rain forests with the
approval of the local governments is a possible future cause
to resort to military force. Another might be actions that
degrade or destroy U.S. fishing grounds, a possibility
demonstrated in 1998 by the 900-mile pursuit and forced
boarding of a Chinese fishing boat, caught using illegal
drift nets by the U.S. Coast Guard. Another possibility is
actions that lead directly to unacceptable air pollution or
acid rain affecting the United States. The recent forest
fires in Indonesia and Florida are suggestive of the impact
such air pollution can have on a society, necessitating the
inclusion of environmental safety as a security interest of
the United States. See James Thach III, "Prepared for Any
Eventuality at Sea," Sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999):
23.
23

and security of strategically important allies, and
deterring regional conflict, especially in the Persian Gulf,
the Mediterranean, and in Northeast Asia.

Freedom of the seas
From the earliest days of the United States, use of the
sea has been crucial to American prosperity and security.
It is not by chance or whim that the Constitution of the
United States directs the Congress to "provide and maintain
a Navy."17

The United States has always been a maritime

trading nation.

Even before the colonies declared their

independence from Great Britain, sea-borne commerce formed
the foundation of American life, and the Royal Navy served
to protect trade upon the Atlantic ocean.
The unalterable facts of geography compel the United
States to look to the sea for trade with any nations other
than Canada and Mexico.
remains true in 1999.

This was true in 1799, and it
The ability to transport goods across

the sea, in safety from capture or damage from hostile
parties, has been the principal mission of the Navy since
its birth:
The interests of this nation demand free and
unfettered use of the seas and its [.s..i.c.] resources
subject to the rule of law. The ultimate purpose of
the Navy is to gain, protect, or permit that use, and

17 constitution
I, Section 8.

of the United states of America, Article
24

the roles and missions go about achieving that
purpose. 18
Free and unfettered use of the seas remains as
important today as at any time in the past.

The great

majority of American trade comes from imports or exports
between the United States and overseas countries.

Of the

top fifteen destination countries for U.S. exports, thirteen
lie across the Atlantic or Pacific oceans.

Together these

thirteen countries account for 266 billion dollars' worth of
goods, representing 45.5 percent of all U.S. exports.

The

same is true of imports to the United States, which amount
to 387 billion dollars' worth of goods and 52.1 percent of
all imports.19
Although trans-oceanic aircraft have made possible air
delivery of goods, the cost of air transport makes this
delivery method suitable only for high-value, time-sensitive
products.

95 percent of all U.S. foreign trade in terms of

tonnage travels by sea, representing 51 percent of foreign
trade by value. 20

Until and unless the laws of gravity and

aerodynamics undergo dramatic change, U.S. commerce will
continue to be overwhelmingly maritime in nature.

the

Ensuring

18 Harlan Ullman, In Harm's Way: American Seapower and
21st Century (Silver Springs, MD: Bartley Press, 1991),

135.
19Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 112113. See Appendix A, Tables 1 and 2 for a complete list of
the top 15 importers and receivers of exports.
20 rbid., 20.
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freedom of the seas through forward presence thus is of
tremendous importance to U.S. markets.
In addition to U.S. commerce, the Navy has undertaken
the protection of essentially all sea-borne trade since
1945.

Both through presence on and near the trade routes,

and through a system of maritime and military alliances,
U.S. naval protection of commercial shipping has helped to
develop a global trade network.

Linked globally to other

nations by trade, with the gray hulls of American ships
protecting their goods, both Western and Asian nations have
developed closer and more peaceful ties through commercial
interaction.

North America, Western Europe, and East Asia

today account for 75 percent of the world's gross product,
and 80 percent of all international trade moves by sea, a
situation made possible by the U.S. Navy's focus on freedom
of the seas. 21
The Earth's geography provides several locations that
serve to constrict movement by sea.
features, while others are man-made.

Some are natural
Freedom of passage

through these chokepoints is of critical importance for
merchant and military shipping.

The five major chokepoints

for maritime movement are the Strait of Gibraltar, the
Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Panama Canal,

21 Lt. Col. Thomas c. Linn, "Naval Forces in the PostCold War Era," Strategic Review (Fall 1992), 19.
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and the Suez Canal.22

Of these, three--Hormuz, Malacca, and

the Suez Canal--have strategic importance for the United
States coupled with proximate and plausible threats of
closure or interference.
The Strait of Hormuz holds perhaps the greatest
strategic significance to the United States of any body of
water, large or small.

Through this long, narrow channel

passes 43 percent of the world's oil supply.23

The Strait

is bordered on the north by Iran for all of its
approximately one hundred-mile length, and shrinks to just
thirty-three miles at its narrowest point.

Iran also has

possession of several islands in the Strait proper.2 4
Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Sirri
Island provide Iran ideal interdiction positions among the
shipping lanes, and all have been fortified with bunkers,
anti-aircraft batteries, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and
launching facilities for anti-ship missiles.

The main

22 while these obviously are not all of the world's
chokepoints, the five listed in this thesis represent
chokepoints at or near the middle of major trade routes,
involving time and cost penalties upon closure. The English
Channel is perhaps the busiest confined seaway in the world,
but is at the end of the major trans-Atlantic routes,
allowing quicker and easier diversion to alternate European
or English ports if the Channel were closed.
23 The Strait of Hormuz: Global Shipping and Trade
Implications in the Event of Closure. Report by the Office
of Naval Intelligence, 1997, 11.
24see Appendix A, Figure 1.
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shipping channel through the Strait passes sufficiently
close to these islands that even 155mm artillery would have
enough range to be effective, and such "unconventional"
weapons have indeed been deployed to Abu Musa.2 5

Not

surprisingly, the Strait of Hormuz has been the scene of
recent conflict between U.S. Navy ships enforcing freedom of
the seas, and Iranian forces attempting to restrict
passage. 26
The Strait of Malacca is the second-busiest seaway in
the world, trailing only the English Channel in annual
transits.

In 1993 over one-half of the world's merchant

capacity, consisting of one-third of the world's merchant
ships, passed through this very confined passage. 27

Malacca

sits in the middle of the shipping route from the Middle
East to East Asia, and sees particularly heavy shipment of

25 For a detailed depiction of the fortifications and
emplacements on Abu Musa, including a schematic diagram and
aerial photographs, see Harold Hough, "Iranian Intentions:
The Strait of Hormuz or Beyond?" Jane's Intelligence Review
(October 1995): 454.
26 see Dexter Smith, "GCC Regional Security," marketing
supplement in Defense News, 3-9 March 1997, 6; Anthony
Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War,
vol. 2,The Iran-Iraq War (San Francisco: Westview Press,
1990), 281; Admiral (Ret.) Wesley McDonald, "The Convoy
Mission," Proceedings Naval Review (May 1988), 36; Ronald
O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," Proceedings Naval Review (May
1988), 30.
27 John Noer, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in
Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996.
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crude oil to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 28
The importance of the sea lines of communication passing
through the Strait of Malacca and surrounding waters was
demonstrated in 1995 by then-Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, who warned China and the Philippines that
interruption of merchant shipping arising from a quarrel
over the Spratley Islands would not be tolerated. 29
The Suez Canal is a man-made chokepoint, connecting the
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, thus providing an
important shortcut between the Middle East and Europe.
Although no longer a major trade route for Persian Gulf oil,
the Suez Canal does carry a high proportion of timesensitive bulk cargoes destined for Europe. 30
The Suez Canal retains strategic importance to the
United States for the movement of Atlantic Fleet naval
forces from their East Coast ports to the Persian Gulf, a
trip shortened by about three thousand nautical miles (or

28see Appendix A, Figure 2.
29 Noer, Chokepoints, 1.
3 °For example, chemicals and machinery parts commonly

transit the Suez Canal, due primarily to new "just-in-time"
business logistics. Also, the emergence of very large crude
carriers (VLCC) has seen much of Middle East oil shipments
diverted around the Cape of Good Hope due to draft
restrictions in the Canal. See The Suez Canal/ SUMED
Complex; Global Shipping and Trade Implications in the Event
of Closure. Report by the Office of Naval Intelligence,
1997, ix, 7-8.
29

about six days' steaming time at twenty knots) compared to
the route around Africa.31

In 1974 the United States agreed

to support both the financial and manpower costs of clearing
the Suez Canal of mines, removing ten sunken blockships, and
removing unexploded ordnance left from the 1973 Yorn Kippur
War.

The operation lasted from April through December 1974,

with a small U.S. contingent remaining in the area until the
formal re-opening on 5 June 1975.32
Maintaining freedom of the seas through these
chokepoints, which are important for both commercial and
military movement, is a difficult task given the location of
potentially hostile forces directly astride the waterways.
Nonetheless, the ships of the U.S. Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Fleets can be found preserving the right of free passage
every day of the year.

Access to Resources
As a major industrialized nation, the United States has
massive resource requirements.

Most of America's

industrialized trading partners have similar if smaller

31 John Collins, Military Geoqraphy for Professionals
and the Public (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1998), 240.
Also, naval forces already deployed in the Mediterranean
would see their normal 11-day transit time to the Persian
Gulf increased to 26 days if forced to sail around Africa.
The Suez canal I SUMED complex, 4.
32 captain J. Huntly Boyd, "Nimrod Spar: Clearing the
Suez Canal," Proceedinqs (February 1976): 18.
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requirements.

Also, the emerging economies of East and

South Asia have rapidly growing resource demands.

Since the

U.S. economy is affected by the economic status of our
global trading partners, ensuring access to resources is
important not just for the United States, but for much of
the world.
Among the resources needed for major industrial
economies, oil is the primary requirement.

Other resources,

such as iron, chromium, and coal, are important to
maintaining industrial nations' production, but oil holds
unique status as a strategic resource.33

The

Quadrennial

Defense Review acknowledges the lasting importance of
petroleum to the United States: "Access to oil will remain a
U.S. national interest for the foreseeable future."34
American interest in maintaining access to oil is wellestablished.

The United States is the world's leading

consumer and importer of oil, rendering America vulnerable
to interruptions in oil supply.

In the past, American

economic recessions have followed closely behind increases
in oil prices, most notably in 1974, 1980, 1981-82, and
1990-91. 35

Immediately following Iraq's 1990 invasion of

33 strait of Hormuz, ii: "Oil stands alone among the
primary commodities in its ability to cause disruptive and
costly economic consequences."
34 cohen,

Quadrennial Defense Review, Section 2, page 1.

35 Holmes and Moore,

Restorinq American Leadership, 22.
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Kuwait, the cost of oil jumped from nineteen dollars per
barrel to forty-two dollars per barrel, eventually costing
the United States nearly 200 billion dollars in lost
productivity over the next year.

Worldwide economic losses

over the same year are estimated at over one trillion
dollars. 36
The Persian Gulf is the principal location of
recoverable oil, with more than two-thirds of known oil
reserves and 43 percent of world oil production concentrated
in the Gulf area. 3 7

Additionally, over 90 percent of the

world's spare production capacity resides in the Gulf, as
most non-Gulf oil producers operate at or near 100 percent
capacity today.

With projected increases in oil demand

among Asian nations, and with other oil-producing regions
unable to increase production to satisfy demand, Persian
Gulf oil is predicted to provide 64 percent of world oil
supply by 2010, representing 81 percent of the growth in oil
consumption over the next decade.3 8

The 1973 Arab oil embargo drove oil from $2.50 per barrel to
over $10 per barrel, while the 1979 Iranian revolution
resulted in a jump from $13 per barrel to $34 per barrel.
36Maj. Gen. Edward Hanlon Jr., "Naval Expeditionary
Warfare: Opening the Door," Surface Warfare (July/August
1997), 7.
37 strait

of Hormuz, 11, 61.

38 rbid., 65, 27.
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One-half of Persian Gulf production goes toward Asian
oil demands, representing 83 percent of all Asian oil
imports, while one-quarter of Persian Gulf oil goes toward
European oil demands, representing 42 percent of all
European oil imports.39

With such high dependence on

Persian Gulf oil among world economic powers, closure or
restriction of the Strait of Hormuz would be economically
devastating:
Any prolonged oil supply disruption caused by the
closure of the Strait of Hormuz will have global
economic consequences and cause severe disruption to
the growing economies of East Asia as oil in the
distribution system is exhausted. Except for Japan,
they maintain no strategic security stockpile to
guard against supply disruptions.4D
Clearly the Gulf will continue to hold strategic
importance to the United States in the future.

While

Caspian Sea oil appears to offer a possible new major supply
of petroleum, the proven reserves of easily-extracted, highquality oil in the Persian Gulf will keep it foremost in
importance, as indicated in Strateqic Assessment 1997: "The
Persian Gulf will retain its preeminent status as the major
source of excess oil capacity. 11 41

President Jimmy Carter

39 rbid., iii.
40 rbid., 24.

41 Hans Bennendjik and Patrick Clawson, eds., Strateqic
Assessment 1997 (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997), 88.
33

made clear the United States' interest in the Gulf in his
State of the Union speech on 23 January 1980:
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States
of America and such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military force. 42
Emphasizing the continued importance of access to the
Gulf's resources in U.S. strategic planning was the 1 July
1995 recommissioning of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, stationed at
Bahrain.43
In addition to oil, the U.S. defense industry is
dependent on chromium, cobalt, and manganese, metals that
are used in the production of high-quality alloys needed for
military jet aircraft components.

Although the United

States is the leading consumer of these metals, none are
produced by American mines.

Instead, imports from South

Africa, Zaire, and Zambia supply most U.S. demand for these
metals. 44

Transported to the United States by ship, these

strategic resources are available to the U.S. defense
industry by virtue of freedom of the seas.

42 cited in First Lt. Philip Wasielewski, "Sea Power and
Counterinsurgency," Proceedings (December 1986): 63.
43 vice Admiral John Scott Redd, "Fifth Fleet,
Arriving," Proceedings (July 1997): 48.
44 Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 22.
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Safety of

u.s.

Allies

One of the central concepts of U.S. security policy is
to promote and protect the safety of U.S. allies, whether
treaty allies such as the NATO nations, or informal allies
such as Israel and Taiwan.

In the past such protection has

included the active defense of South Korea in 1950,
assistance to Israel in 1973, escorting Kuwaiti tankers and
policing the Strait of Hormuz in 1987, restoration of
Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991, and support for Taiwan in 1996.
Absent a clear military threat to the United States itself,
threats to allies are a major focus of U.S. thinking:
The foremost regional danger to U.S. security is the
continuing threat that hostile states with
significant military power pose to allies and friends
in key regions. Between now and 2015, it is
reasonable to assume that more than one such aspiring
regional power will have the motivation and the means
to challenge U.S. interests militarily.45
Key allies requiring U.S. military support today
include Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation
Council

(GCC) members.46

Not surprisingly, the United

States maintains military forces in or near each of these
nations.

45 william Cohen, Secretary of Defense Annual Report to
the President and the Conqress 1998 (Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense, 1998), 2.
46 Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997,
57-68, 83-96, 97-106, 107-116.
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The U.S.-Japan security alliance is judged by U.S.
military leaders as, "the linchpin of our security strategy
in Asia." 47

The disappearance of the Soviet threat to Japan

has been replaced by China's emergence as a potential Asian
power, making the continued defense commitment to Japan
necessary. 4 8

Japan also is a top trading partner of the

United states, trailing only Canada in annual import and
export value.49
In South Korea, the threat of North Korean aggression
has kept American forces present since 1950.

North Korea's

large Army, well-developed ballistic missile capability, and
NBC weapons make the North Korean-South Korean border one of
the most likely sites of future armed conflict.

In addition

to the United States' long-standing political commitment to
South Korea's safety, the South's growing economic strength
and movement toward the principles of democratic government
make defending South Korea a lasting U.S. interest. 50

47 The United States Security Strateqy for the East
Asia-Pacific Region 1998. Report by the Department of
Defense, last updated 25 November 1998. Downloaded from
Defenselink at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/.
48 Peter Rodman, America Adrift (Washington, D.C.: Nixon
Center for Peace and Freedom, 1996), 30.
49 Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 111112; Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 66.
50 Ibid., 104.
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In the Persian Gulf, the members of the GCC all require
U.S. assistance, as their populations are too small to
support large standing armies. 51

Even with the advanced

modern arms purchased by the GCC states from Western nations
over the last two decades, the threat posed by Iran and Iraq
mandates that U.S. military forces be present to protect
these allies.
Israel occupies a unique position among U.S. allies.
Although Israel provides little of the market value common
to most other U.S. allies, and has shown itself more than
capable of self-defense in the past, nonetheless Israeli
security has remained a focus of U.S. foreign policy for
decades.

The United States' historical willingness to

defend democratic states from aggression, combined with a
powerful Jewish-American lobby, have kept Israel a close
ally for over thirty years. 52

President Richard Nixon did

not shy away from a possible U.S.-Soviet confrontation
during the 1973 Yorn Kippur War, when elements of the Sixth
Fleet were ordered to take positions from which they could

51 see Appendix A, Table 3 for a breakdown of the
different Persian Gulf force levels.
5 2see Charles Dittmer, "The United States and the State
of Israel: A Critical Examination of U.S.-Israeli Relations
Since 1981," master's thesis, Southwest Missouri State
University, 1995.
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block Soviet sea lift to Egypt, underscoring the importance
placed on Israeli safety in U.S. foreign policy. 53
In both South Korea and the GCC states of Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, the immediate threat posed by large, armor-heavy
forces on these nations' borders requires the permanent
presence of U.S. land forces, both to send the strongest
possible signal of U.S. commitment and to back up that
commitment with capability.54

These nations provide

excellent examples of the need for land-based forces in some
cases, underscoring the point that naval forces cannot meet
every U.S. security concern. In South Korea and Kuwait,
clearly only heavy land forces will do to protect U.S.
interests.

In each instance the tension caused by a large

U.S. presence on the ground is outweighed by military
necessity.

However, the land forces in Korea and the Gulf

are intended to confront a single threat in a specific
location, and cannot easily or rapidly be re-deployed to
react to other crises.

53captain Kevin Jordan, "Naval Diplomacy in the Persian
Gulf," Proceedings (November 1981): 29.
54 Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997,
84, 88, 100. "The GCC states on their own are no match for
either of their two powerful neighbors [Iran and Iraq]. Only
a sustained U.S. military presence in the Gulf can redress
the inherent military asymmetry . . . Iraq still possesses a
land force that is larger than and qualitatively superior to
all the GCC states combined and Iran . . . The large, heavilyarmed, and forward-deployed military forces of North Korea
continue to pose a serious threat to South Korea and to U.S.
forces stationed there."
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The presence of U.S. naval forces also serves to
express U.S. commitment to the safety of key allies.

The

fact that naval forces are routinely deployed to key areas,
and therefore either present or close at hand if a crisis
emerges, highlights one of the key roles of forward-deployed
U.S. military forces: backing up U.S. diplomacy with
capability. 5 5

When compared to land-based forces, naval

forward presence offers the additional advantage of mobility
and flexibility in supporting allies, as naval forces can
move rapidly in response to crises.

Naval forces,

particularly carrier aircraft, would be especially vital in
any military support to Israel due to access questions for
land-based aircraft.56

Deterrinq Reqional conflict
Possibly the most important reason for maintaining the
forward presence mission in the absence of the Soviet threat
is the need to maintain stability in regions where U.S.

55 Dismukes, National Security Strateqy and Forward
Presence, 39. "Words about forces are important, but they
are a poor substitute for the forces themselves."
56Former CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt: "In three of the
four crises during my watch--Jordan, September 1970; IndiaPakistan, December 1971; Yorn Kippur War, October 1973--the
U.S. Air Force was totally incapable of playing a role due
to lack of access to airfields, and only carrier aviation
could be brought to bear." See On Watch (New York:
Quadrangle, 1976), 70.
39

interests are located. 57

Uncertainty about the origin of

threats to U.S. interests is one of the defining features of
the post-Cold War environment.58

In order to deter regional

actors from aggressive moves that could threaten U.S.
interests, U.S. military forces must be present and
vigilant.
Maintaining stability in key areas is important for
several reasons.

International trade can only continue when

stability exists within a region, allowing the safe
transport of goods.

Conflict in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or

the Mediterranean would impact on global trade, and would
ripple through the U.S. economy even if U.S. forces were not
involved.
Asia currently is experiencing dramatic economic
growth.

Asia holds 40 percent of the world's purchasing

power today, and it is predicted that Asia will contain four
of the five largest economies in the world by 2020.59

As

57 Jacquelyn Davis,

Aircraft Carriers and the Role of
Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1991), 20.
58 Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving,",51:
"There always
seems to be at least one additional crisis either in
progress or simmering. These 'hot buttons' vary in intensity
and location."

Naval Forward
Presence: Present status, Future Prospects (Washington,
59Daniel Goure and Dewey Mauldin,

D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1997),
6.
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described previously, the Persian Gulf will remain a crucial
location for the production and distribution of oil.
Maintaining adherence to law and order, and avoiding
conflict in these regions through deterrence, clearly is in
the United States' best interest. 60

President Bush first

recognized trade as a U.S. national security objective in
1990, and regional stability is the key to economic
intercourse. 6 1
When it comes to maintaining stability in the key
regions of the world, U.S. capability is indispensable.
Many nations can upset the status quo in key regions; only
the United States can maintain it.

The primary reason for

the United States' preeminent role in maintaining regional
peace and security is the perception among other nations
that the United States is a "fair broker", one that can be
trusted to intervene fairly and evenly in confrontations. 62

6 0Hans Binnendjik makes the obvious but important point
that deterring wars is preferable to fighting them: "Three
times between 1914 and 1950, neutrality or disengagement led
America to major conflict. It is better to deter two major
regional conflicts than to fight them." See "The Case for
Forward Deployment," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995), 7.
61 National security strateqy of the United states 1990,
cited in Bradford Dismukes and Commander Bradd Hayes, "The
Med Remains Vital," Proceedings (October 1991): 46.
62 Goure and Mauldin,
Prospects, 48.
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A 1993 survey of U.S. embassy personnel in
Mediterranean countries confirmed this position.

Each

embassy's team indicated that their host nation viewed U.S.
presence as a desirable feature in the Mediterranean, one
that served to deter conflict. 6 3
Pacific.

The same holds true in the

Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore,

echoes the Mediterranean opinion:
We have to accept the reality that there is no
combination of forces in ASEAN that could stand up to
a military confrontation with China. Unless there is
an outside force, such as America, there can be no
balance in the region.64
As long as U.S. interests reside in regions far from
U.S. territory, preventing conflict in those regions will
remain a U.S. interest.
Specific Interests in the Mediterranean Sea

The Mediterranean Sea is one of the three major
strategic hubs that this thesis addresses. 65

The U.S. Sixth

Fleet has responsibility for the Mediterranean, and has been
present in these waters since 1946.

63 Dismukes,

Presence, 37.

National Security Strategy and Forward

64 Goure and Mauldin,
Prospects, 49.

Naval Forward Presence: Status,

65 The Caribbean often is cited as another strategic
hub, but its proximity to CONUS, lack of significant
military threats, and accessibility to land-based air power
make naval forward presence less important than in the
Mediterranean, the Gulf, and East Asia.
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Freedom of the Seas
The Mediterranean contains several important SLOCs,
both for the United States and for the Western European NATO
states.

At the western end of the Mediterranean, the Strait

of Gibraltar provides one of the two entrances or exits from
the Mediterranean.

Further east, the Strait of Sicily and

the Malta Channel produce a chokepoint near the center of
the Mediterranean.

The Gulf of Sidra, which lies to the

north of Libya, provides maneuvering room both for merchant
shipping and military traffic.

Libya's attempt to claim the

Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters led to a series of
military confrontations in 1981 and again in 1986 between
units of the U.S. Navy and Libyan air and surface units. 66
At the eastern end of the Mediterranean lies the Suez Canal
and its associated SUMED pipeline complex, providing the
only alternative to Gibraltar for passage into or out of the
Mediterranean.
Merchant shipping through the Mediterranean connects
the United States and Europe to the Middle East and Asia.

66An often-overlooked motivation for the 1986
Operations in the Vicinity of Libya (OVL-I, -II, and -III),
which challenged Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra as
territorial waters, was the need for operational space in
which to conduct naval exercises, without the interference
and hazards involved in the main shipping channels. Both the
U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy commonly used the Gulf of
Sidra for such exercises. See Colonel W. Hayes Parks,
"Crossing the Line," Proceedinqs (November 1986): 42.
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For the United States, the economies of Italy, Greece,
Turkey, and Israel represent growing markets.

While still

small in comparison to U.S.-Asia trade, the volume of trade
with Turkey and Greece has grown at an annual rate of 9
percent over the last decade, while trade with Israel has
grown at an annual rate of 12 percent.6 7
In addition to merchant traffic, the Mediterranean-Suez
SLOC provides a crucial route for moving military equipment
from Europe to the Persian Gulf in times of crisis.

During

the 1990-91 Desert Shield/Storm operations, 90 percent of
U.S. air lift and sea lift traveled through or over the
Mediterranean, including all of the supplies and equipment
transported to the Gulf from Europe. 68

As described

earlier, the transit from U.S. East Coast bases to the
Persian Gulf via the Mediterranean is shortened by about six
days compared to the route around Africa.
Within the Mediterranean, several nations have military
forces capable of interfering with the passage of maritime
traffic. 69

Most notable among the regional forces is

67 Goure and Mauldin,

Prospects, 52.

Naval Forward Presence: Status,

6 8Dismukes and Hayes, "The Med Remains Vital," 47.
69 The forces of the various NATO nations clearly have
the capability to interfere with Mediterranean traffic.
However, as the likelihood of any of these nations
interfering with merchant traffic is remote absent a
regional war, their respective forces will not be addressed
in this thesis. Israel's close alliance with the United
44

Algeria's possession of two Kilo-class submarines, purchased
from the Soviet Union prior to 1991.70

Capable of deploying

mines while submerged, and armed with 533mm torpedoes, the
Algerian Kilos could allow interdiction in the Strait of
Gibraltar or in the Strait of Sicily.

Libya and Egypt also

possess ex-Soviet Foxtrot and Romeo-class submarines,
although most if not all are believed to be non-operational
due to maintenance problems.

Syria possesses three Romeo-

class boats, whose operational status is unknown. 71
In addition to submarines, every nation on the North
African coast from Morocco to Syria possesses patrol craft
armed with anti-ship missiles.

Some are fairly modern, such

as Tunisia's French-built La Combattante III-class boats,
while others are older ex-Soviet Osa or Nanuchka-class
boats.

However, all are armed with effective anti-ship

missiles, including Exocets (Morocco), Otomats (Egypt,
Libya, Morocco), and SS-N-2 Styx (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and
Syria), making these small craft extremely dangerous to both
merchant and naval ships.72

States likewise exempts Israeli forces from threat
assessments in the Mediterranean.
70 Terence Taylor, The Military Balance 1997/98 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 122;
Francis Tusa, "The Maghreb Cauldron," Armed Forces Journal
International (October 1994): 55.
71 Taylor, The Military Balance 1997/98, 124, 133, 141.
72Ibid., 121-141.
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Access to Resources
The Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline provide a vital
energy lifeline for industrialized European nations, who
depend on Persian Gulf oil for nearly half of their energy
needs.

In 1994, for example, over forty million metric tons

of oil passed through the Suez Canal, while over eighty
million metric tons were pumped through the SUMED
pipeline. 73

Without the ability to move Persian Gulf oil

through the Canal or pipeline, oil shipments would have to
pass around Africa, adding time and additional cost to
European oil imports.74
Within the Mediterranean, shipments of oil are no less
important.

For example, Algeria provides over 70 percent of

Spain's oil requirements.

Also, it is expected that the

majority of Caspian Sea oil destined for Europe in the
future will be pumped through Turkish pipelines, and then
shipped throughout the Mediterranean.75

Maintaining the

73 The Suez Canal/ SUMED Complex, 16. The SUMED
pipeline travels from Ain Sukhna on the Gulf of Suez to Sidi
Kerir on the Mediterranean, just west of Alexandria, a
distance of 320 kilometers.
74 see Appendix A, Table 4 for a comparison of the time
difference between Suez and the Cape of Good Hope.
75Leah McAnally, "NATO's Post-Cold War Internal
Adaptations" (master's thesis, Southwest Missouri State
University, 1997), 97.
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flow of energy to America's major trading partners is of
great importance to the U.S. economy, and the Mediterranean
is the route for the majority of Europe's oil needs.

Safety of

u.s.

Allies

The principal U.S. ally requiring protection in the
Mediterranean is Israel.

Surrounded by Arab neighbors,

Israel has had to fight for its existence on several
occasions.

Egypt and Syria, Israel's traditional security

concerns, last mounted a conventional military assault on
Israel in 1973, but terrorist activity has continued to
plague Israel.
The Camp David peace agreement has kept relations
between Israel and Egypt peaceful if not friendly since
1976, but tensions still exist. 76

Continued trouble arising

from the Palestinian problem could lead to renewed
hostilities, including war, between Israel and Egypt.
Syria, on the other hand, has been unmistakably hostile
towards Israel since 1948, and continues so today.

Syria's

animosity towards Israel exists independent of the Middle
East "Peace Process", and likely will continue as long as
President Assad is alive.

Syrian claims to the Golan

Heights, claims to the water rights in and around the Golan,
and Assad's desire for Syrian hegemony in the eastern

and

76 Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Amonq The Nations:
the World (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 254.
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Israel

Mediterranean will maintain Syria as a mortal threat to
Israel in the future.

Syria has continued to purchase new

military equipment from former Soviet states, including
modern tanks, aircraft, and artillery systems, thus
increasing the size and quality of the Syrian armed
forces. 77
Egypt, notwithstanding possible aggression towards
Israel, is an important U.S. friend in the Mediterranean,
although falling short of the criteria of being an ally on
the order of Israel or Japan.

Both as a primary means of

maintaining peace between Arab nations and Israel, and as
the guardian of the Suez Canal, Egypt likely will remain on
good terms the United States.

Egypt could see its security

threatened by terrorism or para-military activity from
Libya, Sudan, or Ethiopia.

In the recent past, Iran has

attempted to establish a military presence, including a
submarine base, in Sudan.

The presence of submarines, anti-

ship missiles, or minelaying capability astride the Red Sea
would be a direct threat to Egypt, and could be beyond
Egypt's ability to respond to militarily.78

77 Gregory Rublee, "Prosecuting the Syrian Threat to
Israel: Motive, Means, and Opportunity" (master's thesis,
Southwest Missouri State University, 1995), 200-214.
78 Yossef Bodansky, "The Grand Strategy of Iran," Global
Affairs (Fall 1995): 27.
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Turkey and Greece are both NATO members, and their
continued membership in NATO is judged very important in the
current international security environment. 79

Turkey in

particular may encounter external difficulties with Russia,
Iran, and even China, as the Caspian Sea oil fields are
developed. 80

Deterring Regional conflict
Responding to crises in the Mediterranean has been a
frequent occurrence for U.S. forces over the last twentyfive years.

In fact, the Mediterranean has been the focus

of more crises requiring naval forces than any other region
since 1970.81

Continued animosity between Israel and Syria,

Iranian efforts to establish a military presence in Sudan, a
coup by fundamentalist Muslim militants in Algeria--any of
these, and a host of other catalysts, could provide the

79 Turkey is described as, "the linchpin of NATO's
southern strategy by virtue of its geographic position near
the new southern states that border Russia." See Binnendjik,

Strategic Assessment 1997, 36.
80Ahmed Rashid, "A New 'Great Game'-for Fuel," E.ar.
Eastern Economic Review, cited in World Press Review (June
1997): 32; Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still An Enemy?"
Foreign Affairs (September/October 1997): 74. Umit Enginsoy,
"Russian Moves in Armenia Heighten Regional Tensions,"
Defense News, 01 February 1999, 4.
81 Kahan and Sands, Alternative Naval Deployment
Concepts, 3-4. See Appendix A, Table 5 and Table 6 for a
depiction of the frequency and nature of U.S. military
operations in the Mediterranean from 1970-1989.
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spark for a regional conflict. 82

Such a conflict would have

the potential to disrupt the economic stability of the
Mediterranean, and thus the economies of Europe and the
United States.
The most serious regional conflict, although perhaps
not the most likely, would involve another Arab attempt to
attack and destroy Israel.

Such a conflict could spill over

into the Persian Gulf, where other Islamic states might
provide aid to Syria or Egypt.

Thus one U.S. interest,

protection of Israel, could be directly at odds with another
U.S. interest, maintaining the flow of oil from the Persian
Gulf.

An Arab-Israeli war also could see the employment of
NBC weapons, delivered by ballistic missiles.

Both Egypt

and Syria possess SCUD and other ballistic missiles capable
of striking any part of Israel.83

Iran has several long-

range ballistic missiles under development, some in advanced
stages, that could be targeted on Israe1. 8 4

Israel in turn

82Tusa, "The Maghreb Cauldron," 55.
83 Taylor,

The Military Balance 1997/98, 124, 141.

84Barbara Opall, "Israelis Say Russia Aids Iran's Quest
For Missiles," Defense News, 10-16 February 1997, 1; Steve
Rodan, "Iran Missile Program Is Nearly Complete," Jerusalem
.Eo.at., 4 October 1997, 1, "Iran's Missiles Able to Hit Israel
in 18 Months," Jerusalem Post, 11 October 1997, 1,
"Secret
Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missiles in Year,"
Defense News, 6-12 October 1997, 4.
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might be motivated to respond to a successful chemical or
biological attack with a nuclear weapon, using its own
Jericho missiles or F-15 aircraft.

Such nuclear retaliation

could transform a small regional conflict into a much larger
conflict, involving Muslim countries throughout North Africa
and the Middle East.
Turkey and Greece, while both important NATO members,
have a long history of acrimonious relations.

Most recently

a dispute over Russian S-300 SAMs, purchased by Greek
Cypriots, led Greece and Turkey into confrontation, with
Russia threatening to join in to protect its customer after
Turkey threatened to block the missile shipment. 85

Greek-

Turkish issues go back for centuries, making conflict
between them a constant possibility.86
The NATO nations understandably view conflict in the
Mediterranean as a threat to their national interests:
Because of the unstable environment and vital
resources in these areas, many NATO nations (France,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) see
threats emanating from this region as dangerous to
their vital interests.87

85John Roos, "Ersatz Allies: Misstep By Greece Or
Turkey Could Trigger War Over Cyprus," Armed Forces Journal
International (May 1997): 44.
8 6 James Pasley, "Cold Turkey No More: Security
Perspectives for the Republic of Turkey in the Post-Cold War
Era," (master's thesis, Southwest Missouri State University,
1994), 121-141 provides a good treatment of the myriad
issues of contention between Greece and Turkey.
8 7McAnally, "NATO's Post-Cold War Internal
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Deterring conflict in the Mediterranean, or ending
regional conflict quickly if deterrence fails,

remains one

of the primary reasons for the continued presence of Sixth
Fleet ships.
Specific Interests in the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf is an area of great strategic
importance to the United States, and to most of the
industrialized world.

Oil is the overriding factor in all

U.S. interests in the Gulf.

Freedom of the seas (to get the

oil out), the protection of allies (allies only because of
their possession of oil), and preventing regional conflict
(which could interrupt oil shipments) all relate back to
oil, and the need to keep Persian Gulf oil flowing to the
economies of the world.

Freedom of the Seas
Freedom of the seas means one thing in the Gulf:
providing safe passage through the Gulf and the Strait of
Hormuz for tankers loaded with oil.

While over fourteen

million barrels of oil and natural gas pass through the
Strait every day, no other commodity of any importance
originates in the Gulf.

The supertanker, or very large

crude carrier (VLCC), was designed for the transport of
Persian Gulf oil, and over 90 percent of the world's VLCCs

Adaptations," 98.
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pass through the Strait at least once each year.

Of the

twenty-eight ships entering the Gulf daily, half are
tankers. 88
The Strait is the point most vulnerable to
interdiction, a vulnerability made even greater due to
Iran's position astride the full length of the Strait.
Iran's ongoing military buildup is focused on the Strait,
and includes mines, Kilo-class submarines, anti-ship
missiles, fast patrol craft, and small gunboats capable of
attacking merchant ships and tankers.

Iran's mining

operations in the Strait from 1986 to 1988 resulted in the
sinking of several ships, and the near-sinking of USS Samuel

B. Roberts (FFG-58) . 8 9

In addition to the Strait and the

Gulf tanker routes, the oil terminals and associated
facilities must be protected and kept open for the loading
of oi1. 90
In the future, Caspian Sea oil may be distributed to
world oil users via the Gulf.

Iran is the logical location

for a pipeline connecting the Caspian to the ocean, which

88 The

Strait of Hormuz, i, 5, 9.

89smith, "GCC Regional Security," 6; Binnendjik and
Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 92.
90uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Geoffrey Kemp,

Projection of Power: Perspectives. Perceptions. and
Problems (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), 96.

eds.,
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could elevate the need to maintain freedom of the seas in
the Gulf and the Strait to even higher importance. 9 1

Access to Resources
Oil is the only resource of any importance in the Gulf,
but its importance is paramount in the strategic outlook of
the United States, as described by Colin Gray:
No subject for statecraft and private commercial
concern could be more geoeconomical than is access
to, and the price of, oil, and no geoeconomical
subject is more obviously dominated by the threat and
use of force.92
The importance of Persian Gulf oil was recognized as
far back as 1933, when the Standard Oil Company launched its
first Saudi oil venture.

President Franklin Roosevelt

established a rapport with the Saudi kings of the day, and
American oil workers have been present in the area ever
since.9 3
As described previously, world oil demand is expected
to grow enormously in the future, with Asian economies in
particular increasing their demand for energy.

Without the

presence of U.S. forces, a regional hegemon, most likely

9 1Michael Dunn, "Mideast Turnaround,"
Journal International (November 1997): 22.
92 Gray,

Armed Forces

The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, 170.

93Amos Jordan, William Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence Korb,
American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 385-390.
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Iran or Iraq, could establish control of all Gulf oil.
Control by a single entity would be extremely serious due to
Saudi Arabia's unique spare production capacity.

No other

world oil producer could increase production to make up for
lost Persian Gulf oil, allowing monopolistic manipulation of
the world oil market.94
Even without a monopoly over Gulf oil, the disruption
of the oil flow from the Gulf would have serious, possibly
even crippling, results for world economies.

A serious

disruption of Gulf oil flow could drive the cost of oil
beyond fifty dollars per barrel, entailing catastrophic
results for many economies.95

While the U.S. economy likely

could survive a prolonged interruption of Gulf oil, the
economies of Japan and Western Europe would suffer complete
collapse, the effect of which would surely be felt in the
U.S. economy. 96

94 Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, "Come
Home America," in Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones,
and Steven Miller, eds., America's Strategic Choices
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 220-222.
95 Joseph Hoar, "Continuous Forward Presence of Naval
Forces Vital to Maintaining Middle East Stability," .s..aa
Power (January 1995): 44.
96 Jordan et al., American National Security, 391. "In
all likelihood, a prolonged interruption in their [Japan and
Europe] imports would literally bring about their economic
collapse."; The Strait of Hormuz, 18. "The economic
repercussions of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz will
ripple through the global economy."
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Safety of

u.s.

Allies

The safety of U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf poses one
of the biggest challenges faced by U.S. defense planners.
Even in South Korea, where the North's large forces are only
twenty-five miles from Seoul, the difficulties of defending
against aggression are less than in the Gulf.

Kuwait and

Saudi Arabia, small in population and with no natural
defensive positions, are the allies most at risk in the
Gulf.

Their preeminent status as oil producers makes their

survival crucial to the sustained flow of oil to the world,
requiring U.S. military presence on a daily basis.
Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia border on Iraq, where
Saddam Hussein remains in power.

If Saddam regains full

control of Iraq in the future, he might decide to attack his
southern neighbors, both to control their oil reserves and
to exact revenge for the Gulf War and its resulting
sanctions against Iraq.9 7

Saudi Arabia has additional

importance as the leader of the Arab world.

Failure to

protect Saudi Arabia, or to restore Saudi sovereignty after
an invasion, would harm U.S. standing throughout the Arab
world. 98

9 7Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997,
88.
98Rodman, America Adrift, 38.
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While Iraq is viewed as an inunediate threat to Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, Iran is viewed by most observers,
including the full membership of the GCC, as the most
significant long-term threat.99

Continued Iranian

insistence that Bahrain is the "14th Province of Iran",
threats to the United Arab Emirates, including the seizure
and militarization of several islands in the Strait, and a
historical sentiment of Iran's place in the region make Iran
a serious and lasting threat to U.S. allies in the Gulf.lOO

Deterrinq Reqional conflict
As shown from 1980-88, and again in 1990-91, the Gulf
is a region full of potential for major conflict.

The Gulf

is only slightly less likely than the Korean Peninsula as a
possible site of future conflict, as indicated by Vice
Admiral Redd:
Even as we debate the number and size of
contingencies facing our military, we know that as
far as we can see into the future, the Gulf will be
on our screen.
Indeed, the potential for the use of

99 smith, "GCC Regional Security," 4; Redd, "Fifth
Fleet, Arriving," 50; Hoar, "Continuous Forward Presence,"
45.
lOOPhilip Collins, "Iran: An Emerging Military Threat
to U.S. National Interests in the Middle East," (master's
thesis, Southwest Missouri State University, 1994), 134;
Ahmed Hashim, The Crisis of the Iranian state (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 43; Rodman, America Adrift,
43; Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 91.
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U.S. military power arguably is higher in the Gulf
than anywhere else on earth.101
A future conflict could arise from any of the
"persistent instabilities" in the Gulf.102

The lasting

hatred between Iran and Iraq could lead to a repeat of their
eight-year war.

Iran's threats to various GCC members,

especially the UAE, could flare into open conflict.

The

disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, or between Qatar
and Bahrain, also could lead to armed conflict.103
The most likely and dangerous possibility would arise
from Iran or a resurgent Iraq attacking one or several of
the smaller GCC states.

The involvement of the large

Iranian or Iraqi armed forces would require the commitment
of U.S. forces, whereas a conflict between the smaller GCC
militaries would tend to contain itself.

Both Iran and Iraq

have large numbers of modern weapons, and neither nation has
shown any reduction in its desire for hegemony over the
Gulf.104

Most significantly, both Iran and Iraq have

aggressively pursued a full range of NBC capabilities, along
with ballistic missile capability.

Iran is believed to be

101Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49.
102 Jordan et al., America's National security, 417.
103 Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997,
84-85.
104 Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 80;
Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward Presence,
25.
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within a few years, possibly one or two years, of having
nuclear weapons, while Iraq undoubtedly will resume its
hidden nuclear program when UNSCOM is removed. 105
Preventing a regional conflict that could interfere
with world oil flow is important enough to justify the
continued presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf.

Especially

if the belligerents have NBC capability, avoiding conflict
in the Gulf through conventional deterrence must remain a
high priority for the United States.
Specific Interests in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia is a region of great importance to the
United States, ranking at least as high as Europe, if not
higher.

Two of the longest-standing U.S. defense

commitments are in Korea and Japan, while the emerging
economies of the "Asian Tigers"--South Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore--represent a growing percentage of
U.S. foreign trade.

Freedom of the seas
In the North Pacific Ocean, the flow of economic goods
is the primary basis of freedom of the seas.

Asian economic

might is becoming ever more important to the U.S. economy,
lOSA CIA report cited in Smith, "GCC Regional
Security," estimates that Iran could have nuclear weapons
production capability, far more serious a threat than mere
possession of a handful of weapons, by the year 2000. For a
thorough examination of Iran and Iraq's ongoing efforts in
the area of NBC/M, see The Proliferation Primer.
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and is projected to grow enormously in the future.

In 1995,

seven of the top fifteen U.S. trade partners were located in
East Asia: Japan (number two), China (number five), South
Korea (number seven), Taiwan (number eight), Singapore
(number nine), Malaysia (number eleven), and Hong Kong
(number thirteen) .106

Together, these seven nations

combined for an aggregate of 427 billion dollars in trade,
or 33 percent of all U.S. foreign trade.

Protecting the

SLOCs over which this trade travels is a lasting interest of
the United States.
Disputes among Asian nations over the Spratley Islands
are often cited as a possible threat to the SLOCs and
merchant traffic.

China and the Philippines already have

clashed over possession of Mischief Reef, and further
struggles for possession could interrupt the flow of
shipping, especially the shipment of Persian Gulf oil on its
way to Japan and South Korea.107
The South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca also
represent an important military SLOC, as the alternate
routes via the Sunda Strait, the Ombai-Wetar Straits, or the
Torres Strait are all limited in maximum draft, preventing
aircraft carriers and some large auxiliary ships from

10 6 Holmes and Moore,

Restoring American Leadership,

114.
10 7 Rodman,

America Adrift, 28.
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passing through.108

The Strait of Malacca itself is

uncomfortably narrow in places, but has an average depth of
seventy-two feet.109

It also is the shortest route between

East Asia and the Middle East or Europe.

Access to Resources
There are no significant amounts of raw resources
transiting the East Asian SLOCs to the United States.

The

flow of oil to the Asian economies is vital to their
continued prosperity and economic strength, but it is mostly
finished consumer products that pass over the Pacific
destined for the United States.

Oil from the Persian Gulf,

as well as from Brunei on the island of Borneo, makes the
South China Sea the most important SLOC in terms of
resources destined for important U.S. trading partners, but
not for U.S. resource needs.

Safety of

u.s.

Allies

The safety of regional allies is a major consideration
in East Asia, where several small nations with robust
economies reside in close proximity to militarily
threatening neighbors.

108 Noer,

Most also are truly democratic or

Chokepoints, 3. See Appendix A, Figure 3.

10 9 The author passed through the Strait of Malacca
onboard the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) in 1991, and can
testify to the confined nature of this waterway. Due to the
heavy traffic and number of large vessels passing through
Malacca, precise seamanship is required during the transit.
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moving towards democracy, and are threatened by nondemocratic enemies, adding to the imperative of preserving
their security.
Japan is the indispensable U.S. ally in Northeast Asia,
for economic as well as military reasons.

In addition to

being the United States' number two trading partner, Japan
is the base for the U.S. military presence in East Asia,
both for land and sea forces, and therefore the foundation
of U.S. efforts to protect national interests in East
Asia. 110

Maintaining close ties with Japan, and assisting

in Japan's security calculus, also is seen as important in
order to keep Japan from expanding its armed forces, which
could easily produce anxiety and an arms race among Asian
states fearful of a large, well-armed Japan.111

110 Jason Ingebrigtsen, "The U.S.-Japan Security
Alliance: Current Status, Future Prospects," (master's
thesis, Southwest Missouri State University, 1996), 153;
Daniel Chiu, The Politics of overseas Bases and Access
Facilities: Prospects for the Future (Alexandria, VA: Center
for Naval Analyses, 1993), Appendix A, page A-4; Kahan and
Sands, Alternative Naval Deployment Concepts, 3-15;
lllJosef Joffe, "Bismarck or Britain?" in Brown et al.,

America's strategic Choices, 116. Ullman, In Harm's Way,
133: "Although the presence of U.S. military forces in the
Pacific has provoked some controversy and criticism, this
presence has unmistakenly [.sic.] and unambiguously
contributed to regional peace and stability. The U.S.
assumption of the larger military burden has allowed
regional states to forgo acquiring additional military
capability that could have proved threatening to the
region."
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South Korea is, without question, the U.S. ally most at
risk in East Asia, and indeed anywhere in the world.

While

U.S. ground forces remain present in Europe to bolster NATO
against an uncertain threat, and remain in Kuwait to hedge
against possible Iraqi aggression, the threat faced by South
Korea is easily identified and close at hand.

North Korea's

large standing army, its hard-line communist regime, its
unrelenting animosity towards Seoul, and its continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons make the Korean Peninsula the
single most likely and most dangerous location for an attack
on a U.S. ally. 11 2

In addition to the constant state of

tension along the de-militarized zone (DMZ), the current
dire economic situation in North Korea makes the outbreak of
a second Korean War possible at any time.113
Taiwan presents another difficult security
consideration for the United States.

Taiwan is a democratic

state, is the United States' number eight trading partner
worldwide, and is threatened by a non-democratic China
across the Formosa Strait.

Defending Taiwan thus is clearly

112 Ernest Lefever, America's Imperial Burden; Is the
Past Prologue? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 126;
Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership, 54; Jordan
et al., American National Security, 368; Chiu, The Politics
of Overseas Bases, Appendix A, page A-2
1 13 Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997,

97.
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a U.S. interest.114

However, Taiwan's proximity to China,

and its distance from U.S. bases in Japan or the
Philippines, would make Taiwan difficult to defend in the
face of a determined Chinese attack.
A fourth U.S. ally in East Asia, often overshadowed by
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, is the Republic of
Singapore.

Located at the southeast end of the Strait of

Malacca, Singapore is the Pacific equivalent of Gibraltar.
One of the "Four Dragons" of the Pacific, Singapore is a top
U.S. trading partner despite a population of less than three
million citizens.115

When the Philippines demanded the

removal of U.S. forces and installations in the early 1990s,
Singapore moved quickly to replace Subic Bay as a primary
maintenance and refueling station for the U.S. Navy,
including a pier capable of receiving aircraft carriers. 116
Frequent joint training and good military-to-military

11 4 Ted Carpenter, "Managing a Great Power Relationship:
The United States, China and East Asian Security," .The.
Journal of Strateqic studies (March 1998): 8; Jordan et al.,
American National security, 373-374; Kahan and Sands,
Alternative Naval Deployment concepts, 3-15;
115rn 1995, trade with Singapore exceeded trade with
France, and equaled 60 percent of trade with the United
Kingdom. Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership,
114.
116 The

United states security strateqy for East Asia,

7.
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contacts have kept Singapore a solid U.S. ally in the
region.

Deterring Regional conflict
The North Korea-South Korea standoff will continue to
be the number one threat of regional conflict in East Asia,
barring the unlikely event of a peaceful reunification.11 7
The Korean theater is especially troublesome due to the
possibility of a conflict erupting with little or no notice.

An event as small as an accident at the DMZ could escalate
into war, due to the North's "propensity for brinkmanship",
the lack of any military-to-military communications links,
and the close proximity of large troop formations that are
always on a war footing.118
A war in Korea could easily involve chemical or
biological weapons use by North Korea, as well as the use of
any existing nuclear weapons.

Japan would be threatened by

North Korean ballistic missiles, and in the not-too-distant

11 7 Thomas Ricks, "Nightmare Prospect of Nuclear Rogue
State Makes North Korea the Hot Spot That Worries U.S.
Most," Wall street Journal, 3 February 1999, A24.
11 8 Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997,
101-102. The United states Security strategy for East Asia,
13, provides the following commentary: "Along the DMZ, just
24 miles from Seoul, the North Korean Peoples' Army has
nearly 600,000 troops, more than 2,400 tanks, and over 6,000
artillery pieces. It is an area where hostilities could
erupt with little or no warning."
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future so could Hawaii, Alaska, and even the West Coast of
the United States.
As threatening as North Korea is to South Korean and
American forces on the ground, as well as to nearby nations,
most Asian countries view China as the more serious longterm threat.

China's current economic and military growth,

its insistence that Taiwan is a "renegade province", its
aggressive claims to the Spratley Islands, its clumsy
attempts to intimidate Taiwan with a military show of force
in 1996--all are disquieting to the much smaller nations of
East Asia that must live in the shadow of China's 1.3
billion population.119
All of the East Asian nations, except North Korea, see
U.S. presence in the region as a stabilizing influence.
Given the small size of most East Asian states, and "the
major power animosities not far beneath the surface,"
stability likely will continue to depend on U.S. military
presence in East Asia.120

11 9 carpenter, "Managing a Great Power Relationship,"
10; Lefever, America's Imperial Burden, 126; Goure and
Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: status, Prospects, 49;
Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership, 64.
120 Ra'anan et al., Projection of Power, 103; Rodman,
America Adrift, 26; Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence
Abroad," 52.
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Threats to U.S. Interests

Just as U.S. interests are global in nature, so are the
threats to U.S. interests global.

The most pressing threats

to U.S. interests will come from peer or near-peer major
power competitors, such as the former Soviet Union, and from
regional states that can challenge the United States within
their respective regions.

Peer or Near-Peer Competitors
Only two nations can realistically be considered as
potential peer competitors to the United States: China and
Russia.

Arguments are sometimes made that India may become

a major power, or that the European Union could transform
itself into a political and military power, instead of just
an economic power.

However, only China and Russia have the

combination of population size, resources, technology,
military forces, and motivation to challenge the United
States.

Not surprisingly, both China and Russia are

mentioned in the first pages of the National Security

Strategy, as well as being mentioned in other defense
documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and

Secretary of Defense Report to Congress. 121

1 2 1 rn fact, Chinaand Russia are the only "great
powers" mentioned by name in the NS.S..
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Neither China nor Russia can be described as a peer
competitor today, and it is by no means clear that they will
be in the future, but only China and Russia are credible
threats to become peer competitors.

Even so, it is unlikely

that either nation could build itself into a true peer
competitor, able to compete globally with the United States,
in less than twenty-five years, if not longer.
China is often pointed to for its rapidly-growing
economy and third-largest GDP in the world.

However,

China's growth must be measured from its low starting base,
which can distort the significance of economic figures.

For

example, even with the number three GDP worldwide and growth
rates approaching 10 percent annually, China's per capita
GDP is a meager four hundred dollars.

Given China's

population size, it is estimated that China could require as
long as 150 years to match the United States in economic
might. 122

Russia remains in the throes of severe economic

problems, with no relief in sight, and so is even less
likely than China to match the United States in world
standing any time soon.

These problems notwithstanding,

both China and Russia are advanced as twenty-first century
major power threats by many sources.123
122Hon Lee, "China in the 21st Century: America's
Greatest Strategic Challenge," in Mary Sommerville, ed.,
Essays on Strategy XIII (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996),
83.
12 3 chinese and Russian nuclear weapons clearly make
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A more likely possibility for China and Russia would be
their development into near-peer threats in a regional
context, able to employ defensive "keep-out" strategies
against the United States near their own territory, but
unable to project power far from home.

Russian exertions in

the Caspian Sea region, or Chinese efforts to dominate the
East and South China Seas, are examples of possible regional
peer strategies for China and Russia.124
China is viewed as the more serious threat to American
interests in the foreseeable future.

In as little as ten

years, given its current military expenditures, China could
take up the role of a regional peer. 125

China continues to

purchase advanced jet aircraft, nuclear powered and
conventional submarines, air-to-air refueling planes, SAMs,
these nations threats to the United States, but not in the
context of a global competitor able to exert influence in
opposition to U.S. interests through power projection. It
may be that China and Russia are identified as potential
peer threats simply because no other nation can credibly be
substituted for them. However, describing China as an
impending "juggernaut" in world affairs, or as "an emerging
great power" seems to be exaggerating the strength of
available evidence. See America's National Interests, 29,
and Restorinq American Leadership, 55.
12 4A recent U.S. Navy war game, "U.S. Navy RMA
Revolution in Military Affairs Wargame," 21-23 April 1998,
postulated a 'Red' (Chinese) strategy built around sea
denial capability in the China Sea, allowing China to invade
a unified Korea and consolidate its gains before sufficient
U.S. power could be brought to bear to stop the invasion.
125Binnendjik and Clawson,
55.
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Strateqic Assessment 1997,

and other high-tech hardware from Russia. 126

Although today

China is incapable even of projecting military power across
the Formosa Strait, a mere one hundred miles wide, in
sufficient strength to contemplate invading Taiwan, in
twenty-five years' time China could conceivably replace
Japan as the dominant regional military power.12 7
Russia's future is unclear, and could as easily lead to
fragmentation and civil war as to reemergence as a great
power.

What is clear, however, is that Russia would be

challenged even to pose a regional threat to the United
States today, and for at least a decade to come.

Russia's

ground forces are in a pitiable state, its air forces are no
better despite their first-rate aircraft, and its naval
forces face "irreversible" reductions in shipbuilding
capacity combined with the loss of thirteen to fifteen ships
monthly for lack of funds.128
Russia's possible reemergence as a peer or near-peer
competitor centers on its political situation.

The current

conditions in Russia have been likened to those in Weimar

126Lee, "China in the 21st Century," 86.
12 7 china's inability to cross the Formosa Strait
results from lack of amphibious lift capability and Taiwan's
highly capable air defenses. See Binnendjik and Clawson,
strategic Assessment 1997, 52; Lee, "China in the 21st
Century," 91.
12 8 Binnendjik and Clawson,
19.
70

Strategic Assessment 1997,

Germany in the 1920s, with a corresponding possibility of an
ultra-nationalist leader gaining power and rebuilding the
former Soviet empire.129

Another possibility would be the

re-establishment of the Soviet Union or a facsimile.

The

fact that Russia continues to pump money into its submarine
programs, giving it some capacity to deploy military power
beyond its borders, and has continued to pursue an assertive
foreign policy, suggest that Russian leaders still envision
a great power Russia.130

Regional "Bad Actors"
Less-than-great powers with hostile intent can also
pose serious threats to U.S. interests.

When these "bad

actors" reside in areas close to U.S. interests, they are
inherently capable of influencing and affecting those
interests, even without large or modern military forces.
The Gulf War provided the clearest possible example of how a
small, hostile state (admittedly, in Iraq's case, one with
large military forces) can imperil U.S. interests.
Commonly cited bad actors include Iran, Syria, North
Korea, Iraq, and occasionally India.131

These nations

12 9 Lefever, America's Imperial Burden, 129.
130captain John Morgan, "Preparing for Tomorrow's
Troubles," Proceedings (December 1996): 49; Michael
Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment," in Brown et
al., America's strategic Choices, 139.
131Morgan, "Preparing for Tomorrow's Troubles," 49.
71

possess credible military forces and hostile, or at least
uncertain, intentions.

Smaller irritants, such as Haiti or

Somalia, lack the military means to affect important U.S.
interests, and so cannot be considered in the same context.

An important factor in the assessment of threats from
regional bad actors is their need only to conduct operations
in, or close to, their own territory.

These smaller nations

do not need the kinds of global power projection
capabilities possessed by the United States, as their forces
likely will not be operating far from home.

Especially if

able to take advantage of geographical "high ground", such
as a maritime chokepoint, the smaller and less capable
forces of regional bad actors could enjoy significant
advantages over larger and more capable U.S. forces.

Iran's

position astride the Strait of Hormuz, and India's proximity
to the Strait of Malacca, are examples of geographic
equalizers that smaller states could use to their
advantage. 132

Libya once might have been included in the list of bad
actors, but has largely given up the kinds of flagrant bad
behavior that resulted in the 1986 naval and air attacks by
U.S. forces.
132rndia's insistence on pursuing a nuclear-powered
submarine force, at great financial cost and despite
repeated setbacks, can be explained through the benefit such
submarines would provide in a conflict. SSNs have the
endurance and magazine capacity to interdict the Strait of
Malacca, allowing India to prevent the approach of naval
forces from the east. SSNs also could be employed in the Bay
of Bengal to keep opposing naval forces at a distance from
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Rather than engaging the United States in conventional
fighting, the most logical and economical option for a
smaller state to employ would be the use of a geographic
chokepoint and a defensive keep-out strategy.13 3

By

attempting to restrict the ability of U.S. forces to
approach a crisis area by sea, the smaller state could
establish a difficult cost-vs.-interest question for U.S.
planners.

If the chokepoint provided sufficient leverage,

such a keep-out strategy could prevent the necessary U.S.
build-up of forces and materials for prosecuting a regional

war.
An emerging component of such a keep-out strategy is
the use of ballistic missiles, both for deterrence and longrange attacks.

Chapter Six of the Secretary of Defense

Annual Report to Conqress, "Missile Defenses," acknowledges
the impact of ballistic missiles in a regional conflict,
stating that:

India's coast. The impact of a handful of Argentine diesel
submarines on British operations in the Falklands War
indicates the value of submarines in a defensive posture.
See Andrew Koch, "Nuclear-powered submarines: India's
strategic trump card," Jane's Intelligence Review (June
1998): 29; Jacquelyn Davis et al., The Submarine and u.s,
National Security strategy Into the 21st Century (Cambridge,
Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997), 58;
Captain Charles Wilbur, "Remember the San Luis!" Proceedings
(March 1996): 86.
13 3 Goure and Mauldin,
Prospects, 34.
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The threat of missile use in regional conflicts has
grown substantially, and the potential combination of
NBC weapons with theater missiles poses serious
complications to the management of regional crises
and the successful ~rosecution of U.S. strategy for
major theater wars. 34
Given the current very low level of ballistic missile
defenses available to U.S. forces and U.S. allies, the even
lower level of defenses against chemical and biological
agents among civilian populations worldwide, and the
widespread possession of ballistic missiles in the
inventories of various bad actors, it should be expected
that future regional conflicts will involve the use, or
threatened use, of ballistic missiles.
Any regional bad actor able to combine a geographical
advantage with ballistic missiles (and NBC weapons, if
available) into a viable keep-out strategy clearly has the
potential to impinge on U.S. interests.

The regional state

most capable of employing this strategy today is Iran, where
a vital U.S. interest--oil--coincides with a severe maritime
chokepoint.

Appendix B provides a case study of Iran's

capabilities, and how Iran might employ a keep-out strategy
in the Persian Gulf.
Summary

The United States is a maritime state, dependent on the
seas for the life blood of the nation.

Connected to the

markets of Europe and Asia by the sea lanes crossing the
134 cohen,

Secretary of Defense Annual Report 1998,
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world's oceans, seaborne trade forms the backbone of the
largest and strongest economy in the world.
If trade is to flow to and from the United States on
the seas, protection for U.S. trade must likewise be capable
of going to sea, and of offering protection without
dependence on the facilities or good will of others.

This

has long been recognized as the primary function of the
navies of maritime states.

Although not the first to make

the observation, Alfred Thayer Mahan's words,

"The necessity

of a navy springs from the existence of peaceful shipping,"
are as true today as when spoken by Mahan a century ago, and
when spoken by others a century before him.

As long as U.S.

trade moves over the sea in merchant ships, warships must
watch over them.

The tools of naval power may change,

from

sail power to nuclear power, from vessels traveling on the
sea to vessels traveling under or above the sea, but the
need for naval power remains constant for the United States.
The sea has always been the most economical means of
transporting people and goods, allowing a large volume to be
conveyed over long distances at the lowest cost.

Even with

the emergence of large jet aircraft, capable of crossing the
Atlantic or Pacific in a matter of hours, ships remain the
most cost-effective method for the transport of resources,
and the only viable method of transporting bulk resources.
This economy of effort is extremely important in regard to
raw resources, and especially the preeminent resource of the
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twentieth century: oil.

Without the ability to deliver oil

safely to users around the world, the economies of most U.S.
trading partners would collapse, probably dragging the U.S.
economy down with them.

More than perhaps any other

commodity, oil must be transported in large quantities, and
only ships can carry the millions of tons of oil used every
year around the world.
The end of the Cold War was heralded as the beginning
of a "New World Order."

Without the threat of the Soviet

Union, the world was expected to be a safer place for all
concerned, and especially for the United States.
extent this vision has come true.

To some

The prospect of global

thermonuclear war has receded, as has the threat of a major
invasion of Western Europe by Soviet armies.

On the other

hand, new threats have sprung up to take the place of the
Soviet Union.
While the United States homeland may be safer than at
any time since 1945, U.S. allies around the world live in an
increasingly dangerous environment.

Nations led by brutal

dictatorships, in possession of the most modern arms and the
products of malicious science--NBC weapons--can be found in
many regions of the world.

Old great powers, recently

fallen on hard times, may resurrect themselves in the
future.

Often too small to field more than token armies,

and often residing near unfriendly neighbors with the intent
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to do them harm, allies look to the United States for
protection.
One constant has remained after the demise of the
Soviet Union.

The United States is still a global nation,

linked by trade and treaty to other nations in every area of
the planet.

Just as U.S. interests are found in widely-

scattered locations around the world, so are threats to U.S.
interests found abroad.

As long as U.S. interests reside in

places far from U.S. shores, protection must be provided for
those interests.

The next chapter will'examine how naval

forward presence, consisting of Navy and Marine Corps assets
deployed around the world, acts to safeguard American
interests.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE MISSION

In assessing the importance of naval forward presence,
it is helpful to step back and ask the question: Why does
the United States need to employ a military strategy of
forward presence?

Not just U.S. naval forces, but U.S. land

and air forces as well are in position all over the world,
carrying out a multitude of diverse military tasks.

Why

cannot these forces meet their security obligations from
CONUS?

Why are U.S. servicemen required to go into harm's

way around the world?

Most importantly, why is naval

forward presence so important in U.S. national security?
This chapter will examine the need for the forward
presence of U.S. military forces.

After defining the need

for forward presence, the unique capabilities of naval
forward presence will be advanced.

Naval forces have

significant advantages over land-based forces in maintaining
U.S. presence abroad, advantages that derive from the
characteristics of naval forces.

The characteristics and

capabilities of naval forward presence will comprise the
bulk of this chapter.
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Why Forward Presence?
First and foremost, the presence of U.S. military power
is required around the world to protect U.S. interests.
U.S. interests are global in scope, and U.S. military power
must be prepared and positioned to defend those
interests. 13 5

U.S. forces stationed in CONUS are limited to

deterrence for the protection of interests, making them
strictly reactive.

If deterrence fails, CONUS-based forces

can only react to an adversary's actions, and could be too
late in arriving to prevent the adversary from reaching his
objectives.

By remaining in CONUS, instead of being on the

scene in proximity to U.S. interests, U.S. forces thus would
cede the initiative to adversaries.
U.S. forces present in a region send a strong message
to all other states in the area.

Whether land-based or sea-

based, U.S. forces provide a signal of U.S. interest in the
region, and in maintaining peaceful, stable conditions.
Land-based forces, particularly ground combat forces, send
the most specific message of where U.S. interest lies.
forces in the Gulf signal our interest in the region;

U.S.
U.S.

Army forces in Kuwait signal our very specific interest in
the safety and security of Kuwait.

135James Hessman, "Forward-Thinking and ForwardDeployed," Sea Power (November 1997): 20.
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The example of U.S. Army forces in Kuwait demonstrates
another important reason for forward presence.

Regional

allies need to have confidence that the United States is
interested in their safety, and is capable of protecting
them.

Without this reassurance, smaller states may not be

willing to take actions for their own safety, or allow U.S.
actions for the common safety of both, that entail risk of
reprisal.

For example, Saudi Arabia might not allow U.S.

forces to operate from Saudi bases against Iraq if the Saudi
leadership doubted the willingness or ability of U.S. forces
to defend Saudi Arabia.

This apprehension is lessened by

the proximity of U.S. forces.

If the nearest U.S. forces

are located in CONUS, and the only assurance the United
States can give is to restore an ally's sovereignty after
they have been attacked, allies understandably may feel
nervous about any actions that provoke larger neighbors,
even if the provocation occurs through actions intended for
self-defense.
Through presence in a region, U.S. forces also hope to
deter aggression and prevent regional conflicts.

The

presence of U.S. forces applies U.S. deterrence to all
states in the region, and encourages observance of law and
order.

U.S. forces may undertake specific missions or

postures intended to deter individual nations as well, as
when U.S. aircraft enforce the no-fly zones in northern and
southern Iraq, but the presence of U.S. forces acts to
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promote lawful behavior from all the states in a region.

In

order to influence events and to deter credibly, U.S. forces
must be visible to other states.

This deterrent effect

cannot be replicated from CONUS, as articulated by Colin
Gray:
For a great power, let alone a would-be coalition
leader, to function as a player rather than as an
observer of regional security politics, it has to
maintain a local military pres~nce that is more than
lightly symbolic in scale . . . . Great power must be
seen to be believed.136
In order to be convincing in the deterrent role, U.S.
forces must have combat capability.13 7

It is the primary

task of U.S. forces to deter conflict, but the oftennecessary fallback is the ability to fight. 1 38

Without

visible combat power, U.S. forces will only fit Gray's
"lightly symbolic" description.

Lightly symbolic forces may

serve to deter, but if deterrence fails they will be unable
to defend. 139

The British experience in the Falklands, in

136colin Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still
Cloudy," Proceedings Naval Review (May 1990): 42.
1 3 7Admiral William Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted
World," Proceedings (December 1994): 31.
138 Rear Admiral Philip Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready,
Engaged," Proceedings (June 1994): 42.
139 colin Gray points out that, "deterrence is useful
and should be attempted," but also that, "As a general rule,
conventional deterrence is destined to fail because hopes of
swift victory at bearable cost spring eternal in the breasts
of adventurous policy makers and bold strategists."
Accepting Gray's position as true, symbolic deterrent forces
should be seen as having very limited utility in most
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which the on-scene garrison was symbolic rather than
functional,

indicates the all-or-nothing nature of

attempting to deter with symbolic presence, and the much
higher cost of having to fight a regional conflict that
might have been deterred.140
If deterrence does fail, the presence of U.S. forces
often will allow a crisis to be headed off and dealt with
before it blooms into a full-blown conflict.

U.S. forces

help to shape events before crises erupt, but they can also
shape the way the crisis unfolds.

By virtue of their

proximity, U.S. forces are likely to be more informed about
the actions taken by other players in a crisis, and should
be able to take preemptive action in a much more timely
fashion than CONUS-based forces.141
Finally, if deterrence fails and U.S. forces must
fight, U.S. strategy calls for allies to fight alongside
U.S. forces.

Maintaining interoperability between U.S. and

allied forces will be a necessity if they are to fight

situations. See "Deterrence and Regional Conflict: Hopes,
Fallacies, and Fixes," Comparative Strateqy (January-March
1998): 53, 56.
140commander Alan Zimm, "Deterrence: Then & Now,"
Proceedinqs (August 1996): 52.
141Admiral Jay Johnson and General Charles Krulak,
"Forward Presence in a Violent World," Surface Warfare (July
/August 1997): 4; Dismukes, National Security Strateqy and
Forward Presence, 49.
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together, and interoperability requires constant training
and exercises between U.S. and allied forces.1 42

Without

the presence of U.S. forces around the world, training
exercises likely would be limited in scope and frequency.
The requirements spelled out in the preceding
paragraphs form the basis of U.S. military strategy for the
twenty-first century.

The guiding document for U.S.

military planning, Joint Vision 2010, states the importance
of forward presence clearly:
The primary task of the Armed Forces will remain to
deter conflict--but, should deterrence fail, to fight
and win our nation's wars . . . . To ensure we can
accomplish these tasks, power projection, enabled by
overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental
strategic concept of our future force. 1 4 3
Why Naval Forward Presence?

If forward presence is the enabler of power projection,
what attributes make naval forward presence superior to
presence via land-based forces, whether ground units or air
units?

Both the Army and Air Force have their own unique

combat capabilities, and each will be vital in a regional
war.

Forward-based Army units possess the heavy forces

needed for sustained ground combat, while the Air Force has
the ability to conduct air superiority and strike missions

1 42 owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," 32.
143 Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense, 1994), 4.
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time to crises, and organic logistics.

In addition, naval

forces are a primary requirement for introducing Army or Air
Force units into a theater.
Only naval forces combine reliable access to most
regions of the world, forcible entry capability, minecountermeasures (MCM) capability, organic logistics for
combat operations, organic command and control facilities,
and (in the near future) organic TMD capabilities.145

More

importantly, naval forces can bring their capabilities to a
region without the need for host nation permission, since
they operate in international waters. 1 46

With a declining

availability of facilities to which the United States has
reliable access, the ability to operate independent of host
permission is invaluable, and allows naval forces to bring
U.S. tactical air power, U.S. land power, U.S. strike power,
and U.S. command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, sensors, and reconaissance (C 4 ISR) to any area
on earth that is accessible by sea.14 7

145 Roger Barnett, "Regional Conflict Requires Naval
Forces," Proceedings (June 1992): 31-32.
146Morgan, "Preparing for Tomorrow's Troubles," 51.
147 Ectward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 1.
Also, it is significant that 70 percent of the world's
population reside within one hundred miles of the sea,
allowing U.S. naval forces access to the majority of earth's
strategically important locations. See Scott Gourley,
"Expanding the Littoral Battlespace," Sea Power (June 1998):
45.
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After naval forces enter a region, their high level of
sustainability allows them to keep station for weeks or even
months at a time.

With the ability to take on fuel,

food,

ammunition, spare parts, personnel, and electronic data at
sea, naval forces comprise a "sea base" for the projection
of power, and can monitor events in a region without the
entanglements of being stationed in a host nation.

As an

extreme example of sustainability, USS Eisenhower (CVN-69)
and her battle group spent 247 days out of a 252-day period
at sea during the 1979-1980 Iran hostage crisis. 148 Even on
ordinary deployments in the absence of a crisis, at-sea
periods of five or six weeks are common, and may involve
several underway replenishment operations.
Flexibility is one of the most important
characteristics of naval forces.

Because U.S. naval forces

are the only forces that operate across all three mediums-on land, on and under the sea, and in the air--they are
uniquely flexible in responding to crises.14 9

In addition,

naval forces can respond to events at any level of the
spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian operations to major

148Admiral (retired) Carlisle A. H. Trost, "Maritime
Strategy for the 1990s," Proceedings Naval Review (May
1990): 97.
149 owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," 33.
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theater war.1 5 0

The ability of naval forces to take

station, monitor events, gather information, and respond
when directed at an appropriate level of violence (or nonviolence) to a crisis are the quintessential attributes of
forward presence forces.151
When naval forces take station in a region, their level
of visibility can be increased or decreased as the situation
warrants.

This scalability allows naval forces to announce

their presence very plainly, for instance when USS N.e.N

Jersey (BB-62) sailed within sight of the coast of Lebanon,
or to remain over the horizon, out of sight but not out of
mind.15 2

Thus naval forces can be present in crisis areas,

able to monitor events and intercede if necessary, without
being as provocative as land-based U.S. forces.

With the

emerging ability to put the Marines ashore from over the
horizon, maintaining ambiguity about the location of U.S.
naval forces will be a significant advantage.15 3

150 ••• From the
Navy, 1992, 6-7.

Sea (Washington, D.C.: Department of the

151 Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,'' 97.
1S2Barnett, "Regional Conflict Requires Naval Forces,"
33; Captain Robert Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence,"
Proceedinqs (August 1996): 38.
153 General Charles Krulak, "Projecting Combat Power
Ashore: The Marine Corps in Transition," Armed Forces
Journal International (March 1994): 27.
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When naval forces deploy to a region, their position in
international waters avoids the political issues involved in
having U.S. troops on foreign soil.

This is an important

requirement in many Islamic countries, notably Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, as well as in smaller countries that may desire
military-to-military relations and joint training with U.S.
forces, but do not want to be smothered by a large U.S.
presence. 1 5 4

Singapore, for example, is eager to train with

U.S. forces and to host U.S. port calls, but wishes to avoid
a large, permanent presence on its territory. 155

While on

station, naval forces' separation from land protects them
from the kinds of religious or political animosity that led
to the bombing of the Khobar Towers and Beirut Marine
barracks.

Also, their position allows naval forces to

withdraw from a crisis with far less publicity than landbased forces, and without signaling a U.S. retreat in the
eyes of regional friends and adversaries.156

15 4 James Lasswell, "Presence--Do We Stay or Do We Go?"
Joint Force ouarterly (Summer 1995): 85.
155 chiu, The Politics of overseas Bases, Appendix B, B26-27; Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S., Singapore Reach Agreement
Expanding Defense Ties," Defense News, 16-22 November 1998,
30.
156 charles Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1980), 15; Kahan and Sands, Alternative

Naval Deployment Concepts, 2-4.
88

Naval forces are quick to respond to crises due to
their regular positioning in likely trouble areas, and their
ability to shift locations as soon as they receive orders to

Independence (CV-62)

do so.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, USS

and USS

Eisenhower (CVN-69) were positioned in the Indian

Ocean and the Mediterranean, respectively.

Both carriers'

battle groups immediately set course for the Gulf, while
nearly a week passed before the first land-based forces
began deploying to Saudi Arabia.

The reason: ~he ground-

based forces had to wait until U.S.-Saudi agreements on the
size and composition of forces were completed. 1 5 7

In

addition to their ability to re-deploy at a moment's notice,
naval forces on routine deployment are essentially at full
combat readiness all the time.

In the words of one author,

"The Navy is always mobilized, and preparedness is a service
principle.

M-Day is every day for ships at sea."158

This

high level of readiness, which allows peacetime operations
to shift to combat operations in a matter of hours, adds to
the quick response time of naval forces.
When a crisis does escalate into a regional war, naval
forces will be the key enabler for deploying Army and Air

157 David Perin,

Aircraft Carriers: Why Do We Have Them?
How Many Do We Need? (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1993), 19.
158 George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 278;
Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 39.
89

Force units to the theater.

The Army's heavy equipment will

have to come by sea, requiring that the relevant SLOCs are
maintained open.

Mine countermeasures (MCM), long neglected

during the Cold War due to emphasis on open-ocean warfare
against the Soviet Navy, have received renewed focus in
recent years. 159

Diesel submarines, once a small threat to

deep-water nuclear powered submarines and carrier battle
groups, are a significant menace in shallow-water littoral
environments, and must be kept away from arriving cargo
ships.1 6 0

Air-launched anti-ship missiles have shown their

lethality to merchant ships and warships alike in the past,
and must also be defended against during a build-up for
regional war.161

Finally, the need for TMD capability from

the outset of a crisis is one of the most important
requirements of a future overseas deployment of U.S. forces,
and will be met in the near future by the Navy's Aegis-class
destroyers and cruisers.162

l5 9 Robert Holzer, "Study: Mines, Quieter Subs Pose
Looming Naval Threats," Defense News, 8-14 September 1997,
38.
1 6 0commander Joseph Lodmell, "It Only Takes One,"
Proceedinqs (December 1996): 30.
1 61 Mark Hewish, "The Menace Reawakens: Defense Against
Cruise," Jane's International Defense Review (December
1996): 28.
l6 2 Lt. Commander Charles Swicker, "Ballistic Missile
Defense from the Sea: The Commander's Perspective," Naval
War Colleqe Review (Spring 1997): 7; Weaver and Glaes,

Invitinq Disaster.
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Naval forces possess the combat capabilities, freedom
of movement, sustainability, flexibility, and quick
responsiveness needed to defend against uncertain and
unforeseen threats to U.S. interests.

The level of U.S.

dependence on the seas for safety and prosperity is unlikely
to diminish in the near future, or even the distant
future. 163

Thus the need for maritime forces, both Navy and

Marine Corps, to be deployed around the world in the
protection of U.S. interests will be an enduring
requirement:
Political emphases at home and abroad may wax and
wane, but it is difficult to imagine any lessening of
the nation's fundamental requirement for maritime
security to protect its most basic interests in the
future. 164

Naval Diplomacy
Edward Luttwak, in his 1974 work

The Political Uses of

Sea Power, opens with the observation that:
The familiar attributes of an oceanic navy--inherent
mobility, tactical flexibility, and a wide geographic
reach--render it peculiarly useful as an instrument
of policy even in the absence of hostilities. 165

163 until and unless scientific advances overcome the
laws of gravity and allow cheap transportation of goods by
air or space, the oceans will remain the principal highways
for U.S. commerce.
1 64 Joseph Alexander and Merrill Bartlett,

Sea Soldiers
in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare. 1945-1991 (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1995), 172.
165 Luttwak,

The Political Uses of Sea Power, 1.
91

Luttwak's point is a good one, and underscores the fact
that, for the majority of their existence, armed forces will
not be engaged in war, but in peacetime activities.

The

capability to fight wars, and the pursuit in peacetime of
better warfighting skills, has definite utility in U.S.
diplomatic relations with others.

However, the wide range

of peacetime activities that naval forces are able to
undertake, by virtue of their mobility, flexibility, and
reach, give them preeminent status as a peacetime tool of
U.S. diplomacy.
Naval diplomacy may be defined as actions short of war,
possibly involving the use of limited force, intended to
influence the thoughts and actions of other states or
individuals.

The older term "gunboat diplomacy" was well

known in previous eras, especially to such famous mariners
and sea-minded leaders as Admiral Horatio Nelson and
President Theodore Roosevelt.166

While the instruments of

naval diplomacy have changed from Nelson's and Roosevelt's
day, the principle of employing military force in actions

166Nelson is well known for the assertion that, "The
best diplomats are a fleet of English ships of war,", while
Roosevelt's famous "big stick" was the U.S. Navy's Great
White Fleet: "If the American nation will speak softly and
yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training a
thoroughly efficient Navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far."
See Robert Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval
Quotations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 88,
209.
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short of war is an age-old aspect of diplomacy.

Since most

if not all such actions must take place far from U.S.
territory, the sea services' mobility and freedom of
movement is their principal advantage in supporting American
diplomacy.
Naval diplomacy can include such activities and uses as
deterrence, signaling of U.S. interest, providing assurance
to allies, intimidation or suasion of adversaries, limited
combat operations, the enforcement of international
sanctions, the enforcement and protection of freedom of the
seas, and humanitarian and non-combatant evacuation
operations.16 7

At times naval diplomacy takes on the

appearance of "business as usual", as when Sixth Fleet ships
and aircraft sail the Mediterranean on routine deployment.
At other times, the latent power of U.S. naval forces is
plainly visible for all to see, as when those same ships
conduct strikes against Libyan facilities.

In both

instances, however, the intent is the same: to influence the
thoughts and actions of others, and to do so in a way that
safeguards U.S. interests.
An obvious but important point is that military forces
cannot be employed for diplomatic purposes without risk.
167An important difference between naval diplomacy and
gunboat diplomacy is the implicit threat of force in the
latter, whereas naval diplomacy includes non-combat aspects
such as evacuations and humanitarian operations. See Sir
James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," Proceedinqs
(August 1986): 38.
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Even in peacetime, when Sixth Fleet ships sail the
Mediterranean there is the not inconsiderable risk attendant
to ships at sea, and to the sailors and marines aboard those
ships.

Accidents during training, the dangerous environment

of the flight deck, the inherent danger of handling
explosive ordnance, the possibility of being mistaken as a
target during a war involving other states--all combine to
make daily life a dangerous affair for the Navy and Marine
Corps.168
When naval forces are used for naval diplomacy in areas
of tension or crisis, the risk to those forces increases
substantially.

Naval forces are not exempt from danger when

used for naval diplomacy, their other advantages
notwithstanding.

Particularly in light of the proliferation

of modern weapons among even third-rate powers, naval forces
employed in naval diplomacy may be at serious risk, as the

Stark incident demonstrated.169

However, the value provided

by having military force on the scene in potential trouble
spots warrants the continued presence of naval forces.

168During the author's brief service in the U.S. Navy,
each of the examples listed resulted in the loss of life of
sailors and marines: mid-air collisions between jet
aircraft; aviation boatswain's mates blown off the flight
deck; the USS .I..mia turret explosion; and the USS Stark
attack.
1 6 9william Smith, "As Sophisticated Weapons
Proliferate, More Than Ever the Navy Needs to Be Ready,"
Power (January 1995): 59-60.
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sea

Provided that rules of engagement are biased towards
protecting American naval forces,

the risks of naval

diplomacy are well worth taking.170
When using naval diplomacy, two forms of naval power
have shown themselves to be very well-suited to a wide
variety of situations.

The aircraft carrier has attained

premier status as the "big stick" of U.S. naval diplomacy,
carrying nearly as much diplomatic impact as it does
military capability.

Able to conduct a wide range of

military missions, and with logistical and medical
facilities for the largest of humanitarian operations, the
aircraft carrier is the embodiment of naval diplomacy. 171
The second highly-suited form of naval diplomacy is
the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious ready group (ARG).
fact,

In

for operations conducted during periods when the armed

forces as a whole are structured and postured for peace, the

170one of the most telling facts to come out of the
investigation of the Stark incident was the hazy ROE under
which U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf were required to
operate. While U.S. captains were authorized to warn and, if
necessary, to fire on approaching aircraft, one of the two
"overriding concerns" of U.S. leaders was to avoid
"political incidents," such as shooting down a "friendly"
Iraqi aircraft. See Michael Vlahos, "The Stark report,"
Proceedings Naval Review (May 1988): 65.
171Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 38; Sir
James Cable, "Showing the Flag," Proceedinqs (April 1984):
60.
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Marines' constant readiness for war makes them
indispensable:
The need for Marines as a ready force is paramount
when the Nation is largely demobilized; it may
actually recede after full mobilization. The
Nations's ground shock trooQs must be most ready when
the Nation is least ready.172
In a study of 215 incidents from 1946 to 1975 in which
U.S. forces responded, short of war, to crises around the
world, the Marine Corps was found to be a principal
participant in the majority of cases.

The reasons for the

frequent use of the Marines in crises are not hard to
understand:
The sort of limited politically oriented operation
which makes up most of the incidents may well
constitute the essence--that is, the central selfperception or purpose--of the corps . . . . Moreover,
the Marines are equipped, trained, and organized for
quick reaction, limited operations, and flexible
utilization. Most important, Marine Corps units have
been maintained afloat in the Mediterranean, the
Western Pacific, and often in the Caribbean,
throughout the postwar period.173
Events since 1975, including operations in Grenada,
Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia, and Haiti, have demonstrated the
lasting importance of having Navy-Marine ARGs at sea in
potential trouble spots.

The ability to deliver ground

combat forces from the sea, with supporting air power and
172 From the report of the 82nd Congress, cited in
General Charles Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument: The Force
in Readiness in National Defense," Strategic Review (Spring
1997): 10.
173 Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 45.
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naval fire support, is a threat no adversary can ignore when
U.S. naval forces are present.

Deterrence
Perhaps the most important function of naval diplomacy
is conventional deterrence.

Deterrence can be applied to

specific target states, or to uncertain entities that might
wish to do harm to U.S. forces or interests.

Naval forces,

due to their global mobility, combat power, and long inland
reach, are powerful agents of deterrence.

The Department of

Defense defines deterrence as:
the prevention from action by the fear of the
consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought
about by the existence of a creditable threat of
unacceptable counteraction.174
In order for deterrence to work, the deterring state
must present both the capability and credibility to produce
"unacceptable counteraction" for the state to be
deterred.175

Although both are required, capability is the

174 From Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, cited in Zimm,
"Deterrence: Then & Now," 50.
1 75 while the model of deterrence is well established,
it is very difficult to know when deterrence has worked.
Usually all that can be known with certainty about
deterrence is when it has failed; the absence of deterrence
failure, however, does not necessarily mean that deterrence
has been successful. This caveat aside, the components of
deterrence are capability and credibility. See Blechman and
Kaplan, Force Without War, 518; Jordan et al., American
National security, 36.
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prime requirement.

If the deterring state does not have (or

appear to have) the capability to carry out its threatened
action, it will have little if any credibility.
capability is present can credibility exist.

Only after

In the words

of Colin Gray, "Defense deters, if anything can."176
Recent events surrounding the appropriately-named
Mischief Reef have underscored the need for capability first
and foremost.

Chinese military construction on Mischief

Reef, in flagrant violation of an agreement reached with the
Philippines and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), has found Manila without the military means to
deter China, even though the reef is over one thousand miles
from China and a mere two hundred miles from the
Philippines.

As stated by the Philippines' Defense

Secretary, Orlando Mercado:
Many people now have begun to realize that we have
allowed ourselves to become so weak militarily that
we cannot back ug our diplomatic moves with a
credible force.177
Credibility in turn arises from the will to act, and
the belief in the minds of others that the threatened action
might actually be carried out.

In this regard, the level of

interest involved for the deterring state is of great

17 6 Gray, "Deterrence and Regional Conflict," 58.
177 steve Watkins, "Military Weakness Hampers
Philippines in China Dispute," Defense News, 16-22 November
1998, 3; See also Ralph Cossa, "Mischief Reef Flashpoint,"
Defense News, 11 January 1999, 13.
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importance.

A state with a vital interest at stake should

be judged more likely to carry out its deterrent threat than
a state with a marginal interest.

It is as much for this

reason as for defensive capability that U.S. ground troops
are forward-based in Kuwait and South Korea.

Any attack on

these countries almost certainly will cause U.S. casualties,
thereby threatening the vital U.S. interest of safety and
security of American citizens, and de facto involving the
United States in the conflict.

The placement of U.S.

servicemen in harm's way signals the level of U.S. interest
in the defense of these allies.

The knowledge of U.S.

involvement, with the full range of U.S. capabilities that
involvement would entail, strengthens the credibility of
deterrence in Kuwait and South Korea.178
Also important for deterrence is the perception of the
deterring state's willingness to resort to military force.
If the state has often taken action in the past, it will be
seen as more credible than a state that has only rarely
taken action.

Operations such as the MayaQuez rescue, the

Iran rescue attempt, and the Operations in the Vicinity of
Libya (OVL-I, -II, and -III) serve to create a reputation
for action, even if sometimes unsuccessful. 179

Conversely,

17 8Michael O'Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S.
Troops Home?" ForeiQn Policy (Winter 1998-99): 83.
179Allen, The Uses of Navies
"Crossing the Line," 40-42.
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in Peacetime, 11; Parks,

the abrupt departure from Somalia, and repeated toleration
of Saddam Hussein's violations of U.N. resolutions, serve to
create a reputation for inaction.

The prevailing impression

of will in the mind of the target state will be crucial to
the success or failure of deterrent efforts.

The periodic

display of will is itself an important action, as rogue
states and various bad actors tend to "push the envelope" of
acceptable behavior.180
Important in the context of will to use force is the
seemingly lower political penalty for using military force
from the sea, as opposed to using land-based forces.

The

March 1986 attacks by Sixth Fleet carrier aircraft on Libyan
patrol boats aroused little indignation among U.S. allies,
or even from Arab governments in the Mediterranean.

One

month later, when the United States requested basing support
for air strikes with land-based aircraft, only Britain
obliged the request.

Because U.S. allies can be distantly

supportive of U.S. action taken from the sea, as opposed to
actions originating from their territory, force from the sea
may be less constrained than force from land. 181

Thus it

follows that the threat of military force from the sea will
often be more credible than force from land.

lBOzimm, "Deterrence: Then

&

Now," 52.

lBlcable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," 40.
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Perhaps the most important factor in the mind of the
state to be deterred is the visibility of the deterrent
capability.

While some schools of thought, especially the

long-range air power school, believe that forces can exert
presence and deterrence from a distance, it seems more
likely that visible forces,

forces manifestly able to

observe and intervene in a crisis, and to "produce
unacceptable counteraction," will have the strongest
deterrent effect on an adversary.

This point is of great

importance, as it is the adversary's perception that
ultimately determines the success or failure of deterrence,
not U.S. perception.

Thus visibility is of paramount

importance to conventional deterrence. 182

U.S. naval

forces, whether carriers, ARGs, or surface combatants,
combine the military capability and visibility necessary to
produce a strong deterrent effect.

Emerging precision

guided weapons (PGMs), designed for use from the sea, should
make U.S. naval forces a deterrent even to large-scale
ground operations in the near future, while naval TMD

182 Thankfully, even some Air Force officers have called
into question the deterrent capability of forces in CONUS.
See "Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," letter to the
editor, Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 112, written by
Colonel Ronald Dietz, USAF. See also Lasswell, "Presence-Do
We Stay or Go," 84.
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capability should provide deterrence against the leverage of
ballistic missiles.183
Although it is difficult to judge the success of
deterrence, several examples of deterrence success and
failure highlight the need to combine capability with
credibility.

In the Yorn Kippur War of 1973, the Sixth Fleet

was able to deter the Soviet Union from conducting a sea
lift to Egypt.

While the United States had a vital interest

in Israel's survival, and thus could credibly threaten to
take action, the Soviets had at best a secondary interest at
stake, and deemed it not worthwhile to risk a conflict with
the United States. 184

In the 1987-88 convoy operations in

the Persian Gulf, Iranian attempts to mine the Strait and
conduct commando attacks on passing ships largely ceased
after U.S. forces demonstrated the capability to intercept
Iranian forces, even at night.185

In contrast to these

successes, naval operations in the Bay of Bengal in 1971 had
little or no effect on India, since the credibility of the
United States taking military action on the Indian

183 Glenn Goodman, "Nowhere To Hide," Armed Forces
Journal International (October 1997): 64; Willard Fallon,
"Combating the Ballistic Missile Threat," Proceedinqs (July
1994): 31.
184Jordan, "Naval Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf," 29.
185 Ronald O'Rourke, "The Tanker War,"
Review (May 1988): 32.
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subcontinent was marginal.18 6

Saddam Hussein also was not

deterred from invading Kuwait because of his perception of
U.S. interest, which he believed to be indifferent to
Kuwait's sovereignty.
These examples point out the critical relationship
between national interests, from which policy is derived,
and the ability to deter.

If a crisis does not involve

sufficient interest for U.S. intervention in the mind of the
aggressor, deterrence likely will fail.

Likewise, if the

threatened action is not credible to the situation, because
the action is not proportionate to the interest, deterrence
likely will fail.

The relationship between the level of

interest, the threatened action, and the credibility of
naval deterrence is summed up by Sir James Cable: "Gunboat
diplomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular
kind of screw.

It is not a hammer that will bang home any

old nail. 111 8 7
The wide range of options that U.S. naval forces
provide the National Command Authority in crisis response,
often referred to as a "rheostat" of options, allows U.S.
policy-makers to threaten a credible, proportionate action,
and set limits on the options available to the deterred
state.

This is especially true due to the very high

186 Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 518.
18 7 cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," 39.
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readiness of U.S. naval forces, which can shift to combat
operations on very short warning.

Luttwak refers to this

feature of naval deterrence as, "a shadow that impinges on
the freedom of action of adversaries, because the
capabilities can be activated at any time."188
The ability to combine a certain vagueness of intent
with uncertainty of location makes naval forces ideal for
this role, which Luttwak calls "latent suasion." 189

The

ability to operate in international waters, to take station
close up or at a distance, the range of capabilities
provided, the ability to remain for months at a time, and
the responsiveness of forces on the scene, have made U.S.
naval forces the "preeminent military force in discrete
political operations" in the post-World War Two era.l90

A

former Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command
(CinCCENTCOM), Army General Binford Peay, sums up the
deterrent utility of naval forces:
Because of their limited footprint, strategic
agility, calculated ambiguity of intent, and major
strategic and operational deterrent capability, naval
forces are invaluable. Our ability to rapidly move
these forces in 1993 and again in 1994 from the
Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf to positions
off the coast of Somalia and Kuwait demonstrates
extraordinary utility and versatility . . . . The
188 Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, 11.
1B 9 rbid.
190Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 529.
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carrier battle group, in particular, has been an
unmistakable sign of U.S. commitment and resolve in
the Central Region.191

Siqnalinq

u.s.

Interest/Supportinq

u.s.

Allies

One of the principal methods for the United States to
signal its interest in a region or country is by dispatching
military forces.

Given the global mobility of naval forces,

and their freedom to come and go in international waters,
warships clearly make good "diplomats", as Nelson observed.
Add to this mobility the visibility of naval forces and it
is not surprising that the Navy has been the service of
choice for sending a signal of U.S. interest for the last
fifty years. 1 92

Army and Air Force units can be employed in

this role as well, but encounter political, logistical, and
risk concerns from which naval forces largely are exempt.
Again, it is not intended to marginalize the need for land
forces in places like Kuwait or Korea. However, for
providing a flexible, mobile, and responive means of
signalling U.S. interest, naval forces remain superior to
land forces.
The first post-World War Two use of naval forces for
signaling occurred in 1946, when USS Missouri

(BB-63) was

191Quoted in Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence,"

37.
19 2 Roger Barnett, "U.S. Strategy, Freedom of the Seas,
Sovereignty and Crisis Management," Strateqic Review (Winter
1992): 32.
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sent to Turkey by President Truman.1 9 3

Ostensibly sent to

return the body of the late Turkish ambassador in style, in
reality the Missouri's mission was to signal U.S. support
for the Turks, who were being pressured by Stalin to renegotiate the Montreaux Convention.

The Missouri's presence

in this instance largely was symbolic, as no single warship,
not even the "Mighty Mo", could have any decisive impact on
the military balance in the eastern Mediterranean.194
Nonetheless, the appearance of a U.S. capital ship in a
Turkish port gave Turkey a boost in confidence in dealings
with the Soviets, and laid the groundwork for a lasting
U.S.-Turkish alliance.
The deployment of naval forces to a region can signal
U.S. interest without targeting a certain state, as a
deterrent deployment might aim to do.

Over the last fifty

years, the deployment of U.S. naval forces has become part
of the landscape in strategically important areas, and has
served to emphasize U.S. interest in the Mediterranean, the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.195

Even

greater emphasis is placed on a region when U.S. naval
forces are homeported or headquartered there.196

The

193 Baer, 100 Years of sea Power, 282.
194 Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, 32.
195Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 15.
196 Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward
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Seventh Fleet homeports a CVBG and an ARG in Japan, while
the Sixth Fleet is headquartered in Italy.

After the Gulf

War, the Fifth Fleet was re-established and headquartered in
Bahrain, replacing the five-ship Mid East Force with a
thirty-ship fleet as a signal of U.S. interest in the
Gulf. 197
In each of the three strategic hubs, the presence of
U.S. naval forces serves to promote stability, a requirement
for continuity of trade.

For example, the Seventh Fleet in

the Pacific does not have to be postured to deter any one
Asian nation, but can convey to all observers the fact that
the United States is interested in the stability of this
region.

In fact, many observers judge U.S. naval presence

in the Pacific to be the principal stabilizing force in an
important region:
Perhaps most critical for U.S. interests in this
region will be a sustained and visible naval presence
that will reassure friends and allies about the
United States' commitment to the region's political
stability, which is necessary for economic
prosperity.198

Presence, 2.
197In 1982, nearly a decade before the Gulf War, the
authors of Projection of Power advocated stationing a U.S.
fleet in the Persian Gulf, and even advocated homeporting an
aircraft carrier in the region. See Ra'anan et al.,
Projection of Power, 98-99. Also, Redd, "Fifth Fleet,
Arriving," 48.
19 8 Don DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy,"
Proceedinqs (November 1994): 76.
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In addition to general, day-to-day signaling via
presence, naval forces can send specific messages to
specific states through a variety of means.

The means can

be subtle or highly visible, and can show support or
intimidate as needed, often at the same time.

One of the

most common means of showing support for an ally is through
a port visit by U.S. ships.

Easily arranged and beneficial

both to U.S. sailors and the local economy, a visit to Haifa
or Singapore serves to re-affirm the close ties between the
United States and allies.

Ordinarily low-key, a port visit

can also be a pointed reminder to potential enemies of U.S.
capability in a region.

In November 1992, for example, USS

Topeka (SSN-754) held a very visible port visit in Bahrain.
Conducted at the time the first of three Kilo-class
submarines was in transit to Iran from Russia, the visit
served both to remind Iran of the presence of a premier
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform in the Gulf, and to
re-assure the GCC states of U.S. interest in their
safety. 199
Another means of sending a signal of U.S. interest in
events is a significant change in established operating
pattern or tempo.

An increased number of patrol flights

199Although not known for their visibility--the service
motto being "the Silent Service"--in this instance a visit
by a submarine to a U.S. ally proved highly useful in
displaying U.S. interest in the Gulf. See Jan Breemer,
"Where Are The Submarines?" Proceedings (January 1993): 38.
108

from a CVBG, or the placement of a naval force in greater
proximity to a certain location, can signal a departure from
normal operating procedure due to heightened interest.

An

example of such a signal occurred in 1973, at the outset of
the Yorn Kippur War.

The USS

Independence (CV-62) put to sea

immediately on 6 October in the eastern Mediterranean,
signaling increased U.S. interest and watchfulness.

At the

same time, USS Kennedy (CV-67) remained in port in Scotland,
signaling U.S. restraint during a crisis.

When the Soviets

began to show signs of an impending air lift and sea lift to
Egypt, three U.S. carriers concentrated near Crete, a major
departure from normal operating patterns and a strong signal
of U.S. preparedness to act.200
In the late 1970s, an increase in the tempo and
frequency of U.S.-Thailand exercises served to re-assure
Thailand of U.S. support in the face of Vietnamese
provocation.

The annual COBRA GOLD exercises continue to

demonstrate U.S. support for Thailand.

Also in late 1970s,

during the civil war in Yemen, the United States sent the
USS

Constellation (CV-64) CVBG to the Gulf of Aden, as well

as sending Air Force E-3 aircraft to Saudi airfields, to
show support for Saudi Arabia.201
200Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 24-26; John
Douglass, "Often the Only Option," Proceedings (February
1998): 34.
201 Adarn Siegel,

To Deter. Compel. and Reassure in
International Crises: The Role of u.s. Naval Forces
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The deployment of the USS

Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS

Independence (CV-62) CVBGs near the Taiwan Strait in March
1996, in response to Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, also
marked a major departure from normal operating procedure, as
well as a massive concentration of U.S. firepower.2° 2

The

concentration of two CVBGs sends a message simply by virtue
of the latent combat power represented by these forces.2o 3
The level of capability carried by a CVBG or ARG is one of
the reasons these two forms of naval power are so useful in
signaling U.S. interest, and is why U.S. regional commanders
want these assets to be present even when conditions in
their region seem calm:
The presence of U.S. Navy ships has come to represent
an expression of U.S. interest backed by readily
deployable forces.
This presence reassures allies
and is one reason that Unified Commanders still
demand carriers and amphibious forces even in the
absence of an identifiable threat.204
Under the National Security Strategy, which emphasizes
engagement, the ability to re-assure allies and signal

(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1995), 22. At
least in part because of the timely deployment of U.S.
forces to support Saudi Arabia in 1979, the Saudi government
granted full base access to U.S. forces in 1990.
20 2 Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: status,
Prospects, 55-57.
203 Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 52;
Linn, "Naval Forces In The Post-Cold War Era," 20.
20 4 Linn, "Naval Forces in the Post-Cold War Era," 20.
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interest will be an important function of U.S. military
forces.205

Given the mobility, sustainability, visibility,

and responsiveness of naval forces, it seems likely that the
Navy-Marine Corps team will continue to be the instrument of
choice for signaling U.S. interest in the future.

Limited Use of Force
The strongest possible use of naval diplomacy is the
use of military force in limited operations that do not
qualify as war, either in response to or in anticipation of
actions taken by another state or entity. 2 06

The ability to

apply force in a controlled manner, in incremental levels as
the situation warrants, makes this aspect of naval diplomacy
useful for situations in which the United States cannot
tolerate the status quo, is not willing or able to retreat,
but does not wish to engage in a regional war. 207

Limited

20 5 william Johnsen, The Future Roles of U.S. Military
Power and Their Implications (Carlisle, PA: Army War
College, 1997), viii, 11.
2 06The emerging stature of non-state terrorist
organizations world-wide means that naval diplomacy can be
applied to groups of individuals, without necessarily being
directed at the state those individuals reside in. The
recent cruise missile strikes against targets in Sudan and
Afghanistan, and the 1985 intercept of an airliner carrying
the Achille Lauro hijackers by Navy F-14 aircraft, are
examples of naval diplomacy in which U.S. force is applied
to individuals, not governments. See Jeffrey Simon, U........S.....
Countermeasures Aqainst International Terrorism (Fort
Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center,
1990), 25-28.
20 7 Breemer, "Naval Strategy is Dead," 53.
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strikes may be seen as a corollary to deterrence, in which
the United States provides a demonstration of capability and
will to an adversary, while still allowing the adversary to
reverse course and cease its misbehavior.
Because ground forces are more difficult to move into a
region, and because ground forces can have little direct
effect on an adversary without entering his territory, the
utility of Army forces for limited military action is
problematic.208 Unless Army forces are located in an
adjacent state, they will likely be unable to bring force to
bear, and will require permission from the host state.

If

Army forces are employed in limited action, the risk of
sustaining U.S. casualties will be proportionate to the
number of ground troops employed, and will be higher than
for air or naval forces in any case.209
Given the arguments against ground troops in most
cases, the instruments of choice for the limited use of

208rt is important to note the distinction between the
limited use of military force, which entails attacking some
target set of value to an adversary, and political-military
operations such as the intervention in Somalia, which may
not involve physical attacks on any targets, except in selfdefense.
2 09The Mayaquez rescue operation, conducted by Marine
ground troops, often is criticized for having resulted in
forty-one U.S. casualties in the rescue of forty
crewmembers. See Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 11.
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force have been aircraft-delivered weapons. 21 0

In recent

years, cruise missiles and other PGMs also have been used,
obviating the need for the aircraft and pilot in many cases.
The attractiveness of aircraft or PGMs stems from their
ability to conduct discrete, controlled attacks from great
distance, to limit collateral damage, and to minimize the
number of U.S. servicemen put at risk.

Because the United

States is well above most regional powers in the balance of
air power vs. air defenses, the air strike has been a
favored method for employing limited force.
Naval forces provide the ability to deliver U.S. strike
aircraft to any region of the world that can be approached
from the sea, with the all-important virtue of independence
from host nation permission.

The CVBG has no peer in this

regard, as its air wing can deliver a wide range of weapons
to targets hundreds of miles inland.

In addition, the

continued development of such autonomous weapons as the
Tomahawk cruise missile, the stand-off land attack missile
(SLAM and SLAM-ER), the joint stand-off weapon (JSOW), and
the land-attack Standard missile (LASM), allow even smaller
surface combatants and submarines to deliver potent strike
weapons from the sea.211
2 1°commander Robert Stumpf, "Air War With Libya,"
Proceedings (August 1986): 42; Hessman, "Forward-Thinking
and Forward Deployed," 20-21.
2llcaptain Richard Wright, "Shaping the Battlefield:
The 21st-Century Navy," Surface Warfare (March/April 1998):
113

The employment of cruise missiles, especially
Tomahawks, is extremely appropriate in many cases due to the
nature of typical targets for limited use of force.

High-

value assets of an adversary, such as military airfields,
air defense systems, or command and control facilities, tend
to be large, static targets.

Thus cruise missiles, which

can find such targets with increasing accuracy, can allow
the use of force with no risk of U.S. casualties.212
Emerging technology being introduced into the Tomahawk
program should allow Tomahawks to be used against mobile
targets in the future, as well as providing for immediate
battle damage assessment.213

While Tomahawks or similar

cruise missiles may not be appropriate for every target,

for

example terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan, they
are very appropriate for attacking large, fixed targets with
no risk of U.S. casualties.
What other means does the United States have for
employing limited military force?

Unless ground troops are

to be sent into a foreign country to conduct attacks,
aircraft and missiles are the only options.

The Air Force

has tremendous striking power in its tactical aircraft, as

33-35.
212Rear Admiral Walter Locke and Kenneth Werell, "Speak
Softly and ... " Proceedinqs (October 1994): 32.
213 vision.

Presence. Power, 71.
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well as in its inventory of cruise missiles and stand-off
weapons.

Air force bombers, particularly the B-2, are able

to conduct strike missions from far greater distance than
carrier aircraft, even from CONUS if necessary.

However,

all Air Force aircraft except heavy bombers require the
permission of a host nation for launching strikes,
permission that may not be forthcoming. 21 4
The ability of U.S. naval forces to conduct strikes
from international waters, free of host nation permission,
is an advantage that cannot be overstated.

Naval forces are

the ideal instrument for the employment of military force
short of war, and enjoy access to virtually all potential
trouble areas by sea.

Naval strike aircraft, such as the

FA-18E/F, can deliver ordnance up to six hundred miles
inland, while Tomahawks can attack targets up to fifteen
hundred miles from their launch points, making few areas on
earth immune to U.S. naval strike capability.215

Given the

littoral location of almost all plausible sites for the use
of limited military force, the ability to employ modern-day

214 Davis,

Power, 34.

Aircraft carriers and the Role of Naval

215James Hessman, "Overwhelming Air Power-From the
Sea," Sea Power (June 1997): 27; Daniel Murphy, "Achieving
21st Century Naval Mastery," Surface Warfare (March/April
1998): 8.
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"gunboat diplomacy" makes forward-deployed naval forces
indispensable.

Enforcement of Economic sanctions
The ongoing enforcement of economic sanctions against
Iraq is yet another form of naval diplomacy.

Imposed after

the Gulf War, the sanctions are intended to motivate Iraqi
compliance with UNSCOM inspections of Iraqi facilities.

For

maritime sanctions enforcement, only on-scene naval forces
will do.

The need to stop, board, search, and detain

smugglers cannot be met with land or air forces, nor can it
be met from CONUs.216
Since the establishment of Maritime Intercept
Operations (MIO), conducted by the Multinational Intercept
Force (MIF), over eleven thousand suspected smugglers have
been stopped in the Persian Gulf.21 7

Supported by Task

Force 50 of the Fifth Fleet, the MIF since 1991 has
conducted the largest maritime intercept operation in
history.218
From 1991-1995, over 80 percent of attempts to smuggle
oil through the Persian Gulf were foiled by the MIF.

After

U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 was signed, however,
216nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 52.
21711 Sentinels of International Will," All Hands (July
1998): 7.
218 Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49.
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allowing Iraqi oil sales for food and medical supplies, the
interception of oil smugglers has dropped off.

A principal

reason for the reduction in successful intercepts has been,
and continues to be, Iranian assistance to Iraqi
smugglers.219
By allowing Iraqi ships to sail inside the twelve-mile
limit of Iran's territorial waters, Iran effectively
prevents the MIF from conducting intercepts.

Vice Admiral

Thomas Fargo, a former commander of Fifth Fleet, described
the Iranian actions as, "a rather sophisticated effort," and
indicated that substantial portions of illegal Iraqi oil
proceeds were being diverted to Iranian authorities in
return for their assistance. 2 20

Some Iraqi ships reportedly

have been allowed to fly the Iranian flag after entering
Iranian waters, further complicating the problem of
intercepting them.221
Despite Iranian efforts to help Iraq circumvent the
U.N. sanctions, ships of the Fifth Fleet and the MIF remain
on station in the Gulf, with U.S. ships of Task Force 50

219Lt. Commander William Bray, "Five Fleets: Around the
World with the Nimitz," Proceedings (January 1999): 80.
220"u.s. Admiral Says Iraq, Aided by Iran, Is Smuggling
Oil in Gulf," New York Times, 12 February 1997, A7.
221 Tom Chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian
Gulf," Surface warfare (March/April 1997): 4.
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conducting the majority of intercepts. 222

A minimum of two

U.S. ships are constantly on duty conducting maritime
intercepts, including boarding, searching, and, when
violators are caught, escorting ships to Gulf ports for
further investigation.223

Enforcing and Protecting Freedom of the Seas
One of the long-standing principles of international
law is the right of free passage on the seas.

Especially

for a maritime nation, such as the United States, freedom of
the seas is a vital national interest.

As currently

defined, the limit of a coastal state's territorial waters
is twelve miles, beyond which any nation has the right to
navigate and overfly the world's seas and oceans.

Within

twelve miles, ships are allowed "innocent passage," but
overflights are not permitted.

Excessive claims to offshore

waters as territorial waters, based on abuse of
international definitions of territorial bodies of water,
consistently have been resisted by the United States, at
times through the use of naval forces to challenge excessive
claims.224

222 "NAVCENT: Forward Presence,"
/April 1997): 14.

Surface Warfare (March

22 3chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian Gulf," 2.
224Parks, "Crossing the Line," 41-42.
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In the modern era, President Ronald Reagan was one of
the strongest proponents for aggressive defense of freedom
of the seas.

After the Carter administration's half-hearted

attempts to protect freedom of the seas, the Reagan
administration produced formal guidelines for freedom of
navigation (FON) operations.

The first such FON operation

occurred on 18 August 1981, when USS

Forrestal (CV-59) and

USS Nimitz (CVN-68) sailed into the Gulf of Sidra, claimed
by Libya as a territorial sea.

Libya's claim was legally

unjustifiable, and could have set a precedent for the many
similar claims around the world.

After F-14s from the

carriers were fired on by Libyan Su-22 fighters,
planes were shot down in self-defense.

the Libyan

No further incidents

occurred, and the carriers left the Gulf a few days
later.225
After renewed Libyan claims to the Gulf of Sidra,
including Colonel Gadhafi's assertion that the line of
thirty-two degrees, thirty minutes North Latitude
constituted the "Line of Death", President Reagan authorized
the 1986 OVL operations.

OVL-III, conducted from 23-29

March 1986, involved the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers USS

Coral Sea (CV-43), uss Saratoqa (CV-60), and uss America
(CV-66), along with their escorts.

On 24 March these ships

steamed into the Gulf of Sidra in a direct challenge to
225 rbid., 43-44.
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Gadhafi's claims.

When Libyan SAMs were fired at U.S.

aircraft, the carriers responded with strikes against Libyan
facilities and ships.

As in 1981, Libyan provocation ceased

after the first U.S. retaliation.226
One year later, in 1987, President Reagan again
authorized a FON operation, this time in the Persian Gulf.
The Iran-Iraq War had spread to include attacks on each
adversary's shipping.

The attacks, which included

minelaying and aircraft-delivered anti-ship missiles,
threatened to interrupt the steady flow of oil to world
economies, as attacks by Iran often targeted Iraq's two
principal supporters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.2 27

Just two

months after the Stark incident, Reagan authorized the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers with the U.S. flag, and the
formation of convoys escorted by U.S. warships.2 28

Although

Iranian attacks continued for some time after the convoys
were established, by the end of 1987 twenty-three convoys
had been escorted through the Gulf, and Iranian efforts to
conduct commando attacks with small boats largely had ceased
after Marine Corps helicopter gunships repeatedly

226stumpf, "Air War With Libya," 46-47.
22 7 see Appendix A, Table 7, for a chronology of events
in the Gulf in 1987.
228captain Frank Seitz, U.S. Merchant Marine, "S.S.
Bridgeton: The First Convoy," Proceedings Naval Review (May
1988): 52.
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intercepted the Iranian forces.229

The FON operations,

although costly and dangerous, were justified by the
imperative in U.S. national security and foreign policy of
maintaining freedom of the seas.
Another threat to freedom of the seas, less well-known
and seemingly anachronistic, is modern-day piracy.
Occurring primarily in and among the islands of the East
Indies and the South China Sea, roughly eighty acts of
piracy are recorded each year, half of them involving
violence.

Not surprisingly, the ASEAN defense forces

allocate significant effort and resources to combating the
problem of piracy.230

U.S. naval forces, through training

and joint exercises, assist ASEAN nations in their ongoing
efforts to fight piracy.
Enforcing and protecting freedom of the seas is one of
the Navy's principal responsibilities, and is conducted
essentially every day by underway ships.

The focus on the

Mediterranean, the Gulf, and Northeast Asia indicates the
importance of the SLOCs in these regions, but all of the
world's international waters receive the benevolent
attention of the U.S. Navy.

229o'Rourke, "The Tanker War," 30, 34.
230Russ Swinnerton, "Piracy Remains A Concern For
Southeast Asian Nations," Defense News, 25-31 August 1997,
8.
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The preceding sections, covering deterrence, signaling
and re-assuring, limited use of force,

sanctions

enforcement, and enforcement and protection of freedom of
the seas, comprise the broad concept of naval diplomacy.
Each is a useful tool for U.S. relations with other nations,
provided that the risks and limitations of each is
understood.

It is the unique features of naval forces, and

primarily their ability to come and go at will in
international waters, that make possible the wide array of
actions encompassed by naval diplomacy.
Maintaining Interoperability with Allies

Although U.S. forces are the best-equipped and most
capable in the world, it is both sensible and advantageous
to involve U.S. allies whenever possible, both in peacetime
and in times of crisis or conflict.

While the United States

must maintain the capability to act alone, it is especially
important that U.S. allies be able to participate in a
meaningful way in regional crises or conflicts.

Without the

willingness and ability of allies to participate in crises
taking place in their regions, it is doubtful that the U.S.
public would support military action to protect them. 231
The various documents that guide U.S. defense planning
reflect the desire for allied and coalition assistance in

231nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51.
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U.S. national security whenever possible.

The National

Security Strategy states that:
No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot
always secure these basic goals unilaterally . . . the
threats and challenges we face frequently demand
cooperative, multinational solutions.232
The National Military Strategy provides similar
commentary:
Because we will often act in concert with like-minded
nations, as we implement JV 2010, we must also retain
interoperability with our allies and potential
coalition partners.233
The overarching document for the armed forces, Joint
Vision 2010, states:
We must find the most effective methods for
integrating and improving interoperability with
allied and coalition partners. Although our Armed
Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we
expect to work in concert with allied and coalition
forces in nearly all of our future operations.234
Finally, the principal concept of operations for the
Navy-Marine Corps team, Forward ••• From the Sea, states:
In peacetime U.S. naval forces build
"interoperability" . . . so that in the future we can
easily participate fully as part of a formal
multinational response or as part of "ad hoc"
coalitions forged to react to short-notice crisis
situations. 235
232 clinton, National Security strategy, 12.
233 National Military strateqy, 17.
234Joint Vision 2010, 9.
235 Forward ••• From the Sea (Washington, D.C.: Department
of the Navy, 1994), 3.
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If U.S. allies are to possess interoperability with
U.S. forces, there is no substitute for regular training
exercises between U.S. and allied forces. 23 6

It was not

through coincidence or accident that U.S. and NATO forces
were fully interoperable in the Gulf War, but through
constant training in Europe during the Cold War.
Conversely, U.S. and Syrian forces were almost totally noninteroperable, and remain so today.23 7
Forward-deployed forces obviously are the best-suited
to the role of training with allies, since forward-deployed
forces operate in regions of U.S. interest where allies are
located.

U.S. naval forces, as described earlier, continue

to focus on maintaining forward presence in the
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia.
Accordingly, U.S. naval forces constantly train with the
armed forces of allies in these regions.

236Lt. Commander Craig Faller, interview by author, 20
January 1999, via e-mail. "The allies look to the U.S. for
leadership in this area. And while we can talk about it or
discuss issues or even wargame together--the only way to
truly test concepts, doctrine and equipment is by doing it."
Lt. Commander Faller served as Executive Officer on USS .iIQ.hn.
Hancock (DD-981) before reporting to N513 at the Pentagon.
See also Dismukes, National security Strategy and
Forward Presence, 47. "Interoperability is achieved
exclusively through interoperations. Practically speaking,
only forces forward can generate it."
237Ibid., 46; Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted
World," 31.
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In the Mediterranean, ships and aircraft of the Sixth
Fleet conduct frequent exercises with NATO forces.238

In

the Persian Gulf, U.S. allies participate daily in ongoing
operations, such as the MIO efforts.239

U.S. Fifth Fleet

and GCC naval forces also conduct a variety of exercises,
including operations ashore involving Marine ground
units.240

In recent years, such exercises have included MCM

efforts with Omani ships in the Strait of Hormuz, providing
valuable training for a vital wartime need.

In addition to

such formal exercises, U.S. naval forces make regular use of
the facilities owned by the UAE, especially the deep-water
port of Jebel Ali and dry-dock facilities at Dubai. 241

In

the Pacific, U.S. Seventh Fleet units conduct regular
training with naval forces from Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.242
In all, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps conduct around
300 exercises annually, of which nearly half involve allied

238McAnally, "NATO's Post-Cold War Internal
Adaptations," 160.
239Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49.
240 captain Scott Lopez and Sgt. Marc Ayalin, "ARG
Employment: America's Maritime Assault Weapon," Surface
Warfare (March/April 1997): 17.
2411t. Commander Jeffrey Macris, "Knowing Thy Gulf
Partners," Proceedings (March 1998): 39.
242 Tbe United states security strategy for the East
Asia-Pacific Region 1998, 8.
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forces.

The exercise goals typically include training in

basic combat skills, developing common doctrine and
operational procedures, and ensuring that command, control,
and communications procedures and equipment are fully
interoperable.243

Given the high likelihood that future

regional conflicts will be coalition efforts, the ability of
forward-deployed U.S. forces to conduct regular training
with allies helps to build and maintain the necessary
military-to-military contacts, ensuring that U.S. and allied
forces are familiar with each other's operational and
doctrinal practices.244
Familiarizing U.S. Forces with Regional Conditions

Each of the regions to which U.S. forces routinely
deploy have unique features and patterns, which may not be
apparent to forces stationed in CONUS.

Familiarity with a

region requires presence in the region, and is one of the
stronger arguments against a CONUS-based national security
strategy.

For example, the Persian Gulf is a very busy and

congested place, with hundreds of VLCCs, naval vessels,
smaller cargo vessels, and small boats constantly present.
The large number of offshore oil rigs have provided starting
243Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,'' 98;
Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward Presence,
47; Johnsen, The Future Roles of
Military Power, 26.

u.s.

244 Dietz, "Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," 112;
Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," 41-42.
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points for attacks on shipping in the past.245

Vice Admiral

Redd's description of the Gulf makes clear the need for U.S.
forces to be familiar with regions where they may be
required to fight:
The threat is proximate, real, and varied, from lowtech Boghammers and mines to tactical air and air-,
sea-, and ground-launched antiship cruise missiles . .
. . It is an incredibly busy theater . . . . Military
forces must understand the region and all its
dimensions. That comes only through beini there and
operating in the demanding environment.2 6
Constant presence in a region, whether on land or at
sea, allows U.S. forces to become familiar with the features
and conditions of the region, and to incorporate these
features into operational and contingency plans.2 47
For example, during the OVL-I and -II operations, USS

Coral Sea and USS Saratoqa had built up familiarity with
Libyan flight patterns, radar patterns, ship movements, and
communications capabilities, as well as having honed their
own tactical and communications practices.

When USS America

arrived to take part in OVL-III, her crews and pilots had to
acquaint themselves quickly with local conditions. 248

If

U.S. forces were required to respond to a crisis from CONUS,

245smith, "GCC Regional Security," 6.
246Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49, 51.
24 7 0 1 Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops
Home?" 83.
248stumpf, "Air War With Libya," 46.
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it is doubtful that they would have available the
intelligence on the theater needed to allow operations to be
as safe and efficient as possible.

Through lack of

familiarity, the incidence of mistakes, losses, and
collateral damage should be expected to be higher than for
forces already familiar with the area. 249

The routine

deployment of naval forces to important regions, and the
ability of naval forces to gather intelligence on the region
through a variety of means, allows U.S. commanders to remain
current on conditions in the region from day to day.

Crisis Response
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the
corresponding reduction in the likelihood of a global
general war, one of the primary duties of the Armed Forces
of the United States has become crisis response.

Since the

end of World War Two, U.S. forces have responded to an
average of five crises annually.2 5 0

Crisis response may

entail anything from non-combatant evacuation operations
(NEO) to major theater war (MTW), but the ability to respond
quickly to short- or no-warning crises clearly is one of the
principal requirements placed on America's military forces
in the post-Cold War world.

Small-scale contingencies,

249 Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 53.
250Perin, Aircraft carriers, 4.
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falling somewhere along the continuum of crises below MTW,
are expected to form the majority of future events requiring
the intervention of U.S. military forces:
Based on recent experience and intelligence
projections, the demand for smaller-scale contingency
operations is expected to remain high over the next
15 to 20 years . . . . these operations will still
likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S.
forces through 2015.251
Forward-deployed forces are inherently more capable of
responding to crises than forces in CONUS, since forwarddeployed forces will be nearer to crisis locations.

Naval

forces in particular are well-suited for crisis response, at
any point along the spectrum of crisis, due to their
mobility and independence of movement.2 52

Especially if the

warning of an impending event is ambiguous, in which case
political difficulties may exist in the deployment of U.S.
ground or land-based air forces into a region, naval forces
can move into the region and take up position without
depending on host nation permission.
Appendix A, Table Eight presents a description of
crises that naval forces have responded to between January
1991 and October 1998.

The following sections will proceed

from the low end of the crisis spectrum towards the high

251 cohen, Report
Section 3, page 8.

of the Quadrennial Defense Review,

252 Kahan and sands,

concepts, 2-6.
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end, which is major theater war.

One of the most prominent

forms of crisis response in the post-Cold War period has
been the NEO, usually conducted by Navy-Marine Corps ARGs
and their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU).

Non-Combatant Evacuation operations <NEOl
The NEO is the specialty of the Marine Corps, as it
usually requires the ability to put forces ashore, with
organic and supporting firepower and air support, secure an
area, identify and load civilians, and transport the
civilians back to the Marines' ships.

Often the location to

be secured is well inland, requiring the "vertical'' assault
capability of the Marines' CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters.
While a few special cases may be conducted by other naval
forces, the ARG with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable), known as MEU(SOC), is tailormade for the NEO mission.

An ARG consists of three amphibious ships, usually one
big-deck amphibious ship (LHA or LHD) capable of operating
helicopters and AV-8B Harrier jets, and two other amphibious
ships.

The embarked MEU(SOC) consists of approximately

twenty-one hundred Marines, four AH-lT Super Cobra
helicopters, six Harriers, a SEAL detachment, and various
combat support and logistics units.

The ARG's Marines are

not considered special forces, but are tasked with being
mission-capable for twenty-one special missions, including
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clandestine recon/surveillance, tactical recovery of
aircraft and personnel, and specialized demolition, among
others.253

Additionally, each MEU(SOC) is required to be

capable of launching any of the twenty-one special missions
within six hours of receiving orders from the regional
Cinc.254
For many of its missions, the MEU(SOC) will employ a
special formation, known as the Maritime Special Purpose
Force (MSPF), a unit built around the MEU(SOC) 's
reconnaissance teams.

All members are qualified swimmers,

qualified close combat (pistol) shooters, trained in assault
climbing, and possess other small-team skills.255
Frequently paired with the ARG's embarked SEAL detachment,
the MSPF can also operate independently.

Past missions

conducted by MSPFs include the destruction of Iranian oil
platforms and the rescue of Air Force pilot Scott
O'Grady.256

253Arthur Brill, "Anatomy of a MEU(SOC)," Sea Power
(December 1997): 42. See Appendix A, Table 9 for a full
listing of MEU(SOC) special missions.
254Lopez and Ayalin, "ARG Employment," 16; Brill,
"Anatomy of a MEU(SOC)," 45.
255Glenn Goodman, "Special Ops Afloat," Armed Forces

Journal International (April 1995): 18.
256rbid., 18; Scott O'Grady, "The Rescue From My Point
Of View," Armed Forces Journal International (December
1995): 18.
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Navy-Marine ARGs have conducted several large NEOs in
the 1990s, and have shown their flexibility in each.

In

August of 1990, the 22nd MEU(SOC) deployed to the west coast
of Africa in anticipation of evacuating American citizens
from a growing civil war in Liberia.

Ordered from southern

France to Liberia on 25 May 1990, the ARG arrived on 3 June
and stayed nearby until early August.

On 4 August, as

fighting in and around Monrovia increasingly threatened the
U.S. Embassy, the U.S. ambassador contacted the National
Command Authority and requested assistance.

The 22nd

MEU(SOC) was directed to enter Monrovia and establish three
landing zones, including one at the U.S. Embassy, from which
U.S. civilians could be evacuated.
On 5 August, the ARG steamed to a position five miles
offshore and began flying Marine units ashore.
aboard USS

AV-8Bs

Saipan (LHA-2) stood at five-minute standby in

case air support was needed.

Included among the forces

deployed at the Embassy were six Light Armored Vehicles and
the Marines' organic heavy weapons.

From 6 August through

21 August, Marine helicopters and Landing Craft Air-Cushion
(LCAC) ferried U.S. and other nations' civilians to the
ARG's ships.

A total of more than sixteen hundred U.S. and

foreign civilians were evacuated safely, including 754 on 18
August alone. 2 5 7
25 7 Parker, "Operation Sharp Edge," 103-106.
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In January of 1991, a seventy-man Marine MSPF and SEAL
force in two CH-53E helicopters flew 460 miles at night from
their ships to the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, where
they prepared for the arrival of the ARG's twenty CH-46E
helicopters the next morning.

A total of 263 civilians,

including ambassadors of eleven nations and other civilians
from thirty nations, were flown safely back to the ARG.258
On some occasions, non-ARG ships may be in place to
conduct NEO operations.

Such a case occurred in 1991 in the

Philippines, when the eruption of Mount Pinatubo combined
with Typhoon Yunya to create horrific conditions at the U.S.
naval facility at Subic Bay.

Sixteen thousand U.S. Air

Force personnel and their dependents already had driven to
Subic Bay from Clark Field, and ships of the Seventh Fleet
were diverted from all over the Pacific to Luzon to begin
one of the largest peacetime evacuations in history.
Beginning on 16 June 1991, the ships USS Arkansas
(CGN-41), USS Rodney M. Davis (FF-60), and USS Curts (FFG38) loaded nine hundred civilians for the sixteen-hour trip
to Cebu, located farther south in the Philippines.

On 17

June, over seventeen hundred U.S. Air Force servicemen and
dependents were loaded aboard USS

Lonq Beach (CGN-9), USS

Lake Champlain (CG-57), USS Merrill (DD-976), USS~ (FFG-

2 5 8 Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Strategy and the 21st
Century," Journal of strateqic Studies (March 1994): 193;
Goodman, "Special Ops Afloat," 18.
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51), and USNS Passumpsic (T-A0-107).

USS Peleliu (LHA-5),

an amphibious assault ship with very large medical
facilities, took all of the serious medical cases and most
of the pregnancies, four of which were delivered while
aboard ship.

Finally, the aircraft carriers USS Midway (CV-

41) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) were able to carry
several thousand guests apiece.2 59

In a ten-day period

involving several trips per ship, over nineteen thousand
U.S. servicemen, dependents, and civilians were evacuated
safely to Cebu, with no injuries other than minor
accidents.2 6 0
The Marines conducted two NEOs in 1997, one in Albania
and one in Sierra Leone.

In March, over eight hundred U.S.

and foreign civilians were evacuated by helicopter from
Albania.

During the mission, ground fire was directed at

several Marine helicopters.

The escorting AH-lT Super Cobra

gunships were able to silence the ground fire quickly, and
all helicopters returned to the ARG without damage, but the
incident demonstrates the enormous advantage of being able

259The author was stationed onboard Abraham Lincoln at
the time, and took part in the evacuation. In addition to
servicemen and dependents, on two of the Lincoln's three
trips from Subic to Cebu, hanger bays 2 and 3 were utilized
as animal shelters for over 500 dogs of all sizes. One baby
was born onboard the Lincoln, and was named Abraham Lincoln
Prestera in memory of the event.
260Lt. Commander Kevin Mukri, "Fiery Vigil: Out From
the Ash," Proceedinqs Naval Review (May 1992): 117-119.
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to bring along air support and heavy firepower without
depending on other-service assets that may be too distant to
arrive on short notice.

In June 1997, over twenty-five

hundred civilians were evacuated from Freetown, including
thirteen hundred on 3 June alone, after a military coup
overthrew the government of Sierra Leone.261
One reason for the high readiness of Navy-Marine ARGs
to conduct NEOs and other special operations is the constant
practice dedicated to such operations, and the maintenance
of standard operational plans that require only minor
modification to fit a specific scenario.

As stated

previously, each ARG is required to be able to launch any
one of its special missions on six hours' notice.

Each

MEU(SOC) maintains what one Marine officer describes as a
"playbook" for each of the twenty-one special operations.
Contained in the playbook are such variables as different
levels of opposition, different geographical environments,
operations that may involve multiple sites or cross the
borders of multiple countries, and tactical communication
procedures.262
Because of naval forces' ability to take station off
the coast in crisis regions, maintain themselves there for

261Richard Burgess, "Navy/Marine Corps Team Sees NEO
Missions Expand," Sea Power (August 1997): 21.
262Lopez and Ayalin, "ARG Employment," 16.
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weeks or months, and conduct operations with organic air and
firepower support, the Navy-Marine ARG is the perfect
instrument for the NEO mission.

The introduction of the MV-

22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, due to enter the fleet in
2001, will nearly double the range of Marine vertical
operations, allowing NEOs to be performed even further
inland than today's CH-46E helicopters. 263

The safety and

security of U.S. citizens is the one overriding vital
interest of the United States, and the ability of U.S. naval
forces to extract U.S. citizens from areas of existing or
impending danger, on short notice and without logistical
support or political permission from others, is a crucial
capability.

Political/Military special Operations
In addition to normal military and warfighting
missions, naval forces are well-suited to special operations
that require the use, or implied threat of use, of military
force.

Because naval forces can be positioned anywhere in

international waters, and because naval aircraft and Marine
helicopters provide mobility over wide areas, naval forces
are extremely flexible, and have performed several special
operations in recent years.

2 6 3 Loren Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the
Future," Sea Power (November 1997): 44; Krulak, "Projecting
Combat Power Ashore," 27.
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The rescue of Air Force pilot Captain Scott O'Grady is
one example of the special missions naval forces can
conduct.

Known as Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and

Personnel (TRAP), it is one of the special missions for
which each deploying MEU(SOC) is required to be missioncapable.

The 24th MEU(SOC), stationed in the Adriatic Sea

in June 1995, shared responsibility with the Joint Special
Operations Task Force in Aviano, Italy, for the recovery of
any downed aviators.
When Captain O'Grady's F-16 was shot down, the 24th
MEU(SOC) had the unusual luxury of nearly a week for
planning and preparation, rather than the six-hour
requirement.

Intelligence was gathered on local SAM threats

and other ground-based threats, and several different
scenarios for the mission were developed.

When Captain

O'Grady was able to contact a NATO aircraft, six days after
being shot down, the 24th MEU(SOC) was at one-hour readiness
to launch the TRAP mission.264
Launching from USS Kearsarqe (LHD-3), the ARG's bigdeck Wasp-class amphibious ship, the TRAP mission consisted
of two CH-53E helicopters, two AH-lT Super Cobra gunships,
and AV-8B Harrier jets.

FA-18D Hornet aircraft from the

Sixth Fleet provided additional jamming support and ground
2 6 4Brigadier General Martin Berndt and Major Michael
Jordan, "The Rescue of Basher 52," Proceedings (November
1995): 42.
137

support capability.

The flight inland, which covered more

than 100 miles, was conducted at low level and high speed,
and encountered some ground fire along the way.
Nonetheless, Captain O'Grady was located, picked up, and
returned safely to the Kearsarqe, ending a six-day stay in
hostile territory in Bosnia.265
Incredibly, the Marines have received severe criticism
from some authors for the conduct of the O'Grady TRAP
mission, principally due to the difference between Marine
units' non-SOF status and the SOF status of Air Force or
Army search-and-rescue forces.

Comparisons of the MH-53E

Super Stallion helicopters used by the MEU(SOC) to the Air
Force's MH-60G Pave Hawk, comparison of Marine kevlar body
armor and Ranger body armor, lack of full night-vision
capability, and insufficient medical training among Marine
company-sized units, are just some of the arguments raised
in criticizing the Marines.2 66

Lt. Colonel Christopher

Gunther, who commanded the mission, responds to these
criticisms by stating what should be obvious, that any
mission can be improved by waiting for superior forces and
equipment to become available, but at the expense of the

26 5Lt. Colonel Christopher Gunther, "Fortune Favors the
Bold," Armed Forces Journal International (December 1995):
23.
2 66Michael Sparks, "One Missile Away From Disaster,"
Armed Forces Journal International (December 1995): 18-19.
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prompt action that may be required in order to have any
chance of succeeding: "In times of need, the enemy of 'good'
is 'better'. Others may have a better canteen cup ore-tool,
but if they aren't available, you go with what you've
got."267
Another example of a special operation was the 1985
intercept of an airliner carrying the Achille Lauro
hijackers, conducted by F-14s from the USS Saratoga.

Given

the nature of this mission, in which a civilian aircraft was
forced to land in Sicily by U.S. warplanes, it is doubtful
that the use of land-based aircraft would have been approved
by a U.S. ally, a point underscored by Italy's refusal to
turn the terrorists over to the United States.2 68

The

ability to launch the mission from the Saratoga, which had
been positioned by the National Command Authority in the
eastern Mediterranean in anticipation of the operation,
again highlights the advantageous nature of naval forces,
which are free to come and go in international waters.

The

United States will not always have access to the facilities
of other nations, making the ability to operate in
international waters a very valuable attribute.

26 7 Gunther, "Fortune Favors the Bold," 23.
268 simon,
Terrorism, 25-28.

u.s.
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Respondinq to a Short- or No-Warning Invasion
In the event of a short-warning crisis involving a
ground invasion of a U.S. ally, such as Iraq's 1990 invasion
of Kuwait, slowing or halting the invasion is viewed as a
critical phase in the U.S. response.269

The ability to stop

or slow significantly an armored advance is the main focus
of the halt phase in U.S. strategy, and has been co-opted by
the Air Force as the justification for several long-range,
hi-technology systems, such as the B-2 bomber.2 7 0

The focus

on stopping a large armored force as it streams across a
neighbor's borders, however, is a dangerously narrow view of
what is required to establish the conditions needed for the
successful prosecution of a major regional war.
Of equal importance will be the need to defend regional
ports and airfields, friendly force concentrations, and
regional population centers from attack via ballistic
missiles, even in the absence of ballistic missile attacks.
The threat of using NBC weapons, delivered by ballistic
269 william Cohen, Secretar~ of Defense Annual Report to
the President and the Conqress 1997 (Washington, D.C.:
Department of Defense, 1997), 5; Cohen, Report of the
ouadrennial Defense Review, Section 3, page 9.
2 7 oJames Kitfield, "To Halt an Enemy," Air Force
Magazine (January 1998): 62; General Charles Horner, "What
We Should Have Learned in Desert Storm--But Didn't," AiJ:.
Force Maqazine (December 1996): 54; Glenn Goodman, "Virtual
Overseas Presence," Armed Forces Journal International(April
1995) : 12.
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missiles, likely would serve as a strong deterrent to
cooperation with the United States among regional nations,
and could limit or prevent the use of regional facilities.
The blackmail threat to regional population centers, and to
population centers of U.S. allies both within and outside
the theater, can best be met with theater missile defenses
that are present in the region on a full-time basis, not by
flying strikes from CONUS to destroy ballistic missile
launch sites.

The results of the 1991 "Scud Hunt" in Iraq

indicate the difficulty of finding individual ballistic
missile launchers in the territory of an enemy, even an
enemy unable to defend its own airspace.2 71

An adversary

that could have remaining ballistic missiles and NBC
warheads thus would retain the ability to blackmail U.S.
allies, reduce U.S. access to regional facilities, and lower
the likelihood of U.S. intervention.2 7 2

The ability to

defend, and to convince regional allies that the United
States can defend them against ballistic missiles as well,
will be crucial.

271 see Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor,~
Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1995),
Chapter 11, "The Great Scud Hunt," for an excellent
depiction of the problems encountered in finding and killing
Iraqi SCUDS.
272 colin Gray, "The Second Nuclear Age: Insecurity,
Proliferation, and the Control of Arms," in Brassey's
Mershon American Defense Annual 1995-96 ed. Williamson
Murray (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), 151-152.
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Accordingly, the halt phase of an invasion must
encompass more than just destroying armor on the move.
Theater missile defense, available from the outset even
without warning, and anti-air warfare capability must be
combined with the ability to slow or stop an armored
advance, if the conditions for successful termination of the
conflict are to be produced.
Emerging systems expected to enter the fleet in the
near future should allow naval forces to play a role in each
of these aspects of a regional conflict.

The most important

of these systems are the Navy TMD systems, Lower Tier and
Upper Tier.2 7 3

Also important will be emerging anti-armor

weapons capable of being delivered by carrier aircraft or by
Tomahawk missiles, which should allow surface combatants as
well as aircraft carriers to play a part in the halt
phase. 274

Organic MCM capability is being pursued for all

surface combatants and submarines, and should lower the
current level of dependence on dedicated MCM ships.2 7 5

2 73 David Foxwell and Joris Janssen Lok, "Naval TBM
defense matures," Jane's International Defense Review
(January 1998): 28-30.
274 captain Denis Army, "Tactical Tomahawk,"
Warfare (September/October 1997): 22.

Surface

2 7 5The systems mentioned here--TMD, anti-armor weapons,
and MCM systems--will be covered in greater depth in Chapter
IV, and so will not be expanded on in Chapter III.
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It is not intended here to portray naval forces as
being capable of fighting and winning a regional war on
their own.

The Army and Air Force will have to participate

in any crisis that qualifies as a major regional war, and it
is hoped that allies will participate as well.

However, by

being present at the outset of such a crisis, naval forces
should be able to shape events in such a way that successful
termination of the conflict becomes more probable.

The

regular presence of Aegis cruisers and destroyers in the
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific, should
provide TMD capability on a full-time basis, and allow
reinforcement of TMD coverage in times of crisis.

The

presence of Tomahawk-armed surface combatants should provide
anti-armor capability on a full-time basis, sufficient to
blunt if not to stop completely an armored advance.

When

combined with the ability of an ARG to insert forces of its
embarked MEU(SOC), in order to seize facilities for followon forces, naval forces clearly represent an important
element of slowing and halting an invasion, and providing
the conditions needed for the successful prosecution of a
regional war.
Enabling the Deployment of Follow-On Forces

In addition to their usefulness in crisis response,
naval forces will be vital in the deployment of Army or Air
Force units to a theater if a regional war must be fought.
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This was true in 1917, in 1942, in 1990, and will remain
true in the future.

Unless the United States is called on

to wage war against Canada or Mexico, the war by definition
will be overseas, requiring the ability to send U.S. combat
power overseas.2 76

Colin Gray elaborates:

It does not much matter that the exact locus and
occasion for U.S. military interventions in the
future cannot be predicted with certitude, because it
is known that such interventioris will be distantly
overseas. Material large in volume or that is heavy
has to move by sea from North America to Europe,
Asia, or Africa.277
If U.S. military power is to be moved across the sea,
U.S. naval forces will be the key enabler.

Even for Air

Force units that can transport themselves over part or all
of the distance between CONUS and the theater in question,
naval forces will be required during the transit time of
those forces, and for protecting the facilities that those
units will require in the theater.

The same is true for the

deployment of Army units, whose heavy equipment must come by
sea.

The SLOCs that the transport ships will use, the ports

those ships will require for off-loading, the continued
delivery of supplies for Army forces--all will depend on
naval forces for their protection.

276 Forward ... from
277 Gray,

the sea, 6.

The Navy in the Post-Cold War world, 193.
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The frequent analogy used to describe the sea services'
crucial role in the transition from crisis to war is
"holding the door open" for Air Force and Army entry into
the theater.

It is an important role, and one that may have

been de-emphasized after 1991, due to the relative ease with
which the Army and Air Force were able to deploy to Saudi
Arabia.

This is not to say that the Desert Shield

logistical effort was anything but enormous.

Rather, it is

a reflection of the excellent, modern air and sea bases that
awaited U.S. forces arriving in Saudi Arabia, and the allimportant fact that Saddam could do little to impede the
arrival of U.S. forces, and did not make the efforts he was
capable of.

Instead, the United States was given a six-

month period of unobstructed build-up in Saudi Arabia,
without any interference from Iraqi forces.278

In a future

conflict, U.S. naval forces will be required to hold the
door open in two distinct but equally important regards.
First, the sea and air lines of communication must be

278For an excellent treatment of the logistical effort
involved in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, see Lt. General
William Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and
Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Business School
Press, 1992). Pagonis likens the logistical effort of the
Gulf War to, "Transporting the entire population of Alaska,
along with their personal belongings, to the other side of
the world, on short notice," and to, "feeding all the
residents of Wyoming and Vermont three meals a day for forty
days."
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cleared and kept open.

Secondly, the facilities at the end

of the communication lines must be protected against attack.
Clearing the sea lines of communication will be most
difficult in the approaches to the region, particularly if a
maritime chokepoint is involved.

In fact, given the current

preponderance of the U.S. Navy in open-ocean capability, it
is not unrealistic to state that clearing the sea lines will
center on the terminal portion of the transit from U.S.
ports to regional ports, rather than the Cold War model of
naval forces having to fight their way across the Atlantic
Ocean to reach Europe. 27 9

Mines, submarines, and anti-ship

cruise missiles are expected to be employed in a sea denial
strategy by regional opponents, with the goal being to stop
or merely delay the transport of U.S. forces into the
theater.2 8 0

Accordingly, naval forces will have to provide

MCM capability, ASW capability, theater air and anti-cruise
missile defense, and strike capability in order to deal with
the expected threats.

More importantly, these capabilities

will need to be present at the outset of a crisis, meaning
that all surface ships and battle groups must possess at
least some degree of organic MCM and air defense

2 7 9oavid Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,"
Joint Force ouarterly (Summer 1995): 73.
280Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status.

Prospects, 10.
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capability.281

Also, because crisis operations are often

"come-as-you-are" events, without the time for deploying
distant assets into a theater, the MCM and air defense
assets of allies will be important additions to U.S. assets,
re-emphasizing the need for U.S.-allied training.282
At the end of the transit from CONUS or other theaters,
arriving Army forces and Air Force aircraft still require
modern facilities for disembarking or landing.

Since port

and airfield facilities are large, static aim-points,
ballistic missiles provide an excellent means for an
aggressor to attack these high-value targets.

Especially

for nations such as Iraq or North Korea, whose air forces
are very unlikely to be effective in the face of modern air
defense systems, ballistic missiles provide the means to
conduct the deep-strike attacks that their aircraft cannot
conduct.
Although Iraq did not employ its SCUD and Al Hussein
missiles prior to the initiation of hostilities, after 15
January 1991 Iraq fired ballistic missiles at a variety of

281David Foxwell, "Mine-conscious surface ships back on
the agenda," Jane's International Defense Review (May 1997):
26; Alan Maiorano, Nevin Carr, and Trevor Bender, "A Primer
On Naval Theater Air Defense," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring
1996): 26-28; Captain Gary Holmstrom, "Joint Theater Air and
Missile Defense: A Primer for the Surface Warrior," surface
Warfare (March/April 1998): 30-31.
282 Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status.
Prospects, 12.
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military and population targets.

While the effect of Iraq's

missiles was felt largely in the political sphere, where
Israel had to be dissuaded from retaliation, Iraq literally
came within yards of a potentially devastating hit on
coalition ships and supplies at Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia.

On

16 February an Iraqi missile fell into the harbor an
estimated one hundred yards from a pier at which five ships,
including USS Tarawa (LHA-1), were moored.

On the pier

itself were Army fuel trucks, 155mm artillery shells, and
assorted other military equipment.2 83

The Tarawa,

positioned directly adjacent to the 155mm storage area,
would have been at tremendous risk of her own magazines and
aviation fuel being ignited if the SCUD had hit the pier,
probably leading to the destruction of the ship.
Iraq's use of ballistic missiles, which led to the
single largest loss of life for the coalition at Dharan on
25 February, when a storage and barracks facility was hit,
is even more sobering when it is considered that Iraq rarely
engaged in multiple-missile salvos, instead firing
individual SCUDs at regional targets. 284

If a regional

adversary was able to fire large numbers of missiles at a
port or airfield, perhaps twenty or twenty-five at a time,

283John Gresham, "Navy Area Ballistic Missile Defense:
Coming On Fast," Procedinqs (January 1999): 58-59.
284 Ibid.
148

it is reasonable to expect that several missiles would land
on or near something valuable.

And of course, if the

missiles carried chemical or biological warheads rather than
high explosive, the missiles would need to hit only within a
kilometer or so of their aim point to be effective.

Thus

the ability to defend against ballistic missiles is a
critical requirement for a future regional conflict.
Finally, the Gulf War model, in which arriving U.S.
forces found massive, modern facilities waiting for them,
should not be viewed as representative of all possible
future regional conflicts.

Depending on the location of the

conflict and the adversary's ability to target existing
facilities, the Marines may be called on to seize facilities
ashore, or to land and establish suitable locations for the
unloading of forces and supplies "over the beach".2 95

It

may also be necessary for the Marines to land in order to
clear the shore areas of a chokepoint, for example by
seizing Queshm Island, Abu Musa, and the Tunb Islands in the
Strait of Hormuz.
Wherever a regional conflict is situated, deploying
Army and Air Force units to the theater will require that
naval forces are present to keep open the lines of
communication, and to protect facilities until Army and Air
Force strength has been built up sufficiently that they can

285DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 77.
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protect themselves.

Since forward-deployed naval forces are

maintained in the most likely areas of crisis on a full-time
basis, there is reason to be confident about the continued
ability of the United States to fight a regional war.

If

all U.S. forces were withdrawn to CONUS, however, the
deployment of U.S. forces to a distant theater would become
very problematic.

The forward presence mission thus can be

seen to retain its importance in U.S. security strategy,
even in the absence of the Soviet Union or a similar global,
peer-level threat.

Summary
The presence of U.S. military force in proximity to
U.S. interests is a requirement unlikely to diminish in the
future.

As long as U.S. interests reside far from CONUS,

threats to U.S. interests must be guarded against.
Particularly in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and
East Asia, military forces are needed to protect U.S.
interests against existing threats, and to hedge against
unforeseen threats.

For the purposes of deterring

aggressors and protecting U.S. interests, forces that are
forward-based or forward-deployed have clear advantages over
CONUS-based forces.

Where the threat is clearly identified,

as on the Korean Peninsula, land forces may be appropriate
for guarding U.S. interests.

However, for many reasons

forward-deployed naval forces often are more desirable than
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forward-based ground forces.
flexible,

Primarily for providing

responsive, and combat-capable forward presence,

naval forces are the preferred method of positioning U.S.
military power near U.S. interests.
Naval forces provide reliable access to any area of the
world accessible by sea, which encompasses an ever-growing
portion of the earth's landmass.

The forced entry

capability of naval forces, embodied principally by NavyMarine ARGs, allows the insertion of land power from the
sea, both for discrete combat operations and to allow the
follow-on of Army or Air Force units.

Naval forces possess

superb sustainability when at sea, both through their
onboard stores and through the ability to replenish while
underway.

Naval forces are less obtrusive when positioned

in international waters than U.S. forces on the territory of
another state, an important consideration for political and
religious reasons in the Persian Gulf.

With the ability to

operate in the air, on land, and on and under the sea, naval
forces are uniquely flexible in responding to crises, and
can respond at any point along the spectrum of crisis, from
non-violent intervention to sustained combat operations.
Also, naval forces can adjust their level of visibility, by
alternately stationing themselves in plain sight or
remaining over the horizon, and so can monitor an area of
tension without being seen as provoking further tension.
Finally, and most importantly, naval forces do not require
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the permission of any entity except the National Command
Authority to conduct a full range of operations, as their
position in international waters makes them an extension of
sovereign U.S. territory.
By virtue of the above qualities, the Navy-Marine Corps
team can be employed in the practice of naval diplomacy,
which describes military actions short of war, intended to
influence what other states think and do.

Since U.S.

interests are located around the world, and naval forces are
inherently mobile, naval diplomacy provides a tremendously
flexible and responsive tool to U.S. policy-makers.
Included under the concept of naval diplomacy are such
military-political activities as deterrence, signaling U.S.
interest in a region, providing re-assurance to U.S. allies,
intimidating a potential adversary through visible combat
power, limited combat operations, enforcement of
international sanctions, enforcement and protection of
freedom of the seas, and non-combat operations.
The two principal instruments of naval diplomacy in the
current international setting are the aircraft carrier
battle group (CVBG) and the amphibious ready group (ARG).
The CVBG in particular holds preeminent status as a symbol
of American sea power, and sends a proportionate message
when used for naval diplomacy.

The ARG, although not

capable of as wide a range of combat operations as the CVBG,
nonetheless is a very flexible and valuable instrument of

152

naval diplomacy.

Due to the very high readiness maintained

by deployed naval forces, both CVBGs and ARGs can transition
from peacetime operations to crisis response or combat
operations nearly instantly.
For purposes of deterrence, naval forces combine the
requisite capability and credibility to be effective.
Because naval forces do not need basing support or political
permission to conduct combat operations, their threatened
use is more credible than that of land-based forces.

Also,

naval forces' growing capability to conduct limited strikes
with un-manned systems means that, in appropriate cases,
such strikes can be launched with no risk of U.S.
casualties, a factor that adds to the credibility of
threatened action.

When force must be used, force

originating from the sea may be more acceptable to U.S.
allies in terms of political support, as it does not
implicate allies through the use of their facilities.

Naval

forces' visibility, which can be increased or lowered as the
situation dictates, provides great flexibility in the
escalation of deterrent efforts, and perhaps is the most
important factor operating on the minds of adversaries.

A

wing of B-2 bombers may be capable of carrying out
threatened action, but if it is not visible to an adversary
it may not deter.

Since the adversary's perception

ultimately is what determines the success or failure of
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deterrence, visibility counts for a great deal, and naval
forces offer unique scalability in this regard.
When used to signal U.S. interest or support, naval
forces can be employed in a variety of ways.

Sending naval

forces to an area on routine deployment is itself a signal
of U.S. interest, and is the reason that the Mediterranean,
the Persian Gulf, and East Asia maintain full CVBG coverage.
The positioning of naval forces near specific locations
during periods of crisis, for example near Taiwan during the
1996 PRC "missile diplomacy" operations, sends a message of
heightened U.S. interest.

Another means of signaling

interest is through a port visit by U.S. warships, which
serves both to announce U.S. friendship with the host nation
and to support the upkeep of the naval forces.

Even a port

visit can carry a clear message to regional observers, as
when USS

Sam Hanston (SSBN 609) visited the Turkish port of

Izmir in 1963, advertising the U.S. nuclear umbrella
provided to Turkey.286
When signaling U.S. interest falls short, and the use
of limited force must be employed to convince an adversary
to change its behavior, naval forces' ability to apply force
incrementally from a secure sea base makes them ideal
instruments of U.S. policy.

The instruments of choice for

limited use of force have been aircraft and cruise missiles,

286Breemer, "Where Are the Submarines?" 41.
154

since these systems can destroy targets while minimizing
risk to U.S. forces, and naval forces can deliver both
aircraft and cruise missiles to locations where force must
be used.
Another instrument of naval diplomacy is the
enforcement of international economic sanctions.

Since the

great majority of world commerce moves by sea, naval forces
can provide the means to apply economic leverage against
states that have exceeded international norms for acceptable
behavior.

Only ships can stop, board, search, and impound

other ships, requiring naval forces to be present in the
vicinity of sanctioned states.
Often overlooked, perhaps due to its fundamental place
in U.S. policy, is the important need to enforce freedom of
the seas, and to challenge unacceptable claims to
international waters by coastal states.

The ships of the

U.S. Navy fulfill this vital mission every day, in all the
world's seas.
In addition to their use in naval diplomacy, naval
forces support several other important requirements in U.S.
defense policy.

Since naval forces regularly operate in

regions of U.S. interest, they are able to conduct frequent
training operations with U.S. allies, an important means of
maintaining interoperability in case of war.

Equally

important in keeping U.S. forces prepared for regional war
is the need to maintain familiarity with different regions
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of the world.

Different regions have their own unique

characteristics, and constant operations in those regions
build familiarity in case of war.
Crisis response has replaced global general war as the
primary concern of the U.S. military, as the dissolution of
the Soviet Union removed the only plausible threat of a
global war.

Crisis response may involve combat or non-

combat operations, and may be large or small in scale, but
requires the ability to respond on short notice.

Both

through physical proximity and through high everyday
readiness, forward-deployed naval forces are well-suited to
crisis response.

Naval forces should soon be equipped to

take part in the halt phase of sudden cross-border attacks,
as existing and projected anti-armor weapons begin to enter
the fleet.

For the transition from crisis to a regional

war, naval forces will provide vital service by maintaining
the sea and air lines of communication open, and providing
TMD capability for the defense of regional facilities,
population centers, and force concentrations.

If regional

facilities are not available or accessible, the Marines'
forced entry capability may be needed to secure facilities
and safe logistical marshaling areas.
While the primary threat to U.S. interests has changed
with the demise of the Soviet Union, the need to maintain
military force near U.S. interests abroad has not
diminished.

As long as U.S. interests reside far from
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CONUS, which would seem to include the future as far as can
be seen or predicted, U.S. military power must also be
deployed far from CONUS.

By virtue of mobility,

flexibility, sustainability, scalability, and independence
from host nation permission, forward-deployed naval forces
represent the best means of protecting U.S. interests
abroad.

Chapter IV will examine the component capabilities

and systems of naval forward presence, both at present and
in the near future.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES

In meeting the requirements of providing forward
presence, U.S. naval forces will need certain capabilities
in the future.

Those capabilities in turn depend on

specific systems, some of which exist at present and some of
which are under development.

Some systems, for- example the

aircraft carrier, have been suggested to be obsolete in the
post-Cold War setting.

Others, such as TMD, have been

identified as important but have yet to be fielded.
Chapter IV will examine the capabilities and systems
required for the naval forward presence mission in the
twenty-first century, and will examine the Navy's twentyfirst century warfighting concept, known as Network-Centric
Warfare(NCW).
The Shift to a Littoral Focus

In 1992, shortly after the break-up of the Soviet
Union, the U.S. Navy announced a shift in emphasis from
open-ocean operations to operations in the littorals,
defined as areas within 650 miles of the coast.

The Navy

document .•• From The Sea stated that:
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations
of the world claim preeminent control of the seas and
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ensure freedom of commercial passage . . . . This
strategic direction, derived from the National
Security Strategy, represents a fundamental shift
away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward
joint operations conducted from the sea.287
The emphasis on littoral regions stems from the absence
of a global peer competitor, able to challenge U.S.
interests on the high seas, and a new focus on deterring
regional crises.

Since nearly 75 percent of the world's

population live within the littoral r~gion, and since U.S.
interests abroad exist primarily in the littorals, it is
logical for the focus of the sea services to be directed at
coastal areas.
The littoral area typically is a very busy place, with
heavy traffic on the seas and in the air.

The ships and

planes of friendly forces, enemy forces, and neutral states
all occupy a compressed space, with identification and the
monitoring of movement posing a serious difficulty.2 88

Due

to the need for U.S. naval forces to approach the shore in
order to influence events on land, the littoral offers
adversaries the opportunity to layer their defenses.

Mines,

anti-ship cruise missiles, and submarines in particular are
expected to form layered, supporting defenses for coastal
states that desire to keep U.S. forces from approaching.2 89
287 ,,,Frorn The Sea, 3.

288 rbid., 6.
2 89 stephen Keller, "To Influence Events Ashore,"
Power (April 1998): 87.
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.s..e.a.

The focus on the littorals also offers opportunities to the
United States in its efforts to protect national interests.
Naval forces can project power inland for many hundreds of
miles, allowing U.S. sea power to influence events ashore as
never before.
The Marine Corps also has developed a littoral concept
of operations, still focused, as Marine operations always
have been, on events on land, but now conducted and enabled
by position and mobility at sea.

Known as Operational

Maneuver From the Sea, the concept envisions using the sea
as a secure base for maneuver, at the operational level, to
allow Marine forces to strike directly at enemy "centers of
gravity" rather than assaulting through enemy defenses. 290
With the current level of sophisticated weapons contained in
the arsenals of many regional states, the movement of Marine
forces from sea to land will have to be conducted from
greater distance offshore than in the past.

In order both

to protect ARGs and Marine landing forces from shore-based
weapons, and to maintain uncertainty about the destination
of Marine landings, future amphibious operations are likely
to be conducted from over the horizon.291

290"0perational Maneuver From The Sea: A Concept For
The Projection Of Naval Power Ashore," Surface Warfare (July
/August 1996): 9.
29 1 Krulak, "Projecting Combat Power Ashore," 27-28.
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In order to be successful, Operational Maneuver From
the Sea will require tactical and operational mobility,
dedicated fire support, aviation support, and mine
countermeasures support (MCM).

In addition, all naval

vessels will require better self-protection capabilities if
they are to operate close to shore.2 92

Finally, both Navy

and Marine units require improvements in nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) detection and protection. 2 9 3
The overall Navy-Marine Corps focus on operations
closer to the shore than in the past dictates that existing
systems be examined for their continued relevance, and that
new systems be approached from the standpoint of their
suitability to the littoral environment.

Accordingly, there

are two major areas of emphasis in examining the twentyfirst century Navy-Marine Corps team's systems and
equipment.

The first is the ability to project military

power ashore, whether in the form of an ARG's ground combat
units, naval surface fire support (NSFS), or a CVBG's air
strikes.

The second is the ability to defend the force

against littoral threats, and includes anti-submarine

2 92 Robert Holzer, "Funding Shortage Will Delay U.S.
Ship Defense System," Defense News, 14-20 April 1997, 22.
293Mark Ormsby, "The Chemical and Biological Warfare
Threat to Naval Forces," surface Warfare (November/December
1996): 5-8; Stanley Enatsky, "Protecting the Fleet: Tackling
the Chemical/Biological Threat," Surface Warfare (November
/December 1996): 29-31; Major Victor Riley III, "We Need to
Learn ABCs of NBC," Proceedings (August 1993): 38-39.
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warfare (ASW), MCM, TMD, and NBC protection.

These two

broad areas of concern will comprise the bulk of this
chapter.

ARG Component Systems
Under the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea
(OMFTS), the characteristics of mobility and survivability
will be crucial.

Navy-Marine ARGs will have to place the

Marines ashore from over the horizon, while defending
themselves against a variety of threats.

The systems that

are envisioned for the twenty-first century ARG include
several different amphibious ships, two types of landing
vehicles, and a replacement aircraft for existing CH-46
helicopters.

Systems that are in service today, or about to

enter service, are the LHA-1 class, LHD-1 class, and LSD41/49 class amphibious ships, and the Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC).

Systems under development are the LPD-17

class amphibious ship, the Advanced Amphibious Assault
Vehicle (AAAV), and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.
The amphibious ships will form the ARG of the future, while
the LCAC, AAAV, and MV-22 will form the Marine Corps'
"triad" for delivering units from the sea to shore. 294

2 94 vincent Grimes, Richard Scott, and Mike Wells,
"Amphibious Advancement," Jane's Navy International
(September 1997): 24-26.
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The five LHA-1 Tarawa-class amphibious ships date from
the mid-1970s, with the oldest being twenty-two years old.
With a thirty-five year initial service life, and a Service
Life Extension Program (SLEP) refit expected to extend the
ships to nearly fifty years, the LHA-1 class should be in
service well into the twenty-first century.295
The LHA-1 is some two hundred feet longer than the LPH1 class ships it was designed to replace, as well as having
nearly twice the displacement of the LPH-ls.

The LHA-1

ships can operate a mixture of up to forty-two CH-46E, CH53E, UH-1, and AH-1 helicopters, and six AV-BB Harrier jets.
Over seventeen hundred Marines can be embarked, along with
their AAV7Al vehicles, but only a single LCAC can be
acco:rnmodated.296

The LHA-ls are used as the big-deck ship

in an ARG, and can modify their mix of aircraft depending on
the mission.
The newer and larger LHD-1 Wasp-class ships are the
largest amphibious ships ever built, with a displacement of
over forty thousand tons at full combat load.2 97

In

comparison, the World War Two Essex-class c a r r i e r ~ (CV18) displaced thirty-three thousand tons when fully

295Bryan Bender, "USN study will decide future of
amphibious fleet," Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 June 1998, 8.
296 sea

Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 116-117.

29 7 rbid.
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loaded.298

Based on a modified LHA-1 hull, the LHD-ls can

carry twenty-one hundred Marines, three LCACs,

forty-five

helicopters, AV-8Bs, five MlAl main battle tanks, twentyfive Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), eight M 198 artillery
pieces, sixty-eight heavy trucks, and ten logistical
vehicles.

In addition, the six hundred-bed hospital

facilities aboard the LHD-ls are second in size only to
those found on dedicated hospital ships.299
The original Marine Corps request for ten LHD-ls was
halved by the Navy for budgetary reasons, but was later
increased to seven through the direct intervention of
Congress.

At a cost of over one billion dollars each, the

LHD-ls are among the most expensive surface ships in the
fleet,

trailing only the full-size aircraft carriers as a

capital investment.300
USS

The fifth and sixth of the LHD-ls,

Bataan (LHD-5) and USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), have

joined the fleet in the last fifteen months, while the final

298 Jane's Fiqhtinq Ships
Military Press, 1989), 267.

of World War II (New York:

299 commander Christopher Wode, "The Forward Warriors:
The United States Must Revitalize Its Amphibious Fleet,"
Armed Forces Jonrnal International (March 1994): 26; Grimes
et al., "Amphibious Advancement," 27.
300scott Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet, Part II,"

Proceedinqs (August 1996): 58.
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ship of the class, USS Iwo Jirna (LHD-7) is expected to be
commissioned in 2001.301
Due to the significantly higher capabilities of the
LHD-ls compared to the LHA-ls, proposals have been made to
spend the roughly one billion dollars budgeted for the LHA
SLEP refits on additional LHD-ls.

Citing the LHD-l's

superior hangar and deck space, larger well deck, ability to
operate larger numbers of MV-22s, and improved self-defense
capability, both the Senate Armed Services Committee and
Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak have openly
supported purchasing more LHD-ls.302

The two hundred

million dollars of additional cost involved in building new
LHD-ls, instead of refitting the LHA-ls, would be more than
offset by the improved capability of the Wasp-class ships,
as well as providing a new ship with a fifty-year life span,
rather than simply extending the life of an existing LHA for
another fifteen years.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

Jay Johnson has indicated agreement in principle, adding
that the thirteen years until the LHA-ls begin their SLEP
refits should allow ample time for studying the trade-offs

301Richard Burgess, "Fifth Wasp-Class LHD Joins the
Active Fleet," Sea Power (November 1997): 39; Richard
Burgess, "USS Bonhomme Richard Joins the Active Fleet," .s.e.a
Power (September 1998): 24; Vision. Presence, Power, 61.
302Bender, "USN study," 8.
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of the proposal.303

Whatever decision is reached, the Navy-

Marine ARG requirement is for twelve big-deck ships for the
future fleet, with current plans calling for a balance of
five LHA-ls and seven LHD-ls.304
The newest amphibious ship is the LPD-17 San Antonioclass, the first of which is due to be commissioned in 2002.
The LPD-17s will carry 720 Marines, two LCACs, and up to
four CH-46E or CH-53E helicopters.

Storage space aboard

ship will be over twenty-five thousand cubic feet for
vehicles, and over thirty-six thousand cubic feet for other
stores. 305

Intended to replace ships of the LST-1179 class,

LSD-36 class, LKA-113 class, and LPD-4 class, the LPD-17
reflects the influence of the OMFTS philosophy.

Unlike its

predecessors, the LPD-17 will not be able to beach itself in
order to offload equipment and supplies, will not be able to
turn 360 degrees within its own length in shallow water,
cannot pump bulk fuel ashore, and will have only a ten-ton
over-the-side lifting capacity, compared to thirty tons on
previous classes of amphibious ships.306

3 o3Ibid.
304 James Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation,"
Sea Power (November 1997): 13, 17; Krulak, "Projecting
Combat Power Ashore," 28.
305vision. Presence. Power, 62.
306Major Thomas Lloyd, "The Whole LPD-17 Story,"

Proceedings (November 1996): 73.
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Since OMFTS p~sits the delivery of the Marines from
over the horizon, the shallow-water capabilities mentioned
above should not be required.

Also, due to the perceived

need to reduce vulnerability to littoral threats as much as
possible, the LPD-17's crane size was reduced to lower the
ship's radar signature, sacrificing lifting capability for a
smaller radar return.307

Thus the OMFTS vision of

amphibious operations can be seen in the design features of
the newest amphibious ship.
In addition to attempts to lower radar visibility, the
LPD-17 class will have unprecedented self-defense
capability.

The Integrated Combat Direction System (ICDS),

a combination of existing combat direction and self-defense
systems, will be installed in the LPD-17s, as will a forward
VLS cell with sixty-four Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles guided
by a pair of Mk 91 fire control units.

A pair of Rolling

Airframe Missile launchers and a pair of Mk 15 Phalanx Close
In Weapons System (CIWS) mounts also will be installed.30S
In addition to the ARG ships, the Marine Corps is in
dire need of the new amphibious assault vehicle.

The AAAV

is a critical modernization requirement for the Marine
Corps, as many existing AAV7Al vehicles already have served
for over thirty years.

The AAAV is expected to begin

3 0 7 Ibid.
308Grimes, et al., "Amphibious Advancement," 25.
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production in 2005, and to begin service with the fleet in
2007.

The last of the 'AAV7Als will not be replaced until

2011, at which time they will be nearing fifty years of
service.309
Capable of speeds of twenty-five knots in the water,
and forty-five miles per hour on land, the AA.AV will be a
great improvement over the 'AAV7Al, which is limited to eight
or nine knots in the water.3lO

Additionally, the AA.AV will

be able to carry its eighteen Marines ashore from over the
horizon, as its range in the water is seventy-five miles.
Equally valuable will be the use of Global Positioning
System (GPS) data to allow precise navigation from ship to
shore, at night or in poor weather, easing command and
control problems associated with the transition from sea to
land.

Precise navigation also may be required in order to

pass through clear lanes in enemy minefields.311
The AA.AV is being designed with a number of features
that should improve its survivability.

It is intended to be

seaworthy in up to nine-foot seas, to be able to roll up to
sixty degrees to either side, and to pitch up or down to a

309 Jim Courter and Merrick Carey, "An Alligator for The
21st Century," Sea Power (November 1997): 53.
310rbid., 51; Krulak, "Projecting Combat Power Ashore,"
28.
311Robert Holzer, "U.S. Marine Corps Readies for AA.AV
Prototype Phase," Defense News, 17-23 August 1998, 18.
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vertical position as it passes over waves without
foundering.

Modular composite armor, able to be installed

or removed as dictated by the situation, will improve
survivability to battle damage.

The proven Bushmaster 30mm

cannon of the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle has been
paired with a forward-looking infra-red sighting system and
computer fire control.312

Finally, the AAAV will be one of

just two American land combat vehicles (the Bradley being
the other) with full NBC protection, allowing its occupants
to travel through areas of chemical or biological
contamination without donning special protective gear. 313
Like the LPD-17, the AAAV is a manifestation of the
requirements of OMFTS.

It possesses the speed in water and

range to be launched from over the horizon, and should be
much more survivable than its predecessor.

Although the

AAAV will not enter service for another eight years, it
already is being factored into Marine Corps doctrinal
development and amphibious tactics.314

312courter and Carey, "An Alligator for the 21st
Century," 53.
313Holzer, "US Marine Corps Readies," 18.
It should be
noted that troops in the AAAV would still need to don
protective gear before leaving the vehicle, or to have the
vehicle thoroughly de-contaminated. However, the ability to
pass through contaminated areas is an important improvement
over the AAV7Al.
314Roman Schweizer, "Waterworld: The Marine Corps Is
Rethinking Operations Ashore and May Just Stay At Sea,"
Armed Forces Journal International (September 1998): 60.
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A second important leg of the Marines' amphibious triad
is the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, intended as a
replacement for existing CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters.

In

order to meet the OMFTS requirement of delivering combat
power directly to an enemy's center of gravity, which may be
miles or hundreds of miles inland, the ability to employ
vertical assault is crucial.

The Vietnam-era CH-46E and CH-

53E helicopters have been performing this role for many
years, and each is nearing the end of its useful service
life.

The CH-46E in particular is showing signs of age, as

seen from its accident record between 1985 and 1995, when
one CH-46E was lost nearly every three months due to
airframe failure or accident.315

Not surprisingly, Marine

Commandant General Krulak has stated that his number one
modernization priority is the development of the MV-22.316
The MV-22 is a hybrid aircraft, able to take off and
land vertically like a helicopter, but also able to fly as a
fixed-wing airplane.

The MV-22's oversized propellers are

mounted at the end of its wing, and the entire engine
assembly can be rotated forward after takeoff, allowing the
Osprey to transition from vertical lift to forward flight.
While its two to three-fold increase in payload over the CH-

31 5Loren Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the
Future," Sea Power (November 1997): 43.
316Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 13.
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46E is significant, its most important feature is its fivefold increase in speed.

After taking off and shifting to

forward flight, the Osprey has a top speed of 275 knots and
a range of two hundred miles.31 7

The Osprey can carry

twenty-four fully-loaded Marines, can refuel in flight,

and

has a ferry range of twenty-one hundred miles with a single
aerial refueling.318
The Osprey currently is undergoing sea trials aboard
USS Saipan (LHA-2), which will include vertical and rolling
takeoffs, landing at various ship speeds, landing in high
winds, lifting netted cargo from a sling hook, and night
operations.319

The Marine Corps plans to purchase 360

Ospreys, with the first being delivered in 1999.

The first

operational squadron is expected to be formed in 2001, with
the last Ch-46Es being replaced in 2014.320
The MV-22 might have entered service as early as 1991,
since it began development in 1985.

However, technical

problems and strong resistance from different quarters in
the Department of Defense nearly killed the MV-22

Sea

317 Richard Burgess, "Naval Aviation Program Update,"
Power (June 1998): 10.

3 1 8 Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the Future," 46;
Vision. Presence, Power, 57.
31911 v-22 Tiltrotor Aircraft Undergoes Sea Trials,"
Defense News, 8 February 1999, 15.
320Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into Future," 43.
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development program.

Only the continued insistence of

Congress that the MV-22 be developed and fielded kept the
project alive.321

It is unpleasant to consider where the

Marine Corps might be today, with no replacement for the
aging CH-46, had the MV-22 been allowed to die.
The third leg of the amphibious triad is the Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).

Capable of carrying sixty tons

(seventy-five tons in a maximum overload configuration), and
able to travel over water at forty knots, the LCAC provides
a critical ability to deliver heavy vehicles from ship to
shore quickly, including the MlAl tanks recently acquired by
the Marines.322

The first LCAC was delivered to the Navy in

1984, with a total of ninety-one LCACs ordered through
1997. 3 23
Typical loads for an LCAC are: one main battle tank;
four LAVs; three AAV7Al amphibious vehicles; or two M 198
155mm towed howitzers. 32 4

With a deck area of eighty-one by

321 Ibid., 45. One of the strongest opponents of the MV22 was Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who felt it was too
expensive. Ironically, it was the arrival of Bill Clinton,
one of the worst Presidents of this century in regard to
national security and defense issues, that helped rescue the
MV-22. Clinton had endorsed the MV-22 during his 1992
campaign, and he continued to support it after the election.
322 vision.

Presence. Power, 61.

323 Norman Polmar,

Naval Institute Guide to the Ships
and Aircraft of the u.s. Fleet (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1993), 183; Vision. Presence. Power, 61.
324 Polmar,

Naval Institute Guide, 184.
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twenty-seven feet, the LCAC could also carry well over one
hundred troops, time-sensitive bulk cargo such as ammunition
or fuel, and any of the assorted items of equipment that a
MEU(SOC) might desire to take ashore.

The LCAC has a

projected service life of thirty years, including a SLEP
program at fifteen years.32S

Able to drive itself into and

out of the well decks of LHA, LHD, LSD, and LPD amphibious
ships, and able to travel 200 miles with a full sixty-ton
payload, the LCAC is a very versatile and valuable vehicle.
The ARG's ships, which in the future will consist of
an LHA or LHD big-deck ship matched with an LSD and LPD,
should be able to position the LCACs, AAAVs, and MV-22s in
proximity to an enemy's coast, enabling the Navy-Marine
Corps team to project power ashore virtually anywhere in the
world.

When combining the LCAC, the AAAV, and MV-22 in the

future, the Marine Corps amphibious triad should be able to
deliver combat power quickly, both onto and beyond the
beach, enabling OMFTS's vision of rapidly moving Marine
forces striking directly at adversary centers of gravity.

Naval surface Fire support
Among the different areas of naval warfare, possibly no
area is undergoing a more dramatic change than naval surface
fire support (NSFS).

In addition to a new concept for

325vision, Presence, Power, 61.
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organizing and directing NSFS, known as Ring Of Fire (ROF),
several weapons programs are underway that will utilize a
combination of GPS data and on-board sensors to provide
highly accurate fire support to Marine forces ashore.

The

application of GPS guidance to ordinary iron bombs already
has produced the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which
should allow virtually any tactical aircraft to make
precision attacks previously limited to F-18D or A-6E
aircraft equipped with laser designators.

This section will

cover two systems designed specifically for launch or firing
from surface combatants, rather than from aircraft.

These

two systems are the 5-inch gun/Extended Range Guided
Munition and the Tactical Tomahawk.
The 5-inch rifled gun has been the standard naval gun
since the early twentieth century, and continues to serve on
every destroyer and cruiser in the fleet.

The current model

is the Sin/54 caliber Mk 45, which was designed and fielded
in the mid 1960s primarily as an anti-air weapon.

Although

the anti-air warfare (AAW) mission has shifted to missiles,
the 5-inch gun has been retained for its secondary roles of
fire support and anti-surface warfare.

The thirteen-mile

range of the gun was not seen as a major disadvantage during
the 1960s and 70s, since many older 8-inch gun cruisers, as
well as the Iowa-class battleships, remained on active duty
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with the fleet.326

With the retirement of the Iowa-class

ships, apparently for good, the only naval gun remaining is
the Mk 45.

With the Navy's shift to littoral operations,

the range of the Mk 45 has become a serious limitation in
providing NSFS.
The Marine Corps is the primary driver of gunfire
requirements.

With the new Operational Maneuver From the

Sea strategy, the Marines now require gunfire support to a
much greater depth than in the past.

Starting with the

twenty-five-mile offshore position typical of amphibious
operations, the Marines require fires to a depth of sixteen
miles inland to prepare the beach landing area, as well as
an additional twenty-two miles to suppress enemy artillery
and tactical missiles.

Thus the Marine requirement of

providing support fires from a distance of sixty-three miles
has become the criteria for NSFs.327
Firing a 5-inch round to a range of sixty-three miles
is made possible through modifications to the Mk 45 gun,
increasing the size of the round's propellant charge, and
providing a new type of 5-inch shell with rocket assistance.
Fortunately, the Mk 45 gun is not limited by chamber
pressure, but only by the strength of the recoil mechanism,

326oennis Hagan, "Naval Gunfire Support: Versatile
Weapons Systems for Warfighting Needs," Surface Warfare
(September/October 1997), 30-31.
3 2 7 rbid., 32.
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so that adding forty inches to the barrel length and
strengthening the recoil/counter-recoil components will
allow the larger propellant charge.

The rocket propellant

is designed to burn for several seconds after launch,
increasing the shell's apogee and giving the shell
additional velocity.328
The most important component of the new gunfire support
system, however, is the new projectile.

Even at a range of

only thirteen miles, with observer support, the Mk 45 has a
circular error probable (CEP) of 333 meters.

Maintaining

and improving on this level of accuracy at sixty-three miles
would be virtually impossible without some type of guidance.
The new Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) utilizes a
combination of GPS data and an inertial navigation system
(INS) to maintain the accuracy needed for close gunfire
support.

In order to accommodate the GPS/INS guidance

package, as well as a submunitions payload, the ERGM has a
length of sixty-one inches, compared to around forty inches
for standard 5-inch shells.
The ERGM utilizes GPS data in two ways.
firing,

Prior to

the location of the target is fed into the shell's

guidance system.

Since GPS data is three dimensional,

differences in altitude between the ship and the target are
328captain John w. Townes III, "Naval Surface Fire
Support: On Target," Surface Warfare (January/February
1997), 24-26; Hagan, "Naval Gunfire Support,'' 32-33.
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accounted for.

Next, immediately after firing the ERGM's

GPS receiver locks on to four GPS satellites, allowing for
precise self-location.

The ability to lock on to GPS

satellites in the early seconds of flight is crucial, as
enemy jamming of the GPS signal is expected as the shell
nears the target area.

In addition, the INS system cannot

easily be calibrated prior to firing.

Instead, the GPS

receiver updates the INS after firing, allowing the INS to
be initialized in flight.

The GPS/INS system controls a set

of small fins to allow the ERGM to correct its course, and
for terminal guidance.

The INS provides terminal guidance

if the GPS receiver is jammed, maintaining the degree of
precision needed to provide an acceptable CEP when friendly
forces are near the target area.329
The new system has been designated as the 5-inch/62
caliber ERGM.

The system is planned for installation on

most of the Aegis cruisers (CG-52 through 73), as well as
most of the DDG-51 class destroyers yet to be built.

A

total of forty-nine ships, with seventy-one 5-inch/62 ERGM
guns, are expected to be deployed by 2008.

The ERGM will

initially be provided with seventy-two XM-80 multi-purpose
submunitions, an Army munition developed for the 155mm
howitzer.

A unitary warhead for hard-target penetration

329Kenneth Lyons, "Extended Range Guided Munition,"
Surface Warfare (May/June 1996): 8-9.
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also should be available in the future. 33 0

With the ERGM

shell being larger and heavier than the standard 5-inch
shell, the twenty rounds per minute standard of NSFS will
have to be reduced to ten rounds per minute.

However, it is

expected that the ERGM's improved accuracy will make up for
the lower rate of fire.331
When employed in the context of ROF, a description of
which will follow, the ERGM system should make the NSFS
process more effective, accurate, and timely.

With ROF, any

ship within range can respond to a call for fire.

The

ability to mass naval fires, and to coordinate those fires
to allow shifting from target to target rapidly, should
provide greater flexibility and effect to Marine forces
ashore.332

Fire mission planners should be capable of

receiving and responding to requests for fire very quickly,
as the firing platform will not need to lay the gun in the
traditional manner.

The target's GPS coordinates are the

only offboard requirement.

After the target's location has

been provided to the ERGM, the shell can be fired along an
azimuth to the target and guide itself to impact.

Since the

330Murphy, "Achieving 21st Century Naval Mastery,"

Surface Warfare (March/April 1998), 12; Lyons, "Extended
Range Guided Munition," 9,11.
3 31scott Truver, "A call for fire: Launching the NSFS
projectile," Jane's Navy International (September 1997): 18.
332william Gravell, "The Offensive Punch of NetworkCentric Warfare," Surface Warfare (March/April 1998): 16.
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ERGM will be able to change its trajectory in flight,

it may

be possible simply to raise the gun to the elevation that
provides the greatest range, and allow the ERGM to fly
itself to the target.

In any event, the ERGM will provide a

greatly improved capacity for offshore fire support, an
improvement made possible by the ERGM's ability to utilize
GPS data.
A second improvement to NSFS being made possible by
integration of GPS data is the Tactical Tomahawk.

An

evolutionary development of the BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise
missile, the Tactical Tomahawk will provide greater
flexibility in targeting and effectiveness:
System improvements include inflight retargeting;
battlefield loiter capability; a missile-mounted
camera that gives a snapshot of the battlefield for
BDI [Battle Damage Indication], Battle Damage
Assessment (BDA), and target identification; on-board
GPS mission planning; and an architecture to allow
for future advances and alternative payloads.3 33
As with the ERGM, it is the ability to utilize GPS data
that makes the Tactical Tomahawk possible.

Unlike the ERGM,

however, the Tactical Tomahawk is a powered aircraft,
meaning that it can remain airborne under its own power for
over two hours.

The Tomahawk also has a much greater

payload than the ERGM, allowing sensor, communications, and
weapons payloads to be carried simultaneously.

333 vision.
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The Tactical

Tomahawk will be provided with a two-way satellite link,
which will allow the missile to report its status to strike
planners.

The planners likewise will be able to communicate

with the missile, allowing re-targeting in mid-flight.

This

capability is perhaps the greatest improvement over existing
Block II and Block III Tomahawks, which cannot be retargeted after launch. 3 34

In addition to re-targeting

capability, the Tactical Tomahawk should support multipleengagement attacks through the use of submunitions,
particularly the Brilliant Antitank (BAT) submunition. 335
The advantages of the Tactical Tomahawk's new
capabilities are obvious.

With loiter capability, a

Tactical Tomahawk could be positioned over enemy territory
and wait for a target of opportunity.

With the networked

sensor capability envisioned for the twenty-first century
Navy, a target could be attacked by such a loitering
Tomahawk almost as soon as the target is detected.

The

Tomahawk's 1,500-mile range allows the kind of deep strike
attacks formerly conducted by A-6E aircraft, which are now
retired. 336

The ability to use GPS makes possible the re-

334captain John W. Townes, "Surface Strike: The
Powerful Punch of Deterrence," Surface Warfare (January/
February 1997), 19.
335Army, "Tactical Tomahawk," 22-23.
336Murphy, "Achieving 21st Century Naval Mastery," 11.
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targeting and loiter capability of Tactical Tomahawk, by
allowing new target coordinates to be downlinked while the
missile is in flight.

Using only INS and terrain contour

matching guidance, Block II and III Tomahawks require
several hours for programming before launch, and cannot be
retargeted after launch.

Although still awaiting contractor

and Naval Strike Warfare Division approval for production,
the Tactical Tomahawk should begin low-rate initial
production in 2002.337
The new ROF concept for coordinating and directing NSFS
typifies the networked systems entering service with the
armed forces.

ROF currently exists only at the level of

Fleet Battle Experiments, which are conducted by underway
forces around the world to test operational concepts.

Fleet

Battle Experiment Bravo (FBE-B), conducted in AugustSeptember 1997 by USS Coronado (AGF-11), USS Peleliu (LHA5), and USS

Russell (DDG-59), tested the ROF concept of a

local area network for providing NSFS.

In addition to the

ships listed above, ground elements of the 13th Marine
Expeditionary Unit also participated in the experiment.

The

six elements of ROF are:
•

Continuous automatic inventory of the force's

•

The ability to quickly and easily apportion ordnance to
warfare commanders.

337 vision,

Presence, Power, 71.
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weapons.

•

The ability to automatically pair ordnance to targets.

•

The sharing of common information by all providers and
users.

•

Automated integrated deconfliction tools.

•

The ability for each ship's fire control system to be
the master or decision-maker station.3 38
ROF is a local area network (LAN) that connects ships,

forces ashore~ artillery fire planners, and close air
support.
fire,

ROF is designed to manage all kinds of support

from short range gunfire to Tomahawk land attack

missiles.

ROF allows different platforms to "plug in" to

the LAN at any time, as ships arrive or depart the area.
Upon plugging in, the magazine loadout of the platform is
automatically provided to the task force commander via the
LAN. 339

The platform's weapons can then be assigned to

calls for fire by the master station in the LAN.

Each

ship's captain can manually select limits on the amount of
his magazine that can be expended, so that the ship
maintains a minimum level of ordnance for self-defense.
The weapons on the LAN are continuously inventoried, so
that weaponeering can be automated to the greatest extent
practical.

For example, the ROF software might require

338 navid Blake, Joe Penny, and Allen Hjelmfelt, Fleet

Battle Experiment Bravo-Ring of Fire Analysis Report {U}
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1998), 1-2.
33 9rbid., 7.
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human intervention only if there is uncertainty as to the
best match of weapon to target.

The ROF system in its

current form requires human approval for any fire mission, a
safety feature that may not be practical to automate.340
Any fire control station on the LAN can serve as the master
station, and will be able to launch ordnance from another
ship's magazines remotely when functioning as the master
station.

Thus, there should be no degradation of the system

as individual ships come and go, or suffer battle damage. 3 4 1
The subsequent Fleet Battle Experiment Charlie (FBE-C),
conducted 1-11 May 1998 by the USS

Eisenhower

(CVN-69)

battle group, utilized lessons learned from FBE-B to further
test the ROF concept.

Among the conclusions of FBE-C was

the statement that, "The ROF engagement grid concept is
ready for expanded experimentation to include Sensor Grid
and sensor fusion inputs."342

Such testing will be

conducted through additional Fleet Battle Experiments in the
future.

Already the ROF concept is providing a significant

improvement in NSFS, in that ROF allows a large number of
fire requests to be processed simultaneously, rather than

340 rbid., 10-11.
341 rbid., 8-10.
342 Fleet Battle Experiment Charlie (FBE-C} Quick Look
Report, unpublished report by the U.S. Navy Maritime Battle
Center, 12 May 1998, 6.
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having to be processed individually. 343

With continued

development, the ROF concept should support OMFTS with
responsive, accurate, long-range fires in any weather, day
or night.

Aircraft carriers: Their Future Prospects
The aircraft carrier is the capital ship of the U.S.
Navy, a position held since June of 1942, when the Pacific
fleet carriers

Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet turned back

the Japanese fleet at Midway.

From the end of World War Two

until the present day, the CVBG has been the Navy's "big
stick", both as an instrument of naval diplomacy and as a
warfighting platform.

Able to operate a wide variety of

aircraft and helicopters, and with excellent facilities for
command, control, and communications, the aircraft carrier
remains one of the "basic building blocks" of naval forward
presence.34 4
The value of the carrier is its ability to bring U.S.
tactical air power to any region of the world accessible by
sea, and to allow that air power to be exercised without
dependence on foreign facilities or permission.

The

carrier's air wing (CVW) is capable of a wide range of
military missions, including strike, anti-air, anti343 Kip Wright, "Ring of Fire: A Quantum Leap in
Warfighting," Surface Warfare (November/December 1997), 13.
344 Forward ... From

the Sea, 4.
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submarine, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, airborne
early warning, and search and rescue.

The nine existing

nuclear powered carriers (CVN) also have excellent endurance
and sustainability, as they enjoy effectively unlimited
steaming capability and can carry very large quantities of
aviation fuel and ordnance.345
Despite the powerful and versatile nature of carriers,
their design philosophy and basic relevance in the current
international setting have become hotly-debated topics.

For

reasons of cost, perceived duplication of function between
carrier-based and land-based aircraft, and extremely
valuable status (which could make them too valuable to risk
losing), critics of large-deck CVNs call for a shift to
smaller, less capable but less costly conventional carriers,
or for the abandonment altogether of the aircraft carrier.
The issue of cost cannot be denied in regard to CVNs.
The USS

Enterprise (CVN-65) was the most expensive warship

ever built when launched in 1960, costing 444 million
dollars.

The most recent Nimitz-class carrier, USS

Harry

s.

Truman (CVN-75), was purchased for over six billion dollars,
and will deploy with an air wing valued at several billion
dollars as well.346

In addition to the six billion-dollar

price of CVN-75, -76, and -77, these ships will entail a
345 sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 97-98.
346 Polmar,

Naval Institute Guide, 84, 89.
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further twelve billion dollars each in lifetime operating
costs. 3 4 7

Particularly in light of the current defense

budget, there are valid questions about whether it makes
financial sense to continue purchasing multi-billion dollar
ships. 3 48

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has been very

critical of the cost-effectiveness of CVNs compared to
conventional (oil-burning) carriers (CVs), claiming among
other things that the life-cycle costs of a CVN will exceed
that of a CV by over eight billion dollars.349
A corollary to the cost criticism is the fact that,
with only twelve carriers available, each is too valuable to
risk losing, a concern that easily could preclude certain
wartime employments of a CVBG: "Our entire grand strategy
rests on only twelve battle groups. What can we risk them

347 David Perin,

Fundamental Issues for a New Aircraft
carrier: some Thoughts About cost and Affordability
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), 1.
348 Rear Admiral Daniel Murphy, at the time the Director
of Surface Warfare programs, stated in an October, 1997
press conference that, "We cannot afford to continue to
build 4-5 billion-dollar aircraft carriers." See Otto
Kreisher, "Admiral warns 300-ship goal is periled," .s.a.n
Diego Union-Tribune, 16 October 1997, from DoD Early Bird,
17 October 1997, 16.
349 Bradley Peniston, "Navy Disputes GAO Nuclear Carrier
Critique," Defense News, 7-13 September 1998, 26. For the
complete GAO report, see United States General Accounting
Office, Navy Aircraft Carriers: cost-Effectiveness of
conventionally and Nuclear-Powered carriers, GAO/NSIAD-98-1,
August 1998.
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on?"350

This criticism has great merit, especially in a

world of abundant, cheap anti-ship cruise missiles.
Increasingly as time advances, and as smaller and smaller
states possess themselves of anti-ship missiles, the Navy
will have to weigh the benefits of sea-based aviation
against the likelihood of losing a significant portion of
overall capability in a single ship.

It is not clear what

the answer to this cost-vs.-risk equation will be, but it
must be addressed nonetheless.
Another common criticism is the claim that aircraft
carriers have outlived their intended purpose, which was to
be an instrument of open-ocean fighting against a peer-level
navy, such as the Imperial Japanese Navy or the Red Banner
Fleet.

As such, current carriers are much larger, more

expensive, and more complex to build and operate, than are
called for by the setting in which they will be used.351
Smaller carriers, in the range of forty thousand to fifty
thousand tons and operating around forty multi-mission
aircraft, are advocated as a more appropriate and costeffective means of taking air power to sea. 352

3 soFriedman, The Future of War, 201.
35lcaptain Charles Girvin, "Twilight of the
Supercarriers," Proceedings (July 1993): 42-43.
352 Ibid., 44.
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Then-CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt advocated even smaller
and less-capable "Sea Control Ships" in the early 1970s,
envisioned at seventeen thousand tons and carrying only
helicopters and a small number of Harriers, as a "low mix"
to alleviate the high cost of building only nuclear powered
carriers. 353

While smaller carriers clearly would be less

expensive than large-deck nuclear powered carriers, it is
not clear that they would be more cost-effective, or even as
cost-effective.

Again, this difficult question will have to

be addressed by the Navy in the near future, as the first
post-Nimitz-class carrier is due to be delivered in 2013.3 54
A third common criticism is that land-based aircraft,
and even small remotely-piloted vehicles (RPV), can fulfill
the strike and electronic warfare missions conducted by CVW
aircraft, while other surface combatants can satisfy the air
control, electronic warfare, and anti-submarine missions. 3 55
Land-based aircraft are indeed more versatile than carrierbased aircraft, and can sustain more sorties per plane over

353 zumwalt, On watch, 75-76.
354 scott Truver, "Sunrise or Sunset?: U.S. carrier
power launches itself into the future," Jane's International
Defense Review (February 1997): 26.
355 Lieutenant Richard Arthur, "The Last Days of
Carrier-Based Aviation?" Proceedings (January 1999): 75;
Bill Sweetman, "Pilotless fighters: has their time come?"
Jane's International Defense Review (June 1997): 58.
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time, making land-based air power more effective than
carrier-based air power i f bases are available.
Unfortunately for land-based air power advocates,
history has shown that, in situations short of war, local
allies may be unwilling to grant basing rights for U.S.
planes.3 56

Also, while RPVs clearly have a place in

conducting certain high-risk missions, and are well-suited
for battlefield surveillance, there is little basis for
asserting that they can replace manned strike aircraft at
the present and foreseeable level of RPV technology.

It

seems likely that RPVs will supplant manned aircraft
someday; however, that day would appear to remain far in the
future.
In countering the aforementioned GAO report on the
cost-effectiveness of CVNs, the Navy has argued that nuclear
propulsion allows a CVN to be steamed at top speeds for much
longer periods than a CV, due to a more robust propulsion
plant design.

This allows CVNs to avoid areas of bad

weather, to sprint at top speed over long distances in
response to crises, and to launch aircraft at lower cost.
Nimitz-class CVN can also carry 100 percent more aviation

35 6A recent refusal to grant basing access for lessthan-war use of land-based air power came in 1995, when
Italy refused to allow U.S. F-117 planes to operate out of
Aviano Air Base during the bombing campaign in Bosnia. See
Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 38.
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A

fuel than a JFK-class CV, the last CV class built for the
U.S. Navy. 357
While proposals for smaller CVs are attractive
financially, there is little evidence to support the
assertion that small CVs can provide the same capability as
a single large-deck CVN.

In a study of possible future

naval forces and deployments, it was concluded that:
Credible "work-arounds" in the form of substitute
forces [for CVNs] or varying patterns of operation
could not easily be found to respond to demands .
. . . no naval force group could substitute for the
independent air power and capital ship clout of
large-deck carriers to provide comparable credibility
and reasonable risk.358
Despite all the criticisms launched against large-deck
carriers, some admittedly with merit, the fact remains that
a carrier's ability to deliver U.S. air power to any
littoral area, with 100 percent certainty of access, is a
unique and valuable feature. 3 59

CVBGs have responded to

nearly eighty crises since 1970, many of which were beyond
the reach of land-based aircraft, leading to the justified
35 7 Tom Philpott, "The Year Of Declining Readiness,"~
Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 5; Peniston, "Navy
Disputes GAO Nuclear Carrier Critique," 26.
358 Jerome Kahan et al.,

Alternative Naval Force
Deployment Concepts study: Summary Report (Alexandria, VA:
Center for Naval Analyses, 1991), vi, 28.
359 Peter Perla et al.,

Future sea-Based Aviation:
Roles, Missions, and Threats (Alexandria, VA: Center for
Naval Analyses, 1992), 56; Davis, Aircraft carriers and the
Role of Naval Power, 39.
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claim that, "No other DoD asset can match the carrier's
record or provide that type of powerful and compelling
presence."360

As long as manned combat aircraft remain an

important component of U.S. strategy, it seems likely that
the large-deck aircraft carrier will remain also.

FA-18E/F Super Hornet
The newest aircraft in the Navy's inventory is the
FA-18E/F Super Hornet, intended as a replacement for the A6, the F-14, and the FA-18A/B/C/D.

The FA-18E/F may also

replace the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft in the
future. 361

Stemming from the need to replace the aircraft

mentioned above in a period of declining budgets, the Super
Hornet program is based on a series of modifications to
existing

FA-18C/D aircraft.

By adding four feet to the

length and to the wingspan of the FA-18C/D, the Super Hornet
will carry 33 percent more internal fuel than its
predecessor, and will have 40 percent more range with a
standard strike load of four one thousand-pound bornbs. 3 62
The FA-18E/F also will enjoy 90 percent commonality of parts
with the FA-18C/D, an important logistics concern during the

360Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., "The Value of Being There,"

Proceedings (August 1994): 27.
361Hessman, "Overwhelming Air Power," 26.
362 rbid., 27.
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ten-year period in which FA-18C/Ds will be phased out of
service.363
Initial Navy procurement plans included one thousand
FA-18E/Fs, but the number has been cut to a low of 548 and a
high of 785 by the Quadrennial Defense Review. 364

Although

press reports of the FA-18E/F's development process have
centered on a "wing drop" problem, the problem has been
corrected and approval for low-rate initial production has
been given.

The development program is ahead of schedule

and below budget365
Although the FA-18E/F is below its original budget
predictions, the unit cost of production model Super Hornets
will be around forty-four million dollars. 366

The cost of

the FA-18E/F has drawn criticism as being too high for what
is essentially a stop-gap measure until the Joint Strike

363Loren Thompson, "The New Centerpiece of Naval
Aviation," Sea Power (June 1998): 18.
364 cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
Section 7, page 11. The possible range of F-18E/F
procurement stems from uncertainty about the Joint Strike
Fighter's initial availability and cost, and the possibility
of replacing the EA-6B with a Super Hornet variant. See also
Hessman, "Overwhelming Air Power," 25.
365Thompson, "The New Centerpiece of Naval Aviation,"
18.
36 6 John Tirpak, "The Super Hornet," Air Force Maqazine
(March 1998): 39.
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Fighter enters service sometime late in the next decade.
One naval officer observes that:
The Navy cannot afford carrier-deck aircraft that
cost more than $50 million a copy . . . . Instead of
paying all that money for a single aircraft, perhaps
we should use it for two or three aircraft, planes
that can support Marines on the ground, take out
critical near-shore facilities and defense sites,
protect ships at sea, and fall out of the sky--as
they sometimes do--without breaking the bank. 367
The cost of new carrier aircraft is a vital
consideration for the future of naval aviation as a whole,
since it is aircraft, not carriers, that are the primary
cost drivers of sea-based air power. 3 6 8

The unit cost and

expected service life of new aircraft are the principal
determinants of lifetime cost for a CV and its CVW.

The

implications of purchasing forty-four million-dollar
aircraft thus are clear: unless a significant increase in
aircraft service life is obtained, it is doubtful that

3 67commander Kevin Peppe, "Constant Bearing, Decreasing
Range," Proceedinqs (December 1996): 42.
368 John Hall, Lonq-Term Affordability of Sea-Based
TACAIR; Some Preliminary Examples (Alexandria, VA: Center
for Naval Analyses, 1997), 7. Of seven inputs to lifetime
CVN/CVW costs, the greatest changes derived from increased
aircraft service life from twenty to twenty-five years (a 14
percent reduction in lifetime cost) and from a 10 milliondollar increase in aircraft unit cost (a 15 percent increase
in lifetime cost). Shifting to a more "austere" CVN/CVX
resulted in a 5 percent decrease, while a reduction to a
carrier capable of handling only fifty-five aircraft
resulted in a 4 percent decrease. See Appendix A, Table 10
for a graphic representation of various cost factors
associated with lifetime CVN/CVW costs.
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current CVW size can be maintained.

Thus future CVWs may

deploy with fewer aircraft, perhaps as few as half the
current seventy-five, if unit costs are not reduced.
A future CVW is expected to deploy with FA-18E/Fs as
its only combat jet aircraft, a practice that should lead to
significant savings in parts and maintenance costs.
However, it is not clear that the benefits of "necking down"
to a single aircraft will balance the forty-four milliondollar (or more) cost of each aircraft.

As mentioned

earlier, the FA-18E/F is intended to cover the ten to
twelve-year period before the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
enters service.

However, the ability of the JSF to replace

the FA-18E/F on a one-for-one basis is anything but clear.
Even the Quadrennial Defense Review hedges with the caveat
that:
The Navy will transition to the JSF as soon as costs
and effectiveness for the JSF are well understood and
the aircraft is demonstrated to be superior to the
FA-18E/F . . . . Uncertainties in prospective JSF
production cost warrant careful Departmental
oversight.369
If the JSF program should encounter the kinds of
developmental problems that plagued the A-12 program, or the
Air Force F-111 program, the Navy could be left with a fifty
million-dollar (or more), thirty-year-old aircraft as its

369 cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
Section 7, page 11.
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only twenty-first century combat jet.

Recent articles about

the JSF highlight the concern that the JSF may not be ready
on time, or even be produced at all.3 7 0

While the risks of

this acquisition strategy are apparent, the Navy has stated
that the FA-18E/F, now in production and expected to enter
squadron service in 2001, is, "the right airplane at the
right time."3 71

DD-21/Arsenal Ship/Ohio-class SSGN Conversion
Three different proposals exist for providing new
warships, designed for littoral operations, in the twentyfirst century.

One, the DD-21, is an evolutionary step in

surface combatant design.

The other two proposals, the

arsenal ship and the Ohio-class SSGN conversion, would
represent a new concept in warship design, namely the
concentration of a very large amount of precision strike
firepower in a single platform.

None is beyond the drafting

board stage today, and only the DD-21 seems certain to be
built, but each could provide a valuable capability to the
Navy in the future.
The DD-21 surface combatant is often described as a
land-attack destroyer, since its primary mission would be

37 0william Matthews, "Two New Fighters Flourish; Future
of JSF Uncertain," Defense News, 22 February 1999, 14.
371 sea

Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 162.
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strike warfare.372

After a Cost and Operational Evaluation

Analysis study in 1996, the specifications for DD-21 were
laid out as:
•

128 VLS cells with Tomahawk or other missiles.

•

Two 155mm Vertical Gun for Advanced Ships

•

One 5-inch/62 caliber ERGM gun.

•

A new ASW suite with advanced sonar.

•

Two SH-60R multi-purpose helicopters.

•

A "Smart Ship" system to allow manning by 95

(VGAS).

sailors.3 73
The VGAS system is a pair of vertically-mounted,
155mm/52 caliber guns with a round similar to the ERGM.
Designed to fit within the space allocated for a Mk 41 VLS
cell, each gun will be fully automatic and have a 750-round
magazine.

Further development of ERGM technology is

expected to produce a family of VGAS rounds.

The guns'

vertical orientation below decks will serve to remove the
radar signature of a traditional gun turret. 374

In addition

372Leslie West, "Competing To Build the 21st-Century
Destroyer," Sea Power (April 1998): 93.
3 7 3captain Richard Wright, "Future Force," Surface
Warfare (September/October 1997): 10.
37 4captain Dennis Moral, "Naval Surface Fire: Enabling
Maneuver Warfare," Surface Warfare (July/August 1997): 27;
Captain Richard Wright, "Shaping the Battlefield: The 21stCentury Navy," Surface Warfare (March/April 1998): 34;
Vision. Presence. Power, 79.
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to these offensive capabilities designed to provide support
ashore, several DD-21 defensive requirements have been
described for operations in the littorals.

These include

"full-spectrum signature reduction," improved survivability
to mines, anti-ship missiles, and torpedoes, and a new
command, control, and communications system.375
Through a competitive shipyard development process, the
expected use of innovative design and construction features,
and a firm limit of ninety-five crewmembers, the Navy hopes
to keep the average cost of the DD-21 below 750 million
dollars. 37 6

Thirty-two DD-21 ships are planned, with the

first to be started in 2004 and commissioned in 2008.
The arsenal ship, unlike the DD-21, is envisioned as a
pure land-attack vessel, with no multi-mission capability.
In fact, the arsenal ship is little more than a
transportation platform for five hundred VLS cells, armed
with Tomahawk or other cruise missiles.

With so many

missiles, an arsenal ship would provide a theater Cine with
a large amount of precision firepower in the early stages of
a conflict, when other precision strike assets might not be
available. 377

Targeting ashore could be provided by

3 7 5west, "Competing To Build the 21st-Century
Destroyer," 95.
376 Glenn Goodman, "Redesigning the Navy,"
JournaJ International (March 1998): 28.

Armed Forces

37 7captain Richard Wright, "Potent and Punishing: Ships
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satellite surveillance, special operations forces, or by
RPVs deployed from the arsenal ship.378
In the present joint warfighting setting, the arsenal
ship's magazine likely would be apportioned between the
different Joint Force component commanders, available to
each for the completion of different mission areas.

The

Joint Force Air Component Commander might use the arsenal
ship in counter-air attacks on enemy air bases, while the
Joint Force Land Component Commander might wish to strike
enemy artillery, armored forces, or supply areas.3 79
However the arsenal ship's missiles were divided, the
presence of five hundred Tomahawk or other precision weapons
on a constant basis would provide a very valuable deterrent
and warfighting tool to the regional Cine.
Initial studies of the arsenal ship concept postulated
a 500 million-dollar cost for designing and building each
vessel, with an additional 250-350 million dollars for the
missiles.

The Navy expressed interest in as many as six

arsenal ships, and budgeted forty-five million dollars in
January 1997 for research and development.

However, by

October 1997 the arsenal ship concept had been officially

of the Line for the 21st Century,"
/February 1997): 22.

Surface Warfare

(January

3 7 8Robert Holzer, "Exercise Highlights Arsenal Ship
Firepower," Defense News, 14-20 April 1997, 8.
379wright, "Potent and Punishing," 22.
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rejected by Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, who cited
ever-tighter defense budgets and competing procurement
projects.380

Although interest in the arsenal ship

continues to exist, it would appear that there is
insufficient money in the defense budget to allow
development of the concept.
The Ohio-class SSGN conversion is a proposal to convert
the first four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN) into guided missile submarines (SSGN), able to carry
Tomahawk or other precision missiles.

The SSBNs QhiQ. (SSBN

726), Michigan (SSBN 727), Florida (SSBN 728), and Georgia
(SSBN 729) are slated for de-commissioning in order to meet
START II nuclear force levels.38l

By re-configuring their

Trident missile tubes to carry smaller precision guided
missiles, as many as 150 such missiles could be deployed on
each Ohio-class SSGN.

Each could also deploy a SEAL

detachment, by installing a lock-out chamber in one of the
Trident tubes.382
The Ohio-class boats would require around 400 million
dollars each for conversion, which would include the cost of

380Greg Schneider, "Navy scuttles Arsenal Ship
program," Baltimore Sun, 25 October 1997, in DoD Early Bird,
27 October 1997, 19.
381 Jim Courter, "The Boomer Reborn," Proceedings
(November 1997): 52.
382 Ibid., 53.
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a nuclear refueling for their reactors.

After conversion,

each would provide a very survivable, covert means of
deploying precision strike capability into a crisis region.
Each Ohio SSGN could carry nearly as many Tomahawks as a
typical surface action group, as well as deploying SEAL
teams from as far as 120 miles off an adversary's coast,
using the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) .383

In

addition to retaining full ASW and anti-surface capability
through their existing torpedo systems, each SSGN should
retain excellent electronic intelligence-gathering
capabilities.

If an encapsulated RPV can be developed for

underwater launch, the Trident SSGN would provide an
excellent platform for gathering intelligence many miles
inland.
Since the Ohio-class SSBNs already are paid for and
have many years of remaining service life (Qhi.Q., the oldest,
was launched in 1979), it makes good financial sense to keep
them in the fleet in some capacity.3 8 4

Even if not

converted to SSGN configuration, two of the Ohios should be
kept in service to replace USS Kamehameha(SSN-642) and USS
James

K.

Polk (SSN-645), former SSBNs converted into SEAL

delivery submarines and due to be decommissioned soon. 38 5
383Jim Courter and Loren Thompson, "Arsenal Under the
Sea," Sea Power (June 1997): 44.
3 84 Polmar, Nava] Institute Guide, 56.
3 85 Lt. Colonel Reynolds Peele, "Combat Power Projection
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The future of the four Ohio-class SSBNs, which are due to
begin decorcunissioning in 2002, is not decided, but it would
represent a tremendous waste of potential capability simply
to strike them from the active list.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM}
In addition to the offensive power-projection systems
described in the preceding sections, several defensive
systems and programs are being developed or improved for use
in the twenty-first century.

With the Navy's littoral focus

and the Marines' OMFTS concept, naval forward presence
forces will be required to operate in close proximity to the
coastline of adversaries, necessitating improved defensive
capabilities.

One area that demands improved capability is

mine countermeasures (MCM).
Mines are among the oldest of naval weapons, and remain
highly effective today even in their most rudimentary form.
Because contact mines involve little technology beyond a
contact detonator, they are both easy and inexpensive to
produce. 386

For as little as one thousand dollars each,

virtually any nation can produce effective contact mines,
allowing very large numbers to be produced and deployed. 387
Forward ... From (Under) The Sea," Marine Corps Gazette (June
1995): 12; Courter, "The Boomer Reborn," 52.
38 6captain Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the shallowwater challenge," Jane's Navy International (June 1996): 15.
387 H. Dwight Lyons et al., The Mine Threat: Show
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Thus it should be assumed that any coastal state will be
equipped with significant numbers of contact mines.
Contact mines are highly lethal against even the
largest of merchants and warships.

Partly due to their

large warhead size, and partly due to their direct proximity
to the ship's hull upon detonation, such mines have proven
capable of "mission kills" against U.S. warships on several
occasions, as well as against tankers and other merchants.
The Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian contact mine on 18
April 1988 and very nearly was broken in half, with over
fifty million dollars' worth of repairs and nearly two years
required before she was able to return to service.3 88

When

USS Tripoli (LPH-10) detonated an Iraqi contact mine on 18
February 1991, the explosion caused extensive flooding in
the forward part of the ship, ripped open several JP-5 fuel
tanks, and left a sixteen foot by twenty-six-foot hole in
the Tripoli's hull below the waterline. 3 8 9

Merchant Marine

Captain Paul Seitz, who was captain of the SS Bridgeton when
she struck an Iranian contact mine on 24 July 1987, stated

Stoppers or Speed Bnmps? (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1993), 4.
38 8 chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian Gulf," 5.
A mission kill indicates that the target has survived the
attack, but is not able to perform its mission without
repairs. Thus while the target has not been "killed" for
good, it is out of consideration for some length of time.
389 Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 344.
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that the force of the explosion nearly knocked his bridge
crew off their feet, an impressive statement given the
401,000-ton displacement of the Bridgeton.

Naval repair

personnel later determined that the Bridqeton had struck a
Russian model M-08 contact mine, the design of which dates
to 1908.3 9 0
In addition to contact mines, several existing and
projected types of mines are expected to be encountered in
the future.

Among these advanced mines are both moored and

bottom influence mines, which are triggered by the magnetic,
acoustic, or seismic signature of a passing ship, and moored
and bottom rising mines, whose warhead rises to just beneath
the ship's keel before exploding, thus maximizing the
resulting damage.

The Chinese EM-52 rising mine, which uses

a rocket to propel its warhead towards the surface, is one
such example.

Other advanced rising mines are expected to

employ a small guided torpedo, which should be even more
effective.391
Even when a mine does not explode directly under the
target ship, the shock of a nearby explosion can cause
significant damage.

USS Princeton (CG-59) detonated an

Iraqi bottom influence mine just hours after Tripoli was

390"SS Bridgeton: The First Convoy," 52.
391Jeanne Avery, "The Naval Mine Threat to U.S. Surface
Forces," Surface Warfare (May/June 1998): 7.
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damaged, which knocked out all electrical power and
propulsion for over two hours.
the explosion,

With its rudders jammed by

Princeton had to be towed to Bahrain for

repairs.392
Additional advances expected to be seen in the future
include the use of buried bottom mines, mines made from
high-strength plastic to avoid magnetic mine sweeping, mine
warheads of up to one ton, and the use of multiple trigger
sensors to resist sweeping measures.39 3

Already bottom

influence mines are available that are made of fiberglass,
and that employ geometric shapes in order to resemble rocks
when detected by minehunting sonar.394
The mine problem is made more serious by the fact that
specialized mine-laying ships are not required to deploy
mines.

Any ship or small craft can deploy mines, often with

minimal or no modifications to the vessel involved.

Given

the ability of any nation to produce large numbers of
contact mines, the ready availability of many advanced mines
in world arms markets, and the ease with which mines can be
deployed, perhaps the most serious feature of mine warfare

392 Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 345;
Chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian Gulf," 5.
393 Robert Holzer, "Dangerous Waters,"
10 May 1998, 14.
394Avery, "The Naval Mine Threat," 7.
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Defense News, 4-

is the sheer number of mines that a future adversary could
deploy.395
The Navy's littoral focus, and the Marines' OMFTS
concept, will require that U.S. naval forces approach the
coastline of an adversary, up to and across the shoreline in
the case of a Marine landing.

With the kinds of existing

and projected mines available to virtually any nation, MCM
capability is re-emerging from a long period of little
emphasis to a position of priority in the Navy.

A recent

study entitled "Technology for the United States Navy and
Marine Corps 2000-2035" noted that:
The other potential undersea expeditionary warfare
'show-stopper' for naval forces is mine warfare. All
opponents trying to protect a shore against
amphibious landings or trying to deny free passage of
warships and logistic ships will use mines. 3 9 6
A similar commentary comes from Rear Admiral Mike
Mullen, a former commander of the USS George Washington
(CVN-73) CVBG:
Without MCM capability, we simply can't put the
Marines ashore, nor can we safely operate any ships
in the mine-danger areas. Because of that, full
integration of mine warfare into the warfare campaign
plan and the force commander's scheme in terms of

395"Maneuver Warfare and Mine Countermeasures," Surface

Warfare (May/June 1998): 29.
396 cited in Robert Holzer, "Study: Mines, Quieter Subs
Pose Looming Naval Threats," Defense News, 8-14 September
1997, 38.
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sequence is vital. Without mine warfare, the campaign
stops. 397
U.S. naval forward presence forces will rely on three
methods for providing MCM capability.

The first and oldest

method is through dedicated MCM forces, which employ
purpose-built MCM ships and equipment.

Dedicated open-water

MCM will come from the fourteen MCM-1 Avenger-class ships
acquired from 1985 to 1992. 398

These ships have wooden

hulls, to defeat magnetic mine triggers, and are in the
process of having new digital electronic minehunting gear
installed.

Two are homeported in Japan, and two are

homeported in the Persian Gulf.39 9 The lead ship of the
class,

USS Avenger (MCM-1), operated in the Persian Gulf

during the Gulf War.
A second type of purpose-built MCM craft are the MHC-51

Osprey-class boats, designed primarily for defending ports
and harbors from enemy divers or offensive mining.

Designed

for work in shallow water, and with limited sea-keeping
ability and only fifteen days' endurance, these small craft
are not well-suited to open-water MCM work. 4 00

Instead,

397 cited in Rear Admiral Dennis Conley, "Mine Warfare:
Enabling Power Projection in the Littorals," Surface Warfare
(May/June 1998): 24.
398 Polmar,
399 sea

Naval Institute Guide, 211.

Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 150.

400 vision.

Presence. Power, 63.
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they likely would be tasked with keeping U.S. ports or
beachhead areas free from mines.
The third type of MCM ship is USS
converted LPH-1 amphibious ship.
workshop facilities,

Inchon (MCS-12), a

With large hangar and

Inchon serves as a floating support and

supply base for regional MCM forces.

She also carriers a

squadron of MH-53E Sea Dragon minehunting helicopters. 401
Although a fairly old ship (launched in 1969), Inchon has
shown herself to be well-suited to the floating base
application.

Her ability to operate a large number of

helicopters also is a valuable MCM asset.
A unique dedicated MCM capability comes from the Navy's
Marine Mammal System (MMS) platoons.

Able to be air lifted

anywhere in the world quickly, these platoons comprise a
team of shallow-water divers, a marine mammal unit of
dolphins, animal handlers, and small boat coxswains, and an
unmanned minehunting unit.

The Mk 4 MMS employs four

dolphins to detect and locate deep-moored mines, whether
rising, influence, or contact types.

The Mk 6 MMS employs

six dolphins working in conjunction with explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) and SEAL personnel to protect friendly
harbors from enemy intrusion.

The Mk 7 MMS uses eight

dolphins for the detection, location, and neutralization of
bottom mines.
401 sea

The Mk 7 MMS currently represents the only

Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 151.
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capability in the U.S. Navy for dealing with buried
mines.402

The MMS platoons were integrated into the new

Very Shallow Water MCM (VSWMCM) detachment in 1998.
Intended specifically to search and clear prospective Marine
landing locations, the VSWMCM detachments consist of the MMS
platoons, EOD and SEAL teams, and Marine Corps Force
Reconnaissance divers.403
Perhaps the most important improvement in MCM is the
development of organic systems and capabilities, which
should provide every ship and submarine with its own selfcontained MCM capability.

Because there may not always be

time for the dedicated MCM ships to deploy to a theater in
times of crisis, it is important that every ship be able to
provide its own MCM, if only to allow itself to maneuver
freely within a given area.404

Two means of organic MCM are

airborne, through the helicopter found on almost every
surface combatant in the fleet, and through remotely guided
"swimming" systems.

402 commander Dan Renwick, "Conquering the VSW
Environment: Man and Dolphins on the Front Lines,"
Warfare (May/June 1998): 39-41.
403 vision.

Surface

Presence. Power, 105.

4 04"Mine Explosion: Defensive Efforts Lag Behind Enemy
Technology Gains," Defense News, 4-10 May 1998, 15. Cited in
this article is U.S. Navy data that claims a one- to twoweek delay for deploying MH-53E helicopters, and up to one
month for MCM ships stationed in CONUS. See also Captain
Buzz Broughton, "Mine Countermeasures: Zapping the Speed
Bumps," Surface Warfare (July/August 1997): 16.
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Most ships carry at least one helicopter capable of
locating and clearing mines.

The Inchon's MH-53E

helicopters are the best-suited for airborne MCM due to
their large size, heavy lift capability, and long endurance,
but the Inchon is the only ship of her class and cannot be
in two places at once.

Thus it is important that the

smaller SH-60 helicopters found on most surface combatants
be capable of at least modest MCM.

Several emerging systems

should improve the airborne MCM capability of these smaller
helicopters.
The new CH-60S Knigthhawk version of the MH-60 multipurpose helicopter eventually will employ two different
minehunting and neutralization systems.

The first combines

the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), a bluegreen laser system also known as Magic Lantern, with the
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS), a 20mm gun
with specially-designed ammunition.

These two systems are

optimized for shallow-moored (fifty feet or less) or
surface-moored mines. 4 05

Magic Lantern was demonstrated

successfully in 1995, and three contingency systems are
operated by the HSL-94 ASW squadron pending final
development of the system.406
4 osMajor General Edward Hanlon Jr., "Shaping the
Battlespace: Organic Mine Countermeasures," S11rface Warfare
(May/June 1998): 13.
406vision, Presence, Power, 103.
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The second airborne system will combine the towed
AN/AQS-20 minehunting sonar and the Airborne Mine
Neutralization System (AMNS).

The AMNS is a remotely-

guided, self-destructing shaped-charge weapon, intended to
be deployed from the helicopter operating the AN/AQS-20.
The AN/AQS-20 and AMNS are intended for mines located in
deeper water, and complement the ALMDS and RAMICS systems
that operate against shallow mines.407
To complete the needed organic MCM capability, three
swimming systems are under development.

The first is the

Remote Minehunting System (RMS), a diesel-powered semisubmersible craft operated from surface ships. 408

The RMS

was first demonstrated in an operational setting by USS

Cushing (DD-985) in the Persian Gulf in 1997, and is
expected to enter service in 2000. 409

Described as ''an

organic, high-endurance reconnaissance unit," the RMS is not
capable of neutralizing mines.

Rather, it will provide

intelligence to its parent ship about the safety of
surrounding waters. 410

However, as the

Tripoli and

407 otto Kreisher, "Unencumbered Maneuverability On Day
One," Sea Power (February 1999): 58-59.; Hanlon, ''Shaping
the Battlespace," 14.
408Hanlon, "Shaping the Battlespace," 13.
409 vision,

Presence, Power, 104.

41 0David Foxwell, "Mine-conscious surface ships back on
the agenda," Jane's International Defense Review (May 1997):
33.
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Princeton examples show, simply knowing where the mines are
is of great importance, and the RMS should provide such
knowledge, in both deep and shallow water, at distances of
several miles.411
The two other remote minehunting systems are intended
for U.S. submarines, but hold obvious potential for
adaptation by surface forces.

The first is the Near-term

Mine Reconnaissance System (NMRS), a torpedo tube-launched,
"tethered" system that is controlled through a fiber-optic
cable from the submarine.412

The NMRS will carry the same

AQS-14 minehunting sonar used by current helicopter MCM
units.

After traveling for up to five hours at four to six

knots, the NMRS vehicle is recovered through the submarine's
torpedo tubes, allowing the entire process of launch,
mission execution, and recovery to be performed while
submerged.

Although relatively slow and short-ranged, the

NMRS system will provide an important covert MCM capability
for U.S. submarines.

The NMRS, which relies heavily on

proven commercial systems and components, is viewed as an
interim system, pending development of the more-capable
Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) .413

411Broughton, "Mine Countermeasures," 19.
412Hanlon, "Shaping the Battlespace," 14.
41 3navid Foxwell, "Naval ROVs: alternatives sought for
mine neutralization," Jane's International Defense Review
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The LMRS essentially will be a "mini-submarine", with
its own self-contained power source and navigation system.
It is projected to provide forty to forty-eight hour
endurance and 120-mile range from the launching submarine.
Although the LMRS will be more complex and expensive than
the NMRS, due to the need to develop a suitable power
source, the LMRS should be a much safer option for the
deploying submarine (or ship) .414

Slated to enter service

in 2003, the LMRS should allow long-range, covert minefield
reconnaissance, a vital requirement for OMFTs.415
The MCM systems and capabilities described here will be
vital for a Navy that espouses littoral operations as its
main focus for the twenty-first century.

For a state

attempting to defend against naval forces, mines are an
obvious means of countering U.S. sea power.

Mines should be

expected to be used in any regional chokepoints, as defenses
around likely landing areas, and in important SLOCs.416
Even the threat of mines can impose caution and delay on
U.S. operations.

Clever adversaries can compound this

problem by advertising (or falsifying) their minelaying

(May 1997): 61;

Vision, Presence. Power, 104.

4 14rbid.
415 vision.

Presence. Power, 104-105.

4 1 611 Maneuver Warfare and Mine Countermeasures," 28.
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efforts, and by employing dummy mines to augment existing
minefields.
Because existing deep-water MCM systems and practices
do not work well in shallow or surf-zone waters, the
development of new MCM capabilities has added urgency. 417
The U.S. Navy has neglected MCM for many years, as openocean operations against the Soviet Union were expected to
be the principal activity of the Navy in wartime.

The Navy

has found itself forced to "play catch-up" in this vital
warfighting area, with the result that many developmental
efforts have come to naught.

Despite observations from

within and from outside the Navy that MCM remains underfunded,

a

recent GAO report cites the expenditure of over a

billion dollars on MCM systems, with little to show for
it.418

MCM capability must be improved at every level,

throughout the fleet,

if a littoral strategy is to be

pursued in the twenty-first century.

Anti-Submarine Warfare <ASW}
During the Cold War the U.S. Navy was the recognized
leader in ASW, a not surprising fact given the large Soviet
submarine force that the Navy trained to counter.
Structured for an open-ocean effort against Soviet
417 Daniel Crute, "Surf Zone Technology,"
Warfare (May/June 1998): 36.
418"Mine Explosion," 15.
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Surface

submarines, the Navy's ASW capability primarily was centered
on deep-water operations against large, relatively noisy
nuclear powered submarines.

With the demise of the Soviet

Union, and the shift to littoral operations, the twentyfirst century Navy is confronted with a new ASW challenge:
prosecuting and killing small, quiet diesel-electric
submarines in shallow waters, where many of the systems and
tactics of open-ocean ASW are not effective.419
Since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, the Navy
has seen a significant decrease in size, readiness, and
capability.

ASW has been a particular area of deteriorating

capability, as resources and training for ASW have dwindled
in the post-Cold War period.

The lack of a world-wide,

open-ocean submarine threat and competition for funds from
higher-priority programs, such as TMD, have seen a serious
degradation of the Navy's ASW skills.420

Another reason for

the decline in ASW capability is the restructuring or
dismantling of much of the Cold War ASW force structure.
For example, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft have been reduced
by half since 1989, with the remaining P-3s largely employed
in surface surveillance and reconnaissance. 421

U.S. SSNs,

419Longworth, "Solutions to the shallow-water
challenge," 15.
420Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Chief Emphasizes Need To
Renew ASW Focus," Defense News, 7-13 September 1998, 4.
421 "ASW Atrophy: Training Sinks Dangerously Low,"
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such as the SSN-688 Los Angeles-class, represent the premier
ASW platform, yet their numbers are expected to fall to
fifty, half of the Cold War goal of one hundred, by 2004.42 2
The combination of decreasing ASW force size and structure,
decreasing funds, and lack of emphasis due to the absence of
the Soviet submarine threat have served to leave the Navy in
poor ASW health.
In the littoral setting, ASW will be a critical
capability.

The keep-out strategy expected to be employed

by regional opponents is built upon the traditional weapons
of sea denial, the mine and the submarine.

The study cited

in the previous section on MCM offers a similar position on
submarines:
Of special concern to the naval forces are advanced,
quiet submarines . . . . This would present a major
threat to our ability to initiate and sustain
expeditionary military operations along the littoral
regions, especially in view of evolving concepts for
such warfare that call for extensive fire support and
logistic support from the sea.423
The submarine threat, like the mine threat, must be
taken seriously all the time, even when submarines have not
been identified.

In fact, it is precisely when the location

of enemy submarines is unknown that the greatest effort must

Defense News, 4-10 May 1998, 14.
422 sea

Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 102.

42 3Holzer, "Study: Mines, Quieter Subs," 38.
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be expended in ASW operations.

The British experience in

the Falklands campaign is illustrative of the level of
respect commanded by even a few old, less-capable
submarines.
In the Falklands campaign, Argentina possessed four
diesel-electric submarines, only two of which were
seaworthy.

Of these two, one was an ex-u.s. Guppy-class

World War Two submarine, while the other was a modern German
Type-209.

The British Royal Navy was perhaps the only ASW

peer of the U.S. Navy, operating many of the same advanced
SSNs and ASW helicopter systems.

Yet the mere presence of a

single Argentine submarine in the South Atlantic forced the
British commander to divert significant surface assets to
ASW work, and prevented the British amphibious group from
taking optimal positions for the re-capture of South
Georgia.

Several hundred ASW weapons were dropped or fired

on possible submarine contacts, without damaging the
Argentine submarine San Luis, which was able to conduct at
least three torpedo attacks on British ships. 424
Even the two Argentine submarines that did not go to
sea were able to influence British operations.

One, also a

Guppy-class boat, was towed from port to port to give the
impression that it was operable, thus increasing British
4 24Lodmell, "It Only Takes One," 30; Commander Kevin
Peppe, "Submarines in the Littorals," Proceedings (July
1993): 47.
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apprehension to the submarine threat.

The concerns of a

naval commander faced with enemy submarines is stated by a
U.S. Navy submarine officer:
No greater threat exists to successful operations in
the littorals than that posed by a professionally
operated diesel submarine . . . . Even poorly operated
diesel submarines are a menace . . . . Even the oldest
of diesel submarines . . . retains that most
fundamental of submarine qualities: stealth.4 2 5
Just as uncertainty about mines serves nearly as well
as the actual presence of mines, so can uncertainty about
the presence of submarines serve an adversary's purposes.
Until and unless positive information exists that an enemy
submarine has been sunk, any naval operations in the area
must be assumed to be at risk of submarine attack, and may
be restricted in range of action as a result.
The focus on littoral ASW is especially relevant due to
the possession of diesel submarines by many potential
regional adversaries.

Diesel submarines are found in the

navies of Iran, North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, and, of
course, Russia. 426

Roughly 110 diesel submarines exist in

the inventories of twenty-one nations around the world, many
of them relatively modern German, French, or Russian

425 Ibid.
426 oavid Foxwell, "Sub proliferation sends navies
diving for cover," Jane's International Defense Review
(August 1997): 31.
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models.42 7

In addition to previously exported Kilo-class

boats, the new Russian Amur-class diesel submarine has been
offered for export even before the first Amur has been
launched.428

Clearly there is no shortage of available

submarine capability for small states seeking to strengthen
their defenses.
For the Navy's littoral strategy, ASW will be crucial.
If ships are to approach an enemy's coast, as they must for
amphibious landings, enemy submarines must be defended
against.

Although aircraft carriers have attracted the most

attention as being too valuable to risk losing, the
decreasing size of the U.S. fleet means that every ship
represents a larger percentage of overall capability, and
increasingly may be too valuable to risk.

The concentration

of ever-greater capability into individual vessels, such as
the large AOE fast support ships or the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) ships, means that a single
torpedo attack by even the oldest of diesel submarines can
have disastrous effects for U.S. regional warfighting
efforts.

An ARG's ships, including the large LHA and LHD

ships with their hundreds of U.S. Marines onboard, must
approach an enemy's coast to fulfill their power projection

4 27commander Kaj Toft Madsen, Royal Danish Navy,
"Fighting the B_east," Proceedings (August 1996): 28.
428Foxwell, "Sub proliferation," 33.
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mission, and so will be at the greatest risk of submarine
attack.
In short, no littoral operations can afford to ignore
the threat of an enemy submarine, however old, that is
capable of putting to sea.429

Accordingly, the U.S. Navy

must improve on its current level of shallow-water ASW.
Indicative of the need for improvement are recent training
exercises with South Africa, in which thirty-year-old
French-built diesel submarines were able to avoid detection
by U.S. ships.430

Existing and future diesel submarines may

be armed with homing torpedoes that can be launched from
five miles or more, making the submarine threat even
greater. 431

The shallow-water ASW mission thus must be

elevated in priority among naval planners.
One possible step in improving U.S. ASW training and
capability against diesel submarines would be for the Navy
to purchase its own diesel submarines.

As stated

previously, many advanced German, French, and even Russian
diesel submarines are available on the world arms market.
Acquiring diesel submarines of its own would allow the Navy
first-hand experience in the diesel submarine's operational
tactics and limitations from the submarine commander's
429Lodmell, "It Only Takes One," 31.
43011 ASW Atrophy," 16.
431Madsen, "Fighting the Beast," 30.
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perspective.432

This real-life Red Team capability would be

an invaluable source of information on diesel submarine
operations.

Such diesel submarines could be based overseas,

as the SSBNs once were, in order to provide both realistic
in-theater training as well as combat capability in wartime.
Simply training against the diesel submarines of allies is
unlikely to provide the depth of understanding that
ownership of such submarines would allow.

While no plans

for the purchase of diesel submarines have been announced by
the Navy, this option certainly merits consideration.
Other improvements in ASW capability must come from
increased emphasis on ASW, which must be translated into
increased funding for training and new systems.
paper from CNO Admiral Jay Johnson,

The recent

"1998 ASW Focus

Statement," is a step in the right direction, but additional
efforts still must be made. 433

Newer systems for TMD,

aviation, and other warfighting areas are important, and
have received much attention (and funding)

in recent years.

The submarine threat, on the other hand, has largely been
ignored since the Soviet threat disappeared.

It should not

take the loss of a major warship or logistics ship to a
diesel submarine attack to re-awaken the Navy to the need
for ASW in the littorals.

However, as the British Falklands

432"ASW Atrophy," 16.

433Holzer, "U.S. Navy Chief Emphasizes" 4.
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experience and recent Navy exercises demonstrate, it may be
that such a loss will have to occur to drive home the
importance of ASW.

Theater Missile Defense
Probably no single warfare area is of greater
importance in the current international setting than theater
missile defense (TMD).

One of the common threads in defense

literature concerning possible opponent strategies is the
use of ballistic missiles to attack U.S. forces, facilities,
or allied population centers.

In the absence of a credible

TMD system, the mere possession of ballistic missiles likely
will result in significant political pressure from regional
allies, particularly if the adversary is believed to possess
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.

Regional

allies may be reluctant to render assistance to U.S. forces,
such as base access or overflight rights, if their
population centers are within range of ballistic
missiles. 434
In addition to these political effects, an opponent
with the ability and willingness to use ballistic missiles
to deliver NBC weapons could gain two important military

434some authors use the term "horizontal deterrent" to
describe political pressure from U.S. allies threatened with
ballistic missile attack. See John Peters, The U.S.
Military: Ready for the New World Order? (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 106-107.
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advantages in a conflict with the United States.

First, the

use of persistent chemical weapons on regional port and
airfield facilities could render these facilities useless to
American forces.

Without access to regional ports and

airfields, the kind of build-up seen in the Persian Gulf in
1990 would be virtually impossible. 435

Second, an opponent

in possession of one or more nuclear weapons could use a
ballistic missile to conduct a nuclear attack on American
space assets.

The current and future U.S. level of

dependence on space support are potentially severe
vulnerabilities.

If an opponent were able to destroy or

degrade American space assets, U.S. forces could lose much
of their high-tech advantage.
For these reasons, as well as the threat of attack on
U.S. military forces, the development of TMD systems is a
high priority within the U.S. armed forces:
Because the ability to fight and win major regional
conflicts (MRC) relies on rapid reinforcement from
home bases, the United States is investing heavily in
4 35 see Weaver and Glaes, Inviting Disaster;

(1).T.he.

Impact of Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical Proliferation on
Naval Operations and Capabilities, (2)The Impact of the
Proliferation of Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical Weapons
on the United States Air Force, and (3)The Impact of
Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical Proliferation on u.s.
Armed Forces. 1-3 are reports by the Center for
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, D.C.: NDU, 1996.
Each of these sources describe the absolute necessity of
large facilities in the theater, and the extreme
vulnerability of such static facilities to persistent
chemical attack.
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assets such as C-17s and Roll-on Roll-off ships. The
airfields and ports through which our forces must
arrive are essential to the reinforcement strategy.
The Surface Navy must be capable of protecting these
debarkation points and able to force its way ashore
under the threat or actual conduct of TBM strikes. 436
The Navy systems intended to provide TMD capability
are Navy Area Defense (also known as Lower Tier), and Navy
Theater-Wide (also known as Upper Tier).

Both systems are

built around the Aegis radar system and the SM-2 missile.
The Aegis system also has been proposed as the foundation of
a national missile defense (NMD) system, although such a
system would be prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The first component of naval TMD is the Navy Area
system, or Lower Tier.

Navy Area utilizes the SPY-1 radar

of the Aegis ships, and a modification of the SM-2 missile.
Specifically, the SM-2 Block IVA missile adds a dual semiactive radar/imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance,
as well as an improved blast-fragmentation warhead with
radar proximity fusing.

The use of a proximity fuse reduces

the "all-or-nothing" nature of hit-to-kill systems, as even
a near miss should produce a mission kill. 437

Navy Area is

436captain Phil Balisle, "Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense: Blunting the Attack," surface Warfare (January/
February 1997), 37. The current need for TBMD echoes the
need for carrier-based aircraft in the 1930s-40s, to provide
local air superiority so that Marine and Army forces could
be landed in safety from aerial attack.
43 7 swicker, "Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea,"

8-9.
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intended for short-ranged ballistic missiles, but retains
the ability of the SM-2 Block IV to intercept cruise
missiles and aircraft.438
The SPY-1 radar's ability to track ballistic missiles
has been proven by test range operations, as well as realworld operations.

The SM-2 Block IVA likewise has been

tested successfully at White Sands missile range, where a
Lance ballistic missile target was destroyed on 24 January
1997. 43 9

The first multi-ship test took place in July 1995,

when USS Lake Erie (CG-70) and USS

Port Royal (CG-73)

conducted a tracking experiment at the Pacific Missile Range
facility in Hawaii.440

A recent test, conducted on 18

November 1998 at the Pacific Missile Range, involved the
launch of an SM-2 as a simulated ballistic missile, which
again was tracked by

Lake Erie and Port Royal.

The cruisers

conducted a complete track and intercept of the SM-2, with
only the launch of the SM-2 Block IVA interceptor being
simulated.

USS

Russell (DDG-59), an Aegis destroyer

operating the newer SPY-lD system, repeated the test two

438David Hughes, l'Navy Readies Fleet For Anti-Scud
Warfare," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 February
1997, 62.
439 vision.

Presence. Power, 74.

4 40David Foxwell and Joris Janssen Lok, "Naval TBM
defense matures," Jane's International Defense Review
(January 1998): 28.
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days later using an Aries target missile.

In both tests,

tracking information was shared in real time with Army TMD
facilities in Alabama, in order to demonstrate the joint
warfighting requirement of networking sensors in joint force
application.441

In March 1996 the cruiser USS Bunker Hill

(CG-52) tracked all four Chinese M-9 missiles launched
across the Taiwan Strait, while the Aegis destroyer USS

Mitscher (DDG-57) has tracked Syrian missile tests from a
position in the eastern Mediterranean. 44 2
The ability to utilize Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) data sharing should make Navy Area much
more effective, as data on a target missile's trajectory
could be provided by Aegis-equipped ships located between
the launch point and the target.443

Initial tests of the

CEC system confirm that CEC can be employed in a TMD role,
allowing earlier engagement by the firing ship.

Given the

likely "shoot-look-shoot" method of the Navy Area system,
the ability to fire the first shot as early as possible has
obvious advantages.

Availability of a CEC-equipped EP-3 or

441"Navy Launches New Missile Defense Tests," Defense
:N.e.e.k, 30 November 1998, cited in BMDO External Affairs
Diqest, 30 November 1998.
4 42Foxwell and Lok, "Naval TBM defense matures," 29.
443cEC is an emerging system for sharing radar tracks
on airborne targets in real time. A full description of CEC
will follow later in this chapter.
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E-2C aircraft would maximize the benefit gained through CEC,
but even without an aircraft link the ability to share data
through CEC provides an important advantage in TMD. 444
As valuable as Navy Area will be, it has two
significant disadvantages compared to a longer-range system
like Navy Theater-Wide.

First, because of the short range

of Navy Area (described as "tens of miles"), it ties a
multi-mission Aegis warship to a relatively fixed position,
a position that may be hundreds of miles from the likely
site of battle within the theater.

An Aegis cruiser

positioned to defend Bahrain, for example, would not be
available to provide anti-air, anti-cruise missile, or antisurface capability elsewhere in the Gulf.

Secondly, the

engagement envelope for Navy Area shrinks as the defended
site gets farther inland, making it less effective in
defending sites that are not located on or near the
coast.4 45

For these reasons, a longer-range TMD capability

is required.
The second component of naval TMD is Navy Theater-Wide,
or Upper Tier.

Like Navy Area, Navy Theater-Wide is crafted

around the SPY-1 radar and the SM-2 missile.

Unlike Navy

Area, Theater-Wide is intended as an exo-atmospheric system,
444 cooperative Engagement Capability: A Revolution in
Air Defense, U.S. Navy booklet, no publisher or date, 16.
445swicker, "Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea,"

9.
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destroying incoming ballistic missiles outside the
atmosphere.

In order to conduct intercepts outside the

atmosphere, Navy Theater-Wide will utilize a modified SM-2
missile and the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile
(LEAP) kill vehicle.

Modification to the SM-2 will include

a third stage, comprised of the Advanced Solid Axial Stage
rocket motor, and replacement of the blast-fragmentation
warhead with the LEAP.

The new missile likely will be

designated SM-3.446

An important advantage of Navy Theater-Wide over Navy
Area is the ability to conduct intercepts during the ascent,
mid-course, and descent phase of a ballistic missile's
flight.

Such capability will allow multiple shots in many

cases, as well as dispersing chemical or biological warheads
harmlessly outside the atmosphere.

When combined with Navy

Area, a layered defense against ballistic missiles will be
effected.

The Theater-Wide system should share the same

benefits of CEC data-sharing as Navy Area.

Four successful

test launches of an SM-2 missile configured to carry the
LEAP projectile have been conducted since 1992.

The initial

446rbid., 10. The LEAP kill vehicle is a hit-to-kill
system, relying on direct impact with an incoming missile in
order to destroy it. With a mass of 18kg and a velocity in
the neighborhood of 4.5 km/sec, the kinetic energy of the
LEAP kill vehicle is approximately 250 million ft-lbs!!
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intercept test of the SM-3/LEAP missile is planned for 1999,
with deployment scheduled for as early as 2006.447
While both TMD systems should be capable of relying
only on CEC for offboard cueing, the ability to integrate
space assets into naval TMD would provide a significant
advantage. 448

Space-based sensors should provide the

earliest possible notification of missile launch, due to the
ability of a satellite to look down at the earth:
Providing targeting information to the Aegis system
from these external sensors will supplement the
information provided by the Aegis system's own SPY-1
radar and allow interceptors to "launch on remote
data." This means the interceptor can be launched on
the basis of information provided by external sensors
and before the attacking missile is picked up by the
SPY-1 radar. This would permit attacking missiles to
be intercepted much earlier in their flight
trajectories, substantially widening the area that
can be defended, especially against higher velocity,
longer-range theater ballistic missiles. 449
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a
constellation of satellites in both geosynchronous orbit
(SBIRS-High) and low earth orbit (SBIRS-Low), should provide

447 vision, Presence, Power, 74.
44 8Frank Gaffney, "Defend America-From the Sea,"
Proceedings (October 1998), 73; Swicker, "Theater Missile
Defense from the Sea," 12. Swicker states that, "In 2005,
cueing to Aegis will be primarily a function of the U.S.
Space Command."
449 Defending America: Ending America's Vulnerability to
Ballistic Missiles (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, 1996). Cited in Gaffney, "Defend America-From
the Sea," 73.
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the space-based cueing needed to extract maximum benefit
from the Aegis TMD systems.

Launch of SBIRS-High satellites

was scheduled commence in 2002, but has been pushed back by
the Air Force to 2004. 4 50
will begin in 2004.

Launch of SBIRS-Low satellites

Even with the delays in the SBIRS-High

program, both components of SBIRS should be available when
Navy Theater-Wide enters service.451
Through the use of CEC data-sharing, any Aegis ship
capable of tracking a ballistic missile should be able to
provide cueing to the ship that actually fires at the
ballistic missile.

The ability to utilize offboard cueing

in this manner will extend the range of the firing ship
substantially, allowing a larger coverage against ballistic
missiles and possibly allowing multiple shots in a shoot-

look-shoot engagement.

In addition, both TMD systems are

good examples of the benefit gained through the ability to
place sensors in space, and to transmit information from
space in real-time.

By combining two different systems to

form a layered defense, with space and CEC support to
improve the effectiveness of each component in the TMD
shield, American TMD capability should provide much-needed
protection against ballistic missile attack in the future.
450 warren Fe~ster, "Satellite Projects Killed," Defense
Melis., 15 February 1999, 36.
451 secretary of Defense Annual Report to congress and

the President 1998, 70.
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Despite the recognized importance of TMD, the Area and
Theater-Wide programs have experienced problems imposed from
outside the Department of the Navy.

Lack of enthusiastic

support from the Clinton administration, and even from
within the Department of Defense, have served to reduce the
pace of Navy TMD development.452

A further hindrance to the

Theater-Wide program is its recent merger with the Army's
problem-plagued Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system.

The merger was directed by the Pentagon's

comptroller, William Lynn, for budgetary reasons.45 3

The

Navy has strongly criticized the merger, arguing that it
will force unjustified delays on the development of a longrange TMD system, as well as entailing extra costs to make
the eventual system compatible with each service's operating
requirements. 454
Navy Area has entered initial manufacturing
development, with the full software system installed on Lake

E.r..i..e. and Port Royal.

Problems remain to be solved in making

the Area TMD software, the CEC software, and the existing

452Eugene Fox and Stanley Orman, "Lack of Cooperation
Cripples TMD Credibility, Effectiveness," Defense News, 6-12
October 1997, 21.
4 5 3 colin Clark and Robert Holzer, "Pentagon To Combine
Theaterwide, THAAD," Defense News, 18 January 1999, 4.
454 Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Rips Missile Merger,"
Defense News, 8 February 1999, 4.
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Aegis software compatible, a daunting task given the size of
the Aegis software alone.455

However, the Navy has planned

thirty-five test launches of the SM-2 Block IVA missile in
the next two years, and hopes to have the Navy Area system
fully operational by 2003.

Theater-wide is hoped to be

operational by the year 2005, although a 2006-2008 time
frame is more realistic.4 56

Both systems should provide a

much-needed defensive capability against ballistic missiles,
a capability made more effective through its position at
sea.
Defenses Against Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)

The United States possesses unmatched power projection
capability, both through forward-deployed forces and forces
that can be transported overseas from CONUS, as demonstrated
in 1990-91.

However, the emergence of NBC capability in the

hands of smaller states has the potential to invalidate U.S.
regional warfighting strategy by targeting specific
weaknesses of that strategy.

In particular, chemical and

biological weapons (CBW) represent an attractive 'equalizer'

4 55Bryan Bender, "USN digitisation effort is hit by
integration flaw," Jane's Defense Weekly, 01 July 1998, 9;
Captain Dan Meyer and Captain John Geary, "Aegis Computing
Enters the 21st Century," Proceedings (January 1998): 40.
The Aegis system currently utilizes over fifteen million
lines of computer code and twenty-eight dedicated computers.
456 sea

Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 150.
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for smaller states that envision war with the United
States.45 7
In a regional crisis requiring the deployment of U.S.
power projection forces, the units deployed in the theater
will present an adversary with an enticing target for CBW
attack.

A regional power may conclude that it cannot defeat

American forces using conventional weapons, making CBW
necessary as an equalizer.

Thus the attractiveness of CBW

attack would derive from purely military considerations,
setting aside the logistical, political, and blackmail
benefits of using or threatening to use CW/BW weapons.
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457 While many smaller states are believed to be
pursuing nuclear capability, the possession of chemical and
biological weapons in these nations' arsenals largely is a
known fact. This section thus will be written from the
standpoint that CW and BW are the most likely to be employed
against the United States.
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may not be made available to U.S.

forces due to the threat

of NBC attack or for political reasons.
Given the need to put Marine units "over the beach", an
adversary's first and most viable opportunity to attack U.S.
forces would come in the littoral area.

The necessity for

Marine units to come into close proximity with enemy forces
would allow chemical attack via artillery, rockets, mortars,
mines, and aerial bombs, while the need for supporting naval
forces to concentrate in the waters near the landing area
would allow attack by cruise missiles.458
In regard to attacks on Marine units, the continuing
shortfall in fielding effective CBW protective gear likely
would result in heavy casualties following a chemical
attack.

Among the problems faced by Marine units are

insufficient detection capability, insufficient personal
protective capability, and inability to safely process and
treat chemical casualties.4 59

Marine Corps Major Victor

Riley, writing in Proceedings, offered the following
shortcomings of Marine NBC readiness:
Until recently, there has been no standard testing or
progression of instruction to ensure mastery of NBC
skills beyond the basic level that is required to
ensure survival in a contaminated environment.

45 8 ormsby, "The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat
to Naval Forces," 5.
459 The Impact of Nnclear, Biological, and Chemical
Proliferation on Naval operations and capabilities, 15.
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. The current protective suits (OG-84) used by
the Marine Corps are bulky and extremely heavy .
. The Ml7 protective mask, which most Marines
use, was found to have a failure rate of more than
37% when the Marine Corps Test facility at Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, tested masks that belonged
to units preparing to deploy to SWA between 7 August
and 31 December 1990 . . . . The ability to detect
chemical agents is critical to a unit . . . .
Currently, few detection devices are available. 460

.

While some progress has been made in addressing the
problems identified by Major Riley, significant shortfalls
still exist.

In particular, decontamination training and

knowledge remains a major problem, in part because of the
belief that decontamination operations are too hard to do.
Despite some progress in CBW defensive capabilities,
significant deficiencies in NBC defenses are likely to exist
well into the next decade.
Despite the physical separation of naval units from
opposing forces, CBW attacks also pose a major threat to the
U.S. Navy.

The 1996 National Defense University report

I:mpact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons on Naval operations and capabilities cited
numerous material weaknesses, as well as conceptual
weaknesses, in the Navy's NBC readiness:
•

Fleet NBC training readiness has been substantially
eroded.

•

There is a fundamental division of opinion within
the military community about NBC risks to U.S.
military operations. While most take it very

460 Riley, "ABCs of NBC," 38-40.
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seriously, some tend to discount the NBC threat or
place it in the "too-hard-to-do" box.
•

CBW attacks may be delivered by penetrating weapons.
In the case of some persistent chemical and
biological agents, such attacks could render a ship
effectively unusable for protracted periods.

•

Tactical and doctrinal development remains a major
deficiency.

•

The impact of NBC on naval operations may be
underestimated in war games; the lack of effective,
integrated simulation and modeling tools impedes
gaming and tactical doctrine development.

Among the most telling of the deficiencies noted by the
report was the mindset of many Navy leaders.
quotes listed in the report:

Among the

"NBC will not be the deciding

factor in future regional wars;" "Bugs and gas are like
heavy weather--the fleet will just button down and drive
through;" "If it happens, it happens. We will just continue
with combat operations."

Such statements recall the

official position that Pearl Harbor was too shallow for
aerial torpedo attack, thus ruling out any risk to the
Pacific Fleet.

This mindset may be attributed to another of

the report's observations: "NBC considerations, especially
in the biological area, remain substantially outside the
professional expertise of most naval officers." 4 61
Whether in the context of a Marine landing force or a
naval battle group, the existing deficiencies in detection

461 The

Impact of Nnclear. Biological. and Chemical
Proliferation on Naval Operations and Capabilities, 21.
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and protection require urgent attention.

Additionally, CBW

training must be made more regular and realistic.

Finally,

the level of knowledge concerning CBW issues must be
improved through military education.

As long as the

deficiencies presented here remain, the vulnerability of
military forces to CBW attack will be an 'Achilles Heel' for
an opponent to exploit.
In addition to the military weaknesses describes above,
American power projection forces are dependent on access to
major facilities in order to operate.

Port facilities are

required to deliver the men and material needed to fight a
ground war, while U.S. tactical aircraft require large,
modern airfields from which to operate.

In regard to a

major regional war, the 1997 Secretary of Defense Report to
Congress lists four general phases of U.S. intervention:

1. Halt the invasion.
2. Build up U.S. and allied combat power in the region,
while reducing the enemy's.
3. Decisively defeat the enemy.
4. Provide for post-war stability.462
It should be noted that phases one, two, and three
depend on unfettered access to in-theater facilities.
Without access to regional airfields, U.S. tactical air
power will be unable to repeat the performance of 1990-91,
when most of the Tactical Air Command deployed to Saudi,

462 william Cohen,

Annual Report to the President and

the Congress 1997, 5.
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Emirate, and Omani airfields.

Without access to regional

ports, U.S. sea lift will be unable to repeat the
performance of 1990-91, when 95 percent of the supplies and
equipment used in Desert Storm were delivered by ship. 463
Finally, without the full weight of U.S. air power, and with
diminished capability to deliver and supply ground forces,
the ability to decisively defeat the enemy becomes
problematical.

Thus the use of CBW weapons to neutralize

regional facilities provides an adversary the means to
degrade severely American warfighting capability.
The neutralization of regional facilities does not
require an actual CBW attack in every case.

In the book

Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Aqe, Keith Payne describes
the effect of intimidation produced by possession of CBW
weapons. 464

Since almost the whole of Saudi Arabia is

within the range of Iranian missiles, and all of South Korea
and Japan are within range of North Korean missiles, it is
not difficult to imagine the facilities in these nations
being denied to U.S. forces due to fear of CBW attack.

In

the Persian Gulf and Middle East, most U.S. allies are "one

463 weaver and Glaes, Invitinq Disaster, 3.
464Payne describes the enormous effect SCUD attacks had
on Israel, and emphasizes that the threat of chemical
attack, even though it never occurred, weighed heavily on
Israeli morale. See Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Aqe
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 22-30.
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target" populations in that their capital cities are the
focal point of their national existence, making them even
more fearful of CBW attack.465

Particularly in light of the

United States' minimal ability to defend against ballistic
missiles, the possibility of regional allies denying U.S.
access to their bases cannot be discounted.
In addition to the threat of ballistic missile attack,
cruise missiles will pose an increasing threat to facilities
in the future.

While Third World cruise missile capability

largely remains limited to naval use, it should be expected
that small states will be able to develop rudimentary landattack cruise missiles in the future,

in part due to the

ready availability of GPS information, which could be used
in a guidance system for such a cruise missile.

Even using

the commercial GPS signal, a cruise missile so equipped
would be accurate to within one hundred meters, much better
than any Third World ballistic missile:
This [different nations' planned GPS systems]
suggests that GPS-INS technology suitable for longrange cruise missiles will become widely available in
the Third World in the early 1990s . . . . In theory,
selective availability will prevent Third World
military forces from using GPS to deliver ordnance
with an accuracy better than about 100 meters. For
some applications, that may be enough.466
465Andrew Rathmell, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle
East: Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya," Marine Corps Gazette
(July 1990): 60.
466 seth Carus, cruise Missile Proliferation in the
1990s (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 66.
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Whether or not a Third World nation could develop a
true land-attack missile, capable of utilizing terrain
masking or a multi-leg flight path, remains to be seen.
However, the possibility of a regional power fielding a
basic land-attack cruise missile, capable of correcting its
position autonomously, cannot be discounted.
When such attacks occur, the results are likely to be
severe for any facility struck with CBW weapons.

Chemical

weapons, which are widely held, inexpensive, and whose
effects are very rapid, would provide the optimal agent for
such attacks.

Both The Impact of Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical Proliferation on Naval operations and Capabilities
(1) and its sister report,

The Impact of the Proliferation

of Nuclear, Bioloqical, and Chemical Weapons on the United
States Air Force, (2) provide very frank assessments of the
survivability of major facilities:
(1) Large area defense, decontamination, and

organizational responsibilities remain a major
concern . . • . Next to detection, the most commonly
voiced concern is for the NBC defense of ports and
other large-area logistics nodes.
(2) Wargame participants generally believed that
chemical and biological weapons attacks could shut
down air operations at forward bases . . . . The Air
Force has no effective means to decontaminate
aircraft that have been contaminated by toxic agents
or materials without taking the aircraft out of
service for a long period or damaging key aircraft
components (italics mine).467
467 The Impact of Nuclear, Bioloqical, and Chemical

Proliferation on Naval Operations and Capabilities, 17; The.
Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Bioloqical, and
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Until the facilities needed by U.S. power projection
forces can be given protection from CBW attack, this
vulnerability in U.S. strategy will continue to pose a grave
threat to U.S. prospects in any regional conflict.

The fact

that such protection, if and when it becomes available, must
be provided on a constant basis adds to the problem.

A

regional adversary is unlikely to withhold its CBW weapons
until defenses against them have been positioned.

Rather,

it should be expected that regional facilities would be
attacked at the outset of hostilities, before the United
States could deploy whatever defensive systems it had
available.

Thus the ability to defend against ballistic

missiles would have to be in place permanently.

At present,

of course, the vulnerability of major logistical facilities
is a relative constant, since none of the U.S. theater
missile defense systems, including the two Navy systems, are
ready for deployment.
The most readily correctable vulnerability of the power
projection paradigm is the state of U.S. active CBW
defenses.

As ballistic missiles and cruise missiles

represent the primary means for an enemy to deliver CBW
weapons, defenses aimed at defeating these missiles are
crucial to improving overall U.S. defensive capability.
existing Navy TMD systems remain several years from

Chemical Weapons on the united states Air Force, 4, 7.
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The

deployment.

Cruise missile defenses are more advanced,

especially defenses for use at sea, but will have to be
improved to meet the land-attack cruise missile threat.
More than any other defensive measures, defenses against
ballistic and cruise missiles are vital to improving U.S.
survivability against CBW attacks.
Without the ability to deliver CBW warheads via
ballistic or cruise missile, much of an enemy's CBW leverage
disappears.

No regional air force is likely to get past

American air superiority aircraft to deliver gravity bombs,
nor is a regional navy likely to be able to approach U.S.
naval forces and survive.

The two Navy TMD programs would

provide the enormous advantage of mobility, being capable of
deployment wherever needed without regard to conditions
ashore.

Just as a carrier's aircraft enjoy independence

from foreign basing rights, so would a naval missile defense
system be able to operate anywhere in international waters.
Since U.S. Navy ships are deployed to the Mediterranean,
Persian Gulf, and Korean theaters on a permanent basis,
ensuring the presence of the Aegis-equipped ships needed for
ballistic missile defense would not require a major upheaval
in deployment patterns.
Unlike TMD systems, programs designed for cruise
missile defense have been given little emphasis in recent
years.

Because cruise missiles have been exclusively a

naval problem for many years, the Marines in particular have
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been slow to develop defenses against cruise missiles.

The

problems involved in intercepting and destroying a cruise
missile are not as great as those involved in ballistic
missile defense, and so cruise missile defenses may be
expected to be developed more quickly.
Among the cruise missile defenses intended for use on
land, the Army's PAC-3 version of the Patriot missile and
the Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) appear to hold the
most promise.468

The PAC-3, when completed, will serve as a

dual-purpose system, capable of intercepting ballistic and
cruise missiles, as well as intercepting aircraft.

The

THEL, while still in the design concept stage, has been
tested using the Mid Infra-Red Advanced Chemical Laser
(MIRACL).

The tracking and fire control systems intended

for the THEL system successfully destroyed a 122mm artillery
rocket in 1996, using the MIRACL laser at a low power
setting to simulate the smaller THEL laser. 46 9

Provided

that these Army systems can be made compatible with
deployment as part of an ARG, their adoption by the Marine
Corps would seem a logical step.
In addition to active defenses, measures of passive
defense must be improved if U.S. naval forces are to be
468 "Israel and US forces warm to high-energy laser
weapons," Jane's International Defense Review (February
1997): 5.
469Hewish, "The Menace Reawakens," 33.
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survivable to CBW attacks.

It is only prudent to assume

that an active defense system may allow some ''leaks", making
it less than 100 percent effective against incoming
missiles.

Also, Marine ground forces in close proximity to

enemy forces will need protection against chemical or
biological weapons delivered by mortars or artillery,
methods that cannot be intercepted.

Finally, chemical and

biological weapons can be used in land or naval mines,
requiring that U.S. forces be able to protect themselves
while passing through contaminated areas.

Thus personal and

shipboard protective measures will be vital to protecting
men and equipment.
The first requirement of passive defense is the ability
to detect chemical or biological agents.

The Marine Corps

is ahead of the other services in regard to developing and
fielding chemical detection equipment, which is not
surprising given the role of the Marines in a regional
conflict.

Among the programs underway to improve chemical

detection are several innovative ideas.

One concept, which

has not yet been tested, involves placing a living nerve
cell on a silicon microchip.

The cell fires electronic

signals on a continual basis as long as it remains living.
These signals are sent by the chip to the alarm component of
the system, which will sound if the signal is interrupted.
A chemical agent would kill the nerve cell, interrupting the
signal and sounding the alarm.
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Another system in

development utilizes the light-absorbing properties of most
chemical agents.

Able to detect both aerosol clouds and

surface contamination, the Differential Absorption Lidar
(DIAL) is expected to be effective at up to ten
kilometers.4 7 0
Biological agent detection rates with ballistic missile
defense as one of the most pressing needs for American
forces.

Chemical detection enjoys the benefit of relatively

short warning time due to the rapid effects of most chemical
agents.

Biological agents, however, typically do not

produce effects for hours or days, and in some cases months.
Detection of biological agents therefore must rely on other
methods than the action of the agent itself, as timely
warning would not be possible otherwise.

The Impact of

Nuclear, Biological. and Chemical Proliferation on Naval
Operations and Capabilities states that:
The combination of our inability to detect BW agents
and the potentially high lethality of BW attacks
makes the biological threat especially significant to
naval forces . . . . Biological and chemical agents
can be successfully delivered against naval forces
operating in littoral areas; expeditionary forces are
even more vulnerable . . . . Biological attack
detection remains the single most important technical
problem (italics mine) .471

470 Hewish, "Surviving CBW," Jane's International
Defense Review (March 1997): 35.
471 The Impact of Nnclear. Biological. and Chemical
Proliferation on Naval operations and capabilities, 2-3.
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Unlike chemical detectors, which are produced in
numerous countries and in a variety of forms, biological
detectors remain rudimentary in design.

Despite the high

level of medical and biological knowledge in the United
States, and in many U.S. allies' laboratories, the goal of
producing an effective biological agent detector has not
been reached.4 7 2

However, both the U.S. Army and the

British Army are attempting to develop a stand-off detector
for identifying biological agents.

By utilizing a laser

scanner to measure the diameter and shape of airborne
particles, the presence of biological particles
theoretically could be detected.

The detector also would be

able to produce liquid samples from air passing through the
unit, allowing more detailed analysis of suspected
biological agents.

Known as the Biological Integrated

Detection System (BIDS), the unit is intended to be placed
upwind of threatened areas, to allow sampling of the air
before airborne agents could reach those areas.4 7 3

Like the

PAC-3 and THEL, this system could be adopted by the Marines
for future use.
Both chemical and biological detectors must be improved
in order to protect U.S. forces and allies from chemical and
47 2Brad Roberts, "Bursting the biological bubble: how
prepared are we for biowar?," Jane's International Defense
Review (April 1998): 23.
473Hewish, "Surviving CBW," 36.
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biological agents.

The need for improvement is recognized

by the different services, and efforts are being made to
effect improvements.

However, at present the detection of

chemical and biological agents remains a critical weakness.
The second component of passive defense is protection,
both personal protection for individuals and protection of
facilities and ships.

While existing personal protective

suits offer adequate protection against chemical and
biological agents, the suits are cumbersome and lead to
rapid fatigue under most conditions, degrading troop
performance.

Especially in hot climates, such as the Middle

East, wearing protective gear can be physically exhausting,
even leading to heat stress or heat stroke. 474

Thus the

greatest concern in regard to personal protective gear
involves producing a suit that is capable of protecting
against chemical and biological agents, while being light
enough for extended use without heat exhaustion.
A British design, designated the Mk IV suit, has served
as the model for improved CBW protective suits, as it is
lightweight, relatively comfortable, and far less bulky than
existing OG-84 suits used in the U.S. military.

In order to

focus U.S. development efforts, the Joint Service
Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology program is developing
a single CBW suit for all U.S. service members.

474 Ibid., 47.
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This suit

is intended to be light, durable, able to be decontaminated
and worn again, and have a minimum usable period of 45
days.475
Production and deployment of an effective, durable CBW
suit will be crucial to allowing U.S. troops to operate in a
CBW environment.

Existing suits, while effective, are so

uncomfortable that troop performance is degraded
severely.4 7 6

The suit must be light enough to be easily

man-portable, durable enough to be worn over a period of
days, able to be decontaminated and re-used, and not
physically taxing to wear.

Development of the JSLIST II,

the follow-on to the original U.S. all-service CBW suit, is
aimed at deployment in 2003.477
When a CBW attack occurs, especially a persistent
chemical attack, the ability to decontaminate men and
material in affected areas will be critical.

Particularly

in regard to large facilities such as ports and airfields,
existing decontamination capability is minimal.

475Riley, "ABCs of NBC," 38;

While the

Hewish, "Surviving CBW,"

47.
476weaver and Glaes provide good depiction of the
physical effects of wearing existing suits, which include
decreased hearing and vision, decreased speech
intelligibility, limited manual dexterity, hyperventilation
and panic attacks, mood changes, and physical performance
decrements. See Inviting Disaster, 27.
477Hewish, "Surviving CBW" 47.
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need for decontamination capability has been recognized by
the military services, existing decontamination capability
continues to fall short of the operational requirements set
by Department of Defense (DoD) regulation 5000.2-R:
"Requires all mission-essential systems to be survivable to
those threat levels anticipated in their operating
environment."478
One of the reasons for the lack of emphasis being
placed on decontamination is the widespread belief that
decontamination is too hard to do. 479

In regard to the

decontamination equipment and materials available to Marine
ground forces, there perhaps is some justification for the
too-hard-to-do label.

Major Riley's article on Marine Corps

NBC readiness pointed out that each individual Marine's
M258Al Skin Decontamination Kit consisted only of a small
packet of towlettes, which are suitable only for blister

478 Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997 (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996), Section II,
pg 16.
479The sentiment that many aspects of NBC training and
readiness are "too hard to do" can be found throughout the
twin reports The Impact of Nuclear. Bioloqical, and Chemical
Proliferation on Naval Operations and capabilities and .T.h.e.

Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear. Bioloqical. and
Chemical Weapons on the United states Air Force. This
pessimistic approach to training and readiness must be
viewed as a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts, in that lack
of a determined approach has kept the United States from
developing viable decontamination procedures that are not
"too hard to do."
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agents.

Furthermore, the packaging material used to wrap

the towlettes is prone to failure, resulting in the packet
being rendered useless. 48 0

Regardless of the difficulty

involved, however, the ability to decontaminate men,
equipment, and facilities will be vital to keeping U.S.
forces functional.
The only surface decontamination agent available to the
U.S. military has been found to be extremely corrosive to
many of the vital components of aircraft and other vehicles,
including plexiglass, rubber, and aluminum.

In addition,

the quantity of the agent needed to decontaminate a large
facility is measured in hundreds of tons, making it unlikely
that a port or air base commander would have sufficient
quantities available.481
The overall importance placed on decontamination by the
services and the Department of Defense can be judged from
the mention given in

.1.9..9..1..

Proliferation: Threat and Response

A single paragraph is provided, which does little

more than cover the problems of developing non-corrosive,
environmentally safe decontamination agents.482

It is not

480Riley, "ABCs of NBC," 39.
481 weaver and Glaes cite a U.S. Joint Staff study on
decontaminating a major port after an attack with VX nerve
agent. The report concluded that 863 tons of supertopical
bleach decontaminant would be required. See Invitinq
Disaster, 26.
482 Threat

and Response 1997, Section II, pg 21.
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surprising that one of the major findings of the NDU war
games and their resulting reports is that, "Decontamination
is not currently a priority investment area. 114 8 3
Developing treatment and vaccination options for
biological attacks likewise has been a slow process, and
continues to fall short of required capability.

Ongoing

efforts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
seek to develop a "one vaccination fits all" vaccine, which:
requires only a single oral dose, has no side
effects, provides rapid immunity, offers complete
protection, has a long storage life, is cheap to
produce, and is licensed for worldwide use. However,
these aims remain many years away from fruition
(italics mine) . 484
While vaccines for anthrax have been available since
the 1950s, many other biological agents have no available
vaccine.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's

program for developing biological treatments, known as the
Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures Program, has
budgeted 30 million dollars over the next five years to
develop a full range of vaccines and medications intended
for use with biological casualties.485

However, as the

previous quote indicates, such treatments remain years away,

483 Tbe Impact of Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical

Proliferation on Naval operations and capabilities, 17.
484Hewish, "Surviving CBW," 45.
4 B5 rbid., 46.
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providing little protection to U.S. forces in the
foreseeable future.
While the United States is making some progress in
addressing shortfalls in active defenses and protective gear
for CBW warfare, the state of decontamination and
vaccination capability remains a major problem.

Until these

related capabilities are given more emphasis within the
Department of Defense, U.S. facilities will be at risk of
being neutralized by chemical or biological weapons that get
past whatever active defenses exist.

In addition, moving

and treating any chemical or biological casualty will risk
spreading the chemical or biological agent to additional
personnel, compounding the problems caused by CBW attack.
The Navy and Marine Corps, as well as their sister services,
must improve the level of progress being made in providing
decontamination and vaccination capability if they are to be
sent into harm's way in a chemical or biological
environment.
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)

As the Navy enters the twenty-first century, emerging
technologies in the areas of communications, command and
control, sensor inputs, and information management are being
combined to change fundamentally the way the Navy will
operate.

In a 2 March 1998 memo to all Navy flag officers,

CNO Admiral Jay Johnson set out the Navy's long-range
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planning objectives, which included the overall objective
to:
Develop secure c4 systems and doctrine that provides
the capability to significantly compress the
operational decision loop through reduction of
decision-making layers, through increases in direct
sensor-to-shooter connectivity, and through automated
processing and evaluation aids for decisionmakers.486
The objectives listed above lay out, in simple terms,
the basis of the Navy's twenty-first century warfighting
concept, known as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW): reduce the
number of decision layers in order to obtain speed of
command and rapid tempo of operations, link sensors to
shooters as tightly as possible so that what can be seen can
be killed, and provide assistance in evaluating and
utilizing information so that the commander's intent can be
put into action without unnecessary delay.

The features

that are seen as enablers of NCW are the Sensor Grid, the
Shooter Grid, and the Information Backplane.487
The Sensor Grid will be achieved through the continued
evolution of existing command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) systems such as the Advanced Combat
Direction System (ACDS), which eventually should allow the

486Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, memo
to all Navy flag officers, 3 March 1998.
487 vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Gartska,
"Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,"
Proceedinqs (January 1998): 31.
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fusion of sensor input from virtually any source, including
joint and allied sensors.

The Shooter Grid already exists

in preliminary form as Cooperative Engagement Capability,
which should be applicable to surface targets, ballistic
missile targets, submarine targets, and shore bombardment
targets. 488

Finally, the Information Backplane is expected

to grow out of existing networks, such as the Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) . 48 9

The

program intended to bring together the Sensor, Shooter, and
Information components is Information Technology for the
21st Century (IT-21).

Already in place, IT-21 is co-

directed by OPNAV N6 (Space, Information Warfare, and
Conunand and Control), the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command, and the Naval Computer and Telecommunications
Command. 490

4 88 Bryan Bender, "Buying into networked warfare,"
Jane's Defense Weekly, 13 May 1998, 27; Vice Admiral James
Fitzgerald, Raymond Christian, and Robert Manke, "NetworkCentric Antisubmarine Warfare," Proceedings (September
1998): 93; Glenn Goodman, "Sea-Based Firepower," Armed
Forces Journal Internatjonal (November 1997): 34; Alan
Maiorano, Nevin Carr, and Trevor Bender, "A Primer on Naval
Theater Air Defense," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1996):
24.
489vision,

Presence. Power, 96.

490 Rear Admiral Robert Nutwell, "IT-21 Intranet
Provides Big 'Reachbacks'," Proceedings (January 1998): 36.
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The concept for NCW was derived from the growth of
networks in non-military settings such as businesses, and
the superior performance in many cases of networked
businesses.

In contrast to the rigid hierarchical

organization of a typical military formation,

in a network

organization all units of the network are linked in terms of
information.

A unit does not depend on the higher levels of

the organization to supply information, but instead can seek
information from any location within the bounds of the
network.

When decisions are required, the unit is better

equipped to decide for itself, rather than having to depend
on (and wait for) a higher unit to decide.

The advantages

of units making decisions for themselves are obvious: faster
decision-to-action time, better appreciation of conditions
due to proximity to the problem, and flexibility in problem
solving.491
Possibly the greatest advantage of distributed
decision-making in a networked structure occurs in periods
of "information distortion", when information is
unavailable, incomplete, or uncertain.4 92

Units are able to

"self-synchronize" with other units, allowing flexibility in
solving problems.

Particularly when operating under

4 91Kathleen Carley and Zhiang Lin, "A Theoretical Study
of Organizational Performance Under Information Distortion,"
Management Science (July 1997): 976.
4 92rbid.
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conditions that are similar to previous experience,
intuition and pattern recognition can allow experienced
leaders to reach course-of-action decisions quickly,
maintaining a high operational tempo.

The ability to

maintain a high tempo is particularly applicable to military
operations, where time often is a critical commodity and
information uncertainty often exists.493

It is through the

networking of dispersed platforms and the sharing of
information that NCW is seen by its proponents as providing
superior warfighting capability.
The first component of NCW, the Sensor Grid, will allow
data from virtually any sensor to be viewed by any member of
the network.

Current sensor platforms, such as J-STARS and

E-3 Sentry radar aircraft, represent the first step in the
integration of sensor data.

Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo

validated the ability to utilize such offboard sensor data
from naval, joint, or allied sensors.49 4

In the future,

sensor fusion may include input from satellites, RPVs,
visual or infrared sensors deployed by aircraft or
artillery, seismic sensors, sound sensors, radar data, and

4 93Marine Corps manual MCDP-6, "Command and Control,"
stresses the need to maintain a high operational tempo.
MCDP6 states that, "speed is an essential element of
effective command and control."
494 vision. Presence. Power, 22; Blake, Penny, and
Hjelmfelt, Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo-Rinq of Fire
Analysis Report <Ill, 66-68.
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manual input from special operations units. 495

The result

will be to provide the proverbial "God's eye picture" to
members of the network:
The central concept of networking is the ability for
any participant in the network to directly access any
other participant for information exchange or
activity coordination . . . . The networking goal is
for every unit to have the ability to access and
display, at the same time, all or any part of the
totality of sensor information available from all
sources. While this alone does not guarantee perfect
knowledge, it does mean that whatever insights are
available from all organic, theater and national
sensors arrayed against the problem can be used to
aid every unit in the performance of the mission. 49 6
NCW's Sensor Grid should provide the ability to link

any sensor connected to the network to any platform in the
network, regardless of distance.

The ability to fuse

incoming sensor data efficiently will derive from one of the
properties of a network known as "Metcalf's Law"
physical law).

(not a true

Metcalf's Law holds that the computational

power of a network is proportional to the square of the
number of nodes in the network.

With the ability to link an

495Nick Cook, "US technology will lead the way to
improved reconnaissance systems," Jane's Defense Weekly, 13
May 1998, 29; "Teledyne Ryan's Global Hawk Begins Taxi
Tests," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 November 1997,
38; Dennis Hagan, "Naval Gunfire Support," Surface Warfare
(September/October 1997): 35; Fred Belen, "Tactical
Information Technology ... From the Sea," Proceedinqs
(September 1998): 122.
496captain William Gravell, "The Offensive Punch of
Network-Centric Warfare," Surface Warfare (March/April
1998): 15.
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enormous number of nodes, NCW's Sensor Grid should be able
to assimilate and distribute information from organic
sensors, such as radar, non-organic sensors, such as landbased aircraft, and national, other service, or allied
sensors, such as satellites.49?
NCW's Shooter Grid, also known as the Engagement Grid,
will allow a networked force to make optimum use of
available weapons by pairing weapons to targets quickly and
(potentially) automatically.

The Shooter Grid should allow

any weapons that are within range of a given target to be
fired at that target, regardless of the firing platform's
ability to track the target independently.

When coupled

with the Sensor Grid's situational awareness, the Shooter
Grid is seen as allowing widely dispersed naval forces to
mass fires on a target, to engage targets more quickly and
efficiently, and to utilize built-in deconfliction tools to
avoid having rules-of-engagement software prohibit
attacks. 498

In addition to the Ring of Fire system

described previously, Cooperative Engagement Capability is
an early example of the kind of networked Shooter Grid
envisioned for NCW.

497Leslie West, "Exploiting the Information Revolution:
Network-Centric Warfare Realizes Its Promise," Sea Power
(March 1998): 38.
49 8Gravell, "The Offensive Punch of Network-Centric
Warfare," 16.
257

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) represents the
first implementation of an emerging focus in naval
warfighting: the ability to link sensors to shooters in real
time.

CEC allows individual platforms to share information

on airborne threats, and to engage airborne threats using
remote sensor data.

The

1997 Navy Posture statement

provides the following explanation of CEC:
With CEC, it appears to each shooter's combat system
as if every netted sensor is that unit's own sensor.
Engagement using remotely provided track data is
possible for the first time. In addition, the ability
to develop composite tracks means that every
participating unit has an identical, real-time
picture of the battlespace, as well as identical
identification information.499
CEC utilizes a dedicated onboard computer system of
cooperative engagement processors, together with a datadistribution system, to provide a composite radar track of
airborne targets.

CEC is an outgrowth of two similar

systems, the Battle Group Anti Air Warfare Commander
(BGAAWC) and Force AAW Coordinating Technology (FACT)
program.500

By combining data from different Aegis radars,

CEC can maintain a fire-control-quality radar track

499 Department of the Navy 1997 Posture statement
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997), 73.
SOONorman Friedman, Naval Institute Guide To World
Naval Weapons Systems 1994 Update (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994), 38-39.
258

continuously, without the "fadeouts" conunon when a single
radar attempts to hold a track.
In order to share information in real-time while
remaining highly jam-resistant, CEC-equipped Aegis ships and
E-2C Hawkeye radar surveillance aircraft use very short
transmit/receive windows and line-of-sight signals.

The

transmit/receive functions are automatic, controlled by the
cooperative engagement processors.

Although units can

exchange data only in pairs, the speed achieved through
computer control of the data exchange process makes the
sharing of information effectively instantaneous.Sol
The clearest advantage provided by CEC is the extension
of a ship's anti-air engagement envelope to the maximum
range of its weapons, rather than the ship's radar horizon.
Because CEC provides remote fire control, a ship can fire on
a target well before the ship's radar can detect the target,
provided that another CEC radar has detected the target.
The concept of remote fire control was tested successfully
in

1996 in Hawaii, when a CEC radar and data transmitter

located on a hilltop sent targeting information t o ~

E.ri..e., allowing engagement of a low-flying target drone. 50 2

Air

501 cooperative Engagement Capability: A Revolution in
Defense, U.S. Navy booklet (no publisher or date), 2.
502rbid., 13; Glenn Goodman, "Extending the Horizon,"

Armed Forces Journal International (April 1996): 58; Captain
Jim Patton, "Keeping Up With the Revolution," Proceedings
(July 1996): 41.
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In addition to the advantage of extended range, CEC
also. should provide the capability to defeat self-screening
jammers in anti-ship cruise missiles.

Such jammers

typically radiate electronic noise in a cone of around
thirty degrees in their direction of flight,
the target ship's radar.

thereby jamming

A ship located off of the

missiles' flight path likely would be outside the jammers'
field of interference, and should be able to provide the
target ship's defensive missiles with fire control data. 5 03
Perhaps the most significant advantage offered by CEC
will be the ability to share the E-2C's airborne radar
picture with ships operating in the littoral area.

Land

features can produce radar "shadows", preventing a ship's
radar from detecting low-flying targets inland.

The E-2C's

radar should be able to "peer over" many terrain features
that ships' radars cannot, as well as providing much greater
detection range.

Also, the radar "clutter" of the littoral

region, which can include weather, sand storms, birds,
buildings, and electronic interference or jamming, can
prevent a single ship from maintaining or verifying radar
contacts, making CEC's composite radar picture very
helpful.504

Given the speed of jet aircraft and cruise

503 cooperative Engagement capability, 11.
504commander Robert Engel, "Bringing Aegis to the
Littorals," Proceedings (January 1998): 42.
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missiles, and the current Navy emphasis on operating close
to shore, spotting targets as early as possible obviously is
of great importance.
CEC has entered low-rate initial production as of
January 1998, and has been installed in four ships: USS .John

F. Kennedy (CV-67), USS
and USS

N..a.sJ;l (LHD-1), USS

Vicksburq (CG-69).

Hue City (CG-66),

In addition, USS

Anzio (CG-68)

and several P-3 aircraft were fitted with CEC components in
1997 for a concept evaluation test program.505
1998, the

In July

Hue City and Vicksburq were reported to have

software compatibility problems between their Aegis systems
and the CEC system, preventing both systems from operating
at the same time.506

As described previously, the current

Aegis computer system involves over fifteen million lines of
computer code, indicating the magnitude of the challenge
involved in integrating the two systems.

These problems

aside, the CEC program is moving ahead, with the final
report of the Under Secretary of Defense for Development,
Operational Test, and Evaluation due early in 1999. 507
The Information Backplane, which will link the Sensor
Grid and Shooter Grid, is moving forward under the title of

505vision,

Presence, Power, 72.

506Bender, "USN digitisation effort is hit by
integration flaw," 9.
507 vision,

Presence. Power, 72.
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the Copernicus program.

The

1998 Navy Posture Statement

describes Copernicus:
This common vision [Copernicus] enables the Navy and
Marine Corps to adapt, evolve, and fully integrate
their command and control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) capabilities to conduct joint naval
expeditionary force operations in the 21st century .
. . . Copernicus enables Navy c 4 ISR development and
implementation, such as the Global Command and
Control System (GCCS), Global Command Support System,
Defense Information Systems Network, and the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force c 4 r (MAGTF C4I) .sos
IT-21 forms the major component of Copernicus, and is
seen as the most critical component of NCW.

Accordingly,

the Navy already has allocated financial resources, as well
as human effort, towards the IT-21 program.

IT-21 will

provide a fleet-wide intranet, allowing for the exchange of
information via secure military communications networks and
existing civilian communications networks.

The

Enterprise

CVBG recently used IT-21 technology in planning and
conducting air strikes against Iraq, and saw mission
planning eased by the ready availability of information. 5 09
The ability to send and receive information, at every level
and in regard to any aspect of operations, is a fundamental
requirement of NCW:

, .From the Sea: Anytime. Anywhere. u.s.
Navy 1998 Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: Department of
508 Forward.

the Navy, 1998), Section VIII, pg 15.
509 Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy: IT-21 Shines in Debut
Desert Fox Action," Defense News, 25 January 1999, 6.
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For Network-Centric Warfare to be viable, an
Information Backplane must be developed to support
information flow among the sensor, C2, and shooter
grids . . . . IT-21 provides critical infrastructure
necessary to establish the Information Backplane. The
information systems backplane provides the critical
warfighter end-to-end capability that extends from
personal computers (PCs) on local area network
segments connected to metropolitan area networks and
critical ship-to-shore interface sites . . . . Without
the IT-21 Information Backplane, Network-Centric
Warfare cannot occur.510
After NCW's architecture is in place, the concept is
expected to provide tremendous advantages to U.S. naval
forces by providing "information dominance."

In conjunction

with the Sensor Grid, new computer-assisted command and
control processes are expected to enhance the ability of
U.S. forces to make the best use of information
dominance.Sll

Commanders should be able to view the

battlespace in real time, enjoying accurate knowledge about
the location and activities of friendly and enemy forces.5 12
Individual units will be able to access the intranet for
information, allowing them to utilize the data provided by
remote sensors in real time.

Remote databases will be

510 vision. Presence. Power, 21-22.
51 1cebrowski and Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare,"
33-34.

512commander Austin Boyd, "Space Provides Real-Time
Combat Identification," Proceedings (January 1996): 75.
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available for pulling up needed information, such as the
latest weather or intelligence reports for the theater.513
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the "Godfather of NCW",
has stated that, "Network-Centric Warfare enables a shift
from attrition-style warfare to a much faster and more
effective style characterized by the new concepts of speed
of command and self-synchronization. 11 51 4

Speed of command

will derive from superior information and communications,
allowing the commander's intent to be enacted rapidly.
Self-synchronization will result from the ability of any
unit in the force to cooperate adaptively with other units
as the situation demands, able to solve problems at the unit
level rather than requiring orders from above.5 1 5
In the littoral setting, the advantages gained through
NCW will be of great importance, both for power projection
and for defense against littoral threats.

Given the

position naval forces likely will be required to take close
to an enemy's shore, threats may appear and have to be
defended against within a very short time frame.

Anti-ship

cruise missiles, for example, could cover the distance from

513Nutwell, "IT-21 Intranet Provides Big Reachbacks,"
37.
514 cebrowski and Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare,"
32.
515Roger Barnett, "Grasping 2010 with Naval Forces,"
occasional paper 2-97, U.S. Naval War College, 10.
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shore to the twenty-five-mile position of an ARG in as
little as one minute.

By combining the radar and sensor

data of all units in a networked force, the ability of each
platform within the force to defend itself should be
improved greatly.

The ability to recognize, target, and

attack enemy positions ashore likewise should be improved.
Although still in the early concept development stage, the
NCW qualities of speed of command and self-synchronization
should indeed provide a sizable advantage to U.S. forces,
providing military dominance by virtue of superior
information.
Summary

As the sea services prepare to enter the twenty-first
century, it is important that they evaluate the systems and
capabilities that may be needed in the projected
international setting.

While it is not necessary, or even

possible, to predict with certainty who the opponent of the
future will be, it is possible to predict the nature of the
Navy-Marine Corps team's twenty-first century military
requirements.
Since the sea services have adopted complementary
strategic visions based on operations in the littoral area,
those systems and capabilities that will be needed in the
littoral can be identified.

These capabilities include

amphibious landing, naval surface fire support, sea-based
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aviation (aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings),
future surface combatants, mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, theater missile defense, and NBC
detection, protection, and decontamination capability.
The Marines' ability to get themselves and their
equipment ashore will depend on several systems expected to
enter service in the next decade.

The LHD-1 class of big-

deck amphibious ships are nearly complete, with six of the
seven ships already delivered.

The LPD-17 class ships will

begin to enter service early in the next century.

When

combined with existing LHA-1 class and LST-41/49 class
ships, these vessels will comprise the amphibious ready
groups of the future.

To get the Marines from their ships

to shore, the AAAV and MV-22 Osprey will be vast
improvements over the AAV7Al and CH-46E that they will
replace.

Each of the new vehicles bring major improvements

in speed, delivery range, and survivability to Marine
amphibious and vertical operations.
Once the Marines get ashore, they will be able to call
for support from several Navy land-attack systems.

The 5-

inch naval gun, one of the oldest individual weapons in the
Navy, is being re-engineered to provide long-range,
precision gunfire support to Marine forces ashore, a
capability that had been greatly degraded with the
retirement of the Iowa-class battleships.

By utilizing a

new rocket assisted round and GPS/INS guidance, the new 5266

Three new ship types have been proposed for service in
the next century, each optimized for projecting U.S. power
ashore.

The DD-21 land attack destroyer, which should enter

service in the next decade, will possess several systems for
providing fire support, including a larger and longer-ranged
version of the 5-inch ERGM.

The arsenal ship proposal,

although presently shelved, could provide a large amount of
on-call precision firepower to regional commanders.
Finally, the Ohio-class SSBNs slated for decommissioning in
2002 have been nominated for conversion to SSGN
configuration, providing a smaller, more survivable version
of the arsenal ship, while also providing special forces
delivery and intelligence gathering capability.
For any military operations in the littorals, whether
small-scale operations or major regional conflicts, mine
countermeasures will be crucial.

There is perhaps no more

cost effective means of employing sea denial than through
defensive mining, and potential adversaries should be
expected to utilize mines in the future.

The ability to

detect, locate, and neutralize mines is an absolute
necessity for littoral warfare, a fact underscored by the
Tripoli and Princeton experience in 1991.

Although perhaps

still under-emphasized, U.S. mine warfare capability should
be much improved by the arrival of several new systems in
the next decade, including airborne, surface, and
submersible minehunting and neutralization systems.
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Of equal importance to mine warfare will be antisubmarine warfare.

Similar to mines in its ability to

influence U.S. operations even when not detected, the
submarine has the added advantages of mobility, stand-off
attack capability, and surveillance.

Many modern diesel-

electric submarines are very quiet when operating submerged,
making them especially difficult to detect in the littoral
setting, which can feature high background noise, strong
thermal layers, and distorted sonar performance.

While the

Navy still retains many of the platforms and systems that
made it the best anti-submarine force in the world just a
decade ago, the recent lack of training and funding for
anti-submarine systems have caused a significant decrease in
overall capability.

Re-establishing the former level of

anti-submarine proficiency is an imperative for the Navy's
new littoral strategy.
Theater missile defense is perhaps the single most
important capability being developed for the twenty-first
century.

A small adversary, without the conventional might

even in its own region to confront the United States, could
gain sufficient leverage through the threat of NBC attacks,
delivered by ballistic missiles, to keep regional facilities
closed to U.S. forces.

In the event of a regional conflict,

using ballistic missiles to deliver chemical or biological
weapons onto regional facilities could render those
facilities useless to U.S. forces, thus leveling the field
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by neutralizing U.S. air power and preventing the delivery
of U.S. sea lift.

In either case, the possession of

effective, sea-based missile defenses would allow adversary
ballistic missile threats or actual attacks to be defended
against, protecting U.S. forces, regional facilities, and
allied population centers.

Just as carrier-based aircraft

are able to operate without host nation support, so could a
sea-based theater missile defense system. Thus U.S. missile
defenses could be in place essentially all the time in areas
of U.S. interest, rather than having to be flown to a crisis
region from CONUS.

By 2003 the Lower Tier system should be

deployed, while Upper Tier should be in service by 2008.
All branches of the U.S. armed forces currently are
focusing on improving their level of NBC defenses.

Since

forward-deployed naval units likely will continue to be the
first on the scene when a crisis arises, it is imperative
that their NBC defenses be improved on.

The Marines are the

forces most likely to be at risk in a future conflict, as
they may be tasked with conducting a forced entry to secure
facilities for the follow-on forces.

Accordingly, the

Marines have conducted much successful work on chemical
detection systems, although their personal protective
capability requires further improvement.

Biological agent

detection, however, remains a very difficult problem, as
most biological agents do not produce effects for hours or
days, sometimes weeks, after exposure.
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Also, both the Navy

and Marines must address the problem of decontamination
after a chemical attack, and of providing vaccines or
treatments for biological attacks.
In addition to the systems and capabilities being
developed, the Navy is in the early stages of developing an
information-based warfighting concept, known as NetworkCentric Warfare.

Intended to take advantage of the rapid

advances currently taking place in the areas of
communications, computers, and sensors, it is forecast that
Network-Centric Warfare will provide U.S. forces with
information superiority sufficient to impart military
superiority as well.
The systems and capabilities described in this chapter,
some of which have been around for many years and some of
which still are being developed, are vital for the post-Cold
War security environment.

The United States cannot be sure

where it may have to use military force to defend national
interests in the future, but the likelihood that the United
States will have to resort to force seems as high or higher
than during the Cold War.

Potential adversaries have

adopted new weapons and strategies.

If the Navy-Marine

Corps team is to be prepared for the twenty-first century,
and is to be employed primarily in the littorals, they too
must avail themselves of new weapons, new defenses, and new
concepts.
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Chapter V will examine three suggested alternatives to
forward presence as a strategy for protecting American
interests.

The alternatives are proposals for the posture

and employment of the entire U.S. military, not just naval
forward presence forces.

While each alternative has

champions to argue its merits, it is the position of this
thesis that forward presence, consisting primarily of U.S.
naval forces, is and will remain superior to alternative
strategies for protecting American interests.
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CHAPTER V
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO FORWARD PRESENCE

Although the United States currently relies on the
presence of U.S. forces around the world to safeguard U.S.
interests, the strategy employed by the United States is not
fixed by any binding law, treaty, or convention.

Unlike the

existence of the Navy, which is specifically spelled out in
the Constitution, the national security strategy employed by
the United States is subject to change at the pleasure of
the sitting administration.

While power projection through

forward presence is the basis of the present strategy,
naturally there are other possible strategies.

Three

alternative proposals for U.S. national security strategy
will be presented in this chapter.

These alternatives are:

a smaller, CONUS-based military that would deploy overseas
only in crisis periods; a smaller, CONUS-based military that
would rely heavily, almost exclusively, on air power to
resolve crises; and a much smaller, CONUS-based military
with few if any security obligations beyond the borders of
the United States.
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The "Pull-Back" Strategy: A Smaller,
CONUS-based Military

The first alternative proposal for U.S. national
security strategy is to reduce the size of the armed forces
beyond even their 1999 levels, pull most U.S. forces back to
CONUS, keeping only a few forces forward-deployed to provide
a token presence, and deploy the armed forces overseas only
when a crisis must be resolved with military force.

The

proponents of this strategy cite a number of arguments to
make the case that this strategy is both feasible and
appropriate for the post-Cold War setting.
The most common argument for this strategy is that,
with the demise of the Soviet Union and with China and
Russia not yet able to challenge the United States as peers,
there is no plausible threat to U.S. national security.

The

United States reigns supreme over the world, and can safely
withdraw from its present role as the world's policeman (an
inappropriate role to begin with).

If any regional state

should have the bad judgment to challenge or assail a U.S.
interest, U.S. forces can deploy to the offender's region,
restore order and the status quo, and then return home.
There is no realistic scenario in which American security
and prosperity can be threatened by any other state, so why
exert ourselves unnecessarily?

Even George Kennan, a giant

figure of the Cold War containment strategy, is quoted as
advocating such a "pull-back" strategy: "What we should
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want, in these circumstances, is the minimum, not the
maximum, of external involvement. 11 516
Part of the rationale of the desire for "the minimum,
not the maximum," is the belief that domestic concerns
should take priority over international concerns in the
post-Cold War era.

After all, we "fought" a forty-five year

war against the Soviets in order to enjoy peace and
prosperity at home.
no more?

Why not do so now that the Soviets are

Regional instability largely is irrelevant to the

security of the United States, and the rare regional crisis
that does pose a threat can be dealt with summarily.

Thus

the United States should turn its focus inward to domestic
political and economic concerns, and ignore most of the
events in the international arena.517
Perhaps the most often-used argument given in support
of the pull-back strategy, one that has grown almost to have
a life of its own, is that the so-called "Revolution in
Military Affairs"

(RMA) will allow high-technology U.S.

systems to substitute for a numerically strong, forwarddeployed military.

With an insurmountable technological

edge over the rest of the world, there is no opponent who

516 christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore
Balancing," in Brown et al., America's Strategic Choices,
282.
51 7 Johnson and Krulak,
World," 4.
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cannot be overcome: "It [RMA] appears to offer the United
States the prospect of military power beyond that of any
other country on the planet, now and well into the next
century. 115 18

Technology therefore substitutes for forces

and strategy: we are the best, we will remain the best, and
anyone who challenges us will be overwhelmed by U.S.
technological mastery:
In an era of satellite reconnaissance,
supercomputers, instant telecommunications, and
rapid-reacting U.S. forces based at home, the United
States can respond quickly to emerging crises and
therefore need not maintain a permanent physical
presence abroad . . . . Changes in technolog render
the old ways of projecting power obsolete. 9

1

The favorite choice of RMA proponents as the "poster
boy" for security through technology is the B-2 bomber
(which will be the focus of the second alternative
strategy), armed with a variety of smart and brilliant
weapons:
Stealth and precision-attack abilities, together with
vastly improved situational awareness and
surveillance capabilities, are among the most
important tenets of the RMA, which in many

518Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign
Affairs (March/April 1996): 54.
519 Rodman, America Adrift, 66. See also O'Hanlon, "Can
High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?" 73: "Many of its
[RMA] proponents argue that with the United States able to
strike at any potential enemy anywhere in the world,
overseas military bases and deployments will become much
less important."
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circumstances can permit leveraged tradeoffs between
technology and manpower.520
Another argument of RMA proponents is that, by
employing technology instead of manpower, the risks involved
in military action to U.S. servicemen will be reduced
greatly.52l

Although this argument is fundamentally

correct, it sometimes is distorted into a vision of
bloodless U.S. victory regardless of the specific scenario.
The more technology used, the lower the risk to U.S.
servicemen.

Therefore at some level of technology risk

drops to zero, and any military action can be casualty-free.
Also argued in favor of the pull-back strategy is the
position that the United States no longer can afford the
kinds and numbers of forces that are required for forward
presence.

With no plausible threat to demand a large,

capable military at the pitch of readiness, vigilantly
standing guard around the world, the United States cannot
justify the continued expenditure of hundreds of billions of
dollars on a forward presence military.522

520 charles Perry, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Joseph
Conway, Lonq-Ranqe Bombers & the Role of Airpower in the New
Century (Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, 1995), xi.
52 1 Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51.
S22Johnson and Krulak, "Forward Presence In A Violent
World," 4.
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To preempt the arguments that a pull-back strategy
would involve greater incidence of regional crises, with a
corresponding increase in U.S. deployments to fight regional
wars, pull-back advocates cite the historical record of U.S.
warfighting abroad.

The United States has been involved in

only three of the ten "great power wars'' since achieving
independence from Britain, and could safely have stayed out
of two of the three wars it did fight in.

Only World War

Two posed a sufficient threat to the United States to force
intervention.523

Thus the increased incidence of regional

crises, if any, need not lead to U.S. intervention unless
desired.
Finally, there is the argument that the United States
should give up its position as the world's policeman, that
the United States has, "undertaken an imperial role without
discharging the classic duties of imperial rule," and that
it must, "learn to exercise far greater caution and
restraint than it has recently displayed in the use of
military power."52 4

The pull-back strategy does just that,

and envisions the deployment and use of force only in the

523 Brown et al.,

America's Strategic Choices, 278-279.

524navid Hendrickson, "The End of American History;
American Security, the National Purpose, and the New World
Order," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, eds.,

Rethinking America's Security: Beyond the Cold War to New
World Order (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992), 400-401.
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most dire of crises.

Even Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could

have been ignored, according to this logic, as it did not
sufficiently threaten U.S. interests to justify war. 525
Despite recent statements about the new world order, the
United States should no longer accept the burden of policing
a chaotic world, instead focusing on its own internal
security and prosperity.
What would a pull-back military look like?

Clearly it

would be smaller than the current force size, but would it
consist of the same capabilities, or would it have a
different set of criteria for military missions and
capabilities?

Would the three services remain roughly

balanced in emphasis, with

Joint Vision 2010's follow-on

document as the guiding principle for U.S. forces, or would
one service move to the forefront in protecting American
interests?
While all attempts to describe a pull-back force
structure must be considered hypothetical, it is reasonable
to make several assumptions about what it would look like.
The strategic nuclear forces would retain their crucial
role, and indeed would be increasingly important in
deterring others from direct attack on the United States.
As smaller states around the world begin to acquire nuclear
weapons, as it seems likely that they will, and in light of

5 2 5 rbid., 399.
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the existing arsenals in China and Russia, the United States
would have to retain the position of advantage in regard to
nuclear weapons and nuclear escalation in a crisis.

Smaller

states that wish to avoid conventional defeat in a war
against the United States might come to see nuclear weapons
as providing the needed leverage to achieve their aims, thus
requiring that the United States retain what has been called
"escalation dominance."

As stated by Colin Gray, "Although

the United States likely will have little practical need of
its nuclear arsenal, if that need should arise, nothing else
would do."526
The Navy likely would be elevated in emphasis over the
Army and Air Force in terms of size, as the absolute
requirement for the deployment of U.S. forces from CONUS
would be naval supremacy.

The Navy would not need to be as

large as it is today, but would have to be large enough to
be more than a match for any regional navy or alliance of
regional navies. 5 2 7

The principal mission areas of the Navy

would be those needed to keep the SLOCs open: ASW, AAW, and
MCM. 528

In addition, heavy use would be made of

prepositioning ships for Army heavy equipment and supplies,

526Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast," 42.
527 Brown, et al., America's strategic Choices, 271.
528 Perla et al., Future sea-Based Aviation, 55.
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as well as fast sea lift ships. 529

Getting the

prepositioning ships, as well as the sea lift ships coming
from CONUS, safely into port in the crisis area would be the
principal duty of the Navy.
The Air Force would be the preeminent fighting
service, as air power and high-tech precision weapons would
do most of the fighting, but the Air Force would not need to
be as large as today's.530

Since future aircraft are

expected to be capable of flying to targets in a theater
from bases well outside the theater, or even directly from
CONUS, today's large fleet of short-legged tactical aircraft
would be reduced, replaced by medium- and long-range bombers
able to carry large numbers of precision weapons on each
trip.531

Only a modest number of F-15 or F-16 type tactical

aircraft would remain active, to be deployed into a theater
for air defense purposes.

The impact of RMA technologies

and stealth aircraft would make each aircraft more
effective, allowing fewer aircraft to do the job of today's
large tactical air forces.

As in the Gulf War model, air

power would set the stage for the final victory on the

529nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51.
530 charles Perry, Laurence Rothenberg, and Jacquelyn
Davis, Airpower synergies in the New strategic Era
(Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
1997), 41.
531nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51.
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ground by paralyzing the adversary's forces and conunand
links.
Of great importance for a pull-back strategy would be
space power, since the ability to monitor events abroad
could no longer be provided by on-scene forces.

Also, the

air power assets being deployed from CONUS or other out-oftheater bases, such as Guam or Diego Garcia, would need
targeting information that could be updated in real time,
requiring space-based surveillance.532
Finally, the Army likely would be smaller even than
today's Army.

The ground forces in Europe and Korea no

longer would be needed, nor would forces have to be deployed
to Kuwait, and certainly not to Bosnia or Kosovo.

The Army

would need to maintain three or four heavy divisions, whose
personnel could be flown quickly to a theater to mate up
with prepositioned equipment, and two light divisions.

The

highly mobile 82nd Airborne division would be the model for
the light divisions, all of which would be structured for
air deployment anywhere in the world on short notice.

The

ability to air lift Army ground forces anywhere in the world
largely would obviate the need for Marine amphibious forces,
which would have to deploy by sea from CONUS simply to get
to the theater. 533

Maximum use of air lift would be made in

532Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 10;
53 3william Odom, "Transforming the Military," Foreig:n
Affairs . (July/August 1997) : 58.
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the deployment of Army forces, with sea lift serving to
provide the heavy equipment and supplies needed to bolster
the prepositioning ships.
Although air power would be expected to produce the
shock and degradation of the enemy's strength needed for the
ultimate resolution of the conflict, the services still
would observe much the same joint warfighting philosophy
that exists today, although on a smaller scale.

The Navy

would be responsible for getting the Army and Air Force
safely into the theater, after which time the Army and Air
Force would set about defeating the enemy.

Thus the pull-

back strategy is not a shift in military warfighting
philosophy, but in the national security posture of the
armed forces in peacetime.
What weaknesses exist in the pull-back strategy?

Given

that many of the arguments presented in support of the pullback strategy seem reasonable in and of themselves, what
faults can be found in the pull-back strategy?

More

importantly, is the pull-back strategy a viable alternative
to forward presence?

The answer must be a resounding "no."

First, and most importantly, the pull-back strategy
would place the United States in a reactive posture, able
only to respond to events after the fact. 5 34

Adversaries

who harbor aggressive intent thus might be tempted to pursue

534Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 52.
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a fait accompli strategy, striking quickly and then
attempting to hold onto their gains.

For example, China

might throw its military across the Taiwan Strait, subdue
and occupy Taiwan, and then warn off a U.S. response with
the threat of a war that would have to be fought in China's
front yard, hundreds of miles from U.S. logistical bases,
against a state able to deploy thousands of mines,
submarines, and cruise missiles to keep U.S. forces away.5 35
Iran or Iraq likewise might decide to attack one of the
small GCC nations, and then combine sea denial in the Strait
of Hormuz with NBC blackmail to prevent U.S. intervention.
Given the very narrow majority in the U.S. Senate vote in
support of the 1990 Gulf War, it is not impossible to
imagine the cost of deploying to the Gulf, without the
benefit of Saudi Arabia's major facilities or the support of
a multi-national coalition, being judged too high to
tolerate.

Given the fact that it took six months before the

United States was ready to dislodge Iraq in 1991, when Saudi
Arabia's facilities and multi-national support were
available, the prospect of repeating the 1990-1991 effort

53 5rt is just such a strategy that is posited in a
recent U.S. Navy war game, conducted in cooperation with the
Office of Net Assessment. Set in the year 2020, the game
portrays a Chinese invasion of a re-unified Korea. China's
strategy is to overwhelm Korea quickly, employ sea denial in
the Sea of Japan and the China Sea, and force the United
States into a political settlement. See "U.S. Navy RMA 2020
War Game Draft Final Report." Conducted by the Office of Net
Assessment, 21-23 April 1998, in Tyson's Corner, Virginia.
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with a smaller military would be unattractive to say the
least.
By basing most U.S. forces in CONUS, the United
States in effect would hand over the initiative to
adversaries.

Without forces on the scene at all times, the

kinds of preventive steps afforded by forward presence would
not be available, forcing the United States to re-establish
acceptable conditions in a region rather than preventing
unacceptable conditions from arising in the first place. 536
Thus the United States would have two choices when a crisis
arose: accepting the new status quo, or going to war. 537
'Any change in conditions that did not justify going to war,
or that did not present good chances of going to war
successfully and at acceptable cost, could be forced on the
United States for lack of other options.
The only measures available to the United States for
signaling interest in a region would be diplomatic, and the
only means of backing up diplomatic efforts would be through
deterrence.538

As described earlier, deterrence depends on

capability and credibility to be effective.

While a CONUS-

536cornrnander Christopher Wode, "Beyond Bombers vs.
Carriers," Armed Forces Journal International (April 1995):
29; Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: status.
Prospects, 5.
537Krulak, "'An Enduring Instrument," 8.
538 Dismukes, National security strateqy and Forward
Presence, 39.
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based U.S. military would retain its capability, it is
questionable whether much credibility would remain for
deploying overseas if the issue was not clearly a vital U.S.
interest.

Adding to the problem is the fact that the

adversary's leadership, not U.S. leadership, would have to
perform the mental equation of how much U.S. interest was
involved and how much misbehavior could be gotten away with.
In the period when a crisis was becoming visible,
there would be no opportunity for increasing the signals of
U.S. interest through additional naval forces,

increased

tempo of operations in the region, conducting limited
military operations, or any of the other means of conducting
naval diplomacy.

Also, if U.S. deterrent efforts failed,

they would fail catastrophically.

That is, the United

States would not be able to fall back on defense in the
failure of deterrence, because the forces needed to defend
would be thousands of miles away in CONUS.

U.S. forward

presence forces, on the other hand, would be able to defend
U.S. interests when deterrence failed, hopefully preventing
the aggressor from achieving his aims.
In addition to these faults of a CONUS-based posture,
there is reason to question whether the deployment of U.S.
forces in periods of crisis would be viable logistically.539

539Rear Admiral Thomas Lynch, "A Critical Look at Who
Does What," Proceedings (May 1995): 88.
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Moving forces and equipment from CONUS, as well as
delivering MPS equipment, still would require access to
major port and airfield facilities. 540

With those

facilities captured or under attack by ballistic or cruise
missiles, most if not all equipment being delivered by air
or sea would have to arrive far from the theater and then
travel by land, requiring both a massive logistical effort
and likely the permission to move through another state's
territory.

The tactical aircraft needed for air defense in

the theater still would require major airfields from which
to operate, posing the same problems as the maritime
delivery of equipment.541
Unless the United States had many months in which to
build up its forces, ·it is doubtful that a trans-oceanic
deployment could be conducted to reverse an act of
aggression.

If Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were occupied by

Iran or Iraq, waiting six to twelve months while U.S. forces
and supplies were built up would not be acceptable, since
the loss of Saudi and Kuwaiti oil would cripple the
economies of most U.S. allies in the meantime.

Where U.S.

forces might be built up would pose another major problem in
this scenario.

s 4 00'Hanlon,

"Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops

Home?" 83.
541Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument," 11.
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Provided that U.S. forces were able to reach the
theater, they would lack familiarity with local conditions
and operational patterns, things that forward presence
forces monitor daily in regions around the world.

The

forces of any regional allies that could be convinced to
join the United States would lack interoperability with U.S.
forces, reducing their ability to render assistance.

In

addition, simply convincing regional allies to participate
would be problematic.

The most important factor in

convincing allies to assist the United States is likely to
be those allies' perception of U.S. willingness to act alone
if necessary.542

With the bulk of the U.S. military

stationed at home, U.S. willingness to act alone may not be
credible to regional allies.543

Finally, U.S. forces should

be expected to have less than outstanding combat proficiency
if their use is perceived as very unlikely, since expensive
live training and frequent exercises likely would occur less
often.544

542 Dismukes,
Presence, 45.
543 Rodman,

National Security Strategy and Forward

America Adrift, 67.

5 44 John Pay, "Full Circle: The US Navy and Its
Carriers, 1974-1993," in Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower:
Theory and Practice, special issue of The Journal of
Strateqic Studies (March 1994): 136.
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Lastly, despite the belief in RMA concepts by many in
the defense establishment, technology cannot substitute for
a coherent strategy in U.S. national security.

The Gulf

War's impact on the thinking of many defense planners and
authors is probably the most important factor in the new
wave of RMA enthusiasm.

The orders-of-magnitude superiority

of U.S. forces over Iraqi forces often is extrapolated into
future scenarios without regard to differences of quality,
geography, culture, or will. 545

While technological

advantage is important in U.S. national security and
military strategies, it is not sufficient by itself as a
means of protecting vital interests or prevailing on the
battlefield.
A sound strategy supported by appropriate forces is the
basic requirement for protecting U.S. interests.

Attempting

to protect interests from afar, through the deterrent threat
of deploying halfway around the world to restore order and
rescue U.S. interests, is neither sound nor feasible.

Thus

the pull-back strategy, which rests solely on deterrence to
prevent assaults on U.S. interests, and can only respond to
aggression after the fact,

is no strategy at all.

The pull-

back strategy equates to waiting for trouble to occur, while
hoping that it will not, then expending enormous effort to

545 stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the
Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict,"
International Security (Fall 1996): 173-179.
289

set things right again when regional adversaries exceed the
limits of U.S. tolerance.

While perhaps attractive to some

for financial, technological, or moral-philosophical
reasons, the pull-back strategy is not a viable means of
protecting U.S. interests and security.
"Virtual Presence:" Global Air
Power and Space Surveillance
The second alternative to forward presence centers
around recent technological advances in the areas of air
power and surveillance.

Through such programs and systems

as GPS, space-based sensors, smart and brilliant weapons,
and stealth aircraft, proponents of global air power have
produced the concept of "virtual presence."

Virtual

presence rests on the assumptions that U.S. surveillance
capability can find and track any object on earth, in any
weather and despite any concealment efforts, in real time,
and that stealth aircraft carrying highly lethal smart
weapons can destroy any target on earth from bases far
removed from the theater, even from CONUs. 546
First articulated by then-Air Force Chief of Staff
General Merill McPeak in 1994, virtual presence envisions
U.S. air power providing the means to resolve any crisis,
and obviating the need for more "traditional" military

546sheila Widnall and Ronald Fogleman, "Global
Presence," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1995): 96-99.
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instruments, such as armored forces or amphibious forces. 547
With U.S. aircraft able to move into any region quickly, and
with U.S. space assets watching over every area of the
earth, no impending crisis could develop to the point that
U.S. interests were threatened without being reversed by air
power. 548

The National Defense Panel, established in 1996

as an independent cross-check on the

Quadrennial Defense

Review, accepted many of the claims of air power advocates,
stating that greater use should be made of long-range
bombers and precision weapons.549
The centerpiece of the virtual presence concept is the
B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.

With inter-continental range and

the ability to carry a large load of PGMs, the B-2 is the
embodiment of the high-tech systems counted on by RMA
advocates to allow a smaller force to meet U.S. national
security requirements:
The capacity of the quite revolutionary technologies
embodied in the B-2 to influence the behavior of
regional actors lies in the unprecedented combination
of operational features they make possible in one
system, encompassing long-range power projection
capabilities able to reach virtually any region in

547 James Canan, "McPeak Sums It Up,"
(August 1994): 31.

Air Force Magazine

5 4 8General Ronald Fogleman, USAF, "The Air Force and
Joint Vision 2010,"
25.

Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 1996-97):

549 John Tirpak, "The NDP and the Transformation
Strategy," Air Force Maqazine (March 1998): 22.
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the world from CONUS bases with only one
refueling. 550
Consistently touted as the means to apply U.S. military
power to 100 percent of the earth's surface, without the
need for any support facilities overseas and with impunity
from air defenses, the B-2 combines with space surveillance
to replace physical presence with virtual presence. 551
A supporting agent in virtual presence is the Air
Force's air expeditionary force (AEF) concept, typically a
group of twenty-four to thirty aircraft capable of deploying
rapidly to bases in a theater.

In annual exercises such as

BRIGHT STAR (U.S.-Egypt), the Air Force deploys "alpha
packages" of tankers, F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and ground
personnel to forward bases on short notice, to provide a
rapid air power response to emerging events. 55 2

General

John Jumper, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, has
stated that access to the needed bases likely will not be
withheld by allies in a theater, and that ballistic missiles
and CBW attacks will not be significant impediments to the
AEF concept, allowing CONUS-based air power to maintain
presence from afar.553

SSOPerry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 31.
551Goodman, "Virtual Overseas Presence," 12.
552canan, "Airpower from Home Base," 23.
55311 operating Abroad," Air Force Magazine (December
1998): 28.
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The result of air power's elevation to global status,
at least for backers in the Air Force, has been to truncate
the United States' warfighting strategy to a single phase:
the halt phase.

With rapid deployment of aircraft armed

with PGMs, supported by space-based surveillance assets,
adversaries can be stopped in their tracks, and their
tactical and strategic options quickly whittled down to
surrender or obliteration through the destruction of their
forces. 554

For example, it is claimed that three B-2

bombers could produce enough armor kills with anti-armor
PGMs to halt an attack by three armored brigades in a matter
of minutes.555
The various PGMs, including emerging GPS-aided
munitions (GAMs) as well as older laser or optical guided
weapons, are claimed to allow a force of half as many U.S.
aircraft to inflict Gulf War numbers of kills, while
reducing risk to U.S. pilots.55 6

In the words of one air

power advocate:
I would maintain that from that point [the halt
phase] on, the enemy's strategic options decline. He
is either leaving for home or dying in place, and a

554 Elaine Grossman, "Duel of Doctrines,"
Magazine (December 1998): 30.
555 Perry et al.,

Air Force

Long:-Ranqe Bombers, 41-42.

556 John Tirpak, "Brilliant Weapons," Air Force Maqazine
(February 1998): 48; "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower,"
Air Force Magazine (December 1998): 22.
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follow-on counteroffensive may not be necessary. A
ground war becomes an option rather than an
inevitability. 557
Air and space power thus maintain presence in distant
regions of the world through the knowledge among other
governments that U.S. airplanes could arrive within days or
hours to punish aggressive acts. 558

With PGMs and global

reach, U.S. air power by itself can deter aggression, and
defend U.S. interests if deterrence fails:
That ability [to regain the initiative in a crisis]
may be derived from strikes at global range on short
notice with devastating intensity and accuracy .
. . . Global attack and precision strike are thus key
to the U.S. national security posture.559
General McPeak, addressing the fact that the
adversary's perception is what matters in deterrence, has
stated that regional actors will recognize the global reach
of U.S. bombers and the continual presence of U.S.

557 Major General (Retired) Charles Link, USAF, quoted
in James Kitfield, "To Halt An Enemy," Air Force Magazine
(January 1998): 65.
558Tirpak, "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower," 22:
"The USAF's B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H bombers, from a cold start
at their home bases in the ·continental United States, could
attack virtually anywhere on Earth in 18 hours . . . could
destroy hundreds of armored targets on a single pass, would
be able to stop an enemy column on the march." See also
Glenn Goodman, "The Power Of Information," Armed Forces
Journal International (July 1995): 24: "In most instances,
information, combined with forces that can rapidly respond
with the right mix of capabilities, can achieve U.S. goals."
559Jeffrey Jackson, "Global Attack and Precision
Strike," in Goure and Szara, Air and Space Power in the
Millennium, 106.
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New

satellites, and that, "air and space forces provide global
presence, not a localized presence."5 6 0
Additional advantages gained through long-range air
power and PGMs include safety from attack on the bases
supporting long-range bombers, which can be located far from
a theater, and the reduction by several orders of magnitude
of the number of U.S. servicemen put at risk.

By providing

the means to, "conduct relatively risk-free counterforce
strikes" against enemy NBC facilities, and through exposing
fewer servicemen to enemy fire, long-range air power is
advanced as the safest and most economical means of applying
U.S. combat power.561
Under a virtual presence strategy, the Air Force would
be the mainstay of U.S. military power.

Long-range bombers

would be required in much larger numbers than the 187 called
for in the

ouadrennial Defense Review, while tactical

fighters would be needed in smaller numbers.

The B-2 in

particular would be needed in larger numbers, perhaps as
many as 100.

With higher production expected to bring down

B-2 unit cost by as much as two-thirds, from around 2.2
billion dollars to 865 million dollars per aircraft, a
larger B-2 fleet would be affordable within the overall

S60canan, "McPeak Sums It Up,'' 34; John Correll, "Let's
You and Him Fight," Air Force Magazine (June 1994): 4.
561Horner, "What We Should Have Learned," 54, 55.
295

defense budget as other systems were cut back. 562

Aerial

re-fueling and air lift assets would be needed in large
numbers, to allow aerial re-fueling of bombers and to get
AEF supplies and personnel into a theater quickly.
Space assets would be of equal importance to aircraft,
and could justify the establishment of an Air Force space
corps, or even an independent Space Force.

The ability to

defend U.S. satellites from attack, and to attack and
neutralize other nations' space assets, likely would be
prominent features of a virtual presence strategy.5 6 3
Although U.S. space surveillance capability is very high
today, it is posited that even greater improvements would
need to be made in order to achieve the kind of global
awareness described in the virtual presence strategy.
The Navy likely would be sized and structured very much
as under the pull-back strategy.

Needing only to keep the

military SLOCs open for transporting Army equipment and
supplies to a distant theater, ASW, MCM, and AAW would be
the primary features of the Navy.
The Army would be reduced to perhaps as few as five
divisions, with the armored divisions' heavy gear stored

56 2At the original number of 132 B-2 bombers, the unit
cost was expected to be 480 million dollars. Producing 100
would have cost 865 million per plane, while the current
force of twenty-one aircraft will cost over two billion
dollars each. See Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 72.
563 Friedman, The Future of War, 363-366.
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mainly aboard prepositioning ships.

Two light divisions

would be structured for rapid air deployment.

The principal

function of Army units would be to provide air defenses for
Air Force bases, and to stand by for whatever ground combat
remained to be conducted after U.S. air power had been
applied to the enemy.
What are the faults of the virtual presence strategy?
As the pull-back strategy did, the virtual presence strategy
employs many valid arguments in creating the larger argument
for presence through long-range air power.

The B-2, for

example, no doubt is an aeronautical and military marvel of
high-technology systems.

PGMs have indeed performed much

better than iron bombs, as much as twelve times better
according to various studies.56 4

And air power does offer a

means to minimize the number of U.S. servicemen placed at
risk in applying military force.

Do the individual

arguments in favor of virtual presence support the larger
claim, that virtual presence can and should replace physical
preseqce?

Again the answer must be "no."

Just as the pull-

back strategy's arguments ultimately are unconvincing, so
too does the virtual presence strategy fail to convince in
the end.

564 Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 18, cites the Gulf
War Air Power Survey in claiming that PGMs enjoyed twelve
times better kill ratios than iron bombs.
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The one overwhelming flaw in the virtual presence
concept is the incorrect belief that the ability to kill any
target on earth, at any time and from any distance--if
possible at all, a dubious assumption to begin with--is the
same as providing presence. 56 5

While such a capability may

well be invaluable in a future war, the belief that global
reach and global strike capability is synonymous with
presence is a gross conceptual error.566

The kinds of

strikes portrayed by virtual presence advocates--stopping
three armored brigades on the march with PGMs--are wartime
missions.

Presence is the peacetime employment of military

forces to influence others across a full range of actions
and across the spectrum of violence.

Thus claiming that

global air power can provide presence is to argue apples and
oranges.
Bombers, especially the B-2 bomber, are unique in their
ability to deliver a large amount of destructive force, over
a great distance and in a short time.
are largely one-dimensional.

However, bombers also

The only option afforded to a

commander by available bombers is to put bombs on a

565wode, "Beyond Bombers and Carriers," 29.
56 6 DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 77; Mauz,
"The Value of Being There," 27: "To be sure, bombers have a
role in conflict, and they also contribute to deterrence,
but their contribution to overseas presence is limited and
to suggest that they can compare to naval forces is
nonsense."
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target.5 6 7

Unless the situation calls for a destructive

strike on some target, bombers provide little value.
The analogy often used is that air power is either "on
or off", with no ability to move up or down the spectrum of
activity.

For example, during the entire period during the

1980s when U.S. forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf,
attempting to safeguard Saudi and Kuwaiti oil shipments
during the Iran-Iraq war, not a single strike mission was
flown in the theater. 5 68

There were no instances in which

the United States could justify turning bomber air power
"on", so it was a non-factor.
In crisis response the same limitation applies.

How

would B-2 bombers have resolved the crisis at the U.S.
embassy in Somalia in 1991?

How would bombers go about

monitoring and intercepting Iraqi oil smuggling?

Unless the

crisis calls for the destruction of a certain target set,
bombers are likely to be of little or no value to U.S.
commanders.569

Since presence more often than not involves

567Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument," 10.
568 navid Perin, comparing Long-Range Bombers and the
Carrier Force (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
1994), 9.
569Appendix A, Table 11 and Table 12, compare the
utility of bombers and carrier battle groups in peacetime
crisis response. As shown in these illustrations, unless the
crisis calls for strike missions, bombers will have very
limited ability to contribute.
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less-than-war activities, a platform whose only mission is
destructive cannot be viewed as a suitable means of
providing presence.
While air power advocates may claim that bombers'
military capabilities will produce a deterrent effect, and
that this deterrent effect should operate on regional actors
in the same manner as presence forces, history does not
support this argument.

The B-36 bomber offers a near-exact

parallel to the current B-2 theory of global air power.

The

B-36 was claimed to be capable of attacking any location on
earth quickly, from bases beyond the reach of enemy weapons,
and so would be able to influence events and protect U.S.
interests.

Alas, the Korean War proved otherwise,

just as

Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait, and to stay
there after receiving demands from the U.N. that he leave,
came in the face of truly global U.S. air power.570
Deterrence depends, as always, on the adversary's
perception to be successful.5 7 1

For an adversary with

first-rate intelligence gathering capability, able to
identify and analyze the range of U.S. capabilities, and to
extrapolate the damage likely to be done if those
capabilities are unleashed, a non-visible bomber force may
serve to deter.

However, for less sophisticated actors,

570Johnson, "Carries Are Forward Presence," 39.
571 siegel,

To Deter. compel, and Reassure, 3.
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such as most regional states, visibility remains at the
heart of deterrence, and bombers are poorly-suited to
providing and maintaining visibility.5 72
A further serious flaw in the virtual presence paradigm
is that the historical model that serves as the basis for
many air power claims--the Gulf War--had conditions so
unique as to be highly unlikely to repeat themselves in the
future.

Thus air power may not be applicable, or at least

may not be decisive, in future conflicts.

Even the

perception of the Gulf War has changed over the last eight
years in regard to air power, with many now believing that
air power was not as effective as portrayed at the time. 5 73
Unless a future conflict involves desert terrain,
largely immobile armored forces without any significant air
defenses, a six-month period in which to build up logistics
and gather intelligence, an enemy command and control
structure that has been decapitated at the outset and never
re-established, the withholding of enemy CBW capability, and
no possibility of U.S. space assets being interfered with,
it is unlikely that air power would enjoy the complete

572 colin Gray, Explorations In Strategy (Westport,
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), 75: "Sustained local presence
in the air typically is physically impracticable." Dietz,
"Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," 112.
5 73 Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First
Century," 186.
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freedom of operation experienced in 1991.

Marine Corps

General Paul Van Riper states the matter clearly:
If we're looking to repeat Desert Storm, then I have
little problem with the Air Force argument . . . What
we have are a lot of buzzwords floating around
associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs
. . . It's ludicrous to suggest that such concepts as
'information dominance' will now somehow make all the
military doctrine that came before it irrelevant.5 7 4
In addition, it is likely that even the B-2 would need
a fighter escort when operating in daylight.

While enemies

may not know when or from which direction a B-2 is
approaching, they can defend likely targets and rely on
visual detection in daytime.

If the B-2 can be seen it

becomes a slow, vulnerable target.

Also, it is not

inconceivable that an enemy undergoing an RMA of its own
might field the means to triangulate the B-2's targeting
radar signal in real time, allowing fighters to intercept
incoming B-2s.5 7 5

Finally, given current U.S. research into

radars capable of defeating stealth, it is reasonable to
assume that others are working on the same problem.

If

another nation were able to solve this technical problem, it
is possible that the B-2 could lose its greatest asset. 576

574Kitfield, "To Halt an Enemy," 63.
575 0 1 Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops
Home?" 80.
576oavid Fulghum, "New Radars Peel Veil From Hidden
Targets," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 January 1999,
58.
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Thus there is reason to doubt the B-2's continued ability to
operate with impunity from air defenses.
The AEF concept that supplements global bombers also is
based on questionable assumptions.

In particular, General

Jumper's belief that ballistic missiles and chemical weapons
pose no threat to AEF operations is difficult to reconcile
with different war games and Red Team studies:
With a few SCUDs, can you take out an airfield? No,
you cannot. You can contaminate with chemical
weapons, but that is what we practice for . . . . All
services have practiced doing these sorts of
things. 577
Alternatives to highly corrosive decontaminants are
needed. Current decontaminants leave a corrosive
residue on equipment, buildings, vehicles, etc.,
which impedes combat and support operations and thus
threatens mission accomplishment. The services have
no effective means to decontaminate aircraft that
have been contaminated by toxic agents or materials
without taking the aircraft out of service for a long
period or damaging key aircraft components.578
While military casualties would likely be low, there
are no good options for today's theater airbase
commander if the enemy is able to continuously
restrike/recontaminate his facility . . . . Over time
casualties will increase and efficiency will drop,
with the anticipated disastrous effects on sortie
generation and airlift throughput.57 9

577"0perating Abroad," 28-29.
578 The Impact of Nuclear. Biological, and Chemical

Proliferation on

u.s.

Armed Forces, 14.

579 weaver and Glaes, InvitinQ Disaster, 45.
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Access to bases may be no more secure in peacetime,
when the United States may wish to engage in less-than-war
operations.

Again, it is peacetime operations, not wartime

strikes, that comprise the great majority of presence
missions, and even close allies may hesitate to provide
unrestricted access to their facilities for U.S. planes. 5 80
As capable as U.S. land-based tactical air power may be, the
AEF concept is totally dependent on access to someone else's
facilities to be viable.581
From the weaknesses described here, it is clear that
virtual presence is no more realistic an alternative for
protecting U.S. interests than the pull-back strategy.

In

fact, the term "virtual presence" is a misnomer, as the
concept does not qualify as a peacetime presence strategy at
all, but rather as a high-tech RMA warfighting strategy.
Since the only response available to U.S. leaders under a
virtual presence strategy would be to order bombs dropped on
various targets, in attempting to resolve a crisis the
United States would be forced to choose between accepting an
undesired action, or employing destructive force via air
power to correct the situation, with no intermediate actions
available to U.S. leaders.

580Goodman, "Virtual Overseas Presence," 12.
581 Perry et al.,
strateqic Era, 56.
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In many, indeed in most peacetime presence scenarios,
putting bombs on a target simply does not suffice as an
appropriate, effective solution.

General Krulak makes the

point clearly: "I don't care what anyone says, you're not
going to manage instability in the Persian Gulf, the Indian
Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean from 60,000 feet overhead." 5 82
While global strike capability should be developed for use
in wartime, when the advantages provided by long-range,
stealthy aircraft delivering PGMs clearly would be of great
value, the position that global air power and global strike
capability can allow virtual presence to replace forward
presence has little if any credibility.
Return to an Isolationist Security Policy

A third alternative strategy for U.S. national
security, one that has enjoyed some support in recent years,
is a return to the kind of isolationist policy followed by
the United States between the World Wars.

By focusing only

on the defense of U.S. citizens and territory, an
isolationist policy forgoes even the pretense of protecting
U.S. interests abroad.

By definition, in an isolationist

context the United States has no interests abroad that
require protection.

Isolationism therefore is not in the

same category as the pull-back strategy or the virtual

582Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 13.
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presence strategy, both of which are claimed to be methods
of protecting U.S. interests abroad, but nonetheless is an
alternative strategy for U.S. national security.
The central tenet of an isolationist policy is the
belief that events outside the United States need not
concern us.

For some isolationists this belief comes from

the United States' position of unchallenged power in the
post-Cold War world.

In this regard, the isolationist

strategy can be viewed as the ultimate extension of the
pull-back strategy, with no crisis justifying the deployment
of U.S. forces.

For others, isolationism springs from the

belief that the United States should mind its own business
in the world, and demand the same treatment from other
states.

As long as other states do not threaten U.S.

citizens or territory, they will not be bothered by the
United States.

For whatever reasons, isolationists share

the same guiding principle: the United States should not
extend its influence or power beyond its own borders.
Struggles for power within different regions, possibly
involving open war between rival states, are not expected to
disappear in the future.

For isolationists, however, these

regional disputes do not threaten U.S. safety and security,
and should be ignored. 583

As long as the effects of

regional wars do not spill over onto U.S. territory, which

583Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81.
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seems unlikely as only Canada and Mexico border on the
United States, regional wars are of no importance to the
United States.584
Similarly, the desire to spread democracy abroad is an
inappropriate goal for the United States, and should not be
attempted.

Certainly we support democratic ideals and offer

an example to others of democracy's benefits, but how other
states choose to rule themselves should be none of our
concern.

If others are oppressed by brutal dictatorships,

or if lawless anarchy reigns in a distant region, it is for
the people living there to correct, not the United
States. 585
The vital interests of the United States would amount
to only three requirements: the safety of U.S. citizens, the
integrity of U.S. territory, and the independence of the
U.S. political process.

In regard to overseas interests, at

most the United States should take some interest in and
encourage a balance of power within different regions. 586
Another argument often cited in making the isolationist
case, and indeed one heard for many years before the end of

S84Earl Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," Foreign

Policy (Winter 1990-1991): 7-8.
585Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
81.

5S6Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15.
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the Cold War, is that other states, particularly the
affluent states of Europe and Asia, should provide for their
own defense, allowing U.S. troops and support to be
withdrawn.587

For example, South Korea has twice the

population of North Korea, and an economy nearly an order of
magnitude larger than North Korea's.

South Korea thus

should not need American assistance in defending itself,
certainly not assistance on the order of an entire U.S. Army
division and supporting air assets. 5 8 8

An isolationist

policy would force U.S. allies to ''carry the load" for their
own defense by withdrawing U.S. protection.589
An important point to be noted is that isolationists
would not sever commercial interaction along with military
support in withdrawing from the world.590

U.S. overseas

trade would continue as ever, since it would be in the best
interest of overseas nations, even those hostile or less
than friendly to the United States, to continue to have
economic interaction:
The restraint we propose should not be misdescribed
as a total withdrawal from the world. On the
587 Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence; Status.
Prospects, 19.
588Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
80.
589 Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 210.
590Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81.
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contrary, we believe in a vigorous trade with other
nations and the thriving corrunerce of ideas. Military
restraint need not, and will not, bring economic
protectionism. 591
Even that most strategic of resources, oil, should not
require United States military forces to be deployed
overseas.

Instead, the United States could depend on market

forces to maintain the price of oil, and to ensure the
availability of the huge amounts of oil required for world
economies.

Some possible benefits of this course of action

might be to prompt the U.S. population and government to
lower their demand and dependence on oil, and to promote the
development of useful alternatives to fossil fuels. 592

Even

if Saudi and Kuwaiti oilfields came into the possession of
Iraq or Iran, their oil still would be available on the
world market, as the oil would have no value unless sold,
and market forces again would serve to prevent artificial
manipulation of the oil market.593
The armed forces required by the United States would be
highly capable, but very small and structured for defense,
not power projection.

Accordingly, ballistic missile

defense and the strategic nuclear forces would be of
paramount importance.594

Space systems and high technology

591 Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 200.
5 92 Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 9.

59 3Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 220.
S94Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
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surveillance and strike systems also would be important,
possibly requiring the establishment of a separate Space
Force.595
The conventional forces would make maximum use of high
technology as a force multiplier, an effort made easier by
the United States' technological lead over other nations.
With better technology and a defensive posture, the services
could be reduced to as few as six ground divisions, ten or
eleven Air Force wings, and as few as one hundred ships. 59 6
By withdrawing to CONUS, the requirements placed on the
military would be streamlined greatly.

The services would

need only to defend CONUS and the sea and air approaches, to
retain strong retaliatory nuclear forces,

and to employ

those retaliatory forces along with missile defenses in
order to deter NBC attack.5 97

The rest of the world could

be left alone, with regional affairs and events taking care
of themselves.
The problem, and the reason that isolationism is not a
viable strategy for the United States, is that the world

80.
59 5Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,"81.
596 Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
80; Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 17.
597 Perla et al., Future Sea-Based Aviation, 55;
Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15.
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does not take care of itself, at least not peacefully and in
ways that will be favorable to the United States.

If the

five thousand-plus years of written history are any guide,
there will always be states and entities with hostile
ambitions, bent on taking by force what others possess:
The world does not sort itself out on its own . .
International stability is never a given. It is never
the norm. When achieved, it is the product of selfconscious action by the great powers, and most
particularly of the greatest power, which now and for
the foreseeable future is the United States. If
America wants stability, it will have to create it .
. . . There will constantly be new threats disturbing
our peace. 598
While isolationism might have been sufficient in the
early nineteenth century, when all of America's resource
requirements could be met domestically and the British Navy
served to safeguard trade on the high seas, today and in the
future isolationism cannot be seen as a credible choice for
U.S. national security.

As elaborated in Chapter II, the

United States has interests in nearly every region of the
world.

Only the most narrowly defined interests of safety

and security reside within the borders of the United States.
Whether or not this should be the case is immaterial: it is
the case, and U.S. strategy must deal with what is, not with
what we might like to be.

598charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in
Allison and Treverton, Rethinking America's Security, 301302.
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If Texas and Alaska could provide our oil demands, and
if Canada and Mexico could satisfy our import and export
markets, an isolationist strategy would be viable, if not
necessarily appropriate.

However, the reality is that we do

have interests overseas, there are threats to those
interests, and we cannot protect our interests by
withdrawing into isolation.599
The results of adopting an isolationist strategy might
be slow to manifest themselves, especially in the current
international setting.

The U.S. position of unrivaled power

could allow the United States to muddle along in isolation
for several years, even a decade or more, before being
forced to address a situation that had become threatening to
U.S. interests.600
History, on the other hand, suggests that the United
States would experience a rapid rise in misbehavior
worldwide, which would impinge on U.S. interests sooner
rather than later.

Regional bullies should be expected to

push hard against the envelope of U.S. tolerance, and to
threaten, either directly or indirectly, the safety and
security of the United States.

Charles Krauthammer, in a

remarkable critique of recent U.S. foreign policy, explains
why this is so:
599 Johnsen,

The Future Roles of

u.s.

Military Power, 3.

600Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81.
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The basic difference between the international system
and domestic society is that in domestic society
there exists a monopoly of the means of coercion, an
enforcer, a sovereign. There is generally also a
preexisting community of norms.
Neither of these conditions obtains in the
international arena . . . . And, in any social system,
whether of individuals or nation-states, where there
is no enforcer, there can be no real law. 60 1
The years between World War One and World War Two
provide the clearest example of the perils of isolationism
for the United States.

Convinced after World War One that

the best way to avoid another destructive war was to
withdraw from the world, the United States practiced a
determined isolationism right up until the 7th of December,
1941.602

Ignoring the threat to Europe posed by Hitlerian

Germany, and the threat to Asia posed by a militant Japan,
the United States surrendered the initiative in world
events. 6 03

When the United States could no longer ignore

the outside world, after isolationism had been forcibly
refuted by the Japanese carrier task force at Pearl Harbor,
four years of tremendous effort and cost were required to
restore U.S. security.

There is no reason to think that

601charles Krauthammer,

"A World Imagined,"

The New

Republic, 15 March 1999, 23.
602 Allison and Treverton,
security, 301.

Rethinking America's

603 Jordan et al., American National Security, 12-13.
Ellsworth et al., eds., America's National Interests, 10.
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today's world will order itself any more peaceably than the
world of eighty years ago.
Summary

The current U.S. strategy of power projection through
forward presence is grounded in the experience of the past
and the logical security requirements of the future.

As

with any strategy, alternatives to forward presence exist,
and have been argued forcefully by various authors.

While

championed by thoughtful and well-intentioned persons, the
alternatives presented in this chapter cannot be judged
acceptable in replacing forward presence in U.S. security
strategy.
The first alternative strategy, the pull-back strategy,
can be seen as an attempt to enjoy great power status
without exerting great power effort in the world.

While

maintaining a military similar in structure and capabilities
to the current force, although significantly smaller, the
pull-back strategy would not maintain that force near U.S.
interests, counting instead on the deterrent threat of U.S.
forces to protect interests.

With RMA systems making up for

the reduced size and physical absence of the U.S. military,
U.S. forces could respond from CONUS to any act that
threatened U.S. interests, and overwhelm any opponent
through technological superiority.

Arguments also are made

that the United States can no longer justify the cost of a
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large forward presence military, as no plausible threats
exist to U.S. security.
The pull-back strategy may also be viewed as a reversal
of the "world policeman" role taken on by the United States
since the end of the Cold War.

Since there is no plausible

threat to U.S. safety, domestic interests should take
priority over international affairs, obviating the need for
deploying military force all over the world.
Despite the logic of many pull-back arguments when
viewed in isolation, the whole turns out to be less than the
sum of the parts.

The most obvious flaw in the pull-back

strategy is its total reliance on deterrence to defend U.S.
interests, and the strictly reactive nature of a CONUS-based
military.

If deterrence fails, no defensive options are

likely to exist, a condition virtually certain to encourage
regional bullies and bad actors to contemplate fait accompli
strategies.
None of the intermediate steps afforded by naval
forward presence and naval diplomacy would be available,
forcing the United States to accept an aggressor's actions
or deploy overseas to fight a regional war.

The cost of

deployment could exceed the loss involved in accepting the
new conditions, making it more likely that aggressors would
be able to keep their gains.

If the decision was made to

deploy, U.S. allies would lack interoperability with U.S.
forces, making those allies' contribution less effective.
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Finally, there is reason to be skeptical about the
RMA's ability to solve any strategic problem through
technology.

The substitution of technology for strategy is

one of the pitfalls of buying into the RMA school of
thought, and should be avoided in all cases.

Technology is

important in U.S. security and military strategy, but
technology cannot become strategy.
The second alternative described in this chapter, the
use of global air power to produce virtual presence, is
miscast by its advocates as a means of defending U.S.
interests abroad.

While possibly a potent warfighting

concept, virtual presence through global air power in no way
can substitute for the physical presence of naval forces in
protecting U.S. interests, a role that mostly involves
peacetime activities.
Supported by such Air Force luminaries as former Chief
of Staff McPeak, virtual presence envisions the growth of
space surveillance and long-range air power into an
omnipresent force, able to see and stop any misbehavior, in
any location, at any time and in time to be effective.

The

B-2 bomber, probably the most advanced system in the U.S.
military, is held up as the means to stop or correct any
threat to U.S. interests.

By raining PGMs on adversary

forces, if necessary from bases in CONUS, the B-2 and
supporting air expeditionary forces can prevent enemy plans
from succeeding, thereby protecting U.S. interests.
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Presumably adversaries will recognize the iron logic of U.S.
strategy and refrain from challenging U.S. air power.
Virtual presence is better-suited as a wartime
strategy, when the ability to destroy targets from great
distance, with highly accurate and lethal PGMs, would be
very valuable.

Even in this context, however, there is

reason to doubt that the virtual presence strategy is
sufficient by itself, without the need for Army or Navy
forces to take part.

Ironically, the B-2 is stealthy in

inverse proportion to the technological level of the sensor
it is attempting to evade.

Able largely to avoid detection

by radar or infrared systems, it is as visible to the naked
eye as any other aircraft, making it highly vulnerable in
daytime.

Thus the B-2 would need either to operate only at

night, probably not an option in a fast-moving ground war,
or to have an escort of short-range fighters.

The

limitation of vulnerability to attack on supporting air
bases again intrudes into the problem, as ballistic missiles
and NBC weapons should be capable of neutralizing airfields
within a theater.
The weakness of the virtual presence concept is that it
attempts to apply a wartime activity--dropping bombs--to
solve problems and protect U.S. interests in peacetime.
Virtual presence offers no options for U.S. commanders,
whether in day-to-day operations or crisis response, except
to destroy something of the enemy's.
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Thus virtual presence

relies strictly on the deterrent threat of launching an air
campaign against any nation that threatens U.S. interests,
with no capacity for less-than-war activities.

It is a

strategy manifestly unfit for the conditions that the U.S.
must work with the majority of the time, and to suggest that
it provides any kind of presence, virtual or otherwise, is
at best a statement of misguided enthusiasm from the De
Seversky school of air power.
Finally, the possibility of returning to an
isolationist posture has gained some currency since the Cold
War ended.

Based on the belief that what goes on outside

the United States does not and should not concern us, the
isolationist strategy calls for the return of all U.S.
forces to CONUS, where their only role would be preventing
an attack on U.S. territory.

The services would be reduced

greatly, although still provided with the best and most
advanced systems available.
The vital interests of the United States would be the
safety of U.S. citizens, the integrity of U.S. territory,
and the freedom of the U.S. political process from outside
influence.

Nothing else on earth would require protection,

or be worth fighting for.

Our many allies would have to

fend for themselves in terms of defense, although we would
maintain healthy trade with all amenable nations.

Even

access to oil, on which our economy, and therefore our
quality of life, depends, would not require active measures
318

of protection.

Either through the invisible hand of the

world oil market, or through the pragmatism of the state in
possession of the world's oil, U.S. oil demands could be met
at affordable cost.
If history teaches us anything, it is that peaceful
coexistence is not the natural order of things for sovereign
states.

This lesson is of large importance today, since the

United States depends on resources from abroad, as well as
the survival of world economic markets even more dependent
on oil than our own.

This reason alone is sufficient to

disqualify isolationism as an acceptable strategy for the
United States.

In addition to the need for secure access to

resources, the United States would surrender all but
diplomatic means of influencing others.

Even the pull-back

strategy hedges by retaining the forces to set things right
when others trespass on U.S. interests.

An isolationist

America would have no ability to maintain favorable
conditions abroad.

While viable and not entirely

inappropriate two hundred years ago, this strategy cannot be
considered a realistic possibility today.
The three alternatives presented here are not intended
to encompass every possible strategy for U.S. national
security.

The three alternatives were selected because each

has significant backing within the U.S. defense
establishment, and in the case of isolationism, within the
U.S. population.

However, after examining the shortcomings
319

of each, it is clear that forward presence, and especially
naval forward presence, is the most appropriate and
effective strategy for U.S. national security.

With

interests and threats residing far from U.S. territory, U.S.
forces likewise must be positioned far from U.S. territory
if interests are to be protected.

No other option provides

a realistic means of protecting U.S. interests, influencing
events in the United States' favor, and defending U.S.
interests when armed force is called for.

Thus the Navy-

Marine Corps team's forward presence mission will retain its
importance in the post-Cold War international environment,
and will continue to influence events, protect American
interests, and underwrite the security of the United States.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The United States Navy has been operating around the
world for nearly two centuries, since Thomas Jefferson sent
American warships to the Mediterranean in 1801.

Although

the shape of American sea power has changed in the
intervening years, from sail power to nuclear power, from a
surface Navy to a submarine, surface, air, and space Navy,
the fundamental requirement of sea power has remained the
same for the United States.

Today's Navy is just as

essential to the safety and prosperity of the United States
as was the Navy of John Paul Jones, and will remain so in
the next century.
The United States is a maritime nation, dependent on
the sea for the majority of trade with other nations.

While

aircraft allow goods to cross great distances in a matter of
hours, air lift is extremely expensive and inefficient for
the transportation of bulk cargo, and is incapable of
transporting bulk resources such as oil.

The sea remains

the economic highway of U.S. trade, a fact that has not
changed since the first British colony was established at
Jamestown.

The immutable laws of physics limit the returns
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on air lift, making sea lift the most efficient means of
transporting goods over long distances.
The efficiency of sea lift is of great importance to
the United States, as most U.S. trading partners and many
necessary resources lie across the oceans.

Unlike the

continental states of Europe, the United States must look to
the sea for trade with nations other than Canada and Mexico.
In contrast to the maritime trading states of ancient Greece
or Persia, the United States must cross the two greatest
oceans in the world, the Atlantic and Pacific, in order to
deliver goods to other nations.

Merchant sea lift therefore

is an enduring requirement for the United States, and, as
observed by Mahan, the need for a Navy springs from the
existence of peaceful shipping.

The need for a Navy is an

equally enduring feature of American existence, a need
important enough to be called for by name in the
Constitution.
In addition to the protection of U.S. trade, the Navy
provides the means to defend the United States from attack.
By virtue of the freedom of movement enjoyed by ships at
sea, U.S. naval forces help to ensure that the fight,

if and

when it comes, will be conducted as far from the U.S.
homeland as possible.

Due to the need to watch over U.S.

maritime commerce, and to protect the United States itself,
forward presence has long been judged the best employment
for the Navy-Marine Corps team.
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Three strategic "hubs" warrant special attention in the
form of naval forward presence forces.

These are the

Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia.
Combining U.S. interests, crucial U.S. trading partners, and
clear threats to those interests and trading partners, these
three regions are the principal focus of U.S. naval
deployments.

Indicative of the importance of these regions

is the assignment of a numbered fleet to each: the Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf, and
the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific.
Threats to U.S. interests exist in two general forms.
The first is a peer or near-peer rival, such as the former
Soviet Union.

While the United States presently enjoys the

absence of any such peer threat, the status and health of
China and Russia bear watching, as either could develop
sufficient power and influence to challenge the United
States on a global scale.

The other type of threat, which

receives greater emphasis in the post-Cold War setting,
comes from the existence of "bad actors" in important
regions.

Saddam Hussein is merely the best-known of these

regional bad actors, each of whom has sufficient leverage
through proximity to U.S. interests to require U.S.
attention.

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are the clearest

regional threats, and are the basis for the two-MRC
requirement in U.S. defense planning.
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Each of the services has a role to play in protecting
U.S. interests, and each service has forces located around
the world to provide forward presence.

The Army has been

present in Korea since 1950, as have units of the Air Force.
The Army recently has taken position in Kuwait on a
permanent basis, with Air Force units deployed to several
Gulf nations.

And of course, both the Army and Air Force

have been key members of NATO for nearly fifty years.
While the deployment of Army and Air Force assets
provides valuable presence in support of U.S. interests, the
position on land of Army and Air Force personnel and
equipment means that the permission of a foreign nation must
be secured for their deployment.

Naval forces are free from

the political problems of deploying on another state's
territory, and have the additional advantage of easy
mobility.

Anywhere that there is salt water, the sea

services can operate in the protection of U.S. interests.
It is through the combination of mobility and freedom from
the permission of other states to come and go that naval
forces are superior to land-based forces in providing
presence.
When naval forces are present in a region, the United
States has available a wide range of options for influencing
events, protecting interests, and responding to emerging
crises.

Under the broad concept of naval diplomacy are such

activities as conventional deterrence, signaling U.S.
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interest in a region or state, providing support to allies,
employing limited military force, enforcing sanctions, and
protecting and enforcing freedom of the seas.
The wide range of actions that can be undertaken by
naval forces highlight the difference between forces that
are forward-based, such as Army units in Korea, and forces
that are forward-deployed.

Forward-based units usually are

positioned in a specific location to counter a specific
threat, and are not readily available to react to other
events.

Forward-deployed forces, on the other hand, can be

re-positioned to respond to events, and can move quickly
within a region, or even to another region, in support of
U.S. interests.
Forward presence forces also take part in two important
activities intended to maintain wartime readiness.

First,

forward presence forces are able to conduct joint training
and exercises with U.S. allies, which maintain combat skills
and interoperability.

Allied participation is a central

feature of U.S. planning, and allies must be interoperable
with U.S. forces to assist in wartime.

Second, by operating

in a region on a daily basis, forward presence forces
develop a good knowledge and understanding of conditions in
the region.

Local and regional intelligence, conditions

affecting sonar or radar, patterns of movement within the
region, geographic features of significance, the operational
patterns and tempo of potential adversaries--all can be
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monitored and updated by forces operating in the region.
Without current information on regional conditions, U.S.
forces would be at a disadvantage in wartime, a disadvantage
that could translate into increased casualties, a longer and
more difficult campaign, and even the inability to resolve a
crisis or conflict on favorable terms.

While some

conditions in a region can be monitored with space-based or
other surveillance assets, many local conditions require
forces on the scene for observation.
When crises arise in distant regions, naval forces are
capable of quick response, and of more flexible response
than land-based forces.

Naval forces require only the

orders of the National Command Authority to move into a
crisis area, making them largely immune to political,
religious, or other obstacles that frequently plague landbased forces.

Naval forces also can vary their position and

level of visibility, in contrast to land-based forces, and
can maintain a degree of ambiguity that can heighten an
adversary's apprehension.

In addition, naval forces can be

withdrawn or moved back from a crisis area with less
political impact than the removal of land-based forces.
One of the more frequent types of crisis in recent
years has been situations of violence, or impending
violence, that threaten the safety of U.S. citizens abroad.
Whether involving civil war, general anarchy, or even
natural disasters, these situations often require the
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ability to remove a large number of civilians quickly, and
may require military force to safeguard evacuees until they
are safely out of harm's way.

Known as non-combatant

evacuation operations, this activity has become a Marine
Corps specialty.
With the ability to move quickly from ships at sea to
locations on land, and able to bring along organic firepower
and air support when needed, the amphibious ready group has
proven itself invaluable in getting U.S. citizens out of
trouble in distant locations.

Capable of a wide variety of

special missions, the amphibious ready group provides the
means to place U.S. combat forces, with supporting
firepower, into a crisis area to conduct evacuations,
intelligence gathering, covert operations, or other shortof-war activities.

The ability to operate from

international waters allows such missions to be conducted
without restraint from other states' political leadership,
often a critical concern when time is a limiting factor.
If a crisis involves military aggression, it may be
necessary to respond with the deployment of U.S. military
power to fight a regional war, such as the 1990-91 Gulf War.
If U.S. Army and Air Force units are to deploy to a theater,
their arrival will depend on the ability of forward-deployed
forces to keep open the facilities needed by U.S. air and
sea lift.

An increasingly important aspect of keeping ports

and airfields open in the future will be ballistic missile
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defense.

Two Navy missile defense systems currently are in

development, and should enter service in the next decade.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Navy has
shifted its emphasis from the open ocean to the littorals,
focusing on projecting power ashore rather than blue water
operations.

Without a plausible threat to the movement of

U.S. ships on the high seas, and with the current national
security strategy's focus on regional threats, the shift to
a littoral focus is appropriate.

The only nations likely to

possess the means of challenging the Navy on the open
oceans, China and Russia, are many years, if not decades,
from being able to do so.

Thus the use of the Navy to

influence events ashore directly is a logical move.
With the shift from blue water to the littorals, the
Navy will need to re-assess its systems and capabilities for
the new environment.

Gone is the space buffer afforded by

the open ocean, where naval forces could maintain separation
from opposing forces.

The littoral typically is a very

crowded place, with a large volume of air and sea traffic.
Also, the need to provide greater support to Marine forces
is producing several new systems and capabilities, and
placing greater importance on some existing warfare areas.
The amphibious forces of the Navy-Marine Corps team are
undergoing significant change, as new systems begin to
replace aging Vietnam-era equipment.

The new LHD-1 Wasp-

class amphibious ships are great improvements over the LPH-1
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Iwo Jima-class ships, providing a very large flight deck,
large well deck, and carrying space for a large amount of
Marine Corps manpower and equipment.

It has even been

suggested that the Navy shift funds allocated for refitting
and overhauling the LHA-1 Tarawa-class ships to purchasing
more LHD-ls, a move that would appear to provide the
greatest return on the Navy's investment.
The Marines are preparing to take delivery of two very
important systems, each providing a tremendous improvement
in amphibious capability over its predecessor.

The AAAV

amphibious vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
will provide great increases in the speed with which Marine
forces can be put ashore, as well as the distance from which
Marine landings can be launched.

These increases in range

and speed are highly important in the context of the
Marines' Operational Maneuver From The Sea concept.
In order to provide greater support for Marine forces
ashore, the Navy is improving its shore bombardment
capability, a mission that has suffered for many years from
an inadequate weapon, the 5-inch gun.

Possessing only

thirteen-mile range, the 5-inch gun is no longer suitable
for Marine Corps operations that will attempt to avoid
defended landing areas, instead maneuvering directly against
enemy centers of gravity that may be many miles inland.
Through modifications to the gun and shell, and the
incorporation of GPS guidance, the new ERGM shell will allow
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supporting fires at ranges up to sixty-three miles.

The

VGAS system, intended for installation on the nextgeneration surface combatant, may extend this range out to
one hundred miles.
Naval aviation, including both aircraft carriers and
their embarked aircraft, is at a critical transition point
between the present and the future.

Existing aircraft

carriers are seen by many as too large, too expensive, too
vulnerable, and unnecessary in the post-Cold War setting.
With advances in RPVs, the lack of a threat requiring air
power on the open ocean, and the emergence of the AEF
concept in the Air Force, carriers often are labeled as Cold
War relics, the most expensive method possible for putting a
bomb on a target.

Although undoubtedly expensive to

purchase and operate, carriers bring much more than bombdropping capability to U.S. commanders.

Carrier air wings

are capable of a multitude of missions, all of which can be
conducted independent of host nation permission, a feature
commonly overlooked by carrier critics.

Carriers have no

peer when it comes to providing presence, and will remain a
necessity as long as tactical air power remains a necessity.
The centerpiece of the Navy's carrier air wings in the
next decade will be the FA-18E/F Super Hornet, an enlarged
version of the existing FA-18C/D.

Intended to replace the

A-6E in the strike role and the F-14 in the fighterinterceptor role, the Super Hornet is a throwback to the
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days of the F-4 Phantom, an outstanding multi-mission,
multi-service aircraft in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, the

Super Hornet also entails some risk for the Navy, as it is
intended to serve only until the Joint Strike Fighter enters
service.

If the Joint Strike Fighter program is delayed for

any length of time, the age of the FA-18 program could
become a liability, forcing carrier air wings to deploy with
what is essentially an early 1970s design.

Nonetheless, the

first production Super Hornets have been delivered to the
Navy, and should enter squadron service early in the next
decade.
Three specific mission areas will be of greatly
increased importance for the Navy's littoral strategy.

Mine

countermeasures, neglected for many years as irrelevant to
the Cold War scenario of a mid-ocean battle against the
Soviets, have been given renewed emphasis in recent years.
Mines are one of the most cost-effective of naval weapons,
potentially allowing a state with no naval forces to defend
against even a superpower navy.

With the littoral strategy

calling for operations near the shore, the ability to
detect, locate, and neutralize mines is of tremendous
importance, and must be improved over current levels.
Anti-submarine warfare likewise must be improved if the
Navy-Marine Corps team is to operate in the littoral areas
of the world.

While a mere ten years have passed since the

Navy of Ronald Reagan raised ASW to an art form, the recent
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lack of emphasis on ASW training and modernization has led
to much atrophy in this critical mission area.

Even old

diesel submarines, operated by poorly-trained crews, cannot
be ignored when U.S. naval forces operate in littoral areas,
requiring that urgent attention be given to this area of
naval warfighting.

An emerging mission area will be of paramount
importance in the new international environment.

Ballistic

missile defense was demonstrated as a necessary capability
in 1991, when Iraq used "militarily insignificant" SCUD
missiles as strategic political weapons, attempting to draw
Israel into the Gulf War in order to splinter the coalition.
If used to deliver NBC warheads, ballistic missiles could
render facilities useless, lead to massive U.S. casualties,
and coerce U.S. allies into remaining neutral in a crisis.
Thus the two Navy missile defense programs, Navy Area and
Navy Theater Wide, must continue to receive the full
attention and support of naval leaders.
A related capability of great importance is NBC
defense, detection, and decontamination.

Chemical and

biological weapons in particular have emerged in recent
years as a kind of "poor man's nuclear weapon," allowing
small states to employ military and political leverage
similar to that of nuclear weapons at a fraction of the
cost.

Inexpensive and relatively easy to produce, chemical

weapons are known to exist in many regional arsenals, and
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biological weapons are suspected to be nearly as widespread
as chemical.

Both chemical and biological weapons,

delivered by ballistic missiles, could make it impossible
for U.S. air power and sea lift to utilize regional
facilities, possibly preventing the United States from being
able to deploy into a theater.
Two equally dubious mindsets concerning chemical and
biological weapons seem to prevail among many service
leaders and planners.

The first is that U.S. nuclear

weapons will deter the use of chemical or biological weapons
in a regional conflict, an assumption based on the Cold War
deterrence model of mutually assured destruction.

The

second assumption is that, if chemical or biological weapons
are used, their impact will be marginal and U.S. forces will
suffer little loss of combat capability.

Both assumptions

are contradicted by existing Red Team analyses, by the
different nature of potential regional regimes to be
deterred, and by the lack of adequate detection and
decontamination equipment and procedures among the services.
While all of the services are addressing NBC defense and
protection, it may take a chemical or biological "Pearl
Harbor" to drive home the effectiveness of these weapons.
Finally, a new vision of warfighting for the twentyfirst century is being developed by the Navy.

Known as

Network-Centric Warfare, the concept will be an important
improvement in situational awareness, speed of command, and
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engagement capability.

Through the sharing of information

in real time, the networking of sensors and shooters, and
several automated command and control processes, NetworkCentric Warfare should improve the combat capabilities of
Navy-Marine task forces operating in the littorals, where
events are likely to develop more quickly, and with less
warning, than on the open ocean.
Cooperative Engagement Capability, the first
operational component of Network-Centric Warfare, has been
tested successfully on several occasions, and is likely to
be approved for installation in the fleet in 1999.

Allowing

any networked platform with appropriate weapons to engage an
air or missile target, without having to track the target
independently, CEC should improve greatly the ability of
U.S. naval forces to defend themselves against aircraft,
cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
While forward presence has been the chosen military
posture of the United States since World War Two, the end of
the bi-polar Cold War setting has led many defense planners
and analysts to question whether forward presence is
appropriate for the new international setting.

The lack of

a world peer, on the order of the old Soviet Union, combined
with the United States' unchallenged position as the
military and economic superpower of the world, has produced
several calls for changing the national security strategy
employed by the United States.
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One proposed alternative is to maintain the structure
and mission capabilities of the military, but reduce the
overall size of the military and station most forces in
CONUS.

By retaining the ability to deploy overseas in a

crisis, and threatening to punish any attacks on U.S.
interests, the pull-back strategy is an attempt to maintain
great power status without exerting great power effort.

The

flaws of such a strategy are obvious.
First, U.S. strategy would rest largely on deterrence,
as the forces needed to defend U.S. interests would be
located far from those interests.
fails

Secondly, when deterrence

(as it should be expected to do), the U.S. response

would be reactive, only able to address conditions after the
fact.

Quick-grab strategies thus would be encouraged among

regional powers, who might judge that U.S. deployment was
not credible to protect a less-than-vital U.S. interest.
Third, the deployment of U.S. forces to a distant region
could become a logistical problem too great to overcome,
forcing the U.S. leadership to re-assess the choice of
deploying at all.

Thus the pull-back strategy is not viable

for U.S. national security in the post-Cold War setting.
The second alternative is to return U.S. forces to
CONUS, and rely on global air power and space surveillance
to monitor and regulate events surrounding U.S. interests.
Based on belief in RMA technologies and the long-standing
doctrine of air power according to Billy Mitchell, air power
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and space surveillance would replace physical presence with
virtual presence, allowing a much smaller military to
protect U.S. interests abroad.
While the B-2 bomber and emerging smart and brilliant
weapons should provide a large improvement in U.S.
warfighting capability, there is no basis in fact or corrunon
sense for believing that presence can exist through CONUSbased air power alone.

The most serious flaw in the virtual

presence concept is that it is wrongly applied to peacetime
presence operations, in which visibility and sustainability
are key.

Virtual presence is more suitable for wartime

operations, where stealth aircraft have proven their worth.
However, by limiting U.S. options to accepting an
adversary's actions or conducing a bombing campaign, virtual
presence is wholly unsatisfactory as a peacetime presence
strategy.
The third alternative is a return to the isolationism
of the 1920s and 1930s.

As there is no credible threat to

the U.S. homeland, the forces of the United States should be
brought home, and the United States should withdraw from
world events.

Based on the belief that what other states do

and how they interact is their own business, and placing
faith in fair market practices to ensure the availability of
oil and resources, isolationism observes few if any U.S.
interests besides the safety of U.S. citizens, territory,
and democratic government.
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Although isolationism perhaps resonates with the belief
of many individuals in the philosophy of "live and let
live," it is not appropriate for the interaction of nations,
where no common understanding of acceptable norms or
restraint on misbehavior exist.

Events outside the United

States do affect our safety and prosperity, a fact of life
since the late 1940s, when the U.S. became a net energy
importer.

When combined with our economic dependence on the

health of foreign economies, and the dependence of all
modern industrial states on oil, the Persian Gulf by itself
is sufficient to invalidate an isolationist posture.
The need for forward presence forces will continue in
the post-Cold War world, just as it existed during the Cold
War.

w.hile the threat has changed, and become perhaps more

uncertain in its nature, the need to maintain U.S. military
power in proximity to national interests is a lasting
requirement in U.S. national security.

Where the threat is

well-defined and capable of striking out with little
warning, as in Iraq or North Korea, land-based ground and
air forces are appropriate for maintaining presence and
defensive capability.
For dealing with the current uncertainty in the origin
and location of threats to U.S. interests, however, landbased forces are at a distinct disadvantage.

Forced to take

position on the sovereign territory of another state,

land-

based forces must overcome political obstacles to their
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deployment, political restraint on their freedom of action,
and the political impact that their withdrawal might cause
in the eyes of U.S. allies.

While very valuable, indeed

invaluable, towards the wartime end of the spectrum of
operations, land-based forces are much less valuable in the
peacetime presence operations, intended to hedge against
uncertain threats, that comprise the great majority of U.S.
military action abroad.
Naval forces, through their historical characteristics
of global mobility and freedom of access in international
waters, are the most useful in meeting uncertain threats,
and of sustaining U.S. power near national interests.

With

over fifty years' experience in at-sea replenishment and
logistical support, U.S. naval forces can take station in
any of the world's seas, and maintain station for weeks or
months, even years through the rotation of ships and battle
groups.

This is presence--the permanent occupation of
strategically important positions near U.S. interests,

free

to take any necessary action, subject only to the orders of
the National Corrunand Authority.

With combat power, organic

logistics, and command and control capability already
present in underway battlegroups, deployed naval forces are
essentially at full wartime readiness all the time, and can
respond instantly to emerging crises.

Naval forces offer

the NCA a full range of options in crisis response, ranging
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from non-combatant evacuations to limited military
operations to wartime strikes.

Operating in all mediums--on

land, on and under the sea, in the air, and increasingly in
space--naval forces are likely to possess the means of
responding to any crisis that may occur in the littorals of
the world.
While the international environment has changed
dramatically with the demise of the Soviet Union, the
fundamental need for sea power in U.S. security has not
changed.

Barring a truly revolutionary change in the laws

of physics and aerodynamics as we understand them today, sea
power will remain a constant necessity for the United
States, regardless of the presence or absence of a peerlevel threat.

Through the continued deployment of U.S.

naval forces to vital regions of the world, and through the
ceaseless vigilance of U.S. naval forces in protecting U.S.
national interests, the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue
to be
.a safeguard unto the United States
of America, and a security for such as
pass on the seas upon their lawful
occasions.
--Book of Common Prayer;
Prayer for the Navy
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follow-on counteroffensive may not be necessary. A
ground war becomes an option rather than an
inevitability. 557
Air and space power thus maintain presence in distant
regions of the world through the knowledge among other
governments that U.S. airplanes could arrive within days or
hours to punish aggressive acts. 558

With PGMs and global

reach, U.S. air power by itself can deter aggression, and
defend U.S. interests if deterrence fails:
That ability [to regain the initiative in a crisis]
may be derived from strikes at global range on short
notice with devastating intensity and accuracy .
. . . Global attack and precision strike are thus key
to the U.S. national security posture.559
General McPeak, addressing the fact that the
adversary's perception is what matters in deterrence, has
stated that regional actors will recognize the global reach
of U.S. bombers and the continual presence of U.S.

557 Major General (Retired) Charles Link, USAF, quoted
in James Kitfield, "To Halt An Enemy," Air Force Magazine
(January 1998): 65.
558Tirpak, "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower," 22:
"The USAF's B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H bombers, from a cold start
at their home bases in the ·continental United States, could
attack virtually anywhere on Earth in 18 hours . . . could
destroy hundreds of armored targets on a single pass, would
be able to stop an enemy column on the march." See also
Glenn Goodman, "The Power Of Information," Armed Forces
Journal International (July 1995): 24: "In most instances,
information, combined with forces that can rapidly respond
with the right mix of capabilities, can achieve U.S. goals."
559Jeffrey Jackson, "Global Attack and Precision
Strike," in Goure and Szara, Air and Space Power in the
Millennium, 106.
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New

satellites, and that, "air and space forces provide global
presence, not a localized presence."5 6 0
Additional advantages gained through long-range air
power and PGMs include safety from attack on the bases
supporting long-range bombers, which can be located far from
a theater, and the reduction by several orders of magnitude
of the number of U.S. servicemen put at risk.

By providing

the means to, "conduct relatively risk-free counterforce
strikes" against enemy NBC facilities, and through exposing
fewer servicemen to enemy fire, long-range air power is
advanced as the safest and most economical means of applying
U.S. combat power.561
Under a virtual presence strategy, the Air Force would
be the mainstay of U.S. military power.

Long-range bombers

would be required in much larger numbers than the 187 called
for in the

ouadrennial Defense Review, while tactical

fighters would be needed in smaller numbers.

The B-2 in

particular would be needed in larger numbers, perhaps as
many as 100.

With higher production expected to bring down

B-2 unit cost by as much as two-thirds, from around 2.2
billion dollars to 865 million dollars per aircraft, a
larger B-2 fleet would be affordable within the overall

S60canan, "McPeak Sums It Up,'' 34; John Correll, "Let's
You and Him Fight," Air Force Magazine (June 1994): 4.
561Horner, "What We Should Have Learned," 54, 55.
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defense budget as other systems were cut back. 562

Aerial

re-fueling and air lift assets would be needed in large
numbers, to allow aerial re-fueling of bombers and to get
AEF supplies and personnel into a theater quickly.
Space assets would be of equal importance to aircraft,
and could justify the establishment of an Air Force space
corps, or even an independent Space Force.

The ability to

defend U.S. satellites from attack, and to attack and
neutralize other nations' space assets, likely would be
prominent features of a virtual presence strategy.5 6 3
Although U.S. space surveillance capability is very high
today, it is posited that even greater improvements would
need to be made in order to achieve the kind of global
awareness described in the virtual presence strategy.
The Navy likely would be sized and structured very much
as under the pull-back strategy.

Needing only to keep the

military SLOCs open for transporting Army equipment and
supplies to a distant theater, ASW, MCM, and AAW would be
the primary features of the Navy.
The Army would be reduced to perhaps as few as five
divisions, with the armored divisions' heavy gear stored

56 2At the original number of 132 B-2 bombers, the unit
cost was expected to be 480 million dollars. Producing 100
would have cost 865 million per plane, while the current
force of twenty-one aircraft will cost over two billion
dollars each. See Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 72.
563 Friedman, The Future of War, 363-366.
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mainly aboard prepositioning ships.

Two light divisions

would be structured for rapid air deployment.

The principal

function of Army units would be to provide air defenses for
Air Force bases, and to stand by for whatever ground combat
remained to be conducted after U.S. air power had been
applied to the enemy.
What are the faults of the virtual presence strategy?
As the pull-back strategy did, the virtual presence strategy
employs many valid arguments in creating the larger argument
for presence through long-range air power.

The B-2, for

example, no doubt is an aeronautical and military marvel of
high-technology systems.

PGMs have indeed performed much

better than iron bombs, as much as twelve times better
according to various studies.56 4

And air power does offer a

means to minimize the number of U.S. servicemen placed at
risk in applying military force.

Do the individual

arguments in favor of virtual presence support the larger
claim, that virtual presence can and should replace physical
preseqce?

Again the answer must be "no."

Just as the pull-

back strategy's arguments ultimately are unconvincing, so
too does the virtual presence strategy fail to convince in
the end.

564 Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 18, cites the Gulf
War Air Power Survey in claiming that PGMs enjoyed twelve
times better kill ratios than iron bombs.
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The one overwhelming flaw in the virtual presence
concept is the incorrect belief that the ability to kill any
target on earth, at any time and from any distance--if
possible at all, a dubious assumption to begin with--is the
same as providing presence. 56 5

While such a capability may

well be invaluable in a future war, the belief that global
reach and global strike capability is synonymous with
presence is a gross conceptual error.566

The kinds of

strikes portrayed by virtual presence advocates--stopping
three armored brigades on the march with PGMs--are wartime
missions.

Presence is the peacetime employment of military

forces to influence others across a full range of actions
and across the spectrum of violence.

Thus claiming that

global air power can provide presence is to argue apples and
oranges.
Bombers, especially the B-2 bomber, are unique in their
ability to deliver a large amount of destructive force, over
a great distance and in a short time.
are largely one-dimensional.

However, bombers also

The only option afforded to a

commander by available bombers is to put bombs on a

565wode, "Beyond Bombers and Carriers," 29.
56 6 DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 77; Mauz,
"The Value of Being There," 27: "To be sure, bombers have a
role in conflict, and they also contribute to deterrence,
but their contribution to overseas presence is limited and
to suggest that they can compare to naval forces is
nonsense."
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target.5 6 7

Unless the situation calls for a destructive

strike on some target, bombers provide little value.
The analogy often used is that air power is either "on
or off", with no ability to move up or down the spectrum of
activity.

For example, during the entire period during the

1980s when U.S. forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf,
attempting to safeguard Saudi and Kuwaiti oil shipments
during the Iran-Iraq war, not a single strike mission was
flown in the theater. 5 68

There were no instances in which

the United States could justify turning bomber air power
"on", so it was a non-factor.
In crisis response the same limitation applies.

How

would B-2 bombers have resolved the crisis at the U.S.
embassy in Somalia in 1991?

How would bombers go about

monitoring and intercepting Iraqi oil smuggling?

Unless the

crisis calls for the destruction of a certain target set,
bombers are likely to be of little or no value to U.S.
commanders.569

Since presence more often than not involves

567Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument," 10.
568 navid Perin, comparing Long-Range Bombers and the
Carrier Force (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
1994), 9.
569Appendix A, Table 11 and Table 12, compare the
utility of bombers and carrier battle groups in peacetime
crisis response. As shown in these illustrations, unless the
crisis calls for strike missions, bombers will have very
limited ability to contribute.
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less-than-war activities, a platform whose only mission is
destructive cannot be viewed as a suitable means of
providing presence.
While air power advocates may claim that bombers'
military capabilities will produce a deterrent effect, and
that this deterrent effect should operate on regional actors
in the same manner as presence forces, history does not
support this argument.

The B-36 bomber offers a near-exact

parallel to the current B-2 theory of global air power.

The

B-36 was claimed to be capable of attacking any location on
earth quickly, from bases beyond the reach of enemy weapons,
and so would be able to influence events and protect U.S.
interests.

Alas, the Korean War proved otherwise,

just as

Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait, and to stay
there after receiving demands from the U.N. that he leave,
came in the face of truly global U.S. air power.570
Deterrence depends, as always, on the adversary's
perception to be successful.5 7 1

For an adversary with

first-rate intelligence gathering capability, able to
identify and analyze the range of U.S. capabilities, and to
extrapolate the damage likely to be done if those
capabilities are unleashed, a non-visible bomber force may
serve to deter.

However, for less sophisticated actors,

570Johnson, "Carries Are Forward Presence," 39.
571 siegel,

To Deter. compel, and Reassure, 3.
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such as most regional states, visibility remains at the
heart of deterrence, and bombers are poorly-suited to
providing and maintaining visibility.5 72
A further serious flaw in the virtual presence paradigm
is that the historical model that serves as the basis for
many air power claims--the Gulf War--had conditions so
unique as to be highly unlikely to repeat themselves in the
future.

Thus air power may not be applicable, or at least

may not be decisive, in future conflicts.

Even the

perception of the Gulf War has changed over the last eight
years in regard to air power, with many now believing that
air power was not as effective as portrayed at the time. 5 73
Unless a future conflict involves desert terrain,
largely immobile armored forces without any significant air
defenses, a six-month period in which to build up logistics
and gather intelligence, an enemy command and control
structure that has been decapitated at the outset and never
re-established, the withholding of enemy CBW capability, and
no possibility of U.S. space assets being interfered with,
it is unlikely that air power would enjoy the complete

572 colin Gray, Explorations In Strategy (Westport,
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), 75: "Sustained local presence
in the air typically is physically impracticable." Dietz,
"Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," 112.
5 73 Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First
Century," 186.
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freedom of operation experienced in 1991.

Marine Corps

General Paul Van Riper states the matter clearly:
If we're looking to repeat Desert Storm, then I have
little problem with the Air Force argument . . . What
we have are a lot of buzzwords floating around
associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs
. . . It's ludicrous to suggest that such concepts as
'information dominance' will now somehow make all the
military doctrine that came before it irrelevant.5 7 4
In addition, it is likely that even the B-2 would need
a fighter escort when operating in daylight.

While enemies

may not know when or from which direction a B-2 is
approaching, they can defend likely targets and rely on
visual detection in daytime.

If the B-2 can be seen it

becomes a slow, vulnerable target.

Also, it is not

inconceivable that an enemy undergoing an RMA of its own
might field the means to triangulate the B-2's targeting
radar signal in real time, allowing fighters to intercept
incoming B-2s.5 7 5

Finally, given current U.S. research into

radars capable of defeating stealth, it is reasonable to
assume that others are working on the same problem.

If

another nation were able to solve this technical problem, it
is possible that the B-2 could lose its greatest asset. 576

574Kitfield, "To Halt an Enemy," 63.
575 0 1 Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops
Home?" 80.
576oavid Fulghum, "New Radars Peel Veil From Hidden
Targets," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 January 1999,
58.
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Thus there is reason to doubt the B-2's continued ability to
operate with impunity from air defenses.
The AEF concept that supplements global bombers also is
based on questionable assumptions.

In particular, General

Jumper's belief that ballistic missiles and chemical weapons
pose no threat to AEF operations is difficult to reconcile
with different war games and Red Team studies:
With a few SCUDs, can you take out an airfield? No,
you cannot. You can contaminate with chemical
weapons, but that is what we practice for . . . . All
services have practiced doing these sorts of
things. 577
Alternatives to highly corrosive decontaminants are
needed. Current decontaminants leave a corrosive
residue on equipment, buildings, vehicles, etc.,
which impedes combat and support operations and thus
threatens mission accomplishment. The services have
no effective means to decontaminate aircraft that
have been contaminated by toxic agents or materials
without taking the aircraft out of service for a long
period or damaging key aircraft components.578
While military casualties would likely be low, there
are no good options for today's theater airbase
commander if the enemy is able to continuously
restrike/recontaminate his facility . . . . Over time
casualties will increase and efficiency will drop,
with the anticipated disastrous effects on sortie
generation and airlift throughput.57 9

577"0perating Abroad," 28-29.
578 The Impact of Nuclear. Biological, and Chemical

Proliferation on

u.s.

Armed Forces, 14.

579 weaver and Glaes, InvitinQ Disaster, 45.
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Access to bases may be no more secure in peacetime,
when the United States may wish to engage in less-than-war
operations.

Again, it is peacetime operations, not wartime

strikes, that comprise the great majority of presence
missions, and even close allies may hesitate to provide
unrestricted access to their facilities for U.S. planes. 5 80
As capable as U.S. land-based tactical air power may be, the
AEF concept is totally dependent on access to someone else's
facilities to be viable.581
From the weaknesses described here, it is clear that
virtual presence is no more realistic an alternative for
protecting U.S. interests than the pull-back strategy.

In

fact, the term "virtual presence" is a misnomer, as the
concept does not qualify as a peacetime presence strategy at
all, but rather as a high-tech RMA warfighting strategy.
Since the only response available to U.S. leaders under a
virtual presence strategy would be to order bombs dropped on
various targets, in attempting to resolve a crisis the
United States would be forced to choose between accepting an
undesired action, or employing destructive force via air
power to correct the situation, with no intermediate actions
available to U.S. leaders.

580Goodman, "Virtual Overseas Presence," 12.
581 Perry et al.,
strateqic Era, 56.
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In many, indeed in most peacetime presence scenarios,
putting bombs on a target simply does not suffice as an
appropriate, effective solution.

General Krulak makes the

point clearly: "I don't care what anyone says, you're not
going to manage instability in the Persian Gulf, the Indian
Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean from 60,000 feet overhead." 5 82
While global strike capability should be developed for use
in wartime, when the advantages provided by long-range,
stealthy aircraft delivering PGMs clearly would be of great
value, the position that global air power and global strike
capability can allow virtual presence to replace forward
presence has little if any credibility.
Return to an Isolationist Security Policy

A third alternative strategy for U.S. national
security, one that has enjoyed some support in recent years,
is a return to the kind of isolationist policy followed by
the United States between the World Wars.

By focusing only

on the defense of U.S. citizens and territory, an
isolationist policy forgoes even the pretense of protecting
U.S. interests abroad.

By definition, in an isolationist

context the United States has no interests abroad that
require protection.

Isolationism therefore is not in the

same category as the pull-back strategy or the virtual

582Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 13.
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presence strategy, both of which are claimed to be methods
of protecting U.S. interests abroad, but nonetheless is an
alternative strategy for U.S. national security.
The central tenet of an isolationist policy is the
belief that events outside the United States need not
concern us.

For some isolationists this belief comes from

the United States' position of unchallenged power in the
post-Cold War world.

In this regard, the isolationist

strategy can be viewed as the ultimate extension of the
pull-back strategy, with no crisis justifying the deployment
of U.S. forces.

For others, isolationism springs from the

belief that the United States should mind its own business
in the world, and demand the same treatment from other
states.

As long as other states do not threaten U.S.

citizens or territory, they will not be bothered by the
United States.

For whatever reasons, isolationists share

the same guiding principle: the United States should not
extend its influence or power beyond its own borders.
Struggles for power within different regions, possibly
involving open war between rival states, are not expected to
disappear in the future.

For isolationists, however, these

regional disputes do not threaten U.S. safety and security,
and should be ignored. 583

As long as the effects of

regional wars do not spill over onto U.S. territory, which

583Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81.
306

seems unlikely as only Canada and Mexico border on the
United States, regional wars are of no importance to the
United States.584
Similarly, the desire to spread democracy abroad is an
inappropriate goal for the United States, and should not be
attempted.

Certainly we support democratic ideals and offer

an example to others of democracy's benefits, but how other
states choose to rule themselves should be none of our
concern.

If others are oppressed by brutal dictatorships,

or if lawless anarchy reigns in a distant region, it is for
the people living there to correct, not the United
States. 585
The vital interests of the United States would amount
to only three requirements: the safety of U.S. citizens, the
integrity of U.S. territory, and the independence of the
U.S. political process.

In regard to overseas interests, at

most the United States should take some interest in and
encourage a balance of power within different regions. 586
Another argument often cited in making the isolationist
case, and indeed one heard for many years before the end of

S84Earl Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," Foreign

Policy (Winter 1990-1991): 7-8.
585Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
81.

5S6Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15.
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the Cold War, is that other states, particularly the
affluent states of Europe and Asia, should provide for their
own defense, allowing U.S. troops and support to be
withdrawn.587

For example, South Korea has twice the

population of North Korea, and an economy nearly an order of
magnitude larger than North Korea's.

South Korea thus

should not need American assistance in defending itself,
certainly not assistance on the order of an entire U.S. Army
division and supporting air assets. 5 8 8

An isolationist

policy would force U.S. allies to ''carry the load" for their
own defense by withdrawing U.S. protection.589
An important point to be noted is that isolationists
would not sever commercial interaction along with military
support in withdrawing from the world.590

U.S. overseas

trade would continue as ever, since it would be in the best
interest of overseas nations, even those hostile or less
than friendly to the United States, to continue to have
economic interaction:
The restraint we propose should not be misdescribed
as a total withdrawal from the world. On the
587 Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence; Status.
Prospects, 19.
588Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
80.
589 Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 210.
590Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81.
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contrary, we believe in a vigorous trade with other
nations and the thriving corrunerce of ideas. Military
restraint need not, and will not, bring economic
protectionism. 591
Even that most strategic of resources, oil, should not
require United States military forces to be deployed
overseas.

Instead, the United States could depend on market

forces to maintain the price of oil, and to ensure the
availability of the huge amounts of oil required for world
economies.

Some possible benefits of this course of action

might be to prompt the U.S. population and government to
lower their demand and dependence on oil, and to promote the
development of useful alternatives to fossil fuels. 592

Even

if Saudi and Kuwaiti oilfields came into the possession of
Iraq or Iran, their oil still would be available on the
world market, as the oil would have no value unless sold,
and market forces again would serve to prevent artificial
manipulation of the oil market.593
The armed forces required by the United States would be
highly capable, but very small and structured for defense,
not power projection.

Accordingly, ballistic missile

defense and the strategic nuclear forces would be of
paramount importance.594

Space systems and high technology

591 Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 200.
5 92 Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 9.

59 3Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 220.
S94Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
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surveillance and strike systems also would be important,
possibly requiring the establishment of a separate Space
Force.595
The conventional forces would make maximum use of high
technology as a force multiplier, an effort made easier by
the United States' technological lead over other nations.
With better technology and a defensive posture, the services
could be reduced to as few as six ground divisions, ten or
eleven Air Force wings, and as few as one hundred ships. 59 6
By withdrawing to CONUS, the requirements placed on the
military would be streamlined greatly.

The services would

need only to defend CONUS and the sea and air approaches, to
retain strong retaliatory nuclear forces,

and to employ

those retaliatory forces along with missile defenses in
order to deter NBC attack.5 97

The rest of the world could

be left alone, with regional affairs and events taking care
of themselves.
The problem, and the reason that isolationism is not a
viable strategy for the United States, is that the world

80.
59 5Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,"81.
596 Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third,"
80; Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 17.
597 Perla et al., Future Sea-Based Aviation, 55;
Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15.
310

does not take care of itself, at least not peacefully and in
ways that will be favorable to the United States.

If the

five thousand-plus years of written history are any guide,
there will always be states and entities with hostile
ambitions, bent on taking by force what others possess:
The world does not sort itself out on its own . .
International stability is never a given. It is never
the norm. When achieved, it is the product of selfconscious action by the great powers, and most
particularly of the greatest power, which now and for
the foreseeable future is the United States. If
America wants stability, it will have to create it .
. . . There will constantly be new threats disturbing
our peace. 598
While isolationism might have been sufficient in the
early nineteenth century, when all of America's resource
requirements could be met domestically and the British Navy
served to safeguard trade on the high seas, today and in the
future isolationism cannot be seen as a credible choice for
U.S. national security.

As elaborated in Chapter II, the

United States has interests in nearly every region of the
world.

Only the most narrowly defined interests of safety

and security reside within the borders of the United States.
Whether or not this should be the case is immaterial: it is
the case, and U.S. strategy must deal with what is, not with
what we might like to be.

598charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in
Allison and Treverton, Rethinking America's Security, 301302.
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If Texas and Alaska could provide our oil demands, and
if Canada and Mexico could satisfy our import and export
markets, an isolationist strategy would be viable, if not
necessarily appropriate.

However, the reality is that we do

have interests overseas, there are threats to those
interests, and we cannot protect our interests by
withdrawing into isolation.599
The results of adopting an isolationist strategy might
be slow to manifest themselves, especially in the current
international setting.

The U.S. position of unrivaled power

could allow the United States to muddle along in isolation
for several years, even a decade or more, before being
forced to address a situation that had become threatening to
U.S. interests.600
History, on the other hand, suggests that the United
States would experience a rapid rise in misbehavior
worldwide, which would impinge on U.S. interests sooner
rather than later.

Regional bullies should be expected to

push hard against the envelope of U.S. tolerance, and to
threaten, either directly or indirectly, the safety and
security of the United States.

Charles Krauthammer, in a

remarkable critique of recent U.S. foreign policy, explains
why this is so:
599 Johnsen,
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The basic difference between the international system
and domestic society is that in domestic society
there exists a monopoly of the means of coercion, an
enforcer, a sovereign. There is generally also a
preexisting community of norms.
Neither of these conditions obtains in the
international arena . . . . And, in any social system,
whether of individuals or nation-states, where there
is no enforcer, there can be no real law. 60 1
The years between World War One and World War Two
provide the clearest example of the perils of isolationism
for the United States.

Convinced after World War One that

the best way to avoid another destructive war was to
withdraw from the world, the United States practiced a
determined isolationism right up until the 7th of December,
1941.602

Ignoring the threat to Europe posed by Hitlerian

Germany, and the threat to Asia posed by a militant Japan,
the United States surrendered the initiative in world
events. 6 03

When the United States could no longer ignore

the outside world, after isolationism had been forcibly
refuted by the Japanese carrier task force at Pearl Harbor,
four years of tremendous effort and cost were required to
restore U.S. security.

There is no reason to think that
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today's world will order itself any more peaceably than the
world of eighty years ago.
Summary

The current U.S. strategy of power projection through
forward presence is grounded in the experience of the past
and the logical security requirements of the future.

As

with any strategy, alternatives to forward presence exist,
and have been argued forcefully by various authors.

While

championed by thoughtful and well-intentioned persons, the
alternatives presented in this chapter cannot be judged
acceptable in replacing forward presence in U.S. security
strategy.
The first alternative strategy, the pull-back strategy,
can be seen as an attempt to enjoy great power status
without exerting great power effort in the world.

While

maintaining a military similar in structure and capabilities
to the current force, although significantly smaller, the
pull-back strategy would not maintain that force near U.S.
interests, counting instead on the deterrent threat of U.S.
forces to protect interests.

With RMA systems making up for

the reduced size and physical absence of the U.S. military,
U.S. forces could respond from CONUS to any act that
threatened U.S. interests, and overwhelm any opponent
through technological superiority.

Arguments also are made

that the United States can no longer justify the cost of a
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large forward presence military, as no plausible threats
exist to U.S. security.
The pull-back strategy may also be viewed as a reversal
of the "world policeman" role taken on by the United States
since the end of the Cold War.

Since there is no plausible

threat to U.S. safety, domestic interests should take
priority over international affairs, obviating the need for
deploying military force all over the world.
Despite the logic of many pull-back arguments when
viewed in isolation, the whole turns out to be less than the
sum of the parts.

The most obvious flaw in the pull-back

strategy is its total reliance on deterrence to defend U.S.
interests, and the strictly reactive nature of a CONUS-based
military.

If deterrence fails, no defensive options are

likely to exist, a condition virtually certain to encourage
regional bullies and bad actors to contemplate fait accompli
strategies.
None of the intermediate steps afforded by naval
forward presence and naval diplomacy would be available,
forcing the United States to accept an aggressor's actions
or deploy overseas to fight a regional war.

The cost of

deployment could exceed the loss involved in accepting the
new conditions, making it more likely that aggressors would
be able to keep their gains.

If the decision was made to

deploy, U.S. allies would lack interoperability with U.S.
forces, making those allies' contribution less effective.
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Finally, there is reason to be skeptical about the
RMA's ability to solve any strategic problem through
technology.

The substitution of technology for strategy is

one of the pitfalls of buying into the RMA school of
thought, and should be avoided in all cases.

Technology is

important in U.S. security and military strategy, but
technology cannot become strategy.
The second alternative described in this chapter, the
use of global air power to produce virtual presence, is
miscast by its advocates as a means of defending U.S.
interests abroad.

While possibly a potent warfighting

concept, virtual presence through global air power in no way
can substitute for the physical presence of naval forces in
protecting U.S. interests, a role that mostly involves
peacetime activities.
Supported by such Air Force luminaries as former Chief
of Staff McPeak, virtual presence envisions the growth of
space surveillance and long-range air power into an
omnipresent force, able to see and stop any misbehavior, in
any location, at any time and in time to be effective.

The

B-2 bomber, probably the most advanced system in the U.S.
military, is held up as the means to stop or correct any
threat to U.S. interests.

By raining PGMs on adversary

forces, if necessary from bases in CONUS, the B-2 and
supporting air expeditionary forces can prevent enemy plans
from succeeding, thereby protecting U.S. interests.
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Presumably adversaries will recognize the iron logic of U.S.
strategy and refrain from challenging U.S. air power.
Virtual presence is better-suited as a wartime
strategy, when the ability to destroy targets from great
distance, with highly accurate and lethal PGMs, would be
very valuable.

Even in this context, however, there is

reason to doubt that the virtual presence strategy is
sufficient by itself, without the need for Army or Navy
forces to take part.

Ironically, the B-2 is stealthy in

inverse proportion to the technological level of the sensor
it is attempting to evade.

Able largely to avoid detection

by radar or infrared systems, it is as visible to the naked
eye as any other aircraft, making it highly vulnerable in
daytime.

Thus the B-2 would need either to operate only at

night, probably not an option in a fast-moving ground war,
or to have an escort of short-range fighters.

The

limitation of vulnerability to attack on supporting air
bases again intrudes into the problem, as ballistic missiles
and NBC weapons should be capable of neutralizing airfields
within a theater.
The weakness of the virtual presence concept is that it
attempts to apply a wartime activity--dropping bombs--to
solve problems and protect U.S. interests in peacetime.
Virtual presence offers no options for U.S. commanders,
whether in day-to-day operations or crisis response, except
to destroy something of the enemy's.
317

Thus virtual presence

relies strictly on the deterrent threat of launching an air
campaign against any nation that threatens U.S. interests,
with no capacity for less-than-war activities.

It is a

strategy manifestly unfit for the conditions that the U.S.
must work with the majority of the time, and to suggest that
it provides any kind of presence, virtual or otherwise, is
at best a statement of misguided enthusiasm from the De
Seversky school of air power.
Finally, the possibility of returning to an
isolationist posture has gained some currency since the Cold
War ended.

Based on the belief that what goes on outside

the United States does not and should not concern us, the
isolationist strategy calls for the return of all U.S.
forces to CONUS, where their only role would be preventing
an attack on U.S. territory.

The services would be reduced

greatly, although still provided with the best and most
advanced systems available.
The vital interests of the United States would be the
safety of U.S. citizens, the integrity of U.S. territory,
and the freedom of the U.S. political process from outside
influence.

Nothing else on earth would require protection,

or be worth fighting for.

Our many allies would have to

fend for themselves in terms of defense, although we would
maintain healthy trade with all amenable nations.

Even

access to oil, on which our economy, and therefore our
quality of life, depends, would not require active measures
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of protection.

Either through the invisible hand of the

world oil market, or through the pragmatism of the state in
possession of the world's oil, U.S. oil demands could be met
at affordable cost.
If history teaches us anything, it is that peaceful
coexistence is not the natural order of things for sovereign
states.

This lesson is of large importance today, since the

United States depends on resources from abroad, as well as
the survival of world economic markets even more dependent
on oil than our own.

This reason alone is sufficient to

disqualify isolationism as an acceptable strategy for the
United States.

In addition to the need for secure access to

resources, the United States would surrender all but
diplomatic means of influencing others.

Even the pull-back

strategy hedges by retaining the forces to set things right
when others trespass on U.S. interests.

An isolationist

America would have no ability to maintain favorable
conditions abroad.

While viable and not entirely

inappropriate two hundred years ago, this strategy cannot be
considered a realistic possibility today.
The three alternatives presented here are not intended
to encompass every possible strategy for U.S. national
security.

The three alternatives were selected because each

has significant backing within the U.S. defense
establishment, and in the case of isolationism, within the
U.S. population.

However, after examining the shortcomings
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of each, it is clear that forward presence, and especially
naval forward presence, is the most appropriate and
effective strategy for U.S. national security.

With

interests and threats residing far from U.S. territory, U.S.
forces likewise must be positioned far from U.S. territory
if interests are to be protected.

No other option provides

a realistic means of protecting U.S. interests, influencing
events in the United States' favor, and defending U.S.
interests when armed force is called for.

Thus the Navy-

Marine Corps team's forward presence mission will retain its
importance in the post-Cold War international environment,
and will continue to influence events, protect American
interests, and underwrite the security of the United States.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The United States Navy has been operating around the
world for nearly two centuries, since Thomas Jefferson sent
American warships to the Mediterranean in 1801.

Although

the shape of American sea power has changed in the
intervening years, from sail power to nuclear power, from a
surface Navy to a submarine, surface, air, and space Navy,
the fundamental requirement of sea power has remained the
same for the United States.

Today's Navy is just as

essential to the safety and prosperity of the United States
as was the Navy of John Paul Jones, and will remain so in
the next century.
The United States is a maritime nation, dependent on
the sea for the majority of trade with other nations.

While

aircraft allow goods to cross great distances in a matter of
hours, air lift is extremely expensive and inefficient for
the transportation of bulk cargo, and is incapable of
transporting bulk resources such as oil.

The sea remains

the economic highway of U.S. trade, a fact that has not
changed since the first British colony was established at
Jamestown.

The immutable laws of physics limit the returns
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on air lift, making sea lift the most efficient means of
transporting goods over long distances.
The efficiency of sea lift is of great importance to
the United States, as most U.S. trading partners and many
necessary resources lie across the oceans.

Unlike the

continental states of Europe, the United States must look to
the sea for trade with nations other than Canada and Mexico.
In contrast to the maritime trading states of ancient Greece
or Persia, the United States must cross the two greatest
oceans in the world, the Atlantic and Pacific, in order to
deliver goods to other nations.

Merchant sea lift therefore

is an enduring requirement for the United States, and, as
observed by Mahan, the need for a Navy springs from the
existence of peaceful shipping.

The need for a Navy is an

equally enduring feature of American existence, a need
important enough to be called for by name in the
Constitution.
In addition to the protection of U.S. trade, the Navy
provides the means to defend the United States from attack.
By virtue of the freedom of movement enjoyed by ships at
sea, U.S. naval forces help to ensure that the fight,

if and

when it comes, will be conducted as far from the U.S.
homeland as possible.

Due to the need to watch over U.S.

maritime commerce, and to protect the United States itself,
forward presence has long been judged the best employment
for the Navy-Marine Corps team.
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Three strategic "hubs" warrant special attention in the
form of naval forward presence forces.

These are the

Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia.
Combining U.S. interests, crucial U.S. trading partners, and
clear threats to those interests and trading partners, these
three regions are the principal focus of U.S. naval
deployments.

Indicative of the importance of these regions

is the assignment of a numbered fleet to each: the Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf, and
the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific.
Threats to U.S. interests exist in two general forms.
The first is a peer or near-peer rival, such as the former
Soviet Union.

While the United States presently enjoys the

absence of any such peer threat, the status and health of
China and Russia bear watching, as either could develop
sufficient power and influence to challenge the United
States on a global scale.

The other type of threat, which

receives greater emphasis in the post-Cold War setting,
comes from the existence of "bad actors" in important
regions.

Saddam Hussein is merely the best-known of these

regional bad actors, each of whom has sufficient leverage
through proximity to U.S. interests to require U.S.
attention.

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are the clearest

regional threats, and are the basis for the two-MRC
requirement in U.S. defense planning.
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Each of the services has a role to play in protecting
U.S. interests, and each service has forces located around
the world to provide forward presence.

The Army has been

present in Korea since 1950, as have units of the Air Force.
The Army recently has taken position in Kuwait on a
permanent basis, with Air Force units deployed to several
Gulf nations.

And of course, both the Army and Air Force

have been key members of NATO for nearly fifty years.
While the deployment of Army and Air Force assets
provides valuable presence in support of U.S. interests, the
position on land of Army and Air Force personnel and
equipment means that the permission of a foreign nation must
be secured for their deployment.

Naval forces are free from

the political problems of deploying on another state's
territory, and have the additional advantage of easy
mobility.

Anywhere that there is salt water, the sea

services can operate in the protection of U.S. interests.
It is through the combination of mobility and freedom from
the permission of other states to come and go that naval
forces are superior to land-based forces in providing
presence.
When naval forces are present in a region, the United
States has available a wide range of options for influencing
events, protecting interests, and responding to emerging
crises.

Under the broad concept of naval diplomacy are such

activities as conventional deterrence, signaling U.S.
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interest in a region or state, providing support to allies,
employing limited military force, enforcing sanctions, and
protecting and enforcing freedom of the seas.
The wide range of actions that can be undertaken by
naval forces highlight the difference between forces that
are forward-based, such as Army units in Korea, and forces
that are forward-deployed.

Forward-based units usually are

positioned in a specific location to counter a specific
threat, and are not readily available to react to other
events.

Forward-deployed forces, on the other hand, can be

re-positioned to respond to events, and can move quickly
within a region, or even to another region, in support of
U.S. interests.
Forward presence forces also take part in two important
activities intended to maintain wartime readiness.

First,

forward presence forces are able to conduct joint training
and exercises with U.S. allies, which maintain combat skills
and interoperability.

Allied participation is a central

feature of U.S. planning, and allies must be interoperable
with U.S. forces to assist in wartime.

Second, by operating

in a region on a daily basis, forward presence forces
develop a good knowledge and understanding of conditions in
the region.

Local and regional intelligence, conditions

affecting sonar or radar, patterns of movement within the
region, geographic features of significance, the operational
patterns and tempo of potential adversaries--all can be
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monitored and updated by forces operating in the region.
Without current information on regional conditions, U.S.
forces would be at a disadvantage in wartime, a disadvantage
that could translate into increased casualties, a longer and
more difficult campaign, and even the inability to resolve a
crisis or conflict on favorable terms.

While some

conditions in a region can be monitored with space-based or
other surveillance assets, many local conditions require
forces on the scene for observation.
When crises arise in distant regions, naval forces are
capable of quick response, and of more flexible response
than land-based forces.

Naval forces require only the

orders of the National Command Authority to move into a
crisis area, making them largely immune to political,
religious, or other obstacles that frequently plague landbased forces.

Naval forces also can vary their position and

level of visibility, in contrast to land-based forces, and
can maintain a degree of ambiguity that can heighten an
adversary's apprehension.

In addition, naval forces can be

withdrawn or moved back from a crisis area with less
political impact than the removal of land-based forces.
One of the more frequent types of crisis in recent
years has been situations of violence, or impending
violence, that threaten the safety of U.S. citizens abroad.
Whether involving civil war, general anarchy, or even
natural disasters, these situations often require the
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ability to remove a large number of civilians quickly, and
may require military force to safeguard evacuees until they
are safely out of harm's way.

Known as non-combatant

evacuation operations, this activity has become a Marine
Corps specialty.
With the ability to move quickly from ships at sea to
locations on land, and able to bring along organic firepower
and air support when needed, the amphibious ready group has
proven itself invaluable in getting U.S. citizens out of
trouble in distant locations.

Capable of a wide variety of

special missions, the amphibious ready group provides the
means to place U.S. combat forces, with supporting
firepower, into a crisis area to conduct evacuations,
intelligence gathering, covert operations, or other shortof-war activities.

The ability to operate from

international waters allows such missions to be conducted
without restraint from other states' political leadership,
often a critical concern when time is a limiting factor.
If a crisis involves military aggression, it may be
necessary to respond with the deployment of U.S. military
power to fight a regional war, such as the 1990-91 Gulf War.
If U.S. Army and Air Force units are to deploy to a theater,
their arrival will depend on the ability of forward-deployed
forces to keep open the facilities needed by U.S. air and
sea lift.

An increasingly important aspect of keeping ports

and airfields open in the future will be ballistic missile
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defense.

Two Navy missile defense systems currently are in

development, and should enter service in the next decade.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Navy has
shifted its emphasis from the open ocean to the littorals,
focusing on projecting power ashore rather than blue water
operations.

Without a plausible threat to the movement of

U.S. ships on the high seas, and with the current national
security strategy's focus on regional threats, the shift to
a littoral focus is appropriate.

The only nations likely to

possess the means of challenging the Navy on the open
oceans, China and Russia, are many years, if not decades,
from being able to do so.

Thus the use of the Navy to

influence events ashore directly is a logical move.
With the shift from blue water to the littorals, the
Navy will need to re-assess its systems and capabilities for
the new environment.

Gone is the space buffer afforded by

the open ocean, where naval forces could maintain separation
from opposing forces.

The littoral typically is a very

crowded place, with a large volume of air and sea traffic.
Also, the need to provide greater support to Marine forces
is producing several new systems and capabilities, and
placing greater importance on some existing warfare areas.
The amphibious forces of the Navy-Marine Corps team are
undergoing significant change, as new systems begin to
replace aging Vietnam-era equipment.

The new LHD-1 Wasp-

class amphibious ships are great improvements over the LPH-1
328

Iwo Jima-class ships, providing a very large flight deck,
large well deck, and carrying space for a large amount of
Marine Corps manpower and equipment.

It has even been

suggested that the Navy shift funds allocated for refitting
and overhauling the LHA-1 Tarawa-class ships to purchasing
more LHD-ls, a move that would appear to provide the
greatest return on the Navy's investment.
The Marines are preparing to take delivery of two very
important systems, each providing a tremendous improvement
in amphibious capability over its predecessor.

The AAAV

amphibious vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
will provide great increases in the speed with which Marine
forces can be put ashore, as well as the distance from which
Marine landings can be launched.

These increases in range

and speed are highly important in the context of the
Marines' Operational Maneuver From The Sea concept.
In order to provide greater support for Marine forces
ashore, the Navy is improving its shore bombardment
capability, a mission that has suffered for many years from
an inadequate weapon, the 5-inch gun.

Possessing only

thirteen-mile range, the 5-inch gun is no longer suitable
for Marine Corps operations that will attempt to avoid
defended landing areas, instead maneuvering directly against
enemy centers of gravity that may be many miles inland.
Through modifications to the gun and shell, and the
incorporation of GPS guidance, the new ERGM shell will allow
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supporting fires at ranges up to sixty-three miles.

The

VGAS system, intended for installation on the nextgeneration surface combatant, may extend this range out to
one hundred miles.
Naval aviation, including both aircraft carriers and
their embarked aircraft, is at a critical transition point
between the present and the future.

Existing aircraft

carriers are seen by many as too large, too expensive, too
vulnerable, and unnecessary in the post-Cold War setting.
With advances in RPVs, the lack of a threat requiring air
power on the open ocean, and the emergence of the AEF
concept in the Air Force, carriers often are labeled as Cold
War relics, the most expensive method possible for putting a
bomb on a target.

Although undoubtedly expensive to

purchase and operate, carriers bring much more than bombdropping capability to U.S. commanders.

Carrier air wings

are capable of a multitude of missions, all of which can be
conducted independent of host nation permission, a feature
commonly overlooked by carrier critics.

Carriers have no

peer when it comes to providing presence, and will remain a
necessity as long as tactical air power remains a necessity.
The centerpiece of the Navy's carrier air wings in the
next decade will be the FA-18E/F Super Hornet, an enlarged
version of the existing FA-18C/D.

Intended to replace the

A-6E in the strike role and the F-14 in the fighterinterceptor role, the Super Hornet is a throwback to the
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days of the F-4 Phantom, an outstanding multi-mission,
multi-service aircraft in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, the

Super Hornet also entails some risk for the Navy, as it is
intended to serve only until the Joint Strike Fighter enters
service.

If the Joint Strike Fighter program is delayed for

any length of time, the age of the FA-18 program could
become a liability, forcing carrier air wings to deploy with
what is essentially an early 1970s design.

Nonetheless, the

first production Super Hornets have been delivered to the
Navy, and should enter squadron service early in the next
decade.
Three specific mission areas will be of greatly
increased importance for the Navy's littoral strategy.

Mine

countermeasures, neglected for many years as irrelevant to
the Cold War scenario of a mid-ocean battle against the
Soviets, have been given renewed emphasis in recent years.
Mines are one of the most cost-effective of naval weapons,
potentially allowing a state with no naval forces to defend
against even a superpower navy.

With the littoral strategy

calling for operations near the shore, the ability to
detect, locate, and neutralize mines is of tremendous
importance, and must be improved over current levels.
Anti-submarine warfare likewise must be improved if the
Navy-Marine Corps team is to operate in the littoral areas
of the world.

While a mere ten years have passed since the

Navy of Ronald Reagan raised ASW to an art form, the recent
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lack of emphasis on ASW training and modernization has led
to much atrophy in this critical mission area.

Even old

diesel submarines, operated by poorly-trained crews, cannot
be ignored when U.S. naval forces operate in littoral areas,
requiring that urgent attention be given to this area of
naval warfighting.

An emerging mission area will be of paramount
importance in the new international environment.

Ballistic

missile defense was demonstrated as a necessary capability
in 1991, when Iraq used "militarily insignificant" SCUD
missiles as strategic political weapons, attempting to draw
Israel into the Gulf War in order to splinter the coalition.
If used to deliver NBC warheads, ballistic missiles could
render facilities useless, lead to massive U.S. casualties,
and coerce U.S. allies into remaining neutral in a crisis.
Thus the two Navy missile defense programs, Navy Area and
Navy Theater Wide, must continue to receive the full
attention and support of naval leaders.
A related capability of great importance is NBC
defense, detection, and decontamination.

Chemical and

biological weapons in particular have emerged in recent
years as a kind of "poor man's nuclear weapon," allowing
small states to employ military and political leverage
similar to that of nuclear weapons at a fraction of the
cost.

Inexpensive and relatively easy to produce, chemical

weapons are known to exist in many regional arsenals, and
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biological weapons are suspected to be nearly as widespread
as chemical.

Both chemical and biological weapons,

delivered by ballistic missiles, could make it impossible
for U.S. air power and sea lift to utilize regional
facilities, possibly preventing the United States from being
able to deploy into a theater.
Two equally dubious mindsets concerning chemical and
biological weapons seem to prevail among many service
leaders and planners.

The first is that U.S. nuclear

weapons will deter the use of chemical or biological weapons
in a regional conflict, an assumption based on the Cold War
deterrence model of mutually assured destruction.

The

second assumption is that, if chemical or biological weapons
are used, their impact will be marginal and U.S. forces will
suffer little loss of combat capability.

Both assumptions

are contradicted by existing Red Team analyses, by the
different nature of potential regional regimes to be
deterred, and by the lack of adequate detection and
decontamination equipment and procedures among the services.
While all of the services are addressing NBC defense and
protection, it may take a chemical or biological "Pearl
Harbor" to drive home the effectiveness of these weapons.
Finally, a new vision of warfighting for the twentyfirst century is being developed by the Navy.

Known as

Network-Centric Warfare, the concept will be an important
improvement in situational awareness, speed of command, and
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engagement capability.

Through the sharing of information

in real time, the networking of sensors and shooters, and
several automated command and control processes, NetworkCentric Warfare should improve the combat capabilities of
Navy-Marine task forces operating in the littorals, where
events are likely to develop more quickly, and with less
warning, than on the open ocean.
Cooperative Engagement Capability, the first
operational component of Network-Centric Warfare, has been
tested successfully on several occasions, and is likely to
be approved for installation in the fleet in 1999.

Allowing

any networked platform with appropriate weapons to engage an
air or missile target, without having to track the target
independently, CEC should improve greatly the ability of
U.S. naval forces to defend themselves against aircraft,
cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
While forward presence has been the chosen military
posture of the United States since World War Two, the end of
the bi-polar Cold War setting has led many defense planners
and analysts to question whether forward presence is
appropriate for the new international setting.

The lack of

a world peer, on the order of the old Soviet Union, combined
with the United States' unchallenged position as the
military and economic superpower of the world, has produced
several calls for changing the national security strategy
employed by the United States.
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One proposed alternative is to maintain the structure
and mission capabilities of the military, but reduce the
overall size of the military and station most forces in
CONUS.

By retaining the ability to deploy overseas in a

crisis, and threatening to punish any attacks on U.S.
interests, the pull-back strategy is an attempt to maintain
great power status without exerting great power effort.

The

flaws of such a strategy are obvious.
First, U.S. strategy would rest largely on deterrence,
as the forces needed to defend U.S. interests would be
located far from those interests.
fails

Secondly, when deterrence

(as it should be expected to do), the U.S. response

would be reactive, only able to address conditions after the
fact.

Quick-grab strategies thus would be encouraged among

regional powers, who might judge that U.S. deployment was
not credible to protect a less-than-vital U.S. interest.
Third, the deployment of U.S. forces to a distant region
could become a logistical problem too great to overcome,
forcing the U.S. leadership to re-assess the choice of
deploying at all.

Thus the pull-back strategy is not viable

for U.S. national security in the post-Cold War setting.
The second alternative is to return U.S. forces to
CONUS, and rely on global air power and space surveillance
to monitor and regulate events surrounding U.S. interests.
Based on belief in RMA technologies and the long-standing
doctrine of air power according to Billy Mitchell, air power
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and space surveillance would replace physical presence with
virtual presence, allowing a much smaller military to
protect U.S. interests abroad.
While the B-2 bomber and emerging smart and brilliant
weapons should provide a large improvement in U.S.
warfighting capability, there is no basis in fact or corrunon
sense for believing that presence can exist through CONUSbased air power alone.

The most serious flaw in the virtual

presence concept is that it is wrongly applied to peacetime
presence operations, in which visibility and sustainability
are key.

Virtual presence is more suitable for wartime

operations, where stealth aircraft have proven their worth.
However, by limiting U.S. options to accepting an
adversary's actions or conducing a bombing campaign, virtual
presence is wholly unsatisfactory as a peacetime presence
strategy.
The third alternative is a return to the isolationism
of the 1920s and 1930s.

As there is no credible threat to

the U.S. homeland, the forces of the United States should be
brought home, and the United States should withdraw from
world events.

Based on the belief that what other states do

and how they interact is their own business, and placing
faith in fair market practices to ensure the availability of
oil and resources, isolationism observes few if any U.S.
interests besides the safety of U.S. citizens, territory,
and democratic government.
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Although isolationism perhaps resonates with the belief
of many individuals in the philosophy of "live and let
live," it is not appropriate for the interaction of nations,
where no common understanding of acceptable norms or
restraint on misbehavior exist.

Events outside the United

States do affect our safety and prosperity, a fact of life
since the late 1940s, when the U.S. became a net energy
importer.

When combined with our economic dependence on the

health of foreign economies, and the dependence of all
modern industrial states on oil, the Persian Gulf by itself
is sufficient to invalidate an isolationist posture.
The need for forward presence forces will continue in
the post-Cold War world, just as it existed during the Cold
War.

w.hile the threat has changed, and become perhaps more

uncertain in its nature, the need to maintain U.S. military
power in proximity to national interests is a lasting
requirement in U.S. national security.

Where the threat is

well-defined and capable of striking out with little
warning, as in Iraq or North Korea, land-based ground and
air forces are appropriate for maintaining presence and
defensive capability.
For dealing with the current uncertainty in the origin
and location of threats to U.S. interests, however, landbased forces are at a distinct disadvantage.

Forced to take

position on the sovereign territory of another state,

land-

based forces must overcome political obstacles to their
337

deployment, political restraint on their freedom of action,
and the political impact that their withdrawal might cause
in the eyes of U.S. allies.

While very valuable, indeed

invaluable, towards the wartime end of the spectrum of
operations, land-based forces are much less valuable in the
peacetime presence operations, intended to hedge against
uncertain threats, that comprise the great majority of U.S.
military action abroad.
Naval forces, through their historical characteristics
of global mobility and freedom of access in international
waters, are the most useful in meeting uncertain threats,
and of sustaining U.S. power near national interests.

With

over fifty years' experience in at-sea replenishment and
logistical support, U.S. naval forces can take station in
any of the world's seas, and maintain station for weeks or
months, even years through the rotation of ships and battle
groups.

This is presence--the permanent occupation of
strategically important positions near U.S. interests,

free

to take any necessary action, subject only to the orders of
the National Corrunand Authority.

With combat power, organic

logistics, and command and control capability already
present in underway battlegroups, deployed naval forces are
essentially at full wartime readiness all the time, and can
respond instantly to emerging crises.

Naval forces offer

the NCA a full range of options in crisis response, ranging
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from non-combatant evacuations to limited military
operations to wartime strikes.

Operating in all mediums--on

land, on and under the sea, in the air, and increasingly in
space--naval forces are likely to possess the means of
responding to any crisis that may occur in the littorals of
the world.
While the international environment has changed
dramatically with the demise of the Soviet Union, the
fundamental need for sea power in U.S. security has not
changed.

Barring a truly revolutionary change in the laws

of physics and aerodynamics as we understand them today, sea
power will remain a constant necessity for the United
States, regardless of the presence or absence of a peerlevel threat.

Through the continued deployment of U.S.

naval forces to vital regions of the world, and through the
ceaseless vigilance of U.S. naval forces in protecting U.S.
national interests, the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue
to be
.a safeguard unto the United States
of America, and a security for such as
pass on the seas upon their lawful
occasions.
--Book of Common Prayer;
Prayer for the Navy
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Table 1
TOP 15 IMPORTERS TO THE UNITED STATES

Percentage
of Total

Millions of Dollars

Totals

Total Imported Commodities

743,400

100

Total of Top 15 Trade Partners

593,900

79.9

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

145,100
123,600
61,700
45,600
36,800
29,000
26,900
24,200
18,600
17,500
17,200
16,500
11,400
10,300
9,700

19.5
16.6
8.3
6.1
5.0
3.9
3.6
3.3
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.2
1.5
1.4
1. 3

Canada
Japan
Mexico
China
Germany
Taiwan
United Kingdom
South Korea
Singapore
Malaysia
France
Italy
Thailand
Hong Kong
Venezuela

Source: Kim Holmes and Thomas Moore. Restoring American

Leadership: A u.s. Foreign and Defense Policy

Blueprint. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, 1996.
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Table 2
TOP 15 DESTINATIONS FOR U.S. EXPORTS

Millions of Dollars

Totals

Percentage
of Total

Total Exported Commodities

583,900

100

Total of Top 15 Trade Partners

439,200

75.2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

126,000
64,300
46,300
28,800
25,400
22,400

21.8
11.0
7.9
4.9
4.4
3.8

19,300

3.3

16,600
15,300
14,200
14,200
12,500
11,700
11,400
10,800

2.8
2.6
2.4
2.4
2.1
2.0
2.0
1.8

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Canada
Japan
Mexico
United Kingdom
South Korea
Germany
Taiwan
Netherlands
Singapore
France
Hong Kong
Belgium
China
Brazil
Australia

Source: Kim Holmes and Thomas Moore. Restoring American

Leadership; A u.s. Foreign and Defense Policy
Blueprint. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage
Foundation, 1996.
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Table 3
PERSIAN GULF FORCE LEVELS

country

Manpower

Tanks

Iran

518,000

1,390

2,000

300

Iraq

387,000

2,700

3,800

280

s.

105,000

1,000

300

336

UAE

64,000

225

225

100

Kuwait

15,300

225

60

76

Bahrain

11,000

100

40

24

Qatar

11,000

34

40

11

Arabia

Artillery

Aircraft

Source: Terence Taylor. The Military Balance 1997/98.
London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1997.
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Table 4
COMPARISON OF TRAVEL TIMES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO EUROPE

Persian Gulf to Europe Journey:

SUMED vs, cape Route

Time (Days)
To:

Rotterdam

Fos
(France)

Augusta
(Sicily)

VIA:
Cape of Good Hope
SUMED*

42
29

41
22

42
20

Savings In Time (Days)

13

19

22

Distance (Nautical Miles)
To:

Rotterdam

Fos

Augusta

VIA:

Cape of Good Hope
SUMED

11,170
6,213

10,784
4,499

11,136
3,870

4,957

6,285

7,266

Savings In Distance
(Nautical Miles)

* Includes five days to offload oil at SUMED terminal, pump
through SUMED pipeline, and re-load oil into tanker.

Source: The Suez canal I SUMED Complex: Global Shipping and

Trade Implications in the Event of Closure.

Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence,
1996.
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Table 5
US NAVY MISSIONS BY REGION

12

.

8

D

Caribbean

m

Mediterranean

[Z3

Indian Ocean/
Persian Gulf

•

C
0

.
E
-..

iii

0

Sl

Western Pacific

E
:,

z

4

0
Show of
force

FON

Escort

Open/
Land Survelllance
close LOCs strike
Mission Type

381

NEO

Interventlon

Interdiction

Contingency

Table 6
PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE MISSIONS BY REGION

30

25

111

20

C

~

(II
(II

E

0 15

...
G)

.c

E
:::,

Z

10

5

0

Caribbean

Mediterranean

lndlan Ocean/
Persian Gulf

Ocean area
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Western Pacific

-

Reactive

CJ

Proactive

Table 7
EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF 1987

17 May
25 May
21-22 Jul.
24 Jul.
30 Jul.
10 Aug.

24 Aug.

21 Sep.

Iraqi missile attack on USS Stark (FFG-31).
U.S. Navy warships escort a Kuwaiti-flagged
freighter carrying U.S. arms to Bahrain.
First U.S.-escorted convoy of reflagged Kuwaiti
tankers, including ss Bridgeton, begins.
Bridgeton hit and disabled by mine about 20
miles west of Farsi Island.
U.S. Navy SH-3 Sea King helicopter crashes into
the Gulf while trying to land aboard USS L.a.
Salle (AGF-3). Five are rescued: four die.
F-14 Tomcat from USS Constellation (CV-64) fires
two Sparrow missiles at radar blip thought to be
Iranian F-4 showing hostile intent toward U.S.
P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Neither
missile hit any airborne object. The Texaco
Caribbean, under charter to a U.S. firm, hits a
mine outside of the Persian Gulf in the
international anchorage off of Fujayrah. It was
the first mine encountered outside the Gulf.
Several more were detected over the next two
days.
The USS Kidd (DDG-993) fires warning shots
across the bows of two dhows when they approach
a U.S.-escorted convoy entering the Strait of
Hormuz on its way into the Gulf. Later, an
Iranian warship approaches the convoy. She is
met by the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) and
Guadalcanal(LPH-7). The Iranian ship turns away
after the Jarrett moves between her and the
convoy.
U.S. frigate-based MH-6 Army special operations
helicopters attack and capture the Iran Ajr, an
Iranian landing craft being used for covert
minelaying, about 50 miles northeast of Bahrain,
in an anchorage used by ships before moving into
oil-loading terminals. The next day, SEALs board
the ship and take her in tow. Ten mines are
found on board. Twenty-six Iranians are rescued:
383

Table 7 (continued)

3 Oct.

4 Oct.
8 Oct.

9 Oct.

14 Oct.

15 Oct.

16 Oct.

19 Oct.

1 Nov.

three are reported killed and two are missing. A
U.S. Navy frigate fires warning shots across the
bow of an Iranian hovercraft that approached the
ships towing the Iran Ajr.
Saudi fighter planes and naval forces reportedly
turn back a force of about 60 Iranian speedboats
heading toward the Saudi offshore oilfield at
Khafji. Saudis reportedly alerted to speedboats
by U.S. forces.
U.S. Navy helicopter crashes near the La Salle
off Bahrain, killing one and injuring three.
U.S. frigate-based MH-6 helicopters attack four
Iranian speedboats about 15 miles southwest of
Farsi Island after one of the boats fired on a
U.S. helicopter, sinking one and damaging and
capturing two. U.S. forces pick up six Iranians,
two of whom later die.
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger reports that
parts for U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft
missiles were found on the two speedboats
captured in the 8 October attack.
Administration reportedly rejects informal
request from on-scene U.S. task force corrunander
to come to aid of some non-u.s. flag ships under
attack.
U.S.-owned, Liberian-flagged tanker Sunqari, at
anchor nine miles off Kuwait's Mina al-Ahmadi
terminal, hit and damaged by Silkworm missile
fired by Iran from Fao Peninsula. No casualties,
but ship damaged.
Ref~agged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City, about
ten miles off Mina al-Ahmadi, hit and damaged by
Silkworm missile fired by Iran from Fao
Peninsula. Eighteen injured, including U.S.
master, and ship damaged.
In response to 16 October missile attack, U.S.
destroyer and SEALs shell and blow up Iranian
oil platform east of Bahrain, and destroy
electronic equipment on nearby platform.
U.S. frigate fires machine guns at night on boat
believed to be Iranian speedboat making hostile
high-speed run at U.S. Military Sealift Corrunand
cargo ship Patriot as she was being escorted out
of the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. Boat
later discovered to be United Arab Emirates
384

Table 7 (continued)

12 Dec.

23 Dec.
24 Dec.

25 Dec.

fishing vessel: one Indian fisherman killed:
three others on board injured. U.S. Government
expresses regret for incident.
Helicopters from the USS Chandler (DDG-996)
evacuate 11 people from the Cypriot-registered
tanker Pivot after the tanker was attacked by
Iranian speedboats. A helicopter chartered by
CBS News evacuates another 29.
Norwegian-flagged oil tanker attacked by Iranian
forces reportedly turns down offer from U.S.
Navy helicopter to help evacuate crew.
Iranian speedboat fires shots at U.S. frigatebased helicopter, perhaps only to warn it away,
when helicopter flies to investigate Liberianflagged tanker attacked by Iranian speedboats.
U.S. Navy helicopter evacuates 11 people from
South Korean-flagged freighter Hyundai attacked
by Iranian frigate about 20 miles northeast of
Sharjar, near Abu Musa Island. A helicopter from
a British frigate evacuates another nine.

Source: Ronald O'Rourke. "The Tanker War." Proceedings Naval
Review (May 1988): 33.
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Table 8
DATE, LOCATION, MISSION, AND INVOLVED NAVAL FORCES
1991 - 1998

Dates

Location-operation

u.s.

Naval Forces

Jan. 1991

Somalia-NEC

USS Guam ARG
USS Trenton ARG
USMC Force Recon, SEALS

Jan. 1992-1998

s. Iraq-No Fly Zone
Enforcement;
Maritime Intercepts

CVBGs
SAGS

Dec. 1992

Somalia-humanitarian

USS Ranger CVBG
USS Tripoli ARG
15th MEU (SOC)

Jul. 1993-1997

Adriatic/BalkansNo Fly Zone
enforcement;
Maritime Intercepts

CVBGs
ARGs
MEU(SOC) s

Jan. 1993-Mar. 1994

Somalia-humanitarian

CVBGs
ARGs

Jan. 1993

Iraq-carrier strikes

USS Kitty Hawk CVBG

Jun. 1993

Iraq/Red Sea-Tomahawk
missile strikes

USS Peterson
USS Chancellorsville
USS Roosevelt CVBG

Oct. 1993

Somalia-response to
increasing casualties

USS America CVBG
USS Guadalcanal ARG

Nov. 1993-Aug. 1994

Haiti-UN blockade

ARGs
SEALS

Apr .-Aug.
1994

Rwanda-relief/NEO

USS Peleliu ARG
11th MEU(SOC)
USS Tripoli ARG
15th MEU(SOC)
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Table 8 (continued)

Dates

Location-Operation

u.s.

Oct. 1994

Iraq/Red Seadeterrence; support
for Kuwait

USS Washington CVBG
USS Tripoli ARG
15th MEU(SOC)

Oct. 1994Mar. 1995

Haiti-nation building

Military Sealift
Command

Feb.-Mar.
1995

Somalia-withdrawal
of UN forces

USS Belleau Wood ARG
USS Essex ARG

Jun. 1995

Adriatic Sea-rescue
of Captain Scott
O'Grady

USS Roosevelt CVBG
USS Kearsarge ARG
24th MEU(SOC)

Aug.-Sep.
1995

Adriatic Sea-Bosnia
strikes

USS Roosevelt CVBG
USS America CVBG
USS Kearsarge ARG

Aug. 1995

Iraq/Red Seadeterrence; support
for Kuwait

USS Lincoln CVBG
USS New Orleans SAG

Dec. 1995Dec. 1996

Adriatic/BalkansDayton Peace Accords
enforcement

CVBGs
ARGs

Mar. 1996

China/Taiwan-freedom
of navigation ops;
deterrence

USS Independence CVBG
USS Nimitz CVBG

Sep. 1996

Iraq-carrier strikes

USS Carl Vinson CVBG

Mar.-Jun.
1997

Adriatic-NEC; embassy
security

USS Nassau ARG
26th MEU(SOC)

Apr.-May
1997

Eastern Atlanticstandby off Zaire
to conduct NEO

USS Nassau ARG
26th MEU(SOC)
USS Kearsarge ARG
22nd MEU(SOC)

Sep. 1994

Haiti-intervention
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Naval Forces

USS Eisenhower CVBG
USS Wasp ARG

Table 8 (continued)

Dates

Location-operation

u,s, Naval Forces

Jun. 1997

West Africahumanitarian

USS Kearsarge ARG
22nd MEU(SOC)

Oct. 19971998

Iran/Iraq/Arabian
Gulf-deterrence;
support UNSCOM

USS Nimitz CVBG
USS Washington CVBG
USS Independence CVBG
USS Peleliu ARG
13th MEU(SOC)
USS Guam ARG
24th MEU(SOC)

Source: Vision, Presence, Power: A Program Guide to the u,s,
Navy 1998 Edition. Washington, D.C.: Department of
the Navy, 1998
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Table 9
MEU(SOC) SPECIAL MISSIONS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Humanitarian Assistance
Civic Actions
Clandestine Reconnaissance/Surveillance
In-Extremis Hostage Rescue
Initial Terminal Guidance
Mobile Training Teams
Maritime Interdiction
Seizure/Destruction of Offshore Oil Rigs
Limited Objective Attacks
Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
Deception Operations
Security Operations
Specialized Demolition
Show of Force Operations
Electronic Warfare
Amphibious Raids
Operations in Urban Terrain
Counter-Intelligence Operations
Reinforcement Operations
Fire Support Control

Source: Captain Neil Carns and Captain Stanton Coerr. "A
True Force In Readiness." Proceedings (August 1994):
35.
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Table 10
FACTORS AFFECTING CVN LIFETIME COSTS

Preliminary data

How 7 variables affect the percent change in
average annual CVW APN(l-4) plus CVX SCN
20.0 ..................................................................................................... .

15.0

............................................. .

10.0 · · .. · · · · · · · ··················· ............................................. .
II

DC

;

s.o

"5

10 less .. 20 less ··
A/C per

..... lless.

More

A/C per

'E

"t

0.0

Cl,.

-s.o
-10.0

-1S.O

............................ -- ........ -................. -................................................... .

Preliminary data

Source: John Hall. Lona-Term Affordability of Sea-Based
TACAIR: Some Preliminary Examples. Alexandria, VA:
Center for Naval Analyses, 1997.
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Table 11
COMPARISON OF CARRIER AND BOMBER RESPONSES TO CRISES

CVBG Responses to Crises Since the Vietnam War
Year
1974
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1982
1983
1983
1983
1983

Crisis

Cyprus
Cyprua Unrest
Eagle Pull, Cambodia
Frequent Wind, Viet.
Mayaguez
Lebanon
Keny•Uf,anda
Korean ree Incident
Uganda
~aden War
A ghanistan
Iranian Revolution
China-Vietnam
Yemen
Soviet Troops in Cuba
Afghan/Iran Hostages
Park-Chung Hee
Korea
Iran-Iraq War
Syria
Lib a
Sadat-Sudan
Central America
Israeli Invasion
Peacekeeping Force
Palestinian Massacre
Libya-Sudan
Honduras
Libya-Chad
Marine Barracks Bomb

CVs

Year

Crisis

2
1
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2

1983
1983
1983
1983
1984
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1985
1985
1986
1986
1986
1987
1987
1988
1988
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1993
1993

Iran-Iraq
Korea-Burma
Grenada
Syria
Central America
Persian Gulf
Saudi Hijacking
Cuba
U.S. Pers. in Lebanon
TWA 847 Hijacking
Achille Lauro
Eiypt Air Hijacking
0 L-FON Ops
La Belle Disco, Libya
Pakistan Hi;acking
Persian Gu f Ops
Hostages in Lebanon
Summer Olympics
Maldive• Coup
Lebanon Civil War
Panama Elections
China Civil Unrest
Hostages in Lebanon
Philippines
Operation Desert Shield
Operation Desert Storm
Op. Southern Watch
Somalia
Op. Southam Watch
Operation Deny Right

cv.
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3

2
1

2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
6
1
1
1
1

(Source: CNA Research Memorandum 90-246)

Source: David Perin. Comparing Lonq-Ranqe Bombers and the
Carrier Force. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1994.
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Table 11 (continued)
COMPARISON OF CARRIER AND BOMBER RESPONSES TO CRISES

Bombers in Presence Missions, Combat, and
Shows of Force Since the Vietnam War
(Source:The USAF and National Security , SAF/OSX 1991)

AUG 76 "Following the murder of two army officers, .•• B-52s flew
training missions along the DMZ to underscore U.S. concern."
JAN 80

"B-52s overflew Soviet naval vessels in the Arabian Sea to
demonstrate U.S. power-projection capabilities."

ocr 81

"During Bright Star 82, .•. two B-52Hs [flew] a nonstop mission
from North Dakota to a simulated runway target in Egypt."

DEC 81

"In show-of-force missions in response to mobilization of North
Korean forces, B-52 sorties were flown along the border."

AUG 90

16 B-52s deploy to Diego Garcia in response to Iraqi invasion.

JAN 91

70 B-52s fly combat missions in Operation Desert Storm.

Source: David Perin. Comparing Lonq-Ranqe Bombers and the
Carrier Force. Alexandria, VA: center for Naval
Analyses, 1994.
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Table 12
COMPARISON OF BOMBER AND CARRIER MISSION CAPABILITIES

Tasks in Peacetime and Crises
Mission/Task
• Promote regional stability

CVBGs
Yes

Bombers
No

(e.g., routine deployments)

•

Protect people and property

Yes

No

• Make a show of force

Yes

Some·

• Protect, quarantine, interdict

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Some

(e.g., Iran hostage rescue)

(e.g., Gulf of Libya ops)

sea/air traffic

(e.g., Earnest Will
convoy operations and capture of the
Achille Lauro hijackers)

•

Forestall/respond to hostile or
terrorist acts (e.g., strike Libya)

• Intervene in conflicts
e.. , Grenada

Source: David Perin. Com.parinq Lonq-Ranqe Bombers and the
Carrier Force. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1994.
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Figure 1
STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Strait of Hormuz

Ir an
Bandar-a 'Abbas

•". ~ ~~
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Nore: Shipping lane boundaries are marked.

Source: Hans Binnendjik and Patrick Clawson. strategic

Assessment 1997; Flashpoints and Force structure.
Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997.
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Figure 2
OIL SHIPMENTS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF MALACCA
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Source: John Noer and David Gregory. Chokepoints; Maritime
Economic concerns in southeast Asia. Washington,
D.C.: NDU Press, 1996.
395

Figure 3
ALTERNATIVE EAST-WEST ROUTES TO MALACCA

I

Phll/pplne Sea

I

Sunda Strait

Lombok Strait

Source: John Neer and David Gregory. Chokepoints: Maritime
Economic Concerns in southeast Asia. Washington,
D.C.: NDU Press, 1996.
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APPENDIX B

IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF THE KEEP-OUT STRATEGY
The Persian Gulf is the region of greatest importance
to the United States, by virtue of its oil supplies.
Persian Gulf oil supplies the economies of Europe and Asia
with the majority of their energy needs, and is projected to
grow in importance in the future.

While U.S. dependence on

Persian Gulf oil is relatively low, the U.S. economy depends
on the health of its trading partners, making the secure
flow of oil from the Gulf a vital national interest.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, once a solid U.S. ally in
the Persian Gulf, has become one of the United States' most
bitter opponents since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Although militarily exhausted at the end of the Iran-Iraq
war in 1988, Iran's position astride the Strait of Hormuz
provides Iran the means to block a critical SLOC with
minimal force.

By slowing or stopping the shipment of oil

through Hormuz, Iran could threaten the economic health of
Europe, Asia, and indirectly the United States.
The ability to disrupt the flow of oil to the
industrialized economies of the world provides Iran with
leverage for meeting political goals within the Gulf region.
Thus it is reasonable to expect that Iran has plans for
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interdicting the Strait, either partially or totally.

The

systems and capabilities being acquired by Iran will be
described in the following pages, along with the likely
strategy Iran would use in a confrontation with the United
States.
Iran has been engaged in a military rebuilding program
since 1988, when the Iran-Iraq War ended.

Since that time

Iran has acquired a wide variety of weapons systems,
primarily from Russia and China.

Although Iran's purchases

have gone into every area of its armed forces, the main
focus of Iran's efforts have been made in two areas: naval
systems and ballistic missiles.
The nature of the systems Iran has acquired provide a
good indication of the strategy Iran appears to be pursuing.
After faring poorly against U.S. naval forces in 1987-1988,
Iran now appears to be developing the capability to close
down the Strait of Hormuz, using naval weapons and forces
tailored towards sea denial rather than conventional combat.
Given Iran's position astride the full length of the Strait,
such a strategy is entirely logical.
By following a strategy of sea denial, Iran is
relieved of the need to be able to meet the U.S. Navy-clearly Iran's main adversary--on the open waters of the
Persian Gulf or the North Arabian Sea, where the ships and
aircraft of the U.S. Fifth and Seventh Fleets would enjoy
tremendous advantages in surveillance, targeting, firepower,
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air superiority, and tactical coordination.

Sea denial

requires only that Iran be able to prevent the adversary
from transiting the Strait, a task Iran can meet largely
from positions ashore.

For a nation with no hope of

matching even the 5th Fleet, let alone the entire U.S. Navy,
in traditional naval combat power, sea denial provides the
means to turn a geographical advantage into a military
advantage.
For much of its length the Strait is only thirty-three
miles wide, with the main shipping channels occupying the
center of the Strait.

Given this limited width, Iran can

easily observe and monitor all surface ships passing through
the Strait, even if limited to using optical surveillance
systems.

Iran also holds four islands located in the middle

of the Strait, providing ideal observation positions.

In

addition, possession of the north shore of the Strait allows
Iran to construct, fortify, and camouflage positions for
anti-ship missiles, observation posts, SAMs, and ordinary
artillery pieces.

In order to block the Strait, Iran has

turned to the traditional weapons of sea denial, the mine
and the submarine, and added to these the anti-ship missile.
Iran has purchased several thousands of mines, some of
them advanced influence and rising mines.

The most conunon

mine type in Iran's inventory is the contact mine, a weapon
scarcely changed since World War One.

These mines can be

free-floating, allowing them to drift along on the current,
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or can be moored to float on or just below the surface.

In

either case, the mine must be struck by a passing ship in
order to detonate.

Although technologically crude, such

mines are effective and inexpensive.1

The production of

contact mines is well within the capability of virtually any
nation, and certainly within Iran's capability, allowing
Iran to deploy very large numbers of contact mines.
Influence mines are much more capable than contact
mines, and are more suited to use in deep water.2

The

Chinese EM-52 mine is one example of the influence mines in
Iran's possession.

Iran reportedly has received 1,800

influence mines as part of its ongoing purchases from
Russia. 3

Iran gained much operational experience in the use

of mines during the Iran-Iraq War, in which Iranian mines
were employed to attack the oil shipments of Iraq's
financial supporters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The other sea denial weapon, the submarine, had not
been present in the naval forces of the Gulf states until
Iran's purchase of three Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric

1 Lyons et. al., The Mine Threat; Show stoppers or Speed

Bumps, 1.

2uss Princeton (CG-59) was badly damaged by an Iraqi
influence mine. Ibid.
3 James Bruce, "Choking the Strait: Iranian naval
firepower and the threat to Gulf shipping," Jane's
Intelligence Review (September 1996): 411.
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boats.4

The Kilo is a very quiet submarine when submerged,

a quality that is enhanced by the acoustic nature of the
Gulf.5

The constant shipping traffic through the Gulf, and

particularly the Strait, provides an ideal noise level for a
quiet submarine to hide in.

The Gulf also has a very strong

thermal layer that would impede sonar searches by surface
ships. 6
The Kilo carries eighteen 533mm. torpedoes, which are
thought to be wake-homing Russian models. 7

In addition, the

Kilo can lay as many as thirty-six mines while submerged,
providing the capability for covert deployment of
minefields.a

Although Iran is unlikely to get anything

approaching full effectiveness from its Kilos, the ability
to lay mines while submerged is a valuable attribute by
itself. 9
4The Kilos were purchased in 1992, 1993, and 1996.
"Iran Bolsters Its Fleet With 3rd Russian Sub," New York
Times, 20 January 1997, A5.
5Robert Holzer, "Iran's Kilo Sub Buys Prompt Surge in
ASW Demand," Defense News, 9-15 June 1997, 36.
6James Kraska, "Gatekeepers of the Gulf," Proceedings
(March 1994): 45.
7 Taylor, The Military Balance 1997 / 98, 126.
8Ed Blanche, "Iran's naval forces: a shadow across the
Gulf?" Jane's Navy International (March 1997): 14.
9Any warship is a large concentration of complex
systems, a submarine doubly so. Each system requires a welltrained operator in order to function properly. Simply
mastering the techniques of diving the boat will require
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To complement its mines and submarines, Iran has
invested heavily in anti-ship missiles (SSMs).

Iran has

acquired several different types of SSM, all of which are
believed to be capable of shore or ship launch.

Iran has

also fired at least one type, the C-802, from an F-4
aircraft.10

While all are capable of doing serious damage

to a warship, the most capable of Iran's SSMs is the SS-N-22
Sunburn, reportedly purchased from Ukraine in 1993.11

The

Sunburn travels at nineteen hundred mph, can home on the
electronic emissions of the target ship, and has its own
radar seeker. It performs evasive S-turns during the final
seconds before impact, and carries a three hundred kg
warhead.

In comparison, the Exocet missile that nearly sank

USS Stark carries a 165kg warhead.

The Sunburn's range is

estimated at ninety kilometers.12

lengthy training of Iranian crews. Additionally, maintenance
takes on special importance when the equipment involved is
expected to dive safely beneath the ocean, and Iran's
history of maintaining its systems is poor. In the words of
Seth Carus, "Few military instruments are as difficult to
use well as submarines." Seth Carus, "Iran as a Military
Threat," strategic Forum 113 (May 1997): 3.
lOEd Blanche, "Air-to-surface missiles 'give Iran 360
capability'," Jane's Defense Weekly, 25 June 1997, 3.
llwhether or not the Ukrainian missiles were in fact
SS-N-22s is disputed. See Steven Zaloga, "Russia's Moskit
anti-ship missile," Jane's Intelligence Review (April 1996):
155.
l2Ibid.
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Iran's oldest SSM is the Chinese HY-1 Silkworm.

The

Silkworm is a first-generation SSM, thought to be relatively
inaccurate.13

However, Iran is believed to possess more

than three hundred Silkworms, allowing high-volume attacks.
Furthermore, all of Iran's Silkworms are deployed in shore
batteries, rather than at sea.14

Whether in mobile

launchers or permanent, hardened launchers, shore-based
Silkworms likely would be more survivable than ship-mounted
missiles.

Iran has the luxury of deploying missiles ashore

due to the need only to fire on ships in the Strait.
Another Iranian SSM is the HY-2 Seersucker, also known
as the CSSC-3 or C-801 Sardine.
improved version of the Silkworm.

It is thought to be an
Iran possesses one

hundred Seersuckers, which are deployed in shore batteries
along the Strait and on Sirri Island.15
The C-802 Saccade is Iran's most flexible missile.

It

can be launched from shore batteries, from fast attack craft
(FAC), or from aircraft.

The Saccade is carried on Iran's

Kaman-class and Hudong-class FAC, and has been launched from
F-4 aircraft on at least two occasions.

It has a range of

120 km and carries a seven hundred kg warhead, over four

1 3 Philip Finnegan, "U.S. Confronts Middle East
Challenges," Defense News, 16-22 September 1997, 3.
14Blanche, "Iran's naval forces," 21.
15 Ibid.
403

times larger than the Exocet warhead that sank HMS

Sheffielct. 16
SSMs are a particular hazard in a confined seaway like
the Strait, due to the short reaction time afforded to
target ships.

Fired from shore at a target twenty miles out

in the channel, a six hundred mph Silkworm would reach its
target in two minutes.

A nineteen hundred mph Sunburn would

cover the same distance in forty seconds.

The target ship

thus could come under attack without warning, as Iranian
shore batteries likely would not need to employ radar to
search for targets. Unlike the Stark, which tracked an
inbound Iraqi fighter for over an hour before being fired
on, ships in the Strait could have their response time
measured in seconds.17
The large warheads on Iranian SSMs make them a
significant danger to any ship.

Modern warships have shown

a remarkable susceptibility to critical damage from a single
hit, especially in regard to their electrical systems.

HMS

Sheffield (Exocet missile) and USS Princeton (influence
mine) were rendered dead in the water almost immediately

16Bruce, "Choking the Strait," 414.
1 7 The Stark first received radar data from USS Coontz
(DDG-40) via the Navy Tactical Data System at 2000 local
time. The Stark acquired the Iraqi plane at 2058 and tracked
it until 2107, when the second of two Exocet missiles was
fired. See Vlahos, "The Stark Report," 64.
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after being struck.

The Princeton was without electrical

power to her radar and fire control for over two hours
before being towed to Bahrain, while the Sheffield was lost
while under tow six days after being hit.1 8
In order to take advantage of the confined nature of
the Strait, Iran has built up a force of twenty FAC, each
armed with four SSMs.

These craft are small enough to

conceal themselves along Iran's coastline, waiting for
passing targets before dashing out at high speed to attack.
In addition to their small size, their speed would make them
difficult targets for U.S. weapons.19

Iran's ten Kaman-

class boats can carry four C-801 Seersucker or C-802 Saccade
missiles, while the ten Hudong-class carry only the
latter.20
These craft would need to fire from short range due to
their lack of long-range search radars, so they would not be
survivable in the open for long periods.

It is possible

that target data could be supplied to the FAC by other
units, or they could launch with bearing-only information.
Given the narrow nature of the Strait, the need to launch

18Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the
Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 153;
Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 345.
l9Kraska, "Gatekeepers of the Gulf," 45.
20 Taylor, The Military Balance 1997 / 98, 126.
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from close range is not as significant a disadvantage as it
would be on the open sea.
Ballistic missiles have shared top priority with naval
systems in Iran's re-arming program.

Both as a political

weapon and as a military weapon, ballistic missiles serve
Iran's purposes by providing the means to launch long-range
attacks from Iranian soil.

The Iranian Air Force is

incapable of penetrating a modern air defense network, or
even the fighter CAP of a carrier air wing, so Iran needs
other means of conducting such attacks.

Ballistic missiles

provide the means.
Ballistic missiles allow Iran to strike targets that
would normally be assigned to deep-strike aircraft.

These

include logistical targets, such as Gulf airfields and
ports, tactical targets, such as force concentrations or
ship formations, and strategic targets, such as civilian
population centers.

The ability to deliver NBC warheads

with ballistic missiles offers the additional option of
blackmail, by threatening to attack the population centers
of any state providing assistance or access to its
facilities to U.S. forces.
The primary missile in Iran's inventory is the SCUD,
produced in China and North Korea.

Iran possesses one

hundred SCUD-Band one hundred SCUD-C missiles, and is

406

believed to be capable of producing SCUD-Bs indigenously.2 1
Iran is known to have ten launchers for SCUD missiles, but
may have produced more.22
The SCUD-B has a range of three hundred km and a
payload of one thousand kg.

While it is not an accurate

missile (CEP is estimated between one thousand and fifteen
hundred meters), it can deliver NBC warheads sufficiently
close to intended targ~ts to be effective.

It obviously has

the accuracy to strike cities, as demonstrated in 1991 by
Iraqi SCUDs.23

The SCUD-C is an improved SCUD-B, possessing

greater accuracy and range at the expense of a slightly
smaller payload.

The five hundred km range of the SCUD-C

threatens most Saudi airfields and all Gulf ports.

CEP is

estimated between 750-1,000 meters, while payload is seven
hundred kg.24
Iran has an additional capability in its SA-2 and SA-6
SAMs.

Both of these missiles are capable of being fired in

a ballistic mode, and include in their operating manuals the
steps for doing so.

The SA-2 has a range of 150 km and a

payload of 190 kg, while the SA-6 has a range of 160 km and

21 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 16.
22 Taylor, The Military Balance 1997 / 98, 126.
23carus, "Iran as a Military Threat," 2.
24 Ibid.
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a payload of eighty kg.

With such small warheads, both

missiles clearly are more suited to delivering NBC warheads
than conventional warheads.25

The fact that Iran has

stockpiled chemical artillery shells on Abu Musa suggests
that the SA-6 SAMs stationed there may be intended as NBC
platforms. 26
Iran was believed to be pursuing the North Korean
Nodong missile, which has a one thousand km range.

However,

the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and
North Korea specified that the Nodong not be sold to Iran.
North Korea thus far has observed at least this portion of
the agreement and has not sold the Nodong to Iran. 27
Of greater significance are four new missiles Iran is
believed to be developing indigenously.

With Russian

assistance, Iran reportedly has been developing missiles
with ranges of thirteen hundred km, two thousand km, fortyfive hundred km, and ten thousand km. Israeli intelligence
officials have stated that Russian SS-4 and SS-23 technology
has reached Iran, a claim supported by The Proliferation

2 5Hough, "Iranian Intentions: The Strait of Hormuz or
Beyond?" 454; Carus, "Iran as a Military Threat," 2.
26 Barbara Starr, "CW stockpile 'a threat to Straits of
Hormuz'," Jane's Defense Weekly, 1 April 1995, 3.
2 7Alan George, "US outlines Iranian threat," The Middle
E.as.t. (January 1997): 16.
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Primer.2 8

Recent articles in the Jerusalem Post and Defense

News describe the Shihab-3 missile as having a thirteen
hundred km range and a seven hundred kg payload.

The

Shihab-3 is believed to be an attempted copy of the Nodong.
The Shihab-4, based on the Russian SS-4, is believed to have
a range of two thousand km and a payload of over one
thousand kg. 29
The other two developmental missiles are believed to
have ranges of forty-five hundred km and ten thousand km.
The first is believed to be in early prototype development,
while the second is believed to be at least ten years from
completion.30

If Iran continues to receive Russian

assistance, it could field one or both of these missiles in
the next decade.
With a forty-five hundred km missile Iran would
threaten most of Western Europe, including Paris, Berlin,
Rome, Athens, and other NATO cities.

With a ten thousand km

missile Iran would threaten virtually the entire world, as
only northeastern Russia, Canada, and Alaska would be out of

28 Barbara Opall, "Israelis Say Russia Aids Iran's Quest
For Missiles," Defense News, 10-16 February 1997, 1.
29Rodan, "Iran's missiles able to hit Israel in 18
months," 1.
30Yossef Bodansky, "Iran's New Ballistic Missiles,"
Defense & Foreign Affairs' strategic Policy (May I June
1997): 6.
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range.

The ability to produce such missiles indigenously

would be of great importance to Iran, even if the actual
date of deployment is many years in the future.

Dependence

on outside sources places Iran's ability to acquire missiles
at the mercy of the provider.

As with North Korea, Iran

could find a prospective source unwilling to sell missiles
due to political pressure from the United States.

Whether

missile production is within Iran's technological capability
remains to be seen, but Steve Rodan's articles and the
statements by Israeli intelligence sources suggest that Iran
has made significant progress in this endeavor.
The leverage provided by ballistic missiles is
maximized if those missiles can be used to deliver NBC
warheads to various targets.

Both in terms of political

blackmail, in which the extreme vulnerability of large
populations to chemical and biological agents is a lasting
vulnerability, and in terms of military attacks on large
logistical and support facilities, which are indispensable
to U.S. warfighting capability, NBC weapons are a great
equalizer for smaller states such as Iran.

Not

surprisingly, Iran has a robust chemical weapons capability,
a strongly suspected biological weapons capability, and an
all but publicly acknowledged nuclear weapons program:
Iran has placed a high priority on possessing NBC
weapons and missiles since Tehran's defeat in the
Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Iran has an adequate
technological base to support chemical agent and
missile production activities and a biotechnical
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structure capable of supporting the production of
biological agents. Nevertheless, Iran is attempting
to expand its current technological base to achieve
self-sufficient production in all phases of NBC
weapons and delivery systems. In the nuclear weapons
arena, Iran is attempting to acquire an indigenous
capabilit¥ to produce weapons-grade fissile
material. 1

As mentioned earlier, the use of ballistic missiles to
deliver NBC weapons would allow Iran to conduct both
military and political blackmail operations.

While Iran's

NBC programs pre-date the 1991 Gulf War, one of the lessons
of that war is the overwhelming nature of American
conventional capability.

Iran therefore may have reached

the conclusion that NBC weapons are required to offset U.S.
conventional capability.32

NBC weapons also provide Iran

the means to blackmail neighboring states, by holding the
populations of those states hostage in order to gain
leverage over U.S. access to regional facilities.
Of Iran's NBC programs, its chemical weapons are
considered the most threatening at present, and much has
been written about the size and composition of Iran's
chemical inventory.

It is believed that Iran has produced

at least several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking
agents, and has weaponized at least some of those agents. 33

31 Proliferation; Threat and Response, 13.
3 2weaver and Glaes, Invitinq Disaster, 9.
33 Proliferation; Threat and Response, 15.
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A Washington Times article, citing a classified U.S.
intelligence report, gives a much larger estimate of Iran's
chemical stockpile:
U.S. intelligence officials say Iran has a stockpile
estimated to include up to 2,000 tons of blister,
choking, and nerve agents. The agents include sarin
nerve gas and mustard gas, deployed in aerial bombs,
artillery shells, mines, mortars and short-range
missile warheads (italics mine). 34
Iran also is believed to have received assistance from
China in establishing the infrastructure needed for the
production of chemical weapons, such as glass containers for
storage and transportation.35

Many chemicals with

pharmaceutical or agricultural application can be converted
to useful chemical weapons.

Iran's chemical program thus

could be larger than the official estimates mentioned
earlier.

Iran's efforts to acquire additional chemical

capability have extended to such unlikely sources as Israel
and the United States, where individual citizens have been
arrested and charged with selling chemical ingredients to
Iran. 3 6

34Bill Gertz, "China aided Iran chemical arms,"

Washington Times, 30 October 1997, 1.
35Bill Gertz, "U.S. conceded China still aiding Iran,"

Washington Times, 31 October 1997, 13.
3611 Israeli Held In Iran Traffic In Nerve Gas,"

New York
Times, 7 May 1997, AlO; "2 Accused of Plotting Iran Chemical
Deal," New York Times, 25 January 1997, 8.
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In contrast to Iran's chemical programs, little
concrete evidence exists concerning Iran's biological
programs.

Given the ease with which biological weapons can

be produced and stored, lack of knowledge concerning Iran's
biological weapons is not surprising.

Any nation with

biological expertise can easily produce biological weapons
in secret, as their production does not require large
facilities or staffs.37

While there is little evidence

concerning Iran's biological weapons, there is a consensus
among U.S. officials that such a program exists.
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1996
report, "Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control
Agreements," made the following statements concerning
biological weapons:
China, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Libya and Russia
either retain, or are trying to obtain, the
capability to produce biological weapons • • . All
have signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention . • • • Biological weapons represent a
threat that could rival nuclear warfare in number of
casualties. An anthrax-loaded SCUD missile, for
example, could kill 100,000 people in an urban area •
. . • Iran probably has produced BW agents and
apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those
agents. 38

37Dr. Kathleen Bailey, seminar comments, 23 October
1997, Southwest Missouri State University.
3 8 Jeff Erlich, "U.S. Experts Cite Weakness of
Biological War Treaty," Defense News, 25-31 August 1997, 6.
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In addition to its CW and BW programs, Iran is believed
to have an extensive program underway to develop nuclear
weapons.

In the event of Iran attaining nuclear capability,

the leverage gained by Tehran over Gulf neighbors would be
tremendous.39

Iranian nuclear capability also would make

any U.S. decision to intervene in a Gulf conflict more
difficult.
Iran's nuclear program is generally estimated to be
several years away from fruition, as little as one year or
as many as ten years depending on the source.40

Iran is

believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons both through its
nuclear power industry, and through attempts to purchase
components, fissile material, and finished weapons from
outside sources.

Since Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is able to utilize atomic
energy in nuclear power plants under the guidance of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Such plants

produce plutonium in the form of spent fuel rods, which can
then be processed into weapons-grade material.

With the

fragmentation of the Soviet Union, several newly-independent
39 Peters, The
order?, 106-107.

u.s.

Military; Ready for the New World

40 Leonard Spector, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1995), 119; David Silverberg, "Shadow Over the Gulf,"
Armed Forces Journal International (August 1995): 24;
George, "U.S. outlines Iranian threat," 16.
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states to the North of Iran have found themselves in
possession of fissile material.

The possibility clearly

exists for Iran to acquire such fissile material through
purchase or theft.
Whether or not Iran is able to acquire fissile material
from former Soviet states, continued assistance from Russia
and the IAEA likely will result in Iran's nuclear power
plants becoming operational in the near future, perhaps two
or three years.

Even if Iran is forced to depend on its

reactors for providing plutonium, the length of time before
Iran has weapons-grade fuel is likely to be no more than
five or six years.

Thus it is prudent to assume that, in

addition to its chemical and biological capability, Iran may
have nuclear weapons early in the next decade.
How might Iran attempt to utilize its capabilities in
support of its policies?

By utilizing the Strait of Hormuz

and a keep-out strategy, along with the threat posed by
ballistic missiles and NBC weapons, Iran could attempt to
achieve a fait accompli in the Gulf region, then prevent the
United States from responding.

There are a number of

different goals Iran could pursue in this way.
One example of such an Iranian action in the Gulf could
be an attack on the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Iran and

the UAE have serious and long-standing disagreements over
various islands in the Strait, as well as oil rights in the
415

Gulf and in the Strait.41

Either for reasons of domestic

political difficulties, or simply out of aggressiveness,
Iran could determine to resolve these disagreements through
force.

Iran's goal would be to quickly attack and overcome

the UAE, and seize most or all UAE territory, especially the
coastal areas of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and the offshore oil and
gas fields.
There are other scenarios in which Iran might attempt
to seize the territory of neighboring states and then hold
onto its gains.

Alternatively, Iran could demand the

removal of all U.S. forces from the Gulf, which Iran
considers to be its rightful sphere of influence. 42
such scenarios have one thing in common, however.

All
For Iran

to have any chance of succeeding, the forces of the United
States would have to be kept from intervening.
In order to keep U.S. forces from intervening, Iran's
keep-out strategy would entail deploying mines to block the
Strait and declaring a naval exclusion zone.

Mines could be

deployed in such a way that tanker traffic was still able to
pass through safe corridors, or Iran could attempt to close
the Strait completely.

Next, Iran's Kilos would patrol

behind the minefields, where a defensive posture and their

41 Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997,
91-92.
42 see Hashim, crisis of the Iranian state, 43.
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low noise levels would make them very hard to detect.
Iran's SSM batteries ashore would strive to enforce the
exclusion zone, firing on any naval forces that attempted to
enter the Strait.

Since ships passing through the Strait

could be observed visually, monitoring the passage of nonmerchant ships would not be overly difficult.
In conjunction with its operations in the Strait, Iran
would attempt to blackmail neighboring countries by
announcing that, in the event of U.S. attacks on Iranian
forces or facilities, Iranian ballistic missiles would be
used to retaliate against the country of origin.

Iran might

combine this threat with the threat of closing the Strait
completely, rather than continuing to allow tanker traffic
to pass through.

Politically, Iran would strive to portray

events as concerning only Iran and its victim, stating that
only in the event of U.S. interference would Iran take
actions that would impact on all Gulf nations.
Even moderately skillful manipulation of the media
could convey to U.S. viewers a lack of a vital U.S. interest
worth fighting over.43

The very close vote in the U.S.

Congress for supporting the Gulf War, and the advice of many
senior military, ex-military, and civilian policy-makers to
wait for sanctions to work on Iraq rather than using
43The lengthy debates in Congress and "no blood for
oil" slogans of 1990 are indicators of the viability of this
strategy concerning U.S. public opinion.
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military force, all suggest that Iran could plausibly
construct a political atmosphere in which the United States
would decide against opposing Iran. 44

As noted by Colin

Gray, "Public mood, and not closely reasoned strategic
argument, always sets the level of the U.S. defense effort,"
an observation that applies to the prosecution of specific
crises as much as to support for defense spending and global
military capabilities.45
By holding out to the other Gulf nations, as well as to
oil importers in Europe and Asia, the prospect of averting a
very costly interruption of oil by accepting Iran's actions,
it is possible that sufficient political pressure could be
brought to bear on the United States to accept the
situation.

Germany and France, for example, have

established semi-formal diplomatic ties with Iran in recent
years, which could lead to their advocating acceptance of
Iran's actions.46

Even without political pressure from

4 4Admiral William Crowe, a former Chairman of the JCS,
advocated waiting for up to a year for sanctions to work on
Saddam. In the U.S. Senate vote for supporting the use of
force, the resolution was passed by a mere 52 to 47 vote.
See Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 156, 205.
4 5Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/ Still Cloudy,"
43.

46 Roxanne Farmanfarmaian, "United, the West Can Handle
Iran," New York Times, 19 April 1997, 12A; Jacob Heilbrunn,
"Bon Mots: Iran and Germany Make Nice," The New Republic, 19
May 1997, 17; "The French and Russians Certainly Don't Get
It," Perspective, 2 October 1997, 1-4.
418

Europe or East Asia, if the Gulf states, and especially
Saudi Arabia, refused to allow U.S. strikes to be launched
from their facilities, or to allow U.S. reinforcements to
stage through their airfields, the United States might
determine that the "least bad option" would be to accept
Iran's actions.
If the United States faced the prospect of a military
campaign in Southwest Asia, without the massive logistical
support provided in 1990 by the Gulf states, and with the
political pressure resulting from the threat of complete
closure of the Strait, would the United States choose to
resist Iran?

The question would become even more difficult

to assess if Iran was known to possess nuclear weapons.
If the United States were to attempt to intervene,
Iran's blockade of the Strait would delay greatly the
reinforcement of U.S. forces in the region.

Even more

damaging would be Iran's ability to target regional port and
airfield facilities with chemical weapons, delivered by
ballistic missiles.

Inviting Disaster describes the likely

effect of persistent chemical contamination on ports and
airfields, and judges that such attacks could close down air
and maritime operations in and from those facilities.4 7

47 see Weaver and Glaes, Inviting Disaster, Section 2,
pp. 18-33, and Section 3, pp. 34-51, for a depiction of
hypothetical attacks on Saudi ports and airfields using VX
nerve agent, delivered by SCUD missiles.
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General Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief of U.S. Central
Command (CinCCENTCOM), recently testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that, "theater missile defense and
defense against chemical weapons and biological weapons is
our top priority. 11 48
Iran's strategy would hinge first on deterring the
United States from attempting to intervene, by making the
cost of intervention appear larger than the benefits of
intervention.

Iran's ability to influence the U.S. cost vs.

benefit equation would differ according to the specific
scenario, of course, but deterrence of U.S. intervention
nonetheless would be Iran's first step.

Possession of

nuclear weapons would greatly enhance Iran's deterrent

4 8Responding to Senator Tim Hutchinson's question about
the possibility of chemical attacks on Gulf ports, General
Zinni responded:
"Senator, you've hit on our biggest concern in our
region. There's obviously a proliferation of missile
systems, the technology is advancing, the accuracy and range
are increasing, the potential not only for Iraq, but for
Iran and others in the region . . . that have that. For
CENTCOM, theater missile defense and defense against
chemical and biological weapons is our top priority. In
addition to that, we're not only concerned about our own
ability, which we need to improve greatly, but the ability
of our allies. The ports you mentioned, we rely on host
nation support to get a lot of things done in those ports •
• • • They of course have less capability than we have, but
are critical to our power projection." Testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 January 1999, C-SPAN
broadcast.
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effect on U.S. intervention, certainly as long as U.S.
forces lack theater missiles defenses.49
If Iran's efforts to deter the United States failed,
Iran would attempt to execute its keep-out military
strategy, using blackmail and, if necessary, its available
NBC weapons to attack regional airfields.

Since many

important regional airfields, especially in Saudi Arabia,
are located in remote areas away from civilian population
centers, Iran could conduct these attacks in relative safety
from causing civilian casualties.

The apprehension in

regional populations to NBC attack likely would serve Iran
better than actual NBC attacks on population centers, which
could generate strong demands to retaliate regardless of
further Iranian attacks.SO

Again, as long as U.S. missile

defenses are limited to PAC-3 or Lower Tier, the blackmail
threat of ballistic missiles and NBC weapons would serve
Iran's strategy.

49Gray, "The Second Nuclear Age: Insecurity,
Proliferation, and the Control of Arms," 153.
50 Especially in the larger Middle East, many nations
are "one-target" populations, with a majority of their
citizens located in one or two major cities. A successful
chemical or biological attack thus could destroy such
nations as viable states. The apprehension to NBC weapons in
these nations, which include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar,
Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel, might lead them to deny U.S.
access in a conflict that they did not believe threatened
their vital interests. See Rathmell, "Chemical Weapons in
the Middle East: Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya," 60.
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Iran's keep-out strategy thus would depend on two
component parts.

First, the use of mines to block the

Strait would prevent the rapid transit of U.S. naval forces,
slowing or preventing the reinforcement of the 5th Fleet.
Iran's submarines and SSMs would serve to keep U.S. MCM
forces from operating freely, maximizing the time needed to
attempt to clear mine-free channels.

With MCM efforts

initially limited to submarine-deployed systems, it should
be expected that Iran's minefields would be effective for a
considerable length of time.
The ability to construct, fortify, and hide SSM
launching positions along the full length of the strait
would make the hazard to surface ships severe.

It is likely

that SSMs in such shore batteries could be fired without
radar information, since the Strait could be observed with
ordinary optical systems.

Thus Iranian SSM batteries would

not be identifiable through electronic emissions, making
their destruction more difficult for U.S. forces.

The use

of dummy positions also would complicate U.S. efforts, by
multiplying the number of strikes that would need to be
conducted.
The risk of losing one or more U.S. warships in the
Strait would be high if the United States attempted to
reinforce the Fifth Fleet immediately.

Certainly the risk

would be too high to permit a CVN to attempt to transit the
Strait.

The need to proceed slowly, and wait until MCM
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efforts had produced high-confidence safe channels through
the Strait, would result in political pressure from U.S.
allies that are dependent on Persian Gulf oil.
The second component of Iran's military strategy would
be to counter U.S. air power.

By employing ballistic

missiles and chemical weapons, Iran could strike regional
airfields, very likely contaminating them at lethal levels.
U.S. airbase commanders would have three unattractive
options in this case.

First, Air Force units could don

protective suits and attempt to decontaminate their
facilities and aircraft.

Second, they could relocate to

other facilities out of range of Iran's missiles.

Finally,

they could don protective suits and attempt to continue
operating from a contaminated facility.51
None of these options is likely to be satisfactory in
maintaining U.S. air power at operable condition.
Especially in temperatures above eighty-five degrees,
working in existing protective gear is sufficiently
exhausting to bring operations to a halt, while even at
lower temperatures it is expected that up to 40 percent
reduction in efficiency would be experienced. 52 The most
likely option thus would be relocation to facilities out of

51 weaver and Glaes, Inviting Disaster, 40-42.
52 Ibid., 42.
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range of ballistic missiles, effectively neutralizing U.S.
air power within the region.
By combining these two keep-out operations, one against
U.S. sea power and one against U.S. air power, with the
political impact of the loss of oil to world economies, Iran
could force the United States into choosing the lesser of
two evils and accepting Iran's demands.

While the United

States clearly should be willing to go to war over such an
assault on a vital national interest, it is not
inconceivable that the chosen path to resolving the conflict
would be accepting Iran's actions.
Iran's recent "charm offensive" towards the United
States and other nations, intended to lessen the degree of
international disfavor directed at Iran, can be better
understood in the context of this scenario.53

By

attempting to portray military aggression as a matter to be
settled between Gulf nations, and by emphasizing that Iran
5 3For a depiction of Iran's diplomatic efforts and the
changing view of many nations towards Iran, see: Heilbrunn,
"Bon Mots: Iran and Germany make nice,"; Ed Blanche,
Christopher Foss, and Barbara Starr, "Khatami emerges as
Iran's acceptable face," Jane's Defense Weekly, 15 October
1997, 19; Ed Blanche, "Signs of subtle US policy shift in
Iran," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's sentinel Pointer
(October 1997): 7; Ed Blanche, "Iran under Khatami: pariah
or potential peace partner?" Jane's Intelligence Review
(November 1997): 505; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's new charm
offensive begins," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's
Sentinel Pointer (November 1997): 6; Dunn, "Mideast
Turnaround,"; Caroline Faraj and Philip Finnegan, "Kuwait,
Iran to Hold Joint Naval Exercise," Defense News, 9-15
February 1998, 40.
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did not intend to curtail oil shipment to world economies,
Iran would hope for political support or pressure from
France, Russia, China, and even other GCC states.
Iran's overall strategy thus would combine a geographic
chokepoint, the resulting ability to use that chokepoint to
throttle a vital energy resource, and a regional keep-out
military strategy.

By attempting to raise the perceived

cost to the United States of resorting to military force,
Iran's leaders would hope to reach a political settlement
that would leave Iran in possession of its gains.

Iran's

keep-out strategy thus would represent a sound alignment of
military means to political ends, taking into account not
just Iran's military capabilities, but the military
capabilities and weaknesses, as well as the historical
political behavior, of the United States.
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